ASG Law

Tag: Labor Law

  • Illegal Dismissal: Proving Just Cause at the Time of Termination

    The Supreme Court ruled that an employer must demonstrate just cause for dismissing an employee with substantial evidence available at the time of termination, not later. In this case, the employer’s failure to prove the employee’s alleged misconduct before dismissing her resulted in a finding of illegal dismissal. This decision underscores the importance of due process and the need for employers to thoroughly investigate and substantiate claims against employees before taking disciplinary action, safeguarding workers’ rights against arbitrary termination.

    Forced Out or Jumping Ship? Unraveling an Illegal Dismissal Claim

    This case revolves around Maria Rosario Casas’s departure from Brown Madonna Press Inc. (BMPI), where she served as Vice President for Finance and Administration. Casas claimed she was forced to leave her job, while BMPI argued she requested a graceful exit to avoid an administrative investigation. The central legal question is whether Casas was illegally dismissed, requiring the employer to prove just cause with evidence available at the time of termination.

    The legal battle began when Casas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims after her employment with BMPI ended abruptly. The Labor Arbiter (LA) initially dismissed her complaint, finding that she had abandoned her post. However, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the LA’s decision, concluding that Casas had been illegally dismissed without just cause or due process. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the NLRC’s ruling, leading BMPI to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.

    At the heart of the dispute is the question of whether Casas voluntarily resigned or was terminated by BMPI. The Supreme Court emphasized that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal. To do so, the employee must first present substantial evidence that they were indeed dismissed from employment. The Court scrutinized the evidence presented by both parties, including a clearance and quitclaim document and Casas’s letter requesting reconsideration of her termination.

    The Supreme Court highlighted that employers who claim an employee resigned voluntarily must prove the resignation was indeed voluntary. Resignation requires a clear intent to relinquish one’s position, accompanied by actions demonstrating that intent. In this case, BMPI failed to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim that Casas voluntarily resigned. They did not present a resignation letter, and Casas’s subsequent actions, such as seeking reinstatement and filing an illegal dismissal case, contradicted the idea that she intended to leave her job.

    Furthermore, the Court examined whether BMPI complied with the procedural requirements for dismissing an employee. The Labor Code requires employers to provide written notice of the grounds for dismissal and to give the employee an opportunity to be heard. BMPI failed to provide Casas with any written notice or a chance to defend herself against the allegations against her. This lack of procedural due process further supported the finding of illegal dismissal.

    The Court also addressed the issue of whether there was just cause for dismissing Casas. BMPI alleged that Casas had committed various infractions, including mismanagement of company assets. However, the Court emphasized that just cause must be proven with substantial evidence at the time of the dismissal. In this case, BMPI had not yet substantiated the allegations against Casas when they terminated her employment. Therefore, the Court concluded that there was no just cause for her dismissal.

    The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, holding that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that Casas had been illegally dismissed. The Court emphasized the importance of protecting employees’ security of tenure and ensuring that employers comply with due process requirements when terminating employment. The Court underscored that just cause for dismissal must be proven with substantial evidence at the time of the dismissal, not after the fact.

    The ruling serves as a reminder to employers of their obligations under the Labor Code to provide due process and to have sufficient evidence before terminating an employee. It also highlights the importance of documenting the reasons for dismissal and providing employees with an opportunity to respond to allegations against them. Failure to comply with these requirements can result in a finding of illegal dismissal and significant financial penalties for the employer.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Maria Rosario Casas was illegally dismissed by Brown Madonna Press Inc. (BMPI) or if she voluntarily resigned. The court focused on whether BMPI had just cause for dismissal at the time of termination and followed proper procedure.
    What is considered substantial evidence in illegal dismissal cases? Substantial evidence means relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence and must be credible and convincing.
    What are the two notices required for a valid dismissal? The two-notice rule requires the employer to issue a first notice informing the employee of the grounds for dismissal and a second notice informing the employee of the decision to dismiss. The employee must be given an opportunity to be heard between the two notices.
    What happens if an employer fails to comply with the procedural requirements for dismissal? If an employer fails to comply with the procedural requirements, the dismissal may be deemed illegal, even if there is just cause. The employer may be required to pay damages to the employee.
    What is the difference between just cause and authorized cause for dismissal? Just cause refers to reasons related to the employee’s conduct or performance, such as misconduct or negligence. Authorized cause refers to economic or business-related reasons, such as redundancy or retrenchment.
    What is the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases? The employer bears the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause and that the employee was afforded due process. The employee must first show they were dismissed.
    What remedies are available to an employee who has been illegally dismissed? An employee who has been illegally dismissed may be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority, backwages, and other benefits. They may also be awarded damages, such as moral and exemplary damages.
    What constitutes voluntary resignation? Voluntary resignation is the formal relinquishment of a position or office. It requires a clear intent to resign, free from coercion or undue influence, and must be supported by actions demonstrating the intent to leave.
    Can a Clearance and Quitclaim document validate an illegal dismissal? No, a Clearance and Quitclaim document cannot validate an illegal dismissal if it was signed under duress or without full understanding of the employee’s rights. The document is scrutinized by courts to ensure fairness.
    What role does the NLRC play in illegal dismissal cases? The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is a quasi-judicial body that handles labor disputes, including illegal dismissal cases. It reviews decisions of Labor Arbiters and its decisions can be appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case reinforces the importance of due process and the need for employers to substantiate allegations against employees before termination. Employers must ensure they have sufficient evidence of just cause at the time of dismissal and follow the required procedural steps to avoid liability for illegal dismissal.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: BROWN MADONNA PRESS INC. VS. MARIA ROSARIO M. CASAS, G.R. No. 200898, June 15, 2015

  • Illegal Dismissal: Requisites for Abandonment and Computation of Separation Pay

    The Supreme Court ruled that Dominador B. Sanchez was illegally dismissed by Litex Glass and Aluminum Supply. The court emphasized that for abandonment to be valid, there must be a clear intention to sever the employment relationship, which was not proven in Sanchez’s case. The decision clarifies the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases and sets a precedent for calculating separation pay based on substantiated employment dates.

    Abandonment or Afterthought? Unraveling an Illegal Dismissal Claim

    This case revolves around Dominador B. Sanchez’s complaint against Litex Glass and Aluminum Supply (Litex) and Ronald Ong-Sitco (Ong-Sitco) for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits. Sanchez claimed he was constructively dismissed after an altercation, while Litex argued he abandoned his job. The central legal question is whether Sanchez abandoned his employment or was illegally dismissed, and if illegally dismissed, what remedies are available to him.

    Litex argued that Sanchez abandoned his employment by failing to report for work after receiving “show-cause” letters. However, the Court found that Sanchez made several attempts to clarify his employment status, which Ong-Sitco ignored. These attempts, coupled with the timing of the show-cause letters—sent after Sanchez filed the complaint—indicated that the letters were a mere afterthought. As the Supreme Court stated in Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals:

    Filing of a complaint negates any intention of abandoning foregoing employment.

    To prove abandonment, employers must demonstrate that the employee failed to report for work without valid reason and had a clear intention to sever the employment relationship. Mere failure to report for work after notice does not constitute abandonment. Litex failed to provide convincing evidence of Sanchez’s intent to abandon his job, leading the Court to conclude that he was illegally dismissed. The absence of a valid ground for dismissal further solidified the Court’s decision.

    Article 279 of the Labor Code provides remedies for illegally dismissed employees, including reinstatement and backwages. However, reinstatement may not always be feasible, especially when strained relations exist between the employer and employee. As explained in Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission:

    When an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism has already strained the relations between the employer and employee, separation pay is to be awarded as reinstatement can no longer be equitably effected.

