ASG Law

Tag: Interlocutory Order

  • Certiorari as an Improper Remedy: Understanding Procedural Lapses in Recovery of Possession Cases

    The Supreme Court has reiterated that a petition for certiorari is not the appropriate remedy when other legal avenues are available. In a case involving a dispute over the possession of land, the Court emphasized that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory. This means it’s not a final order and therefore cannot be immediately appealed. Instead, the party should proceed with the case, and if an adverse judgment is rendered, appeal by assigning the denial of the motion to dismiss as an error. This ruling underscores the importance of adhering to proper legal procedures and understanding the hierarchy of remedies available to litigants.

    Carniyan vs. Home Guaranty Corporation: When a Quest for Dismissal Leads to Default

    The case of Ricardo P. Carniyan, et al. v. Home Guaranty Corporation, G.R. No. 228516, decided on August 14, 2019, revolves around a complaint filed by Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) against the Carniyans for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in Quezon City. The Carniyans, instead of filing an answer, filed motions to dismiss and archive the case, arguing that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) lacked jurisdiction because HGC had not yet acquired ownership of the property and its assessed value was below the jurisdictional amount. Judge Villordon of the RTC denied these motions. The Carniyans then filed a motion to expunge the order denying their motions and sought Judge Villordon’s inhibition, which was also denied. Failing to file an answer, they were declared in default, leading them to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which was also denied. The Supreme Court was then asked to determine whether the trial court orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion.

    The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision, emphasizing that the Carniyans had pursued an inappropriate remedy. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court noted that an order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order, not a final one. Therefore, the appropriate remedy was to file an answer, proceed to trial, and, if necessary, appeal an adverse judgment, assigning the denial of the motion to dismiss as an error. This procedural misstep proved fatal to the Carniyans’ case.

    The Court referred to the case of Denso (Phils.), Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which clearly distinguishes between final and interlocutory orders:

    A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto… Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case…but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is “interlocutory.”

    The Court further explained that while there are exceptions to this rule, such as when orders are issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, none of these exceptions applied in the Carniyans’ case. The Carniyans argued that the RTC lacked jurisdiction because HGC had not submitted a certified true copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 262715. However, the Court clarified that the submission of the TCT was not a condition precedent to the RTC’s jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the pleadings, not necessarily by the evidence presented at the initial stages of the case.

    The Supreme Court noted that a motion to dismiss is filed before the parties present their evidence. The rules allow a defendant to file such a motion before answering the complaint. If the motion is denied, the defendant is then given the opportunity to file an answer. The case proceeds to pre-trial and then to trial, where evidence is presented. Therefore, the argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction without the TCT had no legal basis, and no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to Judge Villordon in denying the motion.

    Regarding the denial of the motion to expunge the March 18, 2011 Order and the motion for inhibition, the Court again found no grave abuse of discretion. The Carniyans had previously moved for Judge Villordon’s inhibition, which was denied. A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC specifically prohibits multiple motions for inhibition by one party. Therefore, Judge Villordon’s denial was in accordance with the rules.

    The Court emphasized that the Carniyans failed to file an answer despite being directed to do so by the trial court. This failure led to their declaration of default. When a party is declared in default, Section 3(b) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides a remedy: to file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, with an affidavit showing a meritorious defense. The Carniyans failed to pursue this remedy, making their petition for certiorari even more improper. The appellate court correctly pointed out that the Carniyans could not simply conjure grave abuse of discretion to avail themselves of a petition for certiorari when a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy was available.

    Finally, the Court addressed the rescheduling of the ex parte hearing for HGC’s evidence presentation. The Carniyans alleged that this was due to Judge Villordon’s hasty action, amounting to grave abuse of discretion. However, the Court found no evidence to support this claim. The Carniyans failed to demonstrate that the presiding judge acted arbitrarily or despotically. Absent such a showing, the Court had no basis to overturn the CA’s denial of the petition for certiorari.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court underscored the importance of adhering to proper legal procedures and exhausting available remedies before resorting to extraordinary writs like certiorari. The Carniyans’ failure to follow the established rules of procedure proved detrimental to their case, highlighting the need for litigants to understand and utilize the correct legal avenues for redress.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing orders that ultimately led to the petitioners being declared in default in a recovery of possession case.
    Why did the Supreme Court deny the petition? The Supreme Court denied the petition because the petitioners availed themselves of the wrong remedy (certiorari) instead of following the proper procedures for challenging interlocutory orders and orders of default.
    What is an interlocutory order? An interlocutory order is an order that does not finally dispose of a case, leaving further issues to be resolved by the court. An order denying a motion to dismiss is considered an interlocutory order.
    What should the petitioners have done after the denial of their motion to dismiss? After the denial of their motion to dismiss, the petitioners should have filed an answer, proceeded to trial, and, if an adverse judgment was rendered, appealed by assigning the denial of the motion to dismiss as an error.
    What remedy is available to a party declared in default? A party declared in default may file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default, showing that their failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and that they have a meritorious defense.
    What is grave abuse of discretion? Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners failed to prove that the judge’s actions met this standard.
    Was the presentation of a Torrens title a condition precedent to the court’s jurisdiction? No, the submission of a certified true copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was not a condition precedent to vest the court with jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the pleadings.
    What is A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC? A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC is a rule that applies specifically to litigations in Quezon City trial courts and prohibits the filing of multiple motions for inhibition by one party.

    This case serves as a reminder of the critical importance of understanding and adhering to the proper legal procedures in Philippine courts. Choosing the wrong remedy can have significant consequences, including the loss of legal recourse.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Carniyan vs. Home Guaranty Corporation, G.R. No. 228516, August 14, 2019

  • Certiorari as an Improper Remedy: Understanding Interlocutory Orders and Grave Abuse of Discretion in Recovery of Possession Cases

    In a dispute over a property in Quezon City, the Supreme Court clarified the proper legal avenues for challenging lower court decisions. The Court emphasized that certiorari, a special civil action, is not the correct remedy for appealing interlocutory orders like the denial of a motion to dismiss. Instead, parties must typically wait for a final judgment and then appeal, unless the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction.

    Carniyan vs. HGC: When Can You Bypass the Normal Appeal Process?

    The case revolves around a complaint filed by Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) to recover possession of land from Ricardo P. Carniyan and other residents. The Carniyans sought to dismiss the case, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction because HGC hadn’t submitted a copy of the land title and the assessed value was below the jurisdictional threshold. The trial court denied their motion, leading the Carniyans to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which was also denied. The Supreme Court then had to determine if the CA erred in upholding the trial court’s orders and if the Carniyans’ petition for certiorari was the proper procedural move.

    The Supreme Court began by emphasizing that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal or other adequate remedy. It cited Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 716 Phil. 500, 512 (2013), reinforcing this principle. An order denying a motion to dismiss is generally considered an interlocutory order, meaning it doesn’t fully resolve the case. In such instances, the proper course of action is to file an answer, proceed to trial, and appeal any adverse judgment, raising the issues from the dismissed motion to dismiss as errors. As the Court underscored, “Considering that Judge Villordon, through the March 18, 2011 Order, denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss, the appropriate remedy was to file an answer, proceed to trial, and, in the event of an adverse judgment, interpose an appeal, assigning as errors the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss.”

    This approach contrasts with a final order, which fully disposes of a case. The Court referenced Denso (Phils.), Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 232 Phil. 256 (1987), to differentiate the two:

    A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes “final” or, to use the established and more distinctive term, “final and executory.”

    However, the Court acknowledged exceptions to this rule. Certiorari can be appropriate if the order was issued without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This principle was reiterated in Emergency Loan Pawnshop, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 405 Phil. 524 (2001). The Court elaborated on this, stating, “Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff’s baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case.”

