Tag: Indigenous Cultural Communities

Ancestral Land Rights: Confirming Titles of Indigenous Communities Under the Public Land Act

This Supreme Court decision clarifies the rights of indigenous cultural communities to claim land titles under Section 48(c) of the Public Land Act. The court affirmed that members of these communities can apply for land titles even on lands not initially considered disposable, provided they demonstrate continuous possession in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years. This ruling underscores the state’s commitment to protecting ancestral land rights and recognizing the unique historical and cultural relationship indigenous peoples have with their land.

Mount Data Dispute: Can Ancestral Domain Trump State Land Classifications?

The case revolves around a parcel of land within Mount Data National Park, initially awarded to Sadca Acay, a member of the Kankana-ey Tribe, under a free patent. The Republic of the Philippines sought to cancel the patent, arguing the land was inalienable due to its location within the park. The case reached the Supreme Court after the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of Acay’s title, recognizing his right as a member of an indigenous cultural community to claim land under the Public Land Act.

The Republic’s primary argument centered on the claim that Acay committed fraud by misrepresenting his continuous occupation and cultivation of the land. However, the Court of Appeals pointed to Republic Act No. 3872, which amended the Public Land Act, specifically Section 48(c). This amendment allowed members of national cultural minorities to apply for confirmation of imperfect title over lands of the public domain, whether disposable or not, if the land is suitable for agriculture and the applicant demonstrates possession and occupation for at least 30 years. The court emphasized that Acay, having been granted a free patent, was presumed to have met all legal requirements, and the DENR was presumed to have regularly performed its duties.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, emphasizing the importance of the presumption of regularity in government actions. The Court found that the Republic failed to present clear and convincing evidence of fraud on Acay’s part. Moreover, the Court highlighted the significance of Section 48(c) of the Public Land Act in recognizing ancestral land rights. This section provides a specific avenue for members of indigenous cultural communities to secure land titles, acknowledging their unique relationship with the land.

The Supreme Court delved into the historical context of ancestral land rights, citing the landmark case of Cariño v. Insular Government. This case established the principle that land held under a claim of private ownership since time immemorial is presumed to have never been public land. While recognizing the communal view of land ownership within indigenous cultures, the Court also acknowledged the option for individual members to secure land titles under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA).

The IPRA, enacted in 1997, further solidified the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral domains. The law defines native title as “pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by [indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples], have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest.” Section 12 of the IPRA grants individual members of cultural communities the option to secure land titles if they or their predecessors-in-interest have owned and possessed ancestral lands in their individual capacity for at least 30 years.

This case serves as a reminder of the State’s commitment to protecting the rights of indigenous cultural communities. It also highlighted that forest land is considered part of the public domain and cannot be the subject of registration under the Torrens System, as it is beyond the power and jurisdiction of a cadastral court. However, a recognized exception to the rule on inalienability of public land is if the forest or mineral land has been statutorily reclassified and considered as ancestral land, openly and continuously occupied by a member of an indigenous cultural community.

