ASG Law

Tag: Import Duties

  • Customs Law: Abandonment of Goods Requires Due Notice Despite Importer’s Delay

    In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Customs, the Supreme Court ruled that even if an importer delays filing the necessary import entries, the government must still provide due notice before the imported goods can be considered abandoned. This decision emphasizes the importance of due process in customs procedures, ensuring that importers are not unfairly penalized for delays without proper notification. The absence of such notice prevents the government from claiming ownership of the goods based on abandonment, protecting the importer’s rights and interests.

    Oil Import Delays: Did Pilipinas Shell Commit Fraud or Was Due Process Denied?

    The case arose from a dispute between Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) and the Commissioner of Customs concerning a shipment of oil. Pilipinas Shell imported the oil in 1996 but allegedly delayed filing the Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration (IEIRD). The Commissioner of Customs argued that this delay constituted abandonment of the goods, allowing the government to claim ownership. Pilipinas Shell, on the other hand, contended that the government’s claim was barred by the one-year prescriptive period for assessing duties under Section 1603 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCC).

    The central legal question was whether Pilipinas Shell’s delay in filing the IEIRD constituted fraud and whether the government provided due notice before declaring the goods abandoned. The Commissioner of Customs pointed to an alleged deliberate delay by Pilipinas Shell to take advantage of reduced tariff rates, suggesting fraudulent intent. The Supreme Court, however, found that there was no evidence of fraud presented during the trial. The key document cited by the Commissioner was never formally offered as evidence, rendering it without evidentiary value. This lack of evidence became a critical point in the Court’s decision.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that the absence of fraud is pivotal in determining the applicability of both the prescriptive period under Section 1603 of the TCC and the requirements for ipso facto abandonment. Section 1603 states:

    Section 1603. Finality of Liquidation. When articles have been entered and passed free of duty or final adjustments of duties made, with subsequent delivery, such entry and passage free of duty or settlements of duties will, after the expiration of one (1) year, from the date of the final payment of duties, in the absence of fraud or protest or compliance audit pursuant to the provisions of this Code, be final and conclusive upon all parties, unless the liquidation of the import entry was merely tentative. (emphasis added)

    The Court noted that without fraud, the government’s claim was subject to the one-year prescriptive period. Pilipinas Shell filed its IEIRD and paid the import duty on May 23, 1996, but the demand letter from the Commissioner of Customs was only received on July 27, 2000, more than four years later. Thus, the government was barred from collecting any deficiency in import duties.

    Furthermore, the Court addressed the issue of ipso facto abandonment, which the Commissioner of Customs invoked as an alternative basis for claiming the goods. Section 1801(b) of the TCC provides the conditions for abandonment:

    Section 1801. Abandonment, Kinds and Effect of – An imported article is deemed abandoned under any of the following circumstances:

    x x x x

    b. When the owner, importer, consignee or interested party after due notice, fails to file an entry within thirty (30) days, which shall not be extendible, from the date of discharge of the last package from the vessel or aircraft, or having filed such entry, fails to claim his importation within fifteen (15) days, which shall not likewise be extendible, from the date of posting of the notice to claim such importation. (emphasis supplied)

    The Supreme Court clarified that due notice is a prerequisite for ipso facto abandonment. In this case, the notice was served four years after Pilipinas Shell filed its IEIRD, rendering it ineffective. The Court emphasized that compliance with the due notice requirement is essential to protect the importer’s rights, especially when no fraud is established.

    The Commissioner of Customs relied on the case of Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, arguing that due notice was not necessary in cases of abandonment. However, the Supreme Court distinguished the Chevron case, pointing out that fraud was a key element in that decision. In Chevron, the Court found evidence of fraudulent collusion between the importer and customs officials, justifying the lack of notice. The Court quoted:

    Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, due notice was not necessary. The shipments arrived in 1996.The IEDs and IEIRDs were also filed in 1996. However, respondent discovered the fraud which attended the importations and their subsequent release from the DOC’s custody only in 1999. Obviously, the situation here was not an ordinary case of abandonment wherein the importer merely decided not to claim its importations. Fraud was established against petitioner; it colluded with the former District Collector. Because of this, the scheme was concealed from respondent. The government was unable to protect itself until the plot was uncovered. Consequently, it was impossible for respondent to comply with the requirements under the rules.