    In this case, the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the altercation between Sanchez and Ong-Sitco created a strained relationship, making separation pay an appropriate remedy. While separation pay was not initially sought in the complaint, Sanchez’s acceptance of the award implied his consent. However, a dispute arose concerning the computation of separation pay, specifically the commencement date of Sanchez’s employment. The Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals based their computation on 1994, relying on an SSS certification indicating contributions since 1996.

    The Supreme Court, however, clarified that the burden of proof lies on the employee to substantiate their claim of employment. The Court emphasized that, as stated in L.C. Ordoñez Construction v. Nicdao, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegation and must prove his claim by competent evidence. Sanchez failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove his employment with Litex or related companies before April 2002. The SSS certification only indicated SSS coverage starting in 1996, without specifying the employer. Consequently, the Court determined that the separation pay should be computed from April 2002, when Litex was officially registered.

    In addition to separation pay and backwages, the Court upheld the award of attorney’s fees. As highlighted in Maglasang v. Northwestern University, Inc.:

    An award of attorney’s fees is proper if one was forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect one’s rights and interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission on the part of the party from whom the award is sought.

    Since Sanchez was compelled to litigate to protect his rights due to Litex’s illegal dismissal, the award of attorney’s fees was deemed appropriate.

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Dominador B. Sanchez was illegally dismissed or had abandoned his job, and if illegally dismissed, what remedies were available to him. The computation of separation pay was also a point of contention.
    What is required to prove abandonment of employment? To prove abandonment, the employer must show that the employee failed to report for work without valid reason and had a clear intention to sever the employment relationship. Mere failure to report for work after notice is insufficient.
    What is the significance of the “show-cause” letters in this case? The timing of the show-cause letters, sent after Sanchez filed a complaint, suggested they were a mere afterthought to cover up the illegal dismissal. This timing undermined Litex’s claim that Sanchez had abandoned his job.
    When is separation pay awarded instead of reinstatement? Separation pay is awarded when reinstatement is no longer feasible due to strained relations between the employer and employee. This often occurs when there has been significant conflict or animosity.
    What evidence is needed to prove the date of employment for separation pay computation? The employee must provide competent evidence, such as employment contracts, company records, or credible testimony, to substantiate their claimed date of employment. SSS contributions alone are insufficient to prove the employment start date.
    Why was attorney’s fees awarded in this case? Attorney’s fees were awarded because Sanchez was forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his rights due to Litex’s unjustified act of illegal dismissal.
    What was the final ruling of the Supreme Court? The Supreme Court affirmed that Sanchez was illegally dismissed and entitled to separation pay, backwages, and attorney’s fees. However, the Court modified the computation of separation pay to be reckoned from April 2002, the date Litex was registered.
    How does this case affect employers? This case reminds employers of the importance of following proper procedures in termination and documenting employee infractions. It also emphasizes the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases.
    How does this case affect employees? This case clarifies the rights of employees who are illegally dismissed and the remedies available to them. It also highlights the importance of maintaining accurate records of employment.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Litex Glass and Aluminum Supply v. Sanchez serves as a crucial reminder of the legal standards for proving job abandonment and calculating separation pay. This case underscores the importance of documenting employment relationships and following due process in termination cases. This ruling reinforces employees’ rights against illegal dismissal and provides clarity on the evidentiary requirements for claiming benefits.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: LITEX GLASS AND ALUMINUM SUPPLY vs. SANCHEZ, G.R. No. 198465, April 22, 2015

  • Automatic Disqualification: Safeguarding OFWs by Vetting Errant Recruitment Agencies

    In a crucial decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the power of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to automatically disqualify officers and directors of recruitment agencies whose licenses have been canceled due to violations of recruitment laws. This ruling reinforces the State’s commitment to protecting overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) from exploitation by ensuring that individuals found guilty of misconduct in the recruitment industry are barred from further participation. The decision underscores the principle that operating a recruitment agency is a privilege, not a right, and the government has the authority to regulate and safeguard the interests of vulnerable OFWs.

    Closing Doors: Can POEA Automatically Disqualify Errant Recruitment Agency Directors?

    The Republic, represented by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the POEA, filed a petition against Humanlink Manpower Consultants, Inc., questioning the Court of Appeals’ (CA) ruling that the POEA lacked the power to automatically disqualify Humanlink’s officers and directors from participating in the overseas employment program. The case originated from a complaint filed by Renelson L. Carlos, an OFW who alleged that Humanlink and Worldview International Services Corporation had violated POEA rules by charging excessive fees, failing to issue receipts, and engaging in misrepresentation. The POEA found Humanlink liable and, in addition to canceling its license, disqualified its officers and directors from participating in the overseas employment program. The CA upheld the finding of liability and cancellation of the license but reversed the disqualification of the officers and directors, deeming it a violation of due process and an overreach of the POEA’s supervisory powers.

    The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals, emphasizing the crucial role of the POEA and DOLE in regulating the recruitment, placement, and deployment of overseas workers. While the State acknowledges the economic contributions of OFWs, it does not promote overseas employment as the sole means of economic growth. Recognizing the vulnerability of OFWs to exploitation, the State has established specialized bodies like the POEA to protect their interests. The POEA’s authority to regulate private sector participation in overseas worker recruitment and placement is enshrined in Article 25 of the Labor Code, which states that private entities participate under guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor.

    This authority is further reinforced by Article 35 of the Labor Code and Section 23(b.1) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 9422. These provisions empower the DOLE and POEA to suspend or cancel licenses for violations of rules and regulations. In Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, the Supreme Court affirmed the POEA’s power to cancel licenses of agencies that fail to adhere to regulations. These regulations include the POEA Rules and Regulations, which outline the qualifications and disqualifications for private sector involvement in the overseas employment program.

    Sections 1 and 2, Rule I, Part II of the POEA Rules and Regulations detail these qualifications and disqualifications. Section 1 specifies that only individuals without the disqualifications listed in Section 2 may participate in overseas Filipino worker recruitment and placement. Section 2 lists those disqualified:

    Section 2. Disqualification. The following are not qualified to engage in the business of recruitment and placement of Filipino workers overseas.

    f. Persons or partners, officers and Directors of corporations whose licenses have been previously cancelled or revoked for violation of recruitment laws. (Emphases supplied)

    Therefore, the Court reasoned that upon the cancellation of a license, officers and directors of the involved corporations are automatically barred from engaging in overseas Filipino worker recruitment and placement. The granting of a license constitutes a privilege, not a right, thus making it subject to regulatory powers. The Supreme Court emphasized the need to prevent exploitation of vulnerable overseas workers.

    The Court also noted the importance of interpreting the POEA Rules and Regulations as a whole, rather than isolating specific provisions. This holistic approach ensures that the rules achieve their intended purpose and protect OFWs from unscrupulous recruitment practices.