Furthermore, the decision underscores that these rights are not absolute and require demonstration of continuous possession and compliance with legal requirements. However, the court’s decision clearly affirms that such communities enjoy constitutionally-protected rights to their ancestral lands.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether the free patent granted to Sadca Acay, a member of the Kankana-ey Tribe, for land within Mount Data National Park was valid, given the Republic’s claim that the land was inalienable. The court examined whether Acay’s rights as a member of an indigenous cultural community superseded the land’s classification as part of a national park.
What is Section 48(c) of the Public Land Act?	Section 48(c) is a provision that allows members of national cultural minorities to apply for confirmation of imperfect title over lands of the public domain, whether disposable or not, provided the land is suitable for agriculture and they have possessed and occupied it under a claim of ownership for at least 30 years. This provision creates an exception to the general rule that public lands must be disposable before they can be titled.
*What is the significance of the Cariño v. Insular Government* case?**	Cariño v. Insular Government is a landmark case that recognized the concept of native title, holding that land held under a claim of private ownership since time immemorial is presumed to have never been public land. It established that indigenous communities have rights to their ancestral lands based on long-standing occupation and possession, even before the Spanish conquest.
What is the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA)?	The IPRA is a law enacted in 1997 that recognizes and protects the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral domains. It defines native title as pre-conquest rights to lands and domains that have been held under a claim of private ownership by indigenous communities since time immemorial. The IPRA also provides mechanisms for securing land titles and protecting cultural heritage.
What did the Republic argue in this case?	The Republic argued that the land awarded to Acay was inalienable because it was located within Mount Data National Park. It also claimed that Acay committed fraud by misrepresenting his continuous occupation and cultivation of the land in his free patent application.
What evidence did the respondents present?	The respondents presented tax declarations in Acay’s name dating back to 1955 and 1968, as well as testimony from a witness who stated that he worked alongside Acay in cultivating the land. This evidence was used to support their claim that Acay had continuously occupied and cultivated the land for the required period.
What is the presumption of regularity?	The presumption of regularity is a legal principle that assumes government officials and agencies perform their duties properly and in accordance with the law. In this case, the Court presumed that the DENR and the Director of Lands properly investigated and verified Acay’s application before granting him a free patent.
What is extrinsic fraud?	Extrinsic fraud is fraud that prevents a party from having a fair opportunity to present their case in court. It is a specific type of fraud that can be used as a ground to review or reopen a decree of registration.

This ruling reinforces the importance of upholding the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands. The decision serves as a guide for future cases involving land claims by indigenous peoples, highlighting the need for a balanced approach that respects both the rights of indigenous communities and the state’s interest in managing public lands.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROSITA SADCA, ET AL., G.R. No. 218640, November 29, 2021

November 29, 2021

Indigenous Rights vs. Criminal Law: Courts’ Jurisdiction Over Criminal Offenses by Indigenous People

The Supreme Court has affirmed that the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) does not strip regular courts of their jurisdiction over criminal offenses, even when the accused is an indigenous person. Individuals from indigenous cultural communities charged with crimes cannot use the IPRA to evade prosecution and liability under the laws of the land. This means that despite tribal laws and customs, national laws prevail in criminal matters, ensuring consistent justice for all while respecting indigenous rights.

When Worlds Collide: Can Tribal Justice Override National Criminal Law?

This case revolves around Roderick D. Sumatra, also known as Ha Datu Tawahig, a tribal chieftain of the Higaonon Tribe, who was charged with rape. After charges were filed in court, the Dadantulan Tribal Court absolved Sumatra of the charges. Sumatra sought to dismiss the criminal case against him, arguing that, as an indigenous person, customary laws should take precedence, citing Sections 15 and 65 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA). He petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Cebu City prosecutors and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to recognize the resolution of the Dadantulan Tribal Court, which had cleared him of any liability. The central legal question is whether the IPRA grants indigenous tribunals the power to override the jurisdiction of regular courts in criminal matters.

Judge Singco denied Sumatra’s Motion to Quash, stating that the IPRA did not apply to the prosecution because it did not involve ancestral domain claims or the rights of indigenous communities. The Supreme Court noted that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts was not followed because an equally effective avenue for relief was available to the petitioner through recourse to the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the Court addressed the novel issue of whether the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act works to remove from courts of law jurisdiction over criminal cases involving indigenous peoples.

The Supreme Court began its analysis by explaining the nature of a writ of mandamus. According to Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus is appropriate when a tribunal unlawfully neglects to perform an act specifically enjoined by law or unlawfully excludes another from enjoying a right or office. To be successful, the petitioner must demonstrate a clear legal right and a corresponding ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Mandamus cannot be used to establish a right, but only to enforce one that is already established, a principle highlighted in Lihaylihay v. Tan. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legal right must be clearly established, and the duty must be ministerial rather than discretionary.