    In the Carniyan case, the petitioners argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because HGC hadn’t submitted a copy of the land title. The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, asserting that jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the pleadings. The Court noted that a motion to dismiss is filed *before* evidence is presented, meaning the absence of a title at that stage does not strip the court of its power to hear the case.

    The Court further addressed the petitioners’ challenge to the trial court’s denial of their motion for inhibition (recusal of the judge). Citing A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC, which applies specifically to Quezon City trial courts, the Court emphasized that each party is only allowed one motion for inhibition based on the grounds specified in Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. This rule exists to prevent parties from repeatedly seeking a judge’s removal to delay or manipulate proceedings. Because the Carniyans had already filed one motion for inhibition, the second was correctly denied.

    Moving on, the Supreme Court addressed the declaration of default against the Carniyans for failing to file an answer. The proper remedy for a party declared in default is outlined in Section 3(b) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court:

    (b) Relief from order of default. – A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.

    This requires the defaulting party to demonstrate that their failure to answer was due to a legitimate reason and that they have a valid defense. The Carniyans failed to pursue this remedy. The court referenced Lina v. CA, et al., 220 Phil. 311 (1985), to summarize other remedies, stating: “b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section1(a) of Rule 37; c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)”

    Finally, the Court addressed the rescheduling of the ex parte hearing (a hearing where only one party presents evidence due to the other party’s default). The Carniyans argued this was further grave abuse of discretion, but the Court found they failed to demonstrate any arbitrariness or prejudice on the part of the judge. A mere allegation is insufficient; there must be concrete evidence of bias or improper motive. Without such evidence, the Court was unable to overturn the CA’s decision.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The main issue was whether the petitioners properly availed of the remedy of certiorari to question interlocutory orders of the trial court. The Supreme Court ruled they did not, as certiorari is generally not the correct remedy for challenging such orders.
    What is an interlocutory order? An interlocutory order is a court order that does not fully resolve all the issues in a case. It’s an order made during the course of litigation that is not a final judgment.
    When can you use certiorari to challenge a trial court order? Certiorari is appropriate when the trial court acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This is an exception to the general rule that interlocutory orders cannot be immediately appealed.
    What should a party do if declared in default? A party declared in default should file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default. They must show that their failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and that they have a meritorious defense.
    What is grave abuse of discretion? Grave abuse of discretion means the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
    What is the significance of A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC? A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC is a rule specific to Quezon City courts that limits parties to only one motion for inhibition (recusal) of a judge per case. This prevents parties from repeatedly seeking a judge’s removal to delay proceedings.
    Why was submitting a copy of the land title not required for jurisdiction? The Supreme Court clarified that jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the pleadings, not by the presentation of evidence at the initial stage of a case. The absence of a title at the motion to dismiss stage did not remove the court’s jurisdiction.
    What is an ex parte hearing? An *ex parte* hearing is a hearing where only one party presents evidence, usually because the other party has been declared in default and failed to participate in the proceedings.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of following proper procedural rules in court. Resorting to certiorari prematurely can be fatal to a case, as it is not a substitute for the ordinary process of appeal. Parties must demonstrate grave abuse of discretion to justify using this extraordinary remedy.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Carniyan v. Home Guaranty Corporation, G.R. No. 228516, August 14, 2019

  • Finality of Judgment: Why Attempts to Circumvent Liquidation Proceedings Fail

    In Prime Savings Bank v. Spouses Santos, the Supreme Court reiterated that interlocutory orders, such as denials of applications for temporary restraining orders, cannot be appealed until a final judgment is rendered. The Court also emphasized that once a bank is placed under liquidation, its assets are in custodia legis and are not subject to garnishment or execution outside the liquidation proceedings. This ruling underscores the importance of adhering to established legal procedures and respecting the finality of judgments, especially in the context of bank liquidations, to ensure equitable distribution of assets to creditors.

    Prime Savings Bank’s Last Stand: Can a Bank Evade Liquidation Through Certiorari?

    The case revolves around a complaint filed by Spouses Roberto and Heidi Santos against Engr. Edgardo Torcende and Prime Savings Bank for rescission of sale and real estate mortgage. While the case was pending, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) prohibited Prime Savings Bank from doing business and placed it under receivership, later under liquidation, with the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) as the designated liquidator. The RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses Santos, leading to a notice of garnishment against Prime Savings Bank. The bank then sought to lift the writ of execution and notice of garnishment, arguing that the Spouses Santos should file their claim in the liquidation court. This highlights the tension between the rights of individual creditors and the orderly liquidation of a distressed financial institution.

    Prime Savings Bank’s argument was rooted in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653 (The New Central Bank Act), which stipulates that assets of an institution under receivership or liquidation are in custodia legis and exempt from garnishment, levy, attachment, or execution. The RTC initially agreed with Prime Savings Bank, but later reversed its decision and allowed the execution of the judgment. This prompted Prime Savings Bank to file a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), seeking to reverse the RTC’s order and enjoin the enforcement of the garnishments.

    The CA denied Prime Savings Bank’s application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI). The denial was based on the bank’s failure to sufficiently demonstrate a clear legal right or urgent necessity to justify the injunctive relief. The Supreme Court, in its resolution, pointed out that the bank had availed itself of the wrong remedy by filing a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to question the CA’s resolutions regarding the TRO/WPI application. Rule 45 is intended for appeals from judgments or final orders, not interlocutory orders. The Court emphasized that interlocutory orders cannot be appealed until a final judgment is rendered.

    “No appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order. Instead, the proper remedy to assail such an order is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.”

    Even if the Court were to treat the Petition as one filed under Rule 65, it would still be dismissed as moot and academic. This is because the CA had already decided the underlying Certiorari Petition in favor of Prime Savings Bank. The Spouses Santos had appealed the CA’s decision to the Supreme Court, which denied their petition, and their subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied with finality. Therefore, the issue of whether the TRO/WPI should have been granted became irrelevant, as the main issue had already been resolved in favor of Prime Savings Bank.

    The concept of custodia legis is central to this case. It means that the assets of a bank under liquidation are under the protection and control of the law, specifically the liquidation court. This principle is designed to ensure that all creditors are treated fairly and that the bank’s assets are distributed in an orderly manner. Allowing individual creditors to pursue garnishment or execution outside of the liquidation proceedings would undermine this principle and potentially prejudice the rights of other creditors.

    This case also highlights the importance of understanding the different remedies available to litigants and choosing the correct procedural path. Filing an appeal under Rule 45 when the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 can result in the dismissal of the case. Litigants must carefully assess the nature of the order they are seeking to challenge and choose the appropriate remedy to ensure that their rights are properly protected.

    The ruling in Prime Savings Bank v. Spouses Santos reinforces the principle that once a bank is placed under liquidation, its assets are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the liquidation court. Creditors seeking to recover their claims must file them with the liquidation court and participate in the liquidation proceedings. They cannot circumvent these proceedings by pursuing separate actions for garnishment or execution. This is essential to maintain the integrity of the liquidation process and ensure the equitable distribution of assets to all creditors.