    The Supreme Court stated that the absence of an explicit statement from the POEA or DOLE regarding the disqualification of officers and directors does not alter the legal effect of the license cancellation. The disqualification is automatic upon cancellation, irrespective of whether the POEA or DOLE expressly mentions it in their decision. This reflects the principle of Dura lex sed lex – the law is harsh, but it is the law.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? Whether the POEA has the power to automatically disqualify officers and directors from participating in the government’s overseas employment program upon the cancellation of a recruitment agency’s license.
    What did the Supreme Court decide? The Supreme Court ruled that the POEA does have the power to automatically disqualify officers and directors of recruitment agencies whose licenses have been cancelled due to violations of recruitment laws. This is to protect vulnerable OFWs from potential exploitation.
    What happens when a recruitment agency’s license is cancelled? Upon cancellation of a recruitment agency’s license, the persons, officers, and directors of the concerned corporations are automatically prohibited from engaging in recruiting and placement of land-based overseas Filipino workers. This is a consequence of the rules and regulations set by POEA.
    Is the grant of a recruitment license a right or a privilege? The grant of a license is considered a privilege and not a right, making it a proper subject of the government’s regulatory powers. The government has the authority to regulate and safeguard the interests of vulnerable OFWs.
    What laws and regulations are involved in this case? The case involves the Labor Code of the Philippines, Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), and the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers. These laws and regulations aim to protect OFWs from exploitation.
    What was the basis for the disqualification of officers and directors? The disqualification is based on Section 2(f), Rule I, Part II of the POEA Rules and Regulations, which states that persons, partners, officers, and directors of corporations whose licenses have been previously cancelled or revoked for violation of recruitment laws are not qualified to engage in the business of recruitment and placement of Filipino workers overseas.
    What was the original complaint against Humanlink about? The original complaint alleged that Humanlink and Worldview violated POEA rules by charging excessive fees, failing to issue receipts, and engaging in misrepresentation in connection with the recruitment and placement of workers.
    Did the Court of Appeals agree with the POEA’s decision? The Court of Appeals agreed with the POEA’s finding that Humanlink had violated POEA rules and that its license should be cancelled. However, the CA disagreed with the POEA’s decision to automatically disqualify Humanlink’s officers and directors from participating in the overseas employment program.

    This ruling serves as a stern warning to recruitment agencies and their officers and directors, reinforcing the government’s commitment to protecting OFWs from unscrupulous practices. The automatic disqualification serves as a deterrent against violations and ensures that those who have abused the system are prevented from further harming vulnerable workers. The Supreme Court decision strengthens the regulatory framework governing overseas employment and reaffirms the State’s duty to safeguard the rights and welfare of Filipino migrant workers.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Republic vs. Humanlink Manpower Consultants, Inc., G.R. No. 205188, April 22, 2015

  • Perfecting Appeals: The Strict Requirements for Employers in Labor Disputes

    In the case of Manila Mining Corporation v. Lowito Amor, et al., the Supreme Court reiterated that employers must strictly adhere to the requirements for perfecting an appeal from a Labor Arbiter’s decision. The Court emphasized that failing to comply with these requirements, such as posting the correct appeal bond and serving the memorandum of appeal on time, results in the Labor Arbiter’s decision becoming final and executory. This means the employer loses the chance to challenge the decision, making it critical for employers to follow appeal procedures meticulously to protect their rights.

    Missed Deadlines and Dishonored Checks: Can Manila Mining Salvage Its Appeal?

    Manila Mining Corporation faced a complaint from its employees, Lowito Amor, et al., who alleged constructive dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the employees, awarding them significant monetary compensation. Dissatisfied with the decision, Manila Mining filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), along with a motion to reduce the appeal bond, claiming financial hardship. However, the employees contested the appeal, pointing out that Manila Mining had served the memorandum of appeal late and that the initial appeal bond check was dishonored due to insufficient funds. The Court of Appeals (CA) sided with the employees, finding that Manila Mining failed to perfect its appeal, leading to the reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. This case highlights the critical importance of understanding and complying with the procedural rules governing labor appeals. The Supreme Court was asked to determine if Manila Mining had, in fact, properly perfected its appeal.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that the right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege, and parties must comply strictly with the rules. Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines specifies that appeals from Labor Arbiter decisions must be filed within ten calendar days. For judgments involving monetary awards, the employer must post a cash or surety bond equivalent to the award amount. Additionally, the appellant must furnish a copy of the appeal memorandum to the other party. These requirements are also detailed in Sections 1, 4, and 6 of Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure.

    The Court found that Manila Mining received the Labor Arbiter’s decision on November 24, 2004, giving them until December 4, 2004, to appeal. Since that date fell on a Saturday, the deadline was extended to the next working day, December 6, 2004. While Manila Mining’s memorandum of appeal was dated December 3, 2004, it was notarized on December 6, 2004. The CA noted that the employees only received their copy of the appeal memorandum on February 7, 2005. However, the Supreme Court clarified that delayed service of the memorandum does not automatically invalidate the appeal if the initial filing was timely. The burden of proof lies with the party claiming the appeal was not perfected, meaning the employees had to prove that Manila Mining’s appeal was filed late. A failure to serve a copy of the memorandum of appeal is considered a formal lapse rather than a jurisdictional defect.

    Building on this, the Court addressed the issue of the appeal bond. Manila Mining had requested a reduction of the bond due to financial difficulties, submitting a check for P100,000.00 with their motion. This check was subsequently dishonored. Manila Mining claimed the dishonor was due to an oversight and replenished the funds later. The Supreme Court referred to the guidelines set in McBurnie v. Ganzon, et al., which requires that motions to reduce the appeal bond must be based on meritorious grounds and accompanied by a reasonable provisional bond.

    In McBurnie, the Supreme Court resolved that filing a motion to reduce an appeal bond is acceptable when: (1) there is a meritorious ground; and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted. A motion shall be accompanied by the posting of a provisional cash or surety bond equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the monetary award subject of the appeal, exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees; Compliance with the foregoing conditions shall suffice to suspend the running of the 10-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal. The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion to reduce bond and determine the final amount of bond that shall be posted by the appellant.

    The Supreme Court noted that Manila Mining’s claim of financial hardship lacked substantiating evidence. While the P100,000.00 could be considered a provisional bond, the fact that the initial check was dishonored was critical. The dishonor rendered the tender ineffective, and Manila Mining only addressed the issue 24 days before the NLRC’s resolution, well after the appeal period had expired. The Court emphasized that posting the correct bond is essential for the NLRC to have jurisdiction over the appeal. Therefore, non-compliance makes the Labor Arbiter’s decision final and executory.

    The Supreme Court upheld the CA’s decision, stating that it could not fault the CA for not reviewing the case’s merits because Manila Mining failed to perfect its appeal. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege, and failure to follow the rules renders the judgment final. Once a decision is final, it becomes the law of the case and cannot be altered. Regarding the constructive dismissal claim, the Court noted that under Article 286 of the Labor Code, an employer can suspend business operations for up to six months without terminating employment. However, if operations do not resume within that period, employment is deemed terminated, requiring the employer to pay separation pay.

    In this case, Manila Mining suspended operations on July 27, 2001, and did not resume within six months, making them liable for separation pay. The Court also noted that Manila Mining did not provide adequate proof of serious business losses or comply with the reportorial requirements under Article 283 of the Labor Code, which would have exempted them from separation pay liabilities. The company’s reliance on a previous case (Rosito Asumen, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.) was also dismissed, as the respondents in this case were not parties to that case. Furthermore, the Supreme Court pointed out that it had previously sustained separation pay claims for Manila Mining’s employees in another case (Manila Mining Corp Employees Association-Federation of Free Workers Chapter, et al. v. Manila Mining Corporation, et al.), demonstrating that these cases are decided on a case-by-case basis.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Manila Mining Corporation had perfected its appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s decision, considering the late service of the appeal memorandum and the dishonored appeal bond check.
    What are the requirements for perfecting an appeal in labor cases? To perfect an appeal, the appealing party must file the appeal within ten calendar days, post a cash or surety bond equivalent to the monetary award, and furnish a copy of the appeal memorandum to the other party.
    What happens if the appeal bond check is dishonored? If the appeal bond check is dishonored, it renders the tender ineffective, and the appealing party must promptly replenish the funds. Failure to do so can result in the appeal not being perfected.
    Can an employer request a reduction of the appeal bond? Yes, an employer can request a reduction of the appeal bond if there are meritorious grounds and a reasonable provisional bond is posted.
    What is the effect of failing to perfect an appeal? If an appeal is not perfected, the Labor Arbiter’s decision becomes final and executory, and the NLRC loses jurisdiction to review the case.
    Under what circumstances can an employer suspend business operations without terminating employment? An employer can suspend business operations for up to six months without terminating employment, provided the employer reinstates the employees to their former positions if operations resume within that period.
    What are the requirements for claiming exemption from separation pay due to business losses? To claim exemption from separation pay due to business losses, the employer must provide proof of serious business losses and comply with the reportorial requirements under Article 283 of the Labor Code.
    How is separation pay computed in cases of constructive dismissal? Separation pay is computed at one month’s pay or at least one-half month’s pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
    What does it mean for a decision to become “final and executory”? When a decision becomes “final and executory,” it means the decision is no longer subject to appeal or modification and must be enforced.