    By the time respondent learned of the anomaly, the entries had already been belatedly filed and the oil importations released and presumably used or sold. It was a fait accompli. Under such circumstances, it would have been against all logic to require respondent to still post an urgent notice to file entry before declaring the shipments abandoned. (emphasis added)

    The Supreme Court reiterated that without evidence of fraud, the due notice requirement under CMO 15-94, which implements Section 1801(b) of the TCC, must be strictly followed. This memorandum outlines the specific steps for providing due notice to importers, including posting a notice to file entry at the Bulletin Board seven days before the lapse of the 30-day period.

    The dissenting opinion argued that the government was not seeking to collect customs duties but to recover the value of abandoned oil, making the prescriptive period irrelevant. The dissent also asserted that Pilipinas Shell did commit fraud by deliberately delaying the filing of its IEIRD to avail of lower tariff rates. However, the majority of the Court maintained that the absence of formally presented evidence of fraud and the failure to provide timely due notice were decisive.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Commissioner of Customs could claim ownership of Pilipinas Shell’s oil shipment based on abandonment, despite the lack of due notice and the expiration of the one-year prescriptive period. The court needed to determine if the delay constituted fraud, which would remove the case from the statute of limitations.
    What is the significance of Section 1603 of the Tariff and Customs Code? Section 1603 sets a one-year prescriptive period for the finality of liquidation of duties, meaning that after one year from the final payment of duties, the government can no longer adjust or reassess those duties, unless fraud is proven. This provision aims to provide certainty and limit the government’s taxing powers.
    What does ‘ipso facto abandonment’ mean in this context? Ipso facto abandonment refers to the automatic abandonment of imported articles when the importer fails to file the necessary entry within a specified period, typically 30 days, from the discharge of the goods. However, this abandonment is contingent on the government providing due notice to the importer.
    Why was due notice important in this case? Due notice is a statutory requirement under Section 1801(b) of the TCC and ensures that importers are informed of their obligation to file an entry and claim their goods. Without due notice, the government cannot claim that the goods were abandoned, protecting the importer’s rights.
    How did the ‘Chevron’ case differ from this case? The Chevron case involved proven fraud, where the importer colluded with customs officials to evade duties. In that case, the court ruled that due notice was unnecessary because the fraud concealed the scheme, making it impossible for the government to comply with notice requirements.
    What evidence did the Commissioner of Customs present to prove fraud? The Commissioner of Customs relied on a memorandum from the Customs Intelligence & Investigation Service, alleging a conspiracy to commit fraud. However, this document was not formally offered as evidence during the trial, rendering it without evidentiary value.
    What is CMO 15-94, and how does it relate to this case? CMO 15-94 is Customs Memorandum Order No. 15-94, which provides the Revised Guidelines on Abandonment. It implements Section 1801(b) of the TCC and specifies the procedures for providing due notice to importers, including posting a notice to file entry at the Bulletin Board.
    What was the final ruling of the Supreme Court? The Supreme Court denied the Commissioner of Customs’ motion for reconsideration, affirming that the government’s claim was barred by the prescriptive period and the failure to provide due notice. The Court emphasized that without evidence of fraud, the government could not claim the oil shipment as abandoned.

    The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of due process and the need for concrete evidence when the government seeks to enforce customs regulations. By requiring strict adherence to the due notice requirement and emphasizing the need for proof of fraud, the Court safeguards the rights of importers and ensures fair application of customs laws.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, G.R. No. 195876, June 19, 2017

  • Customs Jurisdiction Prevails: When Courts Can’t Interfere with Seizure Cases

    The Supreme Court ruled that Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) cannot interfere with the Bureau of Customs’ (BOC) exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases. This means that once imported goods are under the BOC’s control, even if a seizure warrant isn’t initially present, the BOC has the sole authority to enforce customs laws. The decision reinforces the BOC’s power to prevent smuggling and efficiently collect import duties, ensuring the government’s ability to fund essential services. This case clarifies the boundaries between judicial and customs authority, protecting the state’s revenue collection process.

    Rice Misshipment or Smuggling Attempt? How Customs Authority Overrides Court Injunctions

    This case revolves around a shipment declared as “agricultural product” that arrived at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone and was later discovered to contain rice. WIRA International Trading Corporation (WIRA) initially paid duties based on the declared value. However, after the Bureau of Customs (BOC) found the shipment to be rice, a dispute arose regarding proper duties and the release of the goods. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) refused to release the shipment despite additional payments made by WIRA, leading to a legal battle over jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the BOC.