    The decision also serves as a reminder of the importance of seeking timely and appropriate legal remedies. Had Prime Savings Bank properly questioned the interlocutory orders of the CA through a Rule 65 petition, the procedural issues might have been resolved differently. However, because the substantive issue of the execution and garnishment was eventually decided in their favor, the procedural misstep became moot.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying Prime Savings Bank’s application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) against the execution of a judgment against its assets.
    Why did the Supreme Court dismiss Prime Savings Bank’s petition? The Supreme Court dismissed the petition because Prime Savings Bank used the wrong remedy (Rule 45 instead of Rule 65) to question interlocutory orders, and the issue became moot because the main case was decided in favor of the bank.
    What is the significance of ‘custodia legis’ in this case? ‘Custodia legis’ means that the assets of a bank under liquidation are under the protection of the law and cannot be garnished or executed upon outside the liquidation proceedings, ensuring fair distribution to all creditors.
    What is the difference between Rule 45 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court? Rule 45 governs appeals from judgments or final orders, while Rule 65 is used to question interlocutory orders or acts tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
    What happens to creditors’ claims when a bank is placed under liquidation? Creditors must file their claims with the liquidation court and participate in the liquidation proceedings to recover their debts, as they cannot pursue separate actions for garnishment or execution.
    What was the outcome of the main case in the Court of Appeals? The Court of Appeals ultimately ruled in favor of Prime Savings Bank, reversing the RTC’s order that allowed the execution and garnishment of the bank’s assets.
    What is a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI)? A TRO is a short-term order restraining a party from performing an act, while a WPI is a more extended order that maintains the status quo pending the resolution of a case.
    Why was the petition considered moot and academic? The petition was considered moot because the main issue regarding the execution and garnishment of Prime Savings Bank’s assets had already been resolved in its favor by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Prime Savings Bank v. Spouses Santos clarifies the procedural requirements for challenging interlocutory orders and reinforces the principle of custodia legis in bank liquidation proceedings. This case serves as a valuable guide for creditors and financial institutions navigating the complexities of debt recovery and bank liquidation.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Prime Savings Bank v. Spouses Santos, G.R. No. 208283, June 19, 2019

  • Interlocutory Orders: Why Immediate Appeals Fail and the Right Path to Justice

    The Supreme Court, in Prime Savings Bank v. Spouses Santos, reiterated a fundamental principle of Philippine remedial law: interlocutory orders, or those that do not fully resolve all issues in a case, cannot be immediately appealed. This ruling underscores the importance of adhering to proper procedural channels, ensuring that appeals are taken only from final judgments to prevent piecemeal litigation and promote judicial efficiency. A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order must generally await the final resolution of the case before seeking appellate review. Ignoring this rule can lead to the dismissal of an appeal, as it did in this case, emphasizing the need for legal practitioners to choose the correct mode of appeal.

    Prime Savings Bank: A Case of Premature Appeal and Procedural Missteps

    The case began with a complaint filed by Spouses Roberto and Heidi Santos against Engr. Edgardo Torcende and Prime Savings Bank, seeking the rescission of a sale and real estate mortgage. While this case was ongoing, Prime Savings Bank was placed under receivership and subsequently liquidation by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), with the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) acting as the statutory liquidator. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially ruled in favor of the Spouses Santos, leading to a notice of garnishment against Prime Savings Bank. The bank, under liquidation, sought to lift the garnishment, leading to a series of conflicting orders from the RTC. This culminated in Prime Savings Bank filing a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) to prevent the execution of the judgment. As part of this petition, they sought a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI), which the CA denied, leading to the present Supreme Court case.

    The Supreme Court’s decision rested on the fundamental distinction between interlocutory and final orders. An interlocutory order is one that does not dispose of a case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. In contrast, a final order fully resolves all issues in a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do. The assailed Resolutions of the CA, which denied Prime Savings Bank’s application for a TRO and/or WPI, were deemed interlocutory because they did not resolve the main issue of whether the RTC’s order allowing execution and garnishment was proper. The Court emphasized that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which Prime Savings Bank invoked, is applicable only to appeals from judgments or final orders.

    “It is a hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court governs appeals from judgments or final orders, not interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment is rendered for one party or the other.”

    This principle is rooted in the policy against piecemeal appeals, which can cause unnecessary delays and multiply litigation. Allowing appeals from every interlocutory order would disrupt the orderly administration of justice and burden appellate courts with fragmented cases. The correct remedy to challenge an interlocutory order is generally a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, even if the Court were to treat the Petition as one under Rule 65, it would still fail because the main Certiorari Petition before the CA had already been decided in favor of Prime Savings Bank, rendering the issue of the TRO moot.

    Moreover, the Supreme Court highlighted the effect of placing a bank under liquidation. Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653, the New Central Bank Act, provides that assets of an institution under receivership or liquidation are in custodia legis and exempt from garnishment, levy, attachment, or execution. This provision aims to protect the assets of the bank for the benefit of its depositors and creditors, ensuring equitable distribution during liquidation proceedings. The RTC’s initial order lifting the writ of execution recognized this principle, but its subsequent reversal was the subject of the CA petition that ultimately favored Prime Savings Bank.

    The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of understanding the nuances of remedial law and choosing the correct procedural remedy. While the initial error was in appealing an interlocutory order, the subsequent resolution of the main case in favor of Prime Savings Bank ultimately rendered the issue moot. This highlights the interconnectedness of legal proceedings and the potential for even procedural missteps to be rendered inconsequential by later events. Lawyers must, however, diligently assess the nature of court orders and pursue the appropriate remedies to protect their clients’ interests effectively.

    Building on this principle, the Supreme Court has consistently held that petitions questioning interlocutory orders should be filed under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion. This approach contrasts with appeals under Rule 45, which are reserved for final judgments. The distinction is crucial because the grounds for review and the procedural requirements differ significantly. Failing to recognize this distinction can lead to the dismissal of a case, regardless of the underlying merits.

    In this context, it is also essential to understand the implications of placing a financial institution under receivership or liquidation. The New Central Bank Act grants the Monetary Board of the BSP broad powers to regulate and supervise banks to maintain financial stability. When a bank is deemed insolvent or incapable of meeting its obligations, the BSP can place it under receivership and eventually liquidation. This process involves the appointment of a receiver or liquidator, typically the PDIC, who takes control of the bank’s assets and liabilities. The primary goal is to protect depositors and creditors by ensuring an orderly and equitable distribution of the bank’s remaining assets.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Court of Appeals correctly denied Prime Savings Bank’s application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI), which was ancillary to its main petition for certiorari.
    Why was Prime Savings Bank’s petition dismissed? The petition was dismissed because it was filed under Rule 45, which is for appeals of final judgments, not interlocutory orders. Additionally, the main case had already been decided in favor of Prime Savings Bank, rendering the issue moot.
    What is an interlocutory order? An interlocutory order is a court order that does not fully resolve all the issues in a case, leaving further matters to be decided. It is distinct from a final judgment, which completely disposes of the case.
    What is the proper remedy for challenging an interlocutory order? The proper remedy for challenging an interlocutory order is generally a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion.
    What is the significance of placing a bank under liquidation? When a bank is placed under liquidation, its assets are considered in custodia legis and are generally exempt from garnishment or execution to protect the interests of depositors and creditors.
    What does custodia legis mean? Custodia legis means “under the custody of the law.” In this context, it refers to the assets of a bank under receivership or liquidation, which are protected from attachment or execution.
    Who is the PDIC in this case? The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) acted as the statutory liquidator for Prime Savings Bank after it was placed under liquidation by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
    What is the role of the Monetary Board of the BSP? The Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) has the authority to regulate and supervise banks, including the power to place them under receivership or liquidation when necessary to maintain financial stability.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Prime Savings Bank v. Spouses Santos serves as a reminder of the importance of adhering to proper procedural rules and understanding the distinctions between different types of court orders. It reinforces the principle that interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable and that the correct remedy is generally a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The decision also highlights the special status of banks under liquidation and the protections afforded to their assets for the benefit of depositors and creditors.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Prime Savings Bank, G.R. No. 208283, June 19, 2019

  • Appeal Rights: Untangling Premature Notices and Conflicting Motions for Reconsideration

    In Iluminada C. Bernardo v. Ana Marie B. Soriano, the Supreme Court clarified that a party’s right to appeal a court decision is not contingent on whether the opposing party files their own motion for reconsideration. The Court ruled that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) erred in denying due course to Bernardo’s notice of appeal, which was filed after her motion for reconsideration was denied, simply because Soriano also filed a motion for partial reconsideration. This decision underscores the principle that each party has an independent right to appeal within the prescribed period, and one party’s actions do not negate the other’s right to seek appellate review.