    This case serves as a crucial reminder to employers of the stringent requirements for perfecting labor appeals. Compliance with these rules is not merely a formality but a jurisdictional necessity, and failure to adhere strictly can result in significant financial liabilities. Understanding these obligations is essential for effective labor relations management.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Manila Mining Corporation v. Lowito Amor, et al., G.R. No. 182800, April 20, 2015

  • Fitness to Work Prevails: Seafarer’s Disability Claim Denied Based on Company Doctor’s Assessment

    In a significant ruling for maritime employment law, the Supreme Court has affirmed the primacy of a company-designated physician’s assessment regarding a seafarer’s fitness to work, even after a period exceeding 120 days from repatriation. This decision clarifies that a seafarer’s claim for permanent total disability benefits can be denied if the company doctor declares the seafarer fit to work within a reasonable extended period, and the seafarer fails to secure a binding opinion from a third, jointly-agreed physician. It underscores the importance of adhering to the procedures outlined in the POEA-SEC contract and relevant collective bargaining agreements.

    The High Seas or Dry Dock? Evaluating a Seafarer’s Right to Disability Benefits

    The case of Wilhelmsen-Smith Bell Manning vs. Allan Suarez centered on whether a seafarer, Allan Suarez, was entitled to permanent total disability benefits after being medically repatriated and subsequently declared fit to work by the company-designated physician. Suarez claimed that a kidney ailment he suffered while working on a vessel entitled him to compensation, particularly because he was unable to work for more than 120 days following his repatriation. The petitioners, Wilhelmsen-Smith Bell Manning, contested this claim, arguing that Suarez’s condition was not work-related and that their designated physician had declared him fit to resume his duties. The Supreme Court ultimately sided with the company, setting aside the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstating the Labor Arbiter’s original ruling, which dismissed Suarez’s complaint.

    The core legal question revolved around the interpretation and application of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) and the relevant Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concerning disability claims for seafarers. Specifically, the court had to determine the weight to be given to the assessment of the company-designated physician versus that of a doctor chosen by the seafarer, and how to interpret the 120-day rule in determining permanent total disability. The Supreme Court’s analysis hinged on several key aspects of maritime law and contractual obligations.

    First, the Court addressed the issue of whether Suarez’s illness, hydronephrosis secondary to Ureteropelvic Junction Obstruction (UJO), was work-related. The POEA-SEC stipulates that employers are liable for compensation only when a seafarer suffers a work-related injury or illness during the term of their contract. While UJO is not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, it is disputably presumed to be work-related under Section 20(4). However, this presumption can be overcome. In this case, the company-designated physician certified that Suarez’s illness was not work-related, supported by medical studies indicating that UJO is often a congenital abnormality. This assessment was crucial in the Court’s determination.

    Building on this point, the Supreme Court emphasized the significance of the company-designated physician’s role in determining a seafarer’s fitness to work or degree of disability. According to Section 20(B)3 of the POEA-SEC, it is the company doctor who makes this determination. Moreover, the AMOSUP CBA also specifies that the degree of disability is to be determined by a doctor appointed by the employer. The Court underscored that the POEA-SEC, supplemented by any applicable CBA, constitutes the law between the parties and must be respected. The Labor Arbiter was therefore justified in relying on the company doctor’s assessment, especially given the extensive examination, treatment, and management provided by the company’s physicians.

    “Under Section 20 (B) 3, par. 1 of the POEA-SEC, it is the company-designated physician who determines the fitness to work or the degree of permanent disability of a seafarer who disembarks from the vessel for medical treatment. The AMOSUP CBA likewise provides that ‘the degree of disability which the employer, subject to this Agreement, is liable to pay shall be determined by a doctor appointed by the Employer.’”

    The Court contrasted the thoroughness of the company doctors’ assessment with the limited evaluation conducted by Suarez’s chosen physician, Dr. Jacinto. The Labor Arbiter noted that Dr. Jacinto’s medical certificate was made without proof of any extensive examination and appeared to be based on a single consultation. Given the comprehensive care provided by the company doctors, the Court found Suarez’s one-time consultation with Dr. Jacinto insufficient to outweigh the company doctor’s assessment.

    A central point of contention was the application of the 120-day rule. The NLRC and CA had relied on this rule to conclude that Suarez suffered from permanent total disability because he was unable to work for more than 120 days. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the 120-day rule cannot be applied rigidly and must be considered in light of the parties’ compliance with their contractual duties and obligations.

    The Court cited Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., emphasizing that the degree of a seafarer’s disability cannot be determined solely based on the 120-day rule, disregarding the employment contract, CBA, and applicable laws. It further explained that the 120-day period could be extended up to 240 days if the seafarer requires further medical attention, during which the employer retains the right to declare a permanent partial or total disability. In Suarez’s case, the company-designated physician declared him fit to work 138 days after his repatriation, which fell within the extended 240-day period.

    The POEA-SEC outlines a specific procedure for resolving conflicting medical opinions: “If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on the parties.” The Court noted that Suarez failed to initiate this process, filing a complaint instead of seeking a third, binding opinion. This failure constituted a breach of his contractual obligations and further undermined his claim.

    Section 20 (B) 3:

    Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

    If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on the parties.

    Finally, the Court addressed the issue of disability grading. The POEA-SEC’s Section 32 provides a Schedule of Disability Impediments for Injuries Suffered and Diseases, including Occupational Diseases or Illnesses Contracted. Permanent total disability is classified under Grade 1. The Court emphasized that disability compensation should be determined based on this schedule, not solely on the number of days a seafarer is unable to work. Since Dr. Jacinto did not declare any impediment grading, Suarez’s claim for total disability benefits necessarily failed.

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether a seafarer was entitled to permanent total disability benefits despite being declared fit to work by the company-designated physician within an extended period after repatriation. The case also examined the proper procedure for resolving conflicting medical opinions.
    What is the significance of the company-designated physician’s assessment? The assessment of the company-designated physician is given primacy under the POEA-SEC and relevant CBAs. It is the company doctor who primarily determines the seafarer’s fitness to work or degree of disability.
    What is the 120-day rule, and how does it apply in this case? The 120-day rule refers to the period during which a seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance after sign-off for medical treatment. However, the Court clarified that this rule should not be rigidly applied, and the period can be extended up to 240 days if further medical attention is required, as long as the company doctor makes an assessment within that extended period.
    What should a seafarer do if their personal doctor disagrees with the company doctor’s assessment? According to the POEA-SEC, the seafarer should seek a third, jointly-agreed physician to provide a binding and final opinion. Failure to follow this procedure can undermine the seafarer’s claim.
    What is Ureteropelvic Junction Obstruction (UJO)? UJO is a blockage in the ureter where it connects to the kidney. In this case, it was a key factor as the company argued, supported by medical evidence, that the seafarer’s UJO was a congenital condition, not work-related.
    What constitutes a work-related illness under the POEA-SEC? A work-related illness is one that occurs during the term of the seafarer’s contract and is caused or aggravated by the working conditions on board the vessel. This connection must be established to claim disability benefits.
    What are the implications of this ruling for seafarers? This ruling reinforces the importance of following the procedures outlined in the POEA-SEC and any applicable CBAs when claiming disability benefits. Seafarers should be proactive in seeking a third medical opinion if they disagree with the company doctor’s assessment.
    What is the role of the Schedule of Disability Impediments in Section 32 of the POEA-SEC? This schedule provides a grading system for various disabilities, and compensation is determined based on this grading, rather than solely on the number of days a seafarer is unable to work. Total disability is classified under Grade 1.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Wilhelmsen-Smith Bell Manning vs. Allan Suarez provides crucial guidance on the interpretation and application of maritime employment laws concerning disability benefits for seafarers. It underscores the importance of adhering to contractual procedures and respecting the role of company-designated physicians while also highlighting the seafarer’s right to seek independent medical opinions through the prescribed channels. This case clarifies the interplay between the POEA-SEC, CBAs, and the 120-day rule, promoting a more balanced and predictable framework for resolving disability claims in the maritime industry.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Wilhelmsen-Smith Bell Manning vs. Allan Suarez, G.R. No. 207328, April 20, 2015