    The central legal question is whether the RTC had jurisdiction to issue an injunction against SBMA, ordering the release of the rice shipment, or whether the BOC had exclusive original jurisdiction over the matter. The petitioner, SBMA, argued that the RTC lacked jurisdiction because the BOC, through its Hold Order and subsequent Warrant of Seizure and Detention, had already taken control of the imported goods. This, they claimed, placed the case squarely within the BOC’s exclusive purview as defined by the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. The respondents, Rodriguez and WIRA, sought to enforce the RTC’s injunction to compel the release of their shipment.

    The Supreme Court sided with the SBMA, emphasizing the **exclusive original jurisdiction** of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) over seizure and forfeiture cases. This jurisdiction is rooted in Section 602 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, which explicitly grants the BOC the power to exercise original jurisdiction over such cases. The Court underscored the importance of preventing judicial interference in customs proceedings to ensure the effective collection of import duties and the prevention of smuggling.

    Specifically, Section 602 states:

    Sec. 602. Functions of the Bureau.- The general duties, powers and jurisdiction of the bureau shall include:
    x x x
    g. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases under the tariff and customs laws.

    The Court noted that from the moment imported goods are under the control of customs authorities, the BOC’s exclusive jurisdiction is triggered. This holds true even if no warrant for seizure or detention has been initially issued. This principle is designed to avoid unnecessary obstacles to the government’s efforts to prevent smuggling and collect duties, which are essential for the government’s functioning. The Supreme Court referenced its earlier ruling in Commissioner of Customs v. Makasiar, stating that the rationale behind precluding RTCs from reviewing customs proceedings is to prevent hindrances in the government’s drive to prevent smuggling and ensure efficient collection of import duties.

    In this case, the BOC Subic Port issued a Hold Order on October 25, 2001, effectively placing the rice shipment under its control. Although a subsequent directive from the BOC Commissioner suggested the release of the shipment upon payment of upgraded duties, the later issuance of a Warrant of Seizure and Detention on May 22, 2002, solidified the BOC’s jurisdiction. This warrant, based on a recommendation from the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS), superseded any previous directives and reaffirmed the BOC’s authority over the shipment.

    The appellate court had questioned the timing of the warrant’s disclosure, noting that it was not initially mentioned in SBMA’s Answer to the Complaint for Injunction and Damages. However, the Supreme Court dismissed this concern, stating that the omission did not negate the warrant’s validity or existence. The critical point was that the warrant was indeed issued, thereby establishing the BOC’s jurisdiction over the seized goods.

    A significant aspect of this case involves the indirect contempt charges filed against SBMA officers for defying the RTC’s Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The Supreme Court addressed this issue by emphasizing the importance of good faith. The Court pointed out that when the TRO was served on June 13, 2002, the BOC’s Warrant of Seizure and Detention was already in effect. This led the SBMA officers to believe that the BOC held exclusive jurisdiction and that the RTC’s order was therefore invalid. The Court stated that:

    Contempt constitutes disobedience to the court by setting up an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice.

    Given these circumstances, the Court concluded that the SBMA officers acted in good faith and should not be penalized for indirect contempt. Their refusal to comply with the TRO was based on a reasonable belief in the BOC’s overriding authority, not on a contumacious disregard for the RTC’s orders. This highlights the importance of considering the context and intent behind actions that may appear to be disobedient to court orders.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and invalidated the RTC’s orders. This decision reinforces the principle that the BOC’s exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases must be respected. The case serves as a reminder that the courts must defer to the BOC’s authority in such matters, allowing the agency to effectively carry out its mandate of preventing smuggling and collecting import duties. By prioritizing the BOC’s mandate, the Court bolstered the government’s capacity to secure revenue and uphold the integrity of its customs operations.

    The RTC’s attempt to suspend proceedings and direct the BOC to resolve the seizure case within a specified timeframe was also deemed improper. As the Supreme Court explained, the existence of the BOC seizure proceedings should have prompted the RTC to dismiss the case altogether. The RTC’s order directing the BOC to act was a clear overreach of its authority and a violation of the BOC’s exclusive jurisdiction. The court must defer to the BOC’s jurisdiction in such cases.