    Custody Battle Crossroads: Can One Party’s Motion Delay Another’s Appeal?

    The case arose from a custody dispute over a minor, Stephanie Verniese B. Soriano, between her grandmother, Iluminada C. Bernardo, and her surviving parent, Ana Marie B. Soriano. The RTC initially granted temporary custody to Bernardo but upheld Soriano’s parental rights. Both parties filed motions for reconsideration. Bernardo’s motion was denied, prompting her to file a notice of appeal. However, the RTC denied due course to her appeal, reasoning that Soriano’s pending motion for partial reconsideration prevented the decision from becoming final.

    Bernardo then filed a Certiorari Petition, arguing that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC’s decision, stating that the RTC’s decision was not yet an appealable judgment because Soriano’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration was pending. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts’ reasoning regarding the denial of Bernardo’s appeal but ultimately denied Bernardo’s petition, finding that certiorari was not the appropriate remedy given the availability of an appeal.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case. The RTC’s initial decision, having addressed the core issue of custody and determined the rights and liabilities of both parties, was indeed a judgment on the merits, not an interlocutory order. Therefore, Bernardo had the right to appeal within 15 days of receiving the denial of her motion for reconsideration. The Court, quoting Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, reiterated that:

    A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.

    The heart of the matter lay in whether Soriano’s motion for partial reconsideration suspended Bernardo’s right to appeal. The Court clarified that it did not. The Supreme Court highlighted the distinct and independent nature of each party’s right to appeal, referencing existing jurisprudence:

    Each party has a different period within which to appeal and that [s]ince each party has a different period within which to appeal, the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the other or another party’s period of appeal.

    This principle ensures that a party who is ready to appeal is not held hostage by the procedural choices of the opposing party. The Supreme Court noted the error in denying due course to Bernardo’s Notice of Appeal. It emphasized that the approval of a notice of appeal becomes a ministerial duty of the lower court, provided the appeal is filed on time and satisfies the content requirements. The Supreme Court further clarified that allowing Bernardo’s appeal would not have stripped the RTC of its jurisdiction to resolve Soriano’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

    However, the Court also pointed out that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not intended to correct mere errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. The Supreme Court reiterated the limited scope of certiorari, noting that it is only appropriate when there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court emphasized the importance of distinguishing between errors of judgment, which are correctable by appeal, and grave abuse of discretion. The Court also cited Cathay Pacific Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals:

    Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

    The Court emphasized that a writ of certiorari will not be issued where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or cumulative. Moreover, the RTC’s order did not completely preclude Bernardo from appealing the decision. She could have filed another notice of appeal after the RTC ruled on Soriano’s motion. Because Bernardo had the remedy of appeal available, the Certiorari Petition was not the correct course of action.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the RTC erred in denying due course to Bernardo’s notice of appeal due to the pendency of Soriano’s motion for partial reconsideration. The Supreme Court clarified that one party’s motion does not negate the other party’s right to appeal within the prescribed period.
    Did the Supreme Court find that the RTC made an error? Yes, the Supreme Court found that the RTC erred in denying due course to Bernardo’s notice of appeal, as her right to appeal was not contingent on Soriano’s motion. However, the Court also determined that certiorari was not the appropriate remedy.
    What is the difference between a final order and an interlocutory order? A final order completely disposes of the case, leaving nothing more for the court to do. An interlocutory order, on the other hand, only resolves incidental matters and does not conclude the case.
    What is grave abuse of discretion? Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction, where power is exercised arbitrarily due to passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. It must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of law.
    When is a petition for certiorari appropriate? A petition for certiorari is appropriate only when the aggrieved party has no plain, adequate, and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as an appeal. It is used to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
    What is the effect of filing a motion for reconsideration on the other party’s right to appeal? The timely filing of a motion for reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the other party’s period to appeal. Each party has an independent right to appeal within their respective periods.
    What should Bernardo have done differently? After the RTC granted Soriano’s motion for partial reconsideration, Bernardo could have filed another notice of appeal, assailing the modified decision, instead of filing a petition for certiorari. The remedy of appeal was available to her.
    What is the main takeaway from this ruling for litigants? The primary takeaway is that parties should diligently observe their own deadlines for filing appeals, regardless of the opposing party’s procedural maneuvers. Your right to appeal is not suspended simply because the other side seeks reconsideration.

    In conclusion, the Bernardo v. Soriano case serves as a reminder of the importance of understanding and adhering to the rules of procedure, particularly regarding appeals. While the RTC erred in denying due course to Bernardo’s appeal, the Supreme Court clarified that certiorari was not the correct remedy, underscoring the principle that each party has an independent right to appeal within the prescribed period.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: ILUMINADA C. BERNARDO v. ANA MARIE B. SORIANO, G.R. No. 200104, June 19, 2019

  • Upholding Party Autonomy: Court Intervention in Arbitration Proceedings Under the ADR Act

    In a dispute between the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and BCA International Corporation, the Supreme Court affirmed the limited scope of court intervention in arbitration proceedings governed by the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Act of 2004. The Court emphasized that under Republic Act No. 9285 and its implementing rules, intervention is generally restricted to specific instances such as requests for interim measures of protection or judicial review of arbitral awards. This ruling reinforces the principle of party autonomy in dispute resolution, ensuring that arbitration remains a swift and impartial alternative to traditional litigation, free from unnecessary judicial interference. The Court dismissed DFA’s petition, underscoring the importance of adhering to the procedural rules outlined in the ADR Act and the Special ADR Rules.

    Navigating Arbitration: When Can Courts Step In?

    The case arose from an Amended Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Agreement between the DFA and BCA International Corporation for the Machine Readable Passport and Visa Project. A dispute led to arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. During the arbitration, BCA sought to amend its Statement of Claims, which DFA opposed. The Arbitral Tribunal eventually allowed the amendment, prompting DFA to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, questioning the tribunal’s decision. DFA argued that the amendment caused undue delay and prejudice, fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause, and circumvented a prior temporary restraining order. The central legal question was whether the Supreme Court could intervene in this stage of the arbitration proceedings.

    The Supreme Court began its analysis by establishing the applicable legal framework. The Court determined that Philippine arbitration laws, specifically RA No. 876, RA No. 9285, and the Special ADR Rules, govern the proceedings. This determination was based on the principle of lex loci contractus, as the parties did not designate a specific law and the agreement was perfected in the Philippines. Importantly, the Court cited a previous case, Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International Corporation, G.R. No. 210858, which affirmed the applicability of RA 9285 to pending arbitration proceedings, emphasizing its procedural nature and retroactive effect.

    Building on this foundation, the Court underscored the policy of the State to promote party autonomy in dispute resolution. RA No. 9285 explicitly encourages the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution methods to achieve speedy and impartial justice. This policy is reflected in the limited instances where court intervention is permitted under the law. These instances include requests for interim measures of protection, judicial review of arbitral awards, and appeals from RTC decisions on arbitral awards to the Court of Appeals. The IRR of RA No. 9285 further clarifies that no court shall intervene except in accordance with the Special ADR Rules.