  • Perfecting Appeals in Labor Cases: Strict Compliance and Consequences of Non-Compliance

    The Supreme Court held that strict compliance with the procedural requirements for perfecting an appeal from a Labor Arbiter’s decision is mandatory. Failure to adhere to these requirements, such as posting the correct appeal bond and serving the memorandum of appeal on time, results in the decision becoming final and executory. This ruling underscores the importance of meticulously following labor law procedures to ensure the right to appeal is not forfeited.

    Mining Dispute: Did Manila Mining’s Appeal Sink Due to Procedural Flaws?

    Manila Mining Corporation faced a constructive dismissal complaint filed by its employees after a prolonged suspension of operations. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the employees, awarding them separation pay, damages, and attorney’s fees. Manila Mining appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), but the employees argued that the appeal was not perfected due to late filing of the memorandum of appeal and an insufficient appeal bond. The Court of Appeals (CA) sided with the employees, reinstating the Labor Arbiter’s decision. This brought the case to the Supreme Court to determine whether Manila Mining had indeed perfected its appeal.

    The core issue revolves around Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which governs appeals from decisions of the Labor Arbiter. This provision stipulates that appeals must be filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the decision. Moreover, in cases involving monetary awards, the employer must post a cash or surety bond equivalent to the award amount. The Supreme Court emphasized that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a natural right, and must be exercised strictly according to the law. “Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.”

    Section 4, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure further details the requisites for perfecting an appeal. This includes filing the appeal within the reglementary period, verifying the appeal, paying the required fee, posting the bond, and serving a copy of the memorandum of appeal to the other party. The failure to comply with any of these requirements can lead to the dismissal of the appeal. Section 6 of the same rule specifically addresses the bond requirement: “In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The appeal bond shall either be in cash or surety in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees.”

    Manila Mining received the Labor Arbiter’s decision on November 24, 2004, giving them until December 6, 2004, to perfect their appeal, considering the weekend. While the memorandum of appeal was dated December 3, 2004, the fact that the copy intended for the employees was served by registered mail only on February 7, 2005, raised questions about the timeliness of the filing. Although the CA initially focused on the late service of the memorandum, the Supreme Court clarified that the burden of proving the non-perfection of the appeal lies with the party claiming it, in this case, the employees. The Court acknowledged that failure to serve a copy of the memorandum is not a jurisdictional defect and can be considered an excusable neglect.

    However, the more critical issue was the appeal bond. Manila Mining filed a motion to reduce the bond, citing financial losses, and attached a check for P100,000.00, significantly lower than the monetary award of P2,138,190.02. Crucially, this check was dishonored due to insufficient funds. The Supreme Court referenced the guidelines established in McBurnie v. Ganzon, et al., which requires that a motion to reduce the appeal bond be based on meritorious grounds and accompanied by a reasonable amount, typically ten percent (10%) of the monetary award as a provisional bond. “The filing of a motion to reduce appeal bond shall be entertained by the NLRC subject to the following conditions: (1) there is meritorious ground; and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted.”

    Even if the P100,000.00 check was considered a provisional bond, its dishonor rendered the tender ineffectual. Manila Mining only replenished the funds 24 days before the NLRC resolution and 116 days after the appeal period had expired. The Supreme Court emphasized that the posting of a bond is indispensable for the NLRC to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. “Since it is the posting of a cash or surety bond which confers jurisdiction upon the NLRC, the rule is settled that non-compliance is fatal and has the effect of rendering the award final and executory.”

    Given these procedural lapses, the Supreme Court upheld the CA’s decision, finding that Manila Mining failed to perfect its appeal. Consequently, the Labor Arbiter’s decision became final and executory. The Court also addressed Manila Mining’s argument that it should be exempt from paying separation pay due to business losses. The Court reiterated that under Article 286 of the Labor Code, an employer may suspend operations for up to six months. If the suspension exceeds this period, the employees are deemed terminated and entitled to separation pay. In this case, Manila Mining suspended operations beyond six months and failed to provide sufficient proof of serious business losses or comply with the reportorial requirements under Article 283 of the Labor Code.

    The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of providing audited financial documents, such as balance sheets and income tax returns, to substantiate claims of business losses justifying retrenchment or closure. Because of the failure to do so, the liability for separation pay, damages and attorney’s fees were correctly applied. The court stated that, “It is essentially required that the alleged losses in business operations must be proven for, otherwise, said ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who might be merely feigning business losses or reverses in their business ventures in order to ease out employees.”

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Manila Mining Corporation perfected its appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s decision, particularly regarding the timeliness of the appeal and the sufficiency of the appeal bond.
    What is the reglementary period to appeal a Labor Arbiter’s decision? The reglementary period to appeal a Labor Arbiter’s decision is ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the decision.
    What is required for the appeal bond in cases involving monetary awards? In cases involving monetary awards, the employer must post a cash or surety bond equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
    Can an employer file a motion to reduce the appeal bond? Yes, an employer can file a motion to reduce the appeal bond, but it must be based on meritorious grounds and accompanied by a reasonable provisional bond, typically ten percent (10%) of the monetary award.
    What happens if the appeal bond check is dishonored? If the appeal bond check is dishonored, it renders the tender ineffectual, and the employer must promptly replenish the funds. Failure to do so can result in the dismissal of the appeal.
    What happens if a business suspends operations for more than six months? If a business suspends operations for more than six months, the employees are deemed terminated and are entitled to separation pay.
    What proof is required to claim exemption from separation pay due to business losses? To claim exemption from separation pay due to business losses, the employer must provide audited financial documents, such as balance sheets and income tax returns, to substantiate the losses.
    Is the right to appeal a natural right? No, the right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege that must be exercised strictly according to the law.
    What is the effect of failing to perfect an appeal? Failing to perfect an appeal renders the decision final and executory, meaning it can no longer be revised, reviewed, changed, or altered.

    This case serves as a critical reminder for employers to meticulously adhere to the procedural requirements for perfecting an appeal in labor disputes. Failure to comply strictly with these rules can result in the loss of the right to appeal and the enforcement of unfavorable decisions.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Manila Mining Corporation v. Amor, G.R. No. 182800, April 20, 2015

  • Reinstatement During Appeal: Employer’s Obligation to Pay Wages Until Final Reversal

    The Supreme Court has affirmed that employers must continue paying wages to a dismissed employee during the period of appeal, even if the Labor Arbiter’s reinstatement order is eventually reversed by a higher court. This obligation persists until the reversal becomes final and executory, as evidenced by the entry of judgment. This ruling ensures that employees are protected during the appeal process, providing financial support while the case is being reviewed. It underscores the employer’s responsibility to comply with reinstatement orders pending final resolution, thereby safeguarding the employee’s rights and welfare.