    In essence, this case provides a clear demarcation of authority. The Supreme Court has affirmed that when it comes to the seizure and forfeiture of imported goods, the Bureau of Customs holds the exclusive power. This ensures that customs laws are enforced consistently and efficiently, without interference from other branches of government. The ruling safeguards the government’s ability to collect revenue and combat smuggling, which are vital to the country’s economic stability.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The primary issue was whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over a case involving the seizure of imported goods, or if the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had exclusive jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the BOC’s exclusive jurisdiction.
    What is the significance of Section 602 of the Tariff and Customs Code? Section 602 grants the BOC exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases under tariff and customs laws. This provision was central to the Supreme Court’s decision.
    When does the BOC acquire exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods? The BOC acquires exclusive jurisdiction from the moment imported goods are in the actual physical possession or control of customs authorities. This is regardless of whether a seizure warrant has been issued.
    What was the basis for the indirect contempt charges in this case? The indirect contempt charges were filed against SBMA officers for allegedly defying a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by the RTC. The TRO ordered the release of the rice shipment.
    Why were the SBMA officers not found guilty of indirect contempt? The Supreme Court found that the SBMA officers acted in good faith, believing that the BOC had exclusive jurisdiction due to an existing Warrant of Seizure and Detention. Their actions were not deemed contumacious.
    What was the RTC’s role in the case, and why was it deemed improper? The RTC initially issued a TRO and later ordered the BOC to resolve the seizure case within a specific timeframe. The Supreme Court deemed this improper, as it infringed upon the BOC’s exclusive jurisdiction.
    What is the main takeaway from this Supreme Court decision? The main takeaway is that courts must respect the BOC’s exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases. This decision safeguards the government’s ability to collect revenue and combat smuggling.
    What was the effect of the Warrant of Seizure and Detention on the case? The Warrant of Seizure and Detention, issued by the BOC, solidified the BOC’s jurisdiction over the rice shipment. It superseded any previous directives and prevented the RTC from interfering with the seizure proceedings.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case underscores the critical role of the Bureau of Customs in enforcing tariff and customs laws without undue interference from the judiciary. By upholding the BOC’s exclusive jurisdiction, the Court has reinforced the government’s ability to protect its economic interests and combat illegal trade practices.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. MERLINO E. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. 160270, April 23, 2010

  • Safeguard Measures and Tariff Imposition: DTI Secretary Bound by Tariff Commission’s Findings

    In Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp., the Supreme Court clarified that the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Secretary cannot impose safeguard measures on imported products without a positive final determination from the Tariff Commission. This ruling reinforces the Tariff Commission’s role in determining whether increased imports cause serious injury to domestic industries, ensuring that safeguard measures are only applied when justified by factual findings. The decision underscores the limits of executive power in imposing tariffs and safeguard duties, protecting importers from arbitrary trade restrictions.

    Cementing Authority: Can the DTI Override the Tariff Commission on Import Safeguards?

    The Southern Cross Cement Corporation, a domestic cement manufacturer, challenged the imposition of safeguard measures on imported gray Portland cement. These measures, sought by the Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor), aimed to protect local cement producers from increased import competition. The core legal question was whether the DTI Secretary could impose definitive safeguard duties despite a negative finding by the Tariff Commission, which had determined that the local cement industry was not suffering serious injury from the imports.

    The Tariff Commission, after formal investigation, concluded that while there was an increase in cement imports, the domestic industry had not suffered serious injury or faced imminent threat. The DTI Secretary initially denied Philcemcor’s application for safeguard measures, citing a Department of Justice opinion that he was bound by the Tariff Commission’s negative finding. However, the Court of Appeals later ruled that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the Tariff Commission’s findings and remanded the case for a final decision. Subsequently, the DTI Secretary imposed a definitive safeguard duty, leading Southern Cross to challenge the decision before the Supreme Court.

    The Supreme Court addressed two critical issues: the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals versus the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in reviewing the DTI Secretary’s decision, and the binding effect of the Tariff Commission’s factual determination on the DTI Secretary. The Court firmly established that the CTA has exclusive jurisdiction over rulings of the DTI Secretary concerning safeguard measures, regardless of whether the ruling imposes or denies such measures. This determination aimed to avoid split jurisdiction and ensure that a specialized court handles complex trade and tariff matters.