Petitioner anchored his plea on Section 65 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA), which provides for the primacy of customary laws and practices when disputes involve ICCs/IPs. Specifically, Section 65 of the IPRA states:

SECTION 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. — When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.

The Court clarified that the provisions under Chapter IX do not only lend legitimacy to and enable the continuing efficacy and viability of customary laws and practices to maintain order and dispense justice within indigenous cultural communities. It emphasized that this provision should be read in conjunction with the rest of the IPRA, particularly Section 15, which states:

SECTION 15. Justice System, Conflict Resolution Institutions, and Peace Building Processes. — The ICCs/IPs shall have the right to use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices within their respective communities and as may be compatible with the national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights.

Building on this, the Court noted that Section 15 limits the application of indigenous justice systems to the extent that they are compatible with the national legal system and internationally recognized human rights. Therefore, Section 65 should not be seen as an unqualified authorization for customary laws to override national laws, but rather as a component of self-governance within the framework of national unity and legal harmony.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the IPRA does not compel courts to relinquish jurisdiction over criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. A crime is an offense against society, a breach of the security and peace of the people at large. The prosecution and punishment of crimes are inherent attributes of the State’s police power, aimed at maintaining social order and deterring offenders. Permitting customary laws to supersede criminal prosecution would disregard the State’s role in upholding justice and protecting its citizens, thereby undermining the sovereignty of the State.

The Court underscored that the intent of the IPRA was not to facilitate a miscarriage of justice, but to balance the preservation of indigenous culture with the maintenance of national unity and legal harmony. It found no basis in the IPRA to support the claim that courts should abandon jurisdiction over criminal proceedings in favor of customary laws. The Dadantulan Tribal Court’s resolution did not grant the petitioner any right to be spared from criminal liability, and the Regional Trial Court was obligated to rule on the alleged liability based on established legal principles.

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) allows indigenous tribunals to override the jurisdiction of regular courts in criminal matters, specifically regarding a rape charge.
What did the Dadantulan Tribal Court decide?	The Dadantulan Tribal Court issued a resolution clearing Roderick Sumatra, a tribal chieftain, of liability for the rape charges and absolving him from criminal, civil, and administrative liability.
Why did the Regional Trial Court deny the Motion to Quash?	The RTC denied the Motion to Quash because the case did not involve ancestral domain claims or rights of indigenous communities, and therefore, the IPRA’s provisions on customary laws did not apply.
What does Section 65 of the IPRA state?	Section 65 of the IPRA states that when disputes involve Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs), customary laws and practices should be used to resolve the dispute.
How does Section 15 of the IPRA limit the application of customary laws?	Section 15 limits the application of customary laws by requiring them to be compatible with the national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights.
What was the Supreme Court’s ruling?	The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus, holding that the IPRA does not compel courts to relinquish jurisdiction over criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. The court directed the respondents to proceed with the resolution of the criminal case.
Why can’t customary laws override criminal prosecution?	Criminal offenses are considered offenses against the State and its citizens, and allowing customary laws to supersede criminal prosecution would undermine the State’s role in upholding justice and protecting its citizens.
What is the significance of the ruling for indigenous rights?	The ruling clarifies that while indigenous rights and customary laws are recognized, they must be balanced with national unity and the national legal system, ensuring that penal statutes are not undermined.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the principle that while indigenous rights are protected and customary laws respected, the national legal system takes precedence in criminal matters to ensure consistent justice and maintain social order. This ruling clarifies the scope and limitations of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act, affirming that it does not provide a blanket exemption from criminal liability for indigenous individuals.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Ha Datu Tawahig v. Cebu City, G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019

March 20, 2019

Navigating Tribal Law: NCIP Jurisdiction in Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Disputes

The Supreme Court’s decision in Loloy Unduran v. Ramon Aberasturi clarifies the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) in disputes involving Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The Court held that the NCIP’s jurisdiction is limited to cases where all parties belong to the same ICC/IP group. Disputes involving parties from different ICC/IP groups or non-IPs fall under the jurisdiction of regular courts. This ruling ensures that customary laws are applied appropriately and that all parties receive due process, while also recognizing the NCIP’s crucial role in protecting indigenous rights within specific communities.