    Smart vs. Solidum: Who Pays While A Dismissal Case Winds Through the Courts?

    In this case, Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Jose Leni Z. Solidum, the central question revolves around the employer’s obligation to pay wages and benefits to a dismissed employee during the appeal process. Jose Leni Z. Solidum was initially terminated by Smart Communications, Inc. After Solidum filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, the Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor, ordering his reinstatement and payment of back wages, damages, and attorney’s fees. Smart appealed this decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which eventually reversed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling. However, during the period between the Labor Arbiter’s initial decision and the NLRC’s reversal, Solidum had been receiving wages and benefits pursuant to the reinstatement order.

    The core issue before the Supreme Court was whether Smart was entitled to a refund of the wages and benefits paid to Solidum during the period of appeal, particularly after the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The legal framework for this issue is rooted in Article 223 of the Labor Code, which governs appeals in labor cases and the effects of reinstatement orders pending appeal. This article, along with relevant jurisprudence, shapes the landscape for determining the obligations of employers and the rights of employees during labor disputes.

    The Supreme Court, in its analysis, reaffirmed the principle that an employer is obligated to reinstate and pay the wages of a dismissed employee during the period of appeal, until the reversal by a higher court becomes final and executory. This principle is based on the social justice considerations inherent in labor law, which aim to protect the rights and welfare of employees. The Court emphasized the importance of the entry of judgment as the definitive marker for determining when a decision becomes final and executory. This is because the entry of judgment is the official record that confirms the finality of the decision, after which it becomes immutable and unalterable.

    “The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.” (Juanito A. Garcia vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009)

    Building on this principle, the Court referred to the case of Bago v. NLRC, where it held that employees are entitled to their accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives, and bonuses until the NLRC’s reversal of the labor arbiter’s order of reinstatement becomes final and executory, as shown on the entry of judgment. The Court clarified that the finality of the decision is not necessarily determined by the date of the decision itself, but rather by the date when the decision becomes final and executory, as officially recorded in the entry of judgment. This distinction is crucial because it establishes a clear and objective standard for determining the employer’s obligation to pay wages and benefits during the appeal process.

    In the case at bar, the NLRC’s 29 May 2009 Decision became final and executory on 10 August 2009, as explicitly stated in the entry of judgment. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that Solidum was entitled to the P2,881,335.86 representing his accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives, and bonuses for the period 21 January to 20 July 2009. This ruling underscores the significance of the entry of judgment as the conclusive evidence of the date of finality, which in turn determines the employer’s financial obligations. The Court rejected Smart’s argument that it was entitled to a refund, emphasizing that the obligation to pay continues until the finality of the reversal.

    This approach contrasts with a scenario where the reversal becomes final and executory at an earlier date. Had the entry of judgment indicated an earlier date of finality, Smart’s obligation to pay Solidum would have ceased accordingly. This highlights the importance of closely monitoring the procedural aspects of labor cases, particularly the issuance and content of the entry of judgment, to accurately determine the timeline of financial obligations. The Supreme Court’s decision serves as a clear reminder to employers of their responsibilities under the Labor Code and relevant jurisprudence.

    The practical implications of this decision are significant for both employers and employees. For employers, it means they must be prepared to continue paying wages and benefits to dismissed employees who have been ordered reinstated, even while pursuing an appeal. This can have a substantial financial impact, especially in cases where the appeal process is lengthy. Employers should therefore carefully assess the merits of their appeals and the potential costs associated with ongoing wage payments. Employees, on the other hand, are assured of continued financial support during the appeal process, providing them with a safety net while their case is being reviewed. This helps to level the playing field in labor disputes, ensuring that employees are not unduly disadvantaged by the appeal process.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether an employer is entitled to a refund of wages and benefits paid to a dismissed employee during the period of appeal, after the Labor Arbiter’s reinstatement order is reversed.
    What did the Supreme Court rule? The Supreme Court ruled that the employer is obligated to pay wages and benefits until the reversal of the reinstatement order becomes final and executory, as indicated in the entry of judgment.
    What is an entry of judgment? An entry of judgment is an official record that confirms the date on which a decision becomes final and executory, marking the point at which it is immutable and unalterable.
    Why is the entry of judgment important? The entry of judgment is important because it definitively establishes the timeline for the employer’s obligation to pay wages and benefits during the appeal process.
    What happens if the reversal becomes final earlier? If the reversal becomes final earlier, as indicated by the entry of judgment, the employer’s obligation to pay wages and benefits ceases accordingly.
    What is the basis for this ruling? The ruling is based on Article 223 of the Labor Code and the social justice considerations inherent in labor law, which aim to protect the rights and welfare of employees.
    What should employers do in light of this decision? Employers should carefully assess the merits of their appeals and the potential costs associated with ongoing wage payments, and closely monitor the issuance of the entry of judgment.
    What does this mean for employees? This ruling assures employees of continued financial support during the appeal process, providing them with a safety net while their case is being reviewed.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Jose Leni Z. Solidum reinforces the employer’s obligation to continue paying wages and benefits to a dismissed employee during the appeal process, until the reversal of the reinstatement order becomes final and executory as shown in the entry of judgment. This ruling is grounded in the principles of social justice and the protection of employee rights. The decision serves as a reminder of the importance of complying with labor laws and regulations.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Jose Leni Z. Solidum, G.R. No. 204646, April 15, 2015

  • Retrenchment and Stare Decisis: Upholding Business Decisions in Labor Disputes

    In the case of Cabaobas v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Pepsi-Cola’s retrenchment program, reinforcing the principle of stare decisis. This doctrine holds that previous court decisions should be followed in similar cases to ensure consistency and stability in the law. The Court found that the company had sufficiently demonstrated financial losses and complied with legal requirements for retrenchment, including proper notice and separation pay. This ruling underscores the importance of adhering to established legal precedents and respecting management’s prerogative to implement necessary business decisions in the face of economic challenges, provided such actions are in accordance with the law.

    Facing Losses: How Far Can Companies Go?

    The case revolves around the legality of the dismissal of several employees of Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. (PCPPI) due to a company-wide retrenchment program aimed at averting further financial losses. The petitioners, Purisimo M. Cabaobas, et al., challenged the retrenchment, arguing that PCPPI was not facing genuine financial difficulties and that the program was designed to undermine their union. This contention was rooted in the employees’ belief that the company was not genuinely facing financial difficulties.

    In response, PCPPI maintained that the retrenchment was a valid exercise of management prerogative, necessitated by significant financial losses incurred in its Tanauan Plant. The company presented audited financial statements to support its claim and asserted that it had complied with all legal requirements for retrenchment, including providing notice to the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The company aimed to demonstrate that the retrenchment was a legitimate measure taken to prevent further economic decline.

    The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether PCPPI had validly implemented its retrenchment program, considering the petitioners’ allegations of illegal dismissal and union-busting. The Court was tasked with determining whether the company had met the stringent requirements for retrenchment under Philippine labor law, including demonstrating substantial losses, providing adequate notice, and exercising good faith. At the core of the dispute was the balance between protecting employees’ rights and respecting management’s need to make necessary business decisions.

    The Supreme Court, in its analysis, heavily relied on the principle of stare decisis, referencing its prior decision in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Molon, G.R. No. 175002, February 18, 2013, 691 SCRA 113. The court explained that this doctrine dictates that a principle or rule of law established by a court of controlling jurisdiction should be followed in other cases involving similar facts and issues. The Court emphasized that adherence to precedents ensures certainty and stability in the law, thereby promoting predictability and public confidence in judicial pronouncements.