    The Special ADR Rules outline specific remedies allowing for court intervention, such as judicial relief involving the existence, validity, and enforceability of the arbitral agreement, interim measures of protection, and challenges to the appointment or termination of an arbitrator. Moreover, the rules specify the process for confirmation, correction, or vacation of an award in domestic arbitration. It’s critical to note that an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, granted only for serious and compelling reasons resulting in grave prejudice to the aggrieved party.

    In this case, the Supreme Court found that the DFA’s petition did not fall within the allowable instances for court intervention. The petition challenged an interlocutory order of the Arbitral Tribunal, not a final order of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court. The Court highlighted that while it has, in certain exceptional cases, overlooked the rule on hierarchy of courts, those cases involved issues of transcendental importance or the need to serve the ends of justice. Here, the DFA’s petition did not present such compelling circumstances to justify bypassing the established procedural framework for arbitration.

    The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the rules on court intervention as outlined in RA No. 9285 and the Special ADR Rules, specifically Rule 19.36 and Rule 19.37 of the latter. These rules ensure that arbitration proceedings remain efficient and autonomous, free from undue interference by the courts. By dismissing the DFA’s petition, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of party autonomy and the limited role of courts in domestic arbitration. It also underscored that the ADR Act and the Special ADR Rules provide a comprehensive framework for resolving disputes through alternative means, and that parties must follow the prescribed procedures for seeking judicial recourse.

    This decision underscores the importance of understanding the specific grounds under which court intervention is permissible in arbitration proceedings. Parties entering into arbitration agreements must be aware of the procedural framework established by RA No. 9285 and the Special ADR Rules. Seeking premature judicial intervention, absent compelling reasons and adherence to the prescribed rules, can be detrimental to the efficiency and autonomy of the arbitration process.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Supreme Court could intervene in an ongoing arbitration proceeding based on a challenge to an interlocutory order of the Arbitral Tribunal.
    What is the principle of party autonomy in arbitration? Party autonomy refers to the freedom of parties to agree on the terms of their arbitration, including the rules and procedures that will govern the process, and the limited scope of court intervention.
    Under what circumstances can a court intervene in arbitration proceedings? Courts can intervene in specific instances outlined in RA No. 9285 and the Special ADR Rules, such as requests for interim measures of protection, judicial review of arbitral awards, and challenges to the appointment of arbitrators.
    What is the significance of RA No. 9285, the ADR Act of 2004? RA No. 9285 institutionalizes the use of alternative dispute resolution in the Philippines, promoting party autonomy and providing a framework for arbitration, mediation, and other ADR methods.
    What are the Special ADR Rules? The Special ADR Rules are rules promulgated by the Supreme Court to govern alternative dispute resolution proceedings, including arbitration, and outline the procedures for judicial intervention in such proceedings.
    What is lex loci contractus? Lex loci contractus is a legal principle stating that the law of the place where the contract is made governs the contract’s validity, interpretation, and performance.
    What is an interlocutory order? An interlocutory order is a temporary decision made during the course of a legal case that does not resolve the entire case but deals with a specific issue or matter within the proceedings.
    Why did the Supreme Court dismiss the DFA’s petition? The Supreme Court dismissed the DFA’s petition because it challenged an interlocutory order of the Arbitral Tribunal and did not fall within the allowable instances for court intervention under RA No. 9285 and the Special ADR Rules.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the importance of party autonomy and the limited role of courts in domestic arbitration. Parties must adhere to the prescribed procedures for seeking judicial recourse. Understanding the specific grounds for court intervention under RA No. 9285 and the Special ADR Rules is crucial for ensuring the efficiency and autonomy of the arbitration process.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) VS. BCA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 225051, July 19, 2017

  • Bail and Res Judicata: An Interlocutory Order in Criminal Proceedings

    The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata, which prevents the re-litigation of a decided issue, does not apply to interlocutory orders in criminal cases, specifically those concerning bail petitions. The Court affirmed that an order denying bail is interlocutory and does not attain finality if new matters warrant a second review. This ensures that an accused’s right to provisional liberty is continuously assessed based on evolving circumstances, particularly when the evidence against them is not strong.

    Second Chances: When Can a Denied Bail Petition Be Reconsidered?

    This case revolves around Manuel Escobar, who was implicated in a high-profile kidnapping for ransom case. Escobar was accused of conspiring in the kidnapping of Mary Grace Cheng-Rosagas, daughter of businessman Robert G. Cheng. The prosecution alleged that Escobar’s resort, Club Solvento, served as a temporary holding place for the victim and that he was an adviser to the kidnappers. Escobar initially filed a petition for bail, which was denied by both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA).

    A key development occurred when Rolando Fajardo, a co-accused, was granted bail. Fajardo’s release was based on the weakness of the testimony against him. Given that the evidence against Escobar was similar, he filed a second petition for bail. The RTC denied this second petition, invoking the principle of res judicata, arguing that the issue had already been decided. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the RTC’s decision, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

    The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether res judicata applies to interlocutory orders in criminal cases, specifically concerning petitions for bail. The prosecution argued that the doctrine should be respected, preventing Escobar from re-litigating the issue of bail. Escobar countered that res judicata is inapplicable in criminal proceedings and that the grant of bail to his co-accused constituted a new circumstance warranting a fresh look at his own bail application.

    The Supreme Court anchored its decision on the fundamental right to bail and the presumption of innocence. The right to bail is a constitutionally protected right, emanating from the accused’s presumption of innocence. This right allows a person in custody to be released temporarily upon posting security to ensure their appearance in court. However, this right is not absolute. It is subject to certain exceptions, particularly when the accused is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, and the evidence of guilt is strong.

    Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. – All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

    In Escobar’s case, the crime of kidnapping for ransom was initially punishable by death, later reduced to reclusion perpetua. Therefore, the grant of bail was subject to the trial court’s discretion, contingent on the strength of the evidence against him. The Court elucidated that res judicata, meaning “a matter adjudged,” bars the re-litigation of the same claim between parties. This doctrine, however, is primarily applicable in civil cases, settling disputes with finality.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that res judicata does not extend to criminal proceedings. While certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may apply to criminal cases, the specific rule on res judicata is not among them. This distinction is crucial because criminal proceedings involve the liberty of an individual, and the courts must remain open to reassessments based on new developments. The Court cited Trinidad v. Marcelo, which explicitly states that res judicata, as found in the Rules of Civil Procedure, has no bearing on criminal proceedings.

    Petitioner’s arguments — that res judicata applies since the Office of the Ombudsman twice found no sufficient basis to indict him in similar cases earlier filed against him, and that the Agan cases cannot be a supervening event or evidence per se to warrant a reinvestigation on the same set of facts and circumstances — do not lie.

    Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings.

    Even assuming that res judicata could apply, the Court noted that an interlocutory order, such as the denial of a bail petition, does not constitute a final judgment on the merits. Res judicata requires a final judgment rendered by a court with jurisdiction, a disposition on the merits, and an identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. An interlocutory order, on the other hand, settles only incidental or collateral matters and leaves something else to be done in the primary case.

    The Court underscored that a bail hearing is summary in nature, designed to determine the weight of evidence for bail purposes, not to adjudicate guilt or innocence. This summary process avoids unnecessary thoroughness and does not delve into the full merits of the case. The fact that a co-accused, Rolando Fajardo, was granted bail based on the same evidence highlighted the need for a re-evaluation of Escobar’s petition. This new development warranted a different view, as it suggested that the evidence against Escobar might not be as strong as initially perceived.