Ancestral Land Feud: Who Decides When Tribes Clash With Outsiders?

In the case of Loloy Unduran, et al. v. Ramon Aberasturi, et al., the central question revolved around which body held the authority to resolve a land dispute where indigenous rights were asserted. The petitioners, representing an indigenous community, argued that the NCIP should have jurisdiction over the case, regardless of whether all parties involved were members of the same ICC/IP group. This argument was rooted in their interpretation of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) and the belief that the NCIP was created to protect IPs from the greater prejudice they experience from non-IPs.

The respondents, on the other hand, contended that the regular courts had jurisdiction because not all parties belonged to the same ICC/IP group. This position was supported by a narrower interpretation of Section 66 of the IPRA, which states that the NCIP has jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, provided that the parties have exhausted all remedies under their customary laws. The Supreme Court, after a thorough review of the IPRA and relevant jurisprudence, ultimately sided with the respondents, clarifying the scope and limitations of the NCIP’s jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court’s analysis hinged on the interpretation of Section 66 of the IPRA, which states:

Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. – The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, that no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elder/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

The Court emphasized that the proviso in Section 66—requiring exhaustion of remedies under customary laws—is a key limitation on the NCIP’s jurisdiction. This requirement implies that the parties involved must belong to the same ICC/IP group, as it would be unfair and impractical to subject parties from different groups or non-IPs to unfamiliar customary laws and processes. Building on this principle, the Court reasoned that the primary purpose of a proviso is to limit or restrict the general language or operation of the statute.

Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that while the IPRA aims to protect the rights of ICCs/IPs, it also recognizes and respects existing property rights, regardless of whether they belong to IPs or non-IPs. This recognition is enshrined in Section 56 of the IPRA, which states: “Property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and respected.” This provision ensures that the IPRA does not unduly infringe upon the rights of individuals who have legitimately acquired property within ancestral domains.

The Court also addressed the argument that Section 72 of the IPRA, which deals with punishable acts and applicable penalties, expands the NCIP’s jurisdiction to include cases where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP group. However, the Court clarified that subjecting non-IPs or members of different ICC/IP groups to customary laws would violate principles of fair play and due process. Therefore, the NCIP’s jurisdiction over violations of the IPRA is limited to cases where the parties belong to the same ICC/IP group. In cases involving different groups or non-IPs, the proper Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction.

In sum, the Supreme Court delineated the NCIP’s jurisdiction into two categories: limited and primary. The NCIP has limited jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA, which applies only to claims and disputes between parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group. However, the NCIP also has primary jurisdiction over certain types of cases, regardless of the parties involved. These include:

Adverse claims and border disputes arising from the delineation of ancestral domains/lands
Cancellation of fraudulently issued CADTs
Disputes and violations of ICCs/IPs rights between members of the same ICC/IP group

This distinction recognizes the NCIP’s expertise in matters related to ancestral domains and customary laws, while also ensuring that the rights of all parties are protected under the law. The Supreme Court also cited the discussions during the Bicameral Conference Committee, noting that the removal of the words “exclusive and original” from the Senate Bill indicated that the NCIP shares concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts.

The Court explicitly addressed the potential conflicts arising from the implementation of various laws, including the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the IPRA, and the Public Land Act. The Joint Department of Agriculture-Land Registration Authority-Department of Environment and Natural Resources-National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (DAR-DENR-LRA-NCIP) Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 2012, identified “Contentious Areas/Issues” that created overlapping jurisdiction between the DAR, DENR, and NCIP. The Supreme Court emphasized that in cases involving prior and vested property rights, the ICCs/IPs are not precluded from questioning the validity of these titles in a proper forum before the DAR Secretary or the Regional Trial Court.