    In this context, the Court found that the factual circumstances in Cabaobas were substantially the same as those in Molon, as the issues, subject matters, and causes of action were identical – the validity of PCPPI’s retrenchment program and the legality of its employees’ termination. The Court noted that there was also a substantial identity of parties, as the respondents in Molon were the petitioners’ former co-employees and co-union members who were also terminated under the same retrenchment program. This commonality in facts and parties led the Court to apply the ruling in Molon to the case at hand.

    To ensure a valid retrenchment, the employer must meet several key requirements. These include demonstrating that the retrenchment is reasonably necessary to prevent business losses that are substantial, serious, actual, and real. Additionally, the employer must provide written notice to both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment. The employer is also required to pay the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one month’s pay or at least one-half month’s pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. Finally, the employer must exercise its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith and use fair and reasonable criteria in determining who will be dismissed and who will be retained.

    In its decision, the Supreme Court quoted its ruling in the Molon case, emphasizing the importance of these requirements:

    Essentially, the prerogative of an employer to retrench its employees must be exercised only as a last resort, considering that it will lead to the loss of the employees’ livelihood. It is justified only when all other less drastic means have been tried and found insufficient or inadequate.

    The Court found that PCPPI had met these requirements, as the company had demonstrated substantial losses and had provided due notice to both the DOLE and the affected employees. The Court also noted that the employees had already been paid the requisite separation pay, as evidenced by quitclaims signed by them. These quitclaims served as acknowledgment of the receipt of their separation benefits. The Court gave weight to the fact that these payments had been made and acknowledged by the employees.

    Petitioners also argued that PCPPI failed to prove it was suffering from financial losses, citing observations from the Labor Arbiter. However, the Supreme Court deferred to the findings of the NLRC and CA, emphasizing that it is not the Court’s role to re-evaluate factual findings supported by substantial evidence. According to the Court, the following ruling shows the company complied:

    More pertinent would have been SGV & Co.’s report to the stockholder. It says:

    The accompanying statement of assets, liabilities and home office account of Tanauan Operations of Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. (‘company’) as of June 30, 1999 and the related statement of income for the year then ended, are integral parts of the financial statements of the company taken as a whole.

    Regarding the allegation of union-busting, the Court concurred with the NLRC’s finding that PCPPI’s retrenchment program was company-wide and not specifically targeted at members of the LEPCEU-ALU. The Court noted that members of the company union were also among those retrenched, undermining the claim that the program was designed to weaken the petitioners’ union. This comprehensive approach indicated that the retrenchment was driven by economic necessity rather than anti-union animus.

    Moreover, the Court highlighted that PCPPI had made efforts to involve employees in the implementation of the retrenchment program. Records indicated that the company had initiated discussions with employees to review the criteria for selecting those to be retrenched. This collaborative approach further supported the conclusion that the retrenchment was undertaken in good faith and not to circumvent the employees’ right to security of tenure. The Court emphasized the importance of such efforts in ensuring fairness and transparency in the retrenchment process.

    In light of these considerations, the Supreme Court ultimately denied the petition and affirmed the CA’s decision upholding the validity of PCPPI’s retrenchment program. The Court reiterated that its role is not to re-evaluate factual findings supported by substantial evidence and that the findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded respect and finality. This deference to the expertise of labor officials reinforces the importance of their role in resolving labor disputes.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. (PCPPI) validly implemented its company-wide retrenchment program, or whether it constituted illegal dismissal of its employees. The petitioners challenged the retrenchment, arguing it was aimed at undermining their union.
    What is the principle of stare decisis? Stare decisis is a legal doctrine that dictates courts should follow precedents set in previous similar cases to ensure consistency and stability in the law. This principle is enshrined in Article 8 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
    What requirements must an employer meet for a valid retrenchment? An employer must demonstrate substantial business losses, provide written notice to employees and DOLE, pay separation pay, exercise good faith, and use fair criteria for selecting employees to be retrenched. These requirements must be carefully followed to ensure the retrenchment is legal.
    How did the Court apply the principle of stare decisis in this case? The Court relied on its prior decision in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Molon, as the facts and issues were substantially the same. Because the legality of the same retrenchment program had been previously upheld, the Court applied the same ruling in this case.
    What evidence did PCPPI present to demonstrate financial losses? PCPPI presented audited financial statements, including a report from SGV & Co., showing net losses in its Tanauan Plant operations. These financial records were crucial in establishing the economic necessity for the retrenchment.
    Did the Court find evidence of union-busting in PCPPI’s retrenchment program? No, the Court concurred with the NLRC’s finding that the retrenchment program was company-wide and not specifically targeted at members of the petitioners’ union. This suggested it was a business decision rather than an attempt to weaken the union.
    What role do labor officials’ findings play in court decisions regarding retrenchment? The factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have expertise in labor matters, are generally accorded respect and finality by the courts. These experts provide valuable insights into complex labor disputes.
    What constitutes substantial evidence in labor cases? Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence; it is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Even if other minds might conceivably opine otherwise, it is considered sufficient.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Cabaobas v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. reinforces the importance of adhering to legal precedents and respecting management’s prerogative to implement necessary business decisions in the face of economic challenges, provided such actions are in accordance with the law. This case serves as a reminder of the delicate balance between protecting employees’ rights and allowing businesses to make difficult choices to ensure their long-term survival.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Cabaobas v. Pepsi-Cola Products, G.R. No. 176908, March 25, 2015

  • Untimely Filing and its Grave Consequences: Understanding the Importance of Procedural Compliance in Labor Disputes

    In the case of Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc. v. Ledesma, the Supreme Court underscored the strict adherence to procedural rules, particularly the timely filing of petitions for certiorari. The Court held that the failure to file a petition within the mandated 60-day period deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction, rendering the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) resolution final and unassailable. This ruling emphasizes the importance of vigilance and diligence on the part of litigants and their counsels in complying with procedural deadlines to ensure their cases are properly heard and adjudicated.

    Missed Deadlines, Dismissed Justice? The Case of Ledesma vs. Waterfront Hotel

    The case revolves around Ildebrando Ledesma, a former House Detective at Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc., who was dismissed based on complaints of sexual misconduct. Ledesma filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which was initially ruled in his favor by the Labor Arbiter (LA). However, upon appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA’s decision, finding Ledesma guilty of grave misconduct. The pivotal issue arose when Ledesma’s counsel, Atty. Gines Abellana, received the NLRC’s Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration on March 15, 2010, but filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) only on May 17, 2010, sixty-three (63) days later.

    Waterfront argued that the petition was filed out of time, while Ledesma, through new counsel, contended that the 60-day period should be reckoned from his personal receipt of the resolution on March 24, 2010. The CA initially admitted the amended petition and reversed the NLRC’s decision, reinstating the LA’s ruling. Waterfront then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, questioning the timeliness of the petition for certiorari before the CA.

    The Supreme Court meticulously examined the procedural aspects of the case, particularly the timeliness of filing the petition for certiorari. The Court cited Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which explicitly states that the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution. Moreover, the Court emphasized that notice to counsel is effective notice to the client, and the receipt of notice by the counsel of record is the reckoning point of the reglementary period. The Court quoted Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals stating:

    As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.

    Building on this principle, the Supreme Court highlighted that the failure to file the petition within the prescribed period is a jurisdictional defect that deprives the appellate court of the authority to entertain the petition. The Court also addressed Ledesma’s argument that the 60-day period should be counted from his personal receipt of the NLRC Resolution, stating that such a stance is bereft of any legal basis. Notice to counsel is legally considered notice to the client. This is a well-established rule in Philippine jurisprudence.