    “Any interested party who is adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure may file with the CTA, a petition for review of such ruling within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof,” the SMA states. This provision, according to the Court, encompasses all rulings related to the application for safeguard measures, including those that deny the imposition of such measures.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court emphasized the binding nature of the Tariff Commission’s positive or negative final determination. It clarified that while the DTI Secretary has the authority to choose the appropriate safeguard measure, this power is contingent upon the Tariff Commission’s positive determination that increased imports are causing serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry. The Court underscored that Section 5 of the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA) is the most fundamental restriction on the DTI Secretary’s power, as follows:

    Sec. 5. Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard Measures. – The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff] Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agricultural products, the Secretary shall first establish that the application of such safeguard measures will be in the public interest.

    The ruling highlighted that this delegation of legislative power is authorized by the Constitution, which also grants Congress the right to impose restrictions and limitations on the taxation power delegated to the President. Therefore, the DTI Secretary’s authority to impose definitive general safeguard measures is derived from the SMA and is subject to the limitations imposed therein.

    The Court dismissed the Court of Appeals’ reliance on legislative records and congressional debates, asserting that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its literal meaning. The Court also clarified the distinct functions of the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary. The Tariff Commission’s role is to make a factual determination based on evidence and investigation, while the DTI Secretary’s role is to decide on the appropriate safeguard measure based on the Tariff Commission’s findings and the public interest.

    In essence, the Court affirmed that the DTI Secretary cannot impose safeguard measures without a positive final determination from the Tariff Commission. This interpretation aligns with the Philippines’ obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which requires a member country to determine that a product is being imported in increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry before applying a safeguard measure.

    The Supreme Court declared the Court of Appeals’ decision null and void and set aside the DTI Secretary’s decision imposing the general safeguard measure. The Court emphasized that the DTI Secretary’s decision was a product of the void Court of Appeals’ decision and, therefore, had no legal effect. The ruling underscores the importance of adhering to statutory requirements and procedural limitations in imposing trade restrictions, protecting importers from arbitrary actions by government agencies.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the DTI Secretary could impose safeguard duties on imported cement despite a negative finding by the Tariff Commission. The Supreme Court clarified the separation of powers between the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary.
    What is a safeguard measure? A safeguard measure is an emergency action, such as tariffs or quotas, taken by a country to protect its domestic industries from injury caused by increased imports. It is designed to provide temporary relief to allow industries to adjust to import competition.
    What role does the Tariff Commission play in imposing safeguard measures? The Tariff Commission plays a critical investigatory role. The Tariff Commission determines whether increased imports are causing serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry and makes a final determination, which is binding on the DTI Secretary.
    Is the DTI Secretary bound by the Tariff Commission’s findings? Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the DTI Secretary is bound by the Tariff Commission’s positive or negative final determination. The DTI Secretary cannot impose safeguard measures without a positive final determination from the Tariff Commission.
    Which court has jurisdiction over appeals regarding safeguard measures? The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals regarding safeguard measures. This applies whether the DTI Secretary’s ruling imposes or denies such measures, as per the Supreme Court’s ruling.
    What does the phrase “in connection with” mean in the context of the Safeguard Measures Act? The phrase “in connection with” pertains to all rulings of the DTI Secretary or Agriculture Secretary that arise from the time an application or motu proprio initiation for the imposition of a safeguard measure is taken. The phrase is broadly expansive.
    What is the significance of Section 5 of the Safeguard Measures Act? Section 5 of the SMA outlines the conditions for applying general safeguard measures. It states that the Secretary shall apply a safeguard measure upon a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission.
    What measures may the DTI Secretary impose under the SMA? The safeguard measures which the DTI Secretary may impose under the SMA may take the following variations, to wit: (a) an increase in, or imposition of any duty on the imported product; (b) a decrease in or the imposition of a tariff-rate quota on the product; (c) a modification or imposition of any quantitative restriction on the importation of the product into the Philippines; (d) one or more appropriate adjustment measures, including the provision of trade adjustment assistance; and (e) any combination of the above-described actions

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp. provides clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary in imposing safeguard measures. By affirming the binding nature of the Tariff Commission’s factual determinations and emphasizing the importance of procedural compliance, the ruling promotes fairness and predictability in trade regulation. The case serves as a crucial precedent for future disputes involving safeguard measures and underscores the limits of executive authority in imposing trade restrictions.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION VS. THE PHILIPPINE CEMENT MANUFACTURERS CORP., G.R. No. 158540, July 08, 2004