    The Supreme Court ultimately held that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the RTC’s decision. The denial of Escobar’s second bail petition based on res judicata was erroneous. The Court emphasized that rules of procedure should not disadvantage a party or deprive them of fundamental rights. Appellate courts have the power to correct errors if strict adherence to final judgments would sacrifice justice for technicality.

    The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the dynamic nature of criminal proceedings, particularly concerning bail. An initial denial of bail does not permanently foreclose the possibility of release. Accused individuals can file subsequent petitions if new evidence or circumstances arise that cast doubt on the strength of the prosecution’s case. The Court’s ruling ensures that the right to bail remains a meaningful protection, subject to continuous assessment in light of evolving circumstances.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the doctrine of res judicata applies to interlocutory orders in criminal cases, specifically concerning petitions for bail. The Court clarified that res judicata, a civil law doctrine, does not bar the re-litigation of bail petitions in criminal proceedings when new circumstances warrant reconsideration.
    What is res judicata? Res judicata, meaning “a matter adjudged,” prevents the same parties from re-litigating a claim or issue that has already been decided by a court. This doctrine promotes finality in legal proceedings by preventing endless cycles of litigation.
    Why doesn’t res judicata apply to bail hearings? Bail hearings are interlocutory, meaning they address a temporary or preliminary matter rather than the final resolution of the case. An order denying bail is not a final judgment on the accused’s guilt or innocence, thus res judicata is not applicable.
    What is an interlocutory order? An interlocutory order is a court ruling that addresses a specific issue or matter during the course of a legal proceeding but does not fully resolve the entire case. Such orders are temporary and subject to modification until the court issues a final judgment.
    What was the ‘new matter’ that warranted a second look at Escobar’s bail petition? The grant of bail to Rolando Fajardo, a co-accused, based on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence against him, served as the new matter. This raised questions about the strength of the evidence against Escobar, who was implicated in a similar manner.
    What is the standard for granting bail in capital offenses? When an accused is charged with a capital offense (punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment), bail is a matter of judicial discretion. It can be granted if the evidence of guilt is not strong.
    What does the ruling mean for other accused individuals? The ruling reinforces the right of accused individuals to seek bail and to have their petitions reconsidered if new circumstances arise. It prevents the rigid application of res judicata from depriving individuals of their right to provisional liberty.
    Does a grant of bail mean the accused is innocent? No. A grant of bail is a determination that the accused should be provisionally released pending trial. It does not prevent the court from making a final assessment of the evidence and determining guilt or innocence after a full trial.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in this case clarifies the scope of res judicata in criminal proceedings, particularly in relation to bail petitions. It affirms the importance of continuously assessing the strength of evidence against an accused and ensures that the right to bail is not unduly restricted by prior interlocutory orders. This decision reinforces the protection of individual liberties within the framework of the Philippine justice system.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. MANUEL ESCOBAR, G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017

  • The Limits of Appellate Courts: Introducing New Evidence on Appeal in Philippine Law

    In Philippine law, appellate courts have the power to receive evidence, but this power is not unlimited. The Supreme Court clarified that while the Court of Appeals can receive evidence to resolve factual issues, this power is subject to its internal rules. In ordinary appeals, new evidence is typically only admitted if a motion for a new trial is granted based on newly discovered evidence. This ensures fairness and prevents endless litigation by requiring parties to present all available evidence during the initial trial phase, except in specific, justifiable circumstances.

    Lost Titles, ‘Honey,’ and a Disputed Affidavit: Can New Evidence Change a Family Property Battle on Appeal?

    This case, Crispino v. Tansay, revolves around a property dispute within a close-knit family, highlighting the complexities of trust, sales, and inheritance. Anatolia Tansay, the original owner of a parcel of land known as the Tansay Compound, allegedly executed deeds of sale transferring portions of this land to Zenaida Echaves and her children, Luz Anatolia Crispino and Caridad Echaves Reese. Later, Anatolia filed a case seeking to revoke these transfers, claiming they were made without consideration and intended only as trusts. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Anatolia, declaring her as the rightful owner and ordering the cancellation of the titles issued to the Echaves family. The Echaves family appealed, and during the appeal, they sought to introduce a new piece of evidence: an affidavit allegedly executed by Anatolia, confirming the previous sales. This motion to introduce new evidence became the central legal issue.

    The Court of Appeals denied the motion, treating it as a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, which it deemed inadmissible under the circumstances. The central question before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to admit the affidavit as new evidence and whether its power to grant new trials was limited to cases involving newly discovered evidence. This involved interpreting Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, which outlines the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

    Before delving into the substantive issues, the Supreme Court addressed a procedural matter raised by the respondent. The respondent argued that the petitioners should have challenged the Court of Appeals’ denial of their motion to remand through a special civil action for certiorari, rather than waiting to appeal the final decision. The Supreme Court clarified the distinction between final and interlocutory orders. A final order disposes of the case entirely, while an interlocutory order resolves only incidental matters, leaving the court with further tasks to adjudicate the merits of the case. The Court emphasized that while certiorari is an available remedy for interlocutory orders, it is not the exclusive one. Such orders can be reviewed as part of an appeal from the final judgment, as was the course taken by the petitioners.

    Turning to the substantive issues, the Supreme Court examined whether the Court of Appeals correctly treated the petitioners’ motion to remand as a motion for a new trial. The petitioners argued that their motion should have been considered under the Court of Appeals’ expanded power to receive evidence under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The Court acknowledged this expanded jurisdiction, which empowers the Court of Appeals to receive evidence and perform acts necessary to resolve factual issues in cases within its jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that this power is not absolute. It is qualified by the Court of Appeals’ internal rules, which delineate specific instances when evidence may be received.

    The Court cited Republic v. Mupas, highlighting that the Court of Appeals’ power to receive evidence is indeed qualified by its internal rules. In ordinary appeals like the one at hand, the Court of Appeals may only admit newly discovered evidence. This approach contrasts with special civil actions, such as certiorari, where the Court of Appeals has broader discretion to receive evidence and make factual determinations. The Supreme Court then considered whether the affidavit presented by the petitioners qualified as newly discovered evidence under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court.

    To qualify as newly discovered evidence, the evidence must meet two key criteria. First, it must be shown that the evidence could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the lower court through the exercise of due diligence. Second, it must be of such a character that it would probably change the result of the case. While the affidavit in this case was executed after the Regional Trial Court’s decision, thus satisfying the first criterion, it failed to meet the second. The Supreme Court reasoned that even if the affidavit were admitted, it would not necessarily alter the outcome of the case.

    The validity of the deeds of sale, the core issue, is determined by legal principles, not merely by the parties’ subsequent affirmations. The Court of Appeals could assess the validity of the sales independently of the affidavit. Furthermore, the Supreme Court underscored that allowing parties to introduce new evidence without proper limitations would lead to endless litigation. The procedural rules and internal guidelines of the Court of Appeals serve to maintain order, fairness, and finality in the judicial process.

    In light of these considerations, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision, finding that the affidavit did not constitute newly discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial. This ruling reinforces the importance of presenting all available evidence during the initial trial and underscores the limited circumstances under which appellate courts will consider new evidence. This also reiterates that the expediency of the court is as equally important with the rights of the parties.