This decision underscores the importance of balancing the rights of indigenous communities with the rights of other individuals and entities. It clarifies the role of the NCIP as a specialized body with expertise in indigenous matters, while also recognizing the jurisdiction of regular courts in cases where broader legal principles are at stake. The ruling seeks to avoid potential conflicts and ensure that all parties have access to a fair and impartial legal process.

FAQs

What is the main point of this Supreme Court decision?	The decision clarifies that the NCIP’s jurisdiction over disputes involving indigenous rights is limited to cases where all parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.
What happens if the parties are from different ICC/IP groups?	If the parties involved in the dispute are from different ICC/IP groups, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Does the NCIP have jurisdiction over non-IPs?	Generally, no. Disputes involving non-IPs typically fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts, unless it falls under primary jurisdiction.
What is ‘customary law’ in this context?	Customary law refers to the traditional rules and practices developed and followed by specific indigenous communities in resolving disputes and governing their affairs.
What are the specific powers of the NCIP?	The NCIP is empowered to protect indigenous rights, delineate ancestral domains, and resolve disputes within indigenous communities, operating as a quasi-judicial body.
Why is exhausting customary remedies important?	Exhausting customary remedies respects indigenous self-governance and ensures that traditional methods of conflict resolution are prioritized before resorting to formal legal processes.
What are examples of cases that would fall under the NCIP’s primary jurisdiction?	Cases involving the delineation of ancestral lands, disputes over borders between ancestral domains, and cancellation of fraudulently obtained CADTs fall under NCIP’s primary jurisdiction.
How does this decision affect property rights within ancestral domains?	The decision affirms that existing property rights within ancestral domains are recognized and respected, ensuring that the IPRA does not unduly infringe upon legitimate property claims.

This ruling provides crucial clarity on the jurisdictional boundaries of the NCIP and the regular courts in disputes involving indigenous rights. It aims to strike a balance between respecting indigenous self-governance and ensuring that all parties have access to a fair and impartial legal process. The Supreme Court’s decision in Unduran v. Aberasturi serves as a guiding precedent for future cases involving indigenous rights and ancestral domains.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Loloy Unduran, et al. v. Ramon Aberasturi, et al., G.R. No. 181284, April 18, 2017

April 18, 2017

Ancestral Land Disputes: Reasserting Court Jurisdiction over Indigenous Claims

The Supreme Court clarified the jurisdiction between regular courts and the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) in disputes involving ancestral lands. The Court held that while the NCIP has jurisdiction over disputes involving Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs), this jurisdiction is concurrent with regular courts. An NCIP administrative rule claiming exclusive jurisdiction was struck down as void, reaffirming the principle that administrative rules cannot expand the scope of a law. This decision ensures that regular courts retain their authority in resolving land disputes even when ICCs/IPs are involved.

Clash of Jurisdictions: Who Decides the Fate of Ancestral Lands?

This case revolves around a land dispute in Mountain Province between Thomas Begnaen and Spouses Leo and Elma Caligtan, all members of the Kankanaey Tribe. Begnaen filed a forcible entry complaint in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) after the NCIP Regional Hearing Office (RHO) dismissed his initial complaint. The MCTC dismissed the case, deferring to the NCIP’s supposed exclusive jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed, asserting its own jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals (CA) sided with the NCIP. The central legal question: Does the NCIP have exclusive jurisdiction over ancestral land disputes involving ICCs/IPs, or do regular courts retain concurrent jurisdiction?

The Supreme Court anchored its decision on a prior ruling in Lim v. Gamosa, emphasizing that administrative rules cannot expand the jurisdiction granted by law. The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) grants the NCIP jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. However, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 attempted to establish the NCIP-RHO’s “original and exclusive” jurisdiction, a move the Court deemed an overreach. The Court referred to Sections 65 and 66 of R.A. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997:

SECTION 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices, — When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.

SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws.

The Court stated that the NCIP’s jurisdiction, while important, is not exclusive. Regular courts also possess jurisdiction, particularly in cases involving property rights and land disputes. The Court cited its ruling in Lim, stating:

That NCIP Administrative Circular 44 expands the jurisdiction of the NCIP as original and exclusive in Sections 5 and 1, respectively of Rule III x x x is of no moment. The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment.

It ought to be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the law into effect. The administrative regulation must be within the scope and purview of the law. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, but must remain consistent with the law they seek to apply and implement. They are intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law.

The Supreme Court clarified that when both the NCIP and regular courts have jurisdiction, the principle of concurrence applies. The body that first takes cognizance of the complaint should exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of others. Here, Begnaen initially filed his complaint with the NCIP-RHO. The Supreme Court held that this initial action vested jurisdiction in the NCIP-RHO, even though the case was initially dismissed without prejudice to allow for customary law remedies to be exhausted.

The Court also addressed the issue of ancestral lands, noting that the IPRA recognizes the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands and domains. Even if land is purchased, it can still fall under the definition of ancestral land if it is held under a claim of ownership by ICCs/IPs since time immemorial. The Court pointed to R.A. 8371 Section 3(a) and (b) and Section 56:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

a) Ancestral Domains — Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands — Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to lands occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.

The Court also found that Begnaen engaged in forum shopping by filing a complaint with the MCTC without disclosing his prior complaint with the NCIP-RHO. This violated the rule against forum shopping, which seeks to prevent the rendition of contradictory decisions by different tribunals.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the NCIP has exclusive jurisdiction over ancestral land disputes involving ICCs/IPs, or if regular courts retain concurrent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ruled that the NCIP’s jurisdiction is concurrent with that of regular courts.
What is the significance of the Lim v. Gamosa ruling?	The Lim v. Gamosa ruling established that administrative rules cannot expand the jurisdiction granted by law. This principle was applied in this case to invalidate the NCIP’s attempt to claim exclusive jurisdiction.
What does concurrent jurisdiction mean in this context?	Concurrent jurisdiction means that both the NCIP and regular courts have the authority to hear cases involving ancestral land disputes. The body that first takes cognizance of the complaint exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.
What constitutes ancestral land?	Ancestral land refers to lands occupied, possessed, and utilized by ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. This includes land acquired through purchase, as long as it is held under such a claim.
What is forum shopping, and why is it prohibited?	Forum shopping is the practice of filing multiple actions involving the same issues in different tribunals in the hope of obtaining a favorable ruling. It is prohibited to prevent contradictory decisions and ensure an orderly administration of justice.
What was the result of Begnaen’s forum shopping?	The Supreme Court upheld the MCTC’s dismissal of Begnaen’s complaint due to his failure to disclose the prior NCIP-RHO proceedings. This non-disclosure constituted a violation of the rule against forum shopping.
Why did the NCIP-RHO initially dismiss Begnaen’s complaint?	The NCIP-RHO initially dismissed Begnaen’s complaint without prejudice because he had not exhausted all remedies under customary laws. This meant he had not first attempted to resolve the dispute through the Council of Elders.
What is the role of customary laws in resolving disputes involving ICCs/IPs?	The IPRA emphasizes the primacy of customary laws and practices in resolving disputes involving ICCs/IPs. Parties are generally required to exhaust customary law remedies before seeking recourse in formal legal proceedings.

This case underscores the importance of adhering to established jurisdictional boundaries and respecting the rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. While the NCIP plays a vital role in protecting these rights, regular courts retain concurrent jurisdiction to ensure a fair and balanced legal system. The decision serves as a reminder that administrative agencies must operate within the confines of their enabling statutes and that forum shopping is a prohibited practice that undermines the integrity of the judicial process.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Thomas Begnaen v. Spouses Leo and Elma Caligtan, G.R. No. 189852, August 17, 2016

August 17, 2016