In Atienza v. Saluta, the Supreme Court clarified the rights of family drivers following the repeal of certain provisions of the Labor Code and the inapplicability of the Kasambahay Law. The Court ruled that because the respondent was a personal driver and not covered by either the Labor Code or the Kasambahay Law, his rights were governed by the Civil Code. This decision highlights the importance of accurately classifying employment relationships to determine the applicable legal protections.

Driven by Duty or Personal Favor? Unpacking the Status of a Family Driver

This case revolves around Noel Sacramento Saluta’s complaint for illegal dismissal against Celia R. Atienza and CRV Corporation. Saluta claimed he was a company driver for CRV Corporation, assigned to drive for Atienza, one of the company’s top officials. Atienza countered that Saluta was her personal/family driver. The central legal question is whether Saluta was a company employee entitled to Labor Code benefits or a personal driver governed by the Civil Code, particularly in light of legislative changes affecting domestic workers.

The legal framework for this case involves interpreting employment relationships and understanding the interplay between the Labor Code, the Kasambahay Law, and the Civil Code. The Labor Code, specifically Chapter III on Employment of Househelpers, initially covered family drivers. However, the Kasambahay Law expressly repealed this chapter, leading to a gap in coverage for family drivers. To understand the nuances, one must delve into the facts presented by both parties.

Saluta argued he was a regular employee of CRV Corporation, pointing to his work as necessary for the company’s business and his receipt of salary via ATM, like other employees. Atienza, on the other hand, maintained she hired Saluta as her personal driver, with his duties limited to driving her and her family. This discrepancy in claims necessitated the Court’s careful examination of the evidence to determine the true nature of the employment relationship.

The Supreme Court applied the **four-fold test** to ascertain the existence of an employer-employee relationship: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power of control. Applying this test, the Court found Saluta failed to provide substantial evidence proving he was an employee of CRV Corporation. He did not present an employment contract, company ID, payslips, or any document showing his inclusion in the company payroll. This lack of evidence was critical in the Court’s determination.

The Court emphasized the principle that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting a claim. In this case, Saluta, claiming to be an employee of CRV Corporation, had the burden to prove that employment relationship. He needed to demonstrate that CRV Corporation exercised control over his work, paid his wages, and had the power to dismiss him. His failure to present sufficient evidence led the Court to conclude he was not an employee of the company. Building on this, the Court then assessed whether Atienza had proven he was her personal driver.

The Court highlighted Saluta’s failure to substantiate his claim of illegal dismissal. Aside from his allegation of verbal termination, he presented no evidence he was prevented from returning to work. The Court noted, “Bare and unsubstantiated allegations do not constitute substantial evidence and have no probative value.” The absence of corroborating evidence, such as a statement from Reyes confirming the termination, weakened Saluta’s case. This aligns with the principle that each party must prove their affirmative allegations with clear, positive, and convincing evidence.

Despite finding no illegal dismissal, the Court also determined Saluta did not abandon his work. Abandonment requires both a failure to report for work without a valid reason and a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. The Court found the second element lacking, especially considering Saluta’s filing of an illegal dismissal case, which demonstrated his desire to return to work. The Court referenced Protective Maximum Security Agency, Inc. v. Fuentes, which states:

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the [employee] has no more intention to work.

With the repeal of the Labor Code provisions on househelpers and the non-applicability of the Kasambahay Law, the Court turned to the Civil Code to govern the rights of family drivers. Article 1689 states that household service must be reasonably compensated, while Article 1697 addresses unjust dismissal. The Court reasoned that the express repeal of Articles 141 to 152 of the Labor Code meant these provisions were no longer binding. This led to the application of the Civil Code provisions as the governing law for this type of employment relationship. Thus, according to the Court,

Since what were expressly repealed by the Kasambahay Law were only Articles 141 to 152, Chapter III of the Labor Code on Employment of Househelpers; and the Labor Code did not repeal the Civil Code provisions concerning household service which impliedly includes family drivers as they minister to the needs of a household, the said Civil Code provisions stand. To rule otherwise would leave family drivers without even a modicum of protection. Certainly, that could not have been the intent of the lawmakers.

The Court then addressed Saluta’s claims for wage differentials, holiday pay, 13th-month pay, and service incentive leave pay. It found he was not entitled to these benefits. Citing Articles 82, 94, and 95 of the Labor Code, and Section 3(d) of the implementing rules of Presidential Decree No. 851, the Court reiterated that persons in the personal service of another, such as family drivers, are exempt from these benefits. This reinforces the distinction between employees covered by the Labor Code and those in personal service governed by the Civil Code.

Finally, the Court clarified the impact of its decision on CRV Corporation, which did not appeal the CA Decision. It emphasized that a reversal of a judgment on appeal binds only the parties to the suit and does not benefit non-appealing parties unless their rights and liabilities are inseparable. The Court determined the interests of CRV Corporation and Atienza were not so interwoven as to warrant extending the benefit of the reversal to the corporation. Because CRV Corporation did not appeal, the appellate court decision stood as to the corporation.

FAQs

In conclusion, Atienza v. Saluta underscores the importance of properly classifying employment relationships. The Supreme Court’s decision highlights that in the absence of specific Labor Code or Kasambahay Law coverage, the Civil Code governs the rights and obligations of family drivers. This ruling clarifies the legal landscape and impacts how these employment relationships are viewed and regulated.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Atienza v. Saluta, G.R. No. 233413, June 17, 2019