    FAQs

    What was the central issue in this case? The central issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to admit an affidavit as new evidence during the appeal and whether its power to grant new trials is limited to cases involving newly discovered evidence. This hinged on the interpretation of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and the internal rules of the Court of Appeals.
    What is an interlocutory order? An interlocutory order is a court order that resolves preliminary or incidental matters during a case but does not fully resolve the entire case. Unlike a final order, an interlocutory order leaves further issues to be decided by the court.
    What is ‘newly discovered evidence’ in legal terms? ‘Newly discovered evidence’ refers to evidence that (1) could not have been discovered before the trial in the lower court with reasonable diligence and (2) is of such a character that it would probably change the outcome of the case if presented. Both conditions must be met for evidence to be considered ‘newly discovered.’
    Why did the Supreme Court deny the admission of the affidavit? The Supreme Court denied the admission of the affidavit because, while it was created after the trial court’s decision, it was not of such a character that would probably change the result of the case. The court reasoned that the validity of the deeds of sale could be determined independently of the affidavit.
    What is the significance of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129? Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, outlines the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, including its power to receive evidence and conduct new trials. However, this power is subject to the Court of Appeals’ internal rules, which limit the circumstances under which new evidence can be admitted.
    Can an interlocutory order be appealed? An interlocutory order cannot be directly appealed. However, it can be questioned as part of an appeal from the final judgment rendered in the case.
    What is a motion to remand? A motion to remand is a request to send a case back to a lower court for further proceedings. In this case, the petitioners sought to remand the case to the trial court to present the new affidavit.
    What are the implications of this ruling for property disputes? This ruling underscores the importance of presenting all relevant evidence during the initial trial phase of property disputes. It clarifies that appellate courts will only consider new evidence in limited circumstances, such as when a new trial is granted based on newly discovered evidence that would likely alter the outcome.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Crispino v. Tansay provides valuable guidance on the admissibility of new evidence in appellate proceedings. It clarifies the scope of the Court of Appeals’ power to receive evidence and emphasizes the importance of adhering to procedural rules and internal guidelines. This case serves as a reminder that thorough preparation and presentation of evidence at the trial level are critical for success in legal disputes.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: LUZ ANATOLIA E. CRISPINO vs. ANATOLIA TANSAY, G.R. No. 184466, December 05, 2016

  • Investment Contracts and SEC Jurisdiction: Protecting Investors Through Regulation

    The Supreme Court ruled that a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against CJH Development Corporation and CJH Suites Corporation for selling unregistered investment contracts was an interlocutory order and not appealable. The Court emphasized that the SEC has primary jurisdiction over cases involving the sale of securities, and parties must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention. This decision reinforces the SEC’s authority to protect the investing public from potentially fraudulent schemes by ensuring compliance with the Securities Regulation Code.

    Condotels and Contracts: Is a ‘Leaseback’ a Security Requiring SEC Oversight?

    The case revolves around CJH Development Corporation (CJHDC) and its subsidiary, CJH Suites Corporation (CJHSC), which were selling condotel units in Baguio City under two schemes: a straight purchase and sale, and a sale with a “leaseback” or “money-back” arrangement. The Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), suspecting that the “leaseback” and “money-back” schemes were unregistered investment contracts, requested the SEC to investigate. The SEC’s investigation led to a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) against CJHDC and CJHSC, halting the sale of these condotel units until proper registration was completed. This order was challenged by CJHDC and CJHSC, leading to a legal battle concerning the SEC’s jurisdiction, the nature of the CDO, and the definition of an investment contract.

    The central legal question is whether the “leaseback” and “money-back” arrangements offered by CJHDC and CJHSC constitute investment contracts, which are considered securities under the Securities Regulation Code (SRC). The definition of a security is critical because the SRC mandates that all securities must be registered with the SEC before being offered or sold to the public. This registration requirement is designed to protect investors by ensuring that they have access to adequate information about the investment and the issuer. The SEC’s determination that the arrangements were unregistered securities triggered the issuance of the CDO.

    The Supreme Court underscored that the SEC’s CDO was an **interlocutory order**, which is a provisional decision that does not fully resolve the controversy. As the Court stated, “The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy.” Therefore, it’s not immediately appealable. The Court emphasized that an interlocutory order “merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case.” The SEC’s CDO, being based on prima facie evidence, falls under this category, as it allows for further evidence and hearings to determine the ultimate validity of the claims.

    Building on this, the Court cited the SEC’s own rules of procedure to reinforce the non-appealable nature of a CDO. Section 10-8 of the 2006 Rules of Procedure of the Commission explicitly states:

    SEC. 10-8. Prohibitions. – No pleading, motion or submission in any form that may prevent the resolution of an application for a CDO by the Commission shall be entertained except under Rule XII herein. A CDO when issued, shall not be the subject of an appeal and no appeal from it will be entertained; Provided, however, that an order by the Director of the Operating Department denying the motion to lift a CDO may be appealed to the Commission En Banc through the O[ffice of the] G[eneral] C[ounsel].

    This rule clearly indicates that the proper recourse for parties subject to a CDO is to file a motion to lift the order, rather than immediately appealing to the Court of Appeals. By failing to file this motion, CJHDC and CJHSC did not exhaust the administrative remedies available to them.

    The doctrine of **exhaustion of administrative remedies** requires parties to pursue all available avenues for relief within the administrative system before resorting to judicial intervention. The Court reiterated the rationale behind this doctrine, stating, “Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.” This ensures that administrative agencies are given the opportunity to correct their own errors and resolve disputes within their area of expertise.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the determination of whether the “leaseback” and “money-back” schemes constituted investment contracts required the specialized knowledge and expertise of the SEC. This aligns with the doctrine of **primary administrative jurisdiction**, which holds that courts should defer to administrative agencies on matters that fall within their regulatory competence. The Court reasoned that the SEC, as the agency tasked with enforcing the SRC, is best equipped to determine whether the schemes meet the definition of a security and whether their sale should be regulated.

    CJHDC and CJHSC argued that the SEC’s investigation violated their right to due process. However, the Court rejected this argument, citing Sections 64.1 and 64.2 of the SRC, which allow the SEC to issue a CDO motu proprio (on its own initiative) if it believes that an act or practice, unless restrained, will operate as a fraud on investors or cause grave injury to the investing public. In Primanila Plans, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Court clarified:

    The law is clear on the point that a cease and desist order may be issued by the SEC motu proprio, it being unnecessary that it results from a verified complaint from an aggrieved party. A prior hearing is also not required whenever the Commission finds it appropriate to issue a cease and desist order that aims to curtail fraud or grave or irreparable injury to investors. There is good reason for this provision, as any delay in the restraint of acts that yield such results can only generate further injury to the public that the SEC is obliged to protect.

    The Court emphasized that due process is satisfied as long as the company is apprised of the results of the SEC investigation and given a reasonable opportunity to present its defense. In this case, CJHDC and CJHSC had the opportunity to file a motion to lift the CDO, which would have allowed them to present evidence and arguments against the SEC’s findings.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the SEC’s critical role in protecting investors and regulating the securities market. By affirming the non-appealable nature of interlocutory CDOs and emphasizing the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction, the Court has reinforced the SEC’s authority to act swiftly and decisively to prevent potential fraud and protect the investing public. This decision serves as a reminder to companies offering investment opportunities to ensure compliance with the SRC and to exhaust all available administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention.

    FAQs

    What is a Cease and Desist Order (CDO)? A CDO is an order issued by the SEC directing a person or entity to stop a particular activity that the SEC believes violates securities laws. It is often issued to prevent ongoing or potential harm to investors.
    What does “interlocutory order” mean? An interlocutory order is a temporary decision made during a case that doesn’t resolve the entire dispute. It’s like a preliminary step that addresses a specific issue but leaves the main case unresolved.
    What is an investment contract? An investment contract is a type of security where a person invests money in a common enterprise and expects profits solely from the efforts of others. These contracts are subject to regulation under the Securities Regulation Code.
    Why did the SEC issue a CDO in this case? The SEC issued the CDO because it believed that CJHDC and CJHSC were selling unregistered investment contracts in the form of “leaseback” and “money-back” arrangements. Selling unregistered securities is a violation of the Securities Regulation Code.
    What is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies? This doctrine requires parties to first pursue all available remedies within an administrative agency before seeking relief from the courts. It ensures that agencies have the chance to correct their own errors.
    What is the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction? This doctrine states that courts should defer to administrative agencies on matters that fall within their regulatory competence and require specialized expertise. It prevents courts from interfering in areas where agencies have specific knowledge and experience.
    What should CJHDC and CJHSC have done after the CDO was issued? Instead of immediately appealing to the Court of Appeals, CJHDC and CJHSC should have filed a motion to lift the CDO with the SEC. This would have given them the opportunity to present evidence and arguments against the SEC’s findings.
    Can the SEC issue a CDO without a prior hearing? Yes, the SEC can issue a CDO without a prior hearing if it believes that an act or practice, unless restrained, will operate as a fraud on investors or cause grave injury to the investing public. However, the affected party must be given an opportunity to be heard after the order is issued.

    This ruling clarifies the process for challenging SEC orders and reinforces the importance of adhering to administrative procedures before seeking judicial review. Companies must ensure they comply with securities regulations and understand the proper channels for addressing regulatory concerns.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION vs. CJH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 210316, November 28, 2016

  • Cease and Desist Orders: SEC’s Authority and the Limits of Judicial Intervention

    The Supreme Court ruled that a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is an interlocutory order and, therefore, not immediately appealable. The Court emphasized that parties must first exhaust all administrative remedies, such as filing a motion to lift the CDO with the SEC, before seeking judicial intervention. This decision reinforces the SEC’s primary jurisdiction over cases involving securities regulation and protects the investing public by ensuring swift action against potentially fraudulent activities, without premature disruption from the courts.

    John Hay Echoes: Can Condotel ‘Leasebacks’ Bypass Securities Laws?

    This case revolves around CJH Development Corporation (CJHDC) and its subsidiary, CJH Suites Corporation (CJHSC), which offered condotel units for sale in Baguio City under schemes called “leaseback” and “money-back” arrangements. The Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) raised concerns that these schemes were essentially unregistered investment contracts, prompting the SEC to investigate. After investigation, the SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) against CJHDC and CJHSC, halting their sale of condotel units. The central legal question is whether these leaseback arrangements constitute the sale of unregistered securities, thus falling under the regulatory purview of the SEC.

    The Supreme Court emphasized the interlocutory nature of a CDO, clarifying that such an order is provisional and subject to further determination based on evidence presented by both parties. The Court highlighted the principle that appeals can only be made against final orders, not interlocutory ones, to prevent delays in the administration of justice. In this instance, the CDO was issued based on prima facie evidence, meaning the SEC’s findings could still be disproven. As such, the CDO was deemed temporary and not a final determination on the matter.

    The Court cited Section 10-8 of the SEC’s 2006 Rules of Procedure, which explicitly prohibits appeals against CDOs. This rule underscores the SEC’s authority to swiftly address potential violations of securities laws without being hampered by premature judicial intervention. Furthermore, Section 10-5 of the same rules outlines the process for making a CDO permanent, thereby reinforcing its temporary nature and providing a pathway for affected parties to present their case to the SEC.

    The decision also underscores the importance of exhausting administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. The Court noted that CJHDC and CJHSC failed to file a motion to lift the CDO with the SEC, a remedy specifically provided under Section 64.3 of the Securities Regulation Code (SRC) and Section 10-3 of the SEC’s Rules of Procedure.

    “Any person against whom a cease and desist order was issued may, within five (5) days from receipt of the order, file a formal request for a lifting thereof. Said request shall be set for hearing by the Commission not later than fifteen (15) days from its filing and the resolution thereof shall be made not later than ten (10) days from the termination of the hearing. If the Commission fails to resolve the request within the time herein prescribed, the cease and desist order shall automatically be lifted.”

    This provision offers an avenue for parties to present evidence and arguments against the CDO before resorting to the courts.

    The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction further supports the Court’s decision. This doctrine dictates that courts should defer to administrative agencies when the matter requires the agency’s specialized knowledge and expertise. In this case, determining whether the condotel leaseback schemes constitute investment contracts falls squarely within the SEC’s expertise. The Court emphasized that the SEC is tasked with enforcing the SRC and its implementing rules, making it the appropriate body to initially resolve this issue.

    The Court also addressed the issue of due process, rejecting the argument that CJHDC and CJHSC were denied their right to be heard. Sections 64.1 and 64.2 of the SRC authorize the SEC to issue CDOs motu proprio (on its own initiative) and without a prior hearing, if it deems that the act or practice would operate as a fraud on investors or cause grave injury to the investing public.

    “The Commission, after proper investigation or verification, motu proprio, or upon verified complaint by any aggrieved party, may issue a cease and desist order without the necessity of a prior hearing if in its judgment the act or practice, unless restrained, will operate as a fraud on investors or is otherwise likely to cause grave or irreparable injury or prejudice to the investing public.”

    The Supreme Court referenced Primanila Plans, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, reiterating that a prior hearing is not always required for issuing a CDO. Due process is satisfied as long as the affected party is informed of the SEC’s findings and given an opportunity to present a defense, which CJHDC and CJHSC could have done through a motion to lift the CDO.

    Finally, the Court affirmed the SEC’s finding that selling unregistered securities operates as a fraud on investors. Section 8.1 of the SRC mandates the registration of securities before they are sold or offered for sale, ensuring that prospective buyers have access to essential information. By selling unregistered securities, CJHDC and CJHSC deceived the investing public into believing they had the authority to deal in such securities, thereby undermining investor protection.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) issued by the SEC is immediately appealable to the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court ruled it is not, as it is an interlocutory order.
    What is a Cease and Desist Order (CDO)? A CDO is an order issued by the SEC to halt certain activities that are believed to violate securities laws. It is a temporary measure to prevent potential harm to investors while the SEC investigates further.
    Why is a CDO considered an interlocutory order? A CDO is considered interlocutory because it is provisional and does not represent a final determination on the merits of the case. It is subject to further review and potential modification after a hearing.
    What does it mean to exhaust administrative remedies? Exhausting administrative remedies means using all available procedures within an administrative agency before seeking judicial intervention. In this case, it means filing a motion to lift the CDO with the SEC before appealing to the courts.
    What is the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction? This doctrine states that courts should defer to administrative agencies when the issue requires the agency’s specialized knowledge and expertise. This ensures that technical matters are resolved by those with the appropriate competence.
    Does the SEC need to conduct a hearing before issuing a CDO? No, the SEC can issue a CDO without a prior hearing if it believes that the act or practice will operate as a fraud on investors or cause grave injury to the investing public. However, the affected party has the right to request a hearing to lift the CDO.
    What is an investment contract according to securities law? An investment contract is an agreement where a person invests money in a common enterprise and expects to earn profits primarily from the efforts of others. These contracts are considered securities and are subject to registration requirements.
    What happens if a company sells securities without registering them? Selling unregistered securities violates the Securities Regulation Code and can result in a Cease and Desist Order from the SEC. It also operates as a fraud on investors because it deprives them of crucial information about the securities.

    This case reinforces the SEC’s critical role in protecting the investing public and clarifies the boundaries of judicial intervention in securities regulation. By emphasizing the interlocutory nature of CDOs and the importance of exhausting administrative remedies, the Supreme Court ensures that the SEC can effectively address potential violations of securities laws. This decision also serves as a reminder to companies offering investment schemes to comply with registration requirements and avoid practices that could be construed as fraudulent.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: SEC vs CJH Development Corporation, G.R. No. 210316, November 28, 2016