    Furthermore, the Court addressed the procedural infirmities raised by Ledesma regarding the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, and the lack of a certified true copy of the Board Resolution. The Court clarified that while the Community Tax Certificate presented by Waterfront’s representative may have rendered the jurat defective, it was not a fatal defect. Similarly, the Court stated that only the judgment, order, or resolution assailed in the petition are required to be attached as duplicate originals or certified true copies. The Court cited Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to support this point.

    The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of whether the negligence of counsel should be a ground for relaxing the rules, citing Labao v. Flores. In this case, it was explained that:

    The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.

    However, in Ledesma’s case, the Court found no reason to deviate from the general rule, as the failure to file the petition on time was primarily due to the negligence of his counsel in computing the 60-day period. The Court reiterated that the expiration of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari divests the appellate court of jurisdiction to review the NLRC Resolution. According to Labao v. Flores:

    The NLRC’s resolution became final ten (10) days after counsel’s receipt, and the respondents’ failure to file the petition within the required (60)-day period rendered it impervious to any attack through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the resolution.

    The Supreme Court noted that Ledesma did not attempt to justify the belated filing of his petition. The Court stated that relaxation of procedural rules may be allowed only when there are exceptional circumstances to justify the same. There should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules, as highlighted in Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

    Even assuming the petition for certiorari was timely filed, the Court found that it lacked merit. The Court stated that the CA erred in ruling in favor of Ledesma based on the absence of CCTV footages, an argument not even raised by Ledesma himself. The Court emphasized that in labor cases, substantial evidence is sufficient, which was adequately established by the positive and credible testimonies of the complainants. The Court pointed out that Ledesma never refuted the allegations of sexual misconduct, particularly the incident in the hotel conference room. The Court concluded that Ledesma’s acts constituted misconduct or improper behavior, a just cause for his dismissal, and reiterated the elements of misconduct as established in Lopez v. NLRC.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the petition for certiorari was timely filed with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court focused on the importance of adhering to the 60-day period for filing such petitions.
    What is the reckoning point for the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari? The 60-day period is reckoned from the date of receipt of the judgment, order, or resolution by the counsel of record. Notice to counsel is considered notice to the client.
    What happens if a petition for certiorari is filed beyond the 60-day period? If a petition is filed beyond the 60-day period, the appellate court loses jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The judgment, order, or resolution becomes final and unassailable.
    Can the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari be extended? While there are exceptions, the general rule is that the 60-day period is strictly enforced. Relaxation of the rules is allowed only in exceptional circumstances with reasonable justification for non-compliance.
    Is a client bound by the mistakes of their counsel? Yes, generally a client is bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel. An exception exists if the counsel’s negligence is so gross and inexcusable that the client is deprived of their day in court.
    What constitutes sufficient evidence in labor cases? In labor cases, the standard of proof is substantial evidence, which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This can be based on credible testimonies.
    What are the elements of misconduct as a just cause for dismissal? The elements of misconduct are: (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.
    What should a party do if they believe their counsel made a mistake in filing a petition? The party should immediately consult with another attorney to assess the situation and determine if there are any remedies available. They should also gather evidence to support any claims of gross negligence.

    In conclusion, the Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc. v. Ledesma case serves as a stark reminder of the importance of procedural compliance in legal proceedings. The failure to adhere to the prescribed timelines can have severe consequences, including the loss of the right to appeal and the finality of adverse decisions. Diligence, vigilance, and competent legal representation are essential to ensure that one’s rights are fully protected within the bounds of the law.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: WATERFRONT CEBU CITY CASINO HOTEL, INC. VS. ILDEBRANDO LEDESMA, G.R. No. 197556, March 25, 2015

  • Contractual Obligations Prevail: Separation Pay Despite Business Losses in the Philippines

    The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that a company must honor its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) to pay separation benefits, even if the company closed due to serious financial losses. This decision emphasizes that contractual obligations have the force of law between parties. Companies are bound by the terms they freely agree to, regardless of their financial situation unless the CBA explicitly states otherwise. This case reinforces the importance of clear and unambiguous terms in labor agreements and the protection afforded to employees under Philippine law.

    When Hard Times Meet Binding Agreements: Can a Company Avoid Separation Pay?

    Benson Industries, Inc., a manufacturer of mosquito coils, faced financial difficulties and decided to close its business. Consequently, Benson notified its employees, including members of the Benson Industries Employees Union-ALU-TUCP, of their impending termination. While the company initially provided separation pay calculated at 15 days for every year of service, the union argued that their CBA entitled them to a higher amount: 19 days for each year of service. This discrepancy led to a legal battle, raising the core question: Does a company’s financial hardship excuse it from fulfilling its CBA obligations regarding separation pay?

    The heart of the matter lies in the interpretation of Article 297 (formerly Article 283) of the Labor Code, which addresses the closure of establishments and the resulting separation pay for employees. The Labor Code differentiates between closures due to serious business losses and those for other reasons. In cases of closure not due to serious business losses, employees are entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month’s pay or at least one-half month’s pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. The specific provision states:

    Art. 297. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, x x x. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (½) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.

    However, the Supreme Court emphasized that this exemption applies only to the statutory obligation under Article 297. When separation benefits are stipulated in a contract, like a CBA, the terms of the agreement govern. The Court elucidated the difference, stating that if the CBA unqualifiedly promises separation benefits irrespective of the company’s financial standing, then the contract must be honored. This principle aligns with Article 1159 of the Civil Code, which states that “obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and thus should be complied with in good faith.”

    In this particular case, Section 1, Article VIII of the CBA between Benson Industries and its union explicitly stated that employees terminated without fault would receive separation pay equivalent to not less than 19 days’ pay for every year of service. The CBA provision reads:

    Section 1. Separation Pay – The Company shall pay to any employee/laborer who is terminated from the service without any fault attributable to him, a “Separation Pay” equivalent to not less than nineteen (19) days’ pay for every year of service based upon the latest rate of pay of the employee/laborer concerned.

    The Court noted that even when Benson Industries entered into the CBA, it was already aware of its financial difficulties. Despite this knowledge, it freely agreed to the separation pay provision. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that Benson Industries was obligated to fulfill its contractual commitment, even in the face of business losses. This ruling upholds the principle that contractual obligations are binding and must be complied with in good faith.

    The Supreme Court drew an analogy to the case of Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Lepanto Ceramics Employees Association, where an employer was compelled to pay Christmas bonuses as stipulated in a CBA, despite claiming financial losses. The Court highlighted that:

    A reading of the provision of the CBA reveals that the same provides for the giving of a “Christmas gift package/bonus” without qualification. Terse and clear, the said provision did not state that the Christmas package shall be made to depend on the petitioner’s financial standing. The records are also bereft of any showing that the petitioner made it clear during the CBA negotiations that the bonus was dependent on any condition.  Indeed, if the petitioner and respondent Association intended that the P3,000.00 bonus would be dependent on the company earnings, such intention should have been expressed in the CBA.

    This emphasized the importance of explicitly stating any conditions or limitations in the CBA. In the absence of such stipulations, the agreement is interpreted literally and must be fulfilled. Similarly, in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Eastern Telecoms Employees Union, the Court ruled that a company could not renege on its obligation to pay bonuses under a CBA, even when facing financial challenges. The Court stated:

    ETPI appears to be well aware of its deteriorating financial condition when it entered into the 2001-2004 CBA Side Agreement with ETEU and obliged itself to pay bonuses to the members of ETEU. Considering that ETPI had been continuously suffering huge losses from 2000 to 2002, its business losses in the year 2003 were not exactly unforeseen or unexpected. Consequently, it cannot be said that the difficulty in complying with its obligation under the Side Agreement was “manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.” Besides, as held in Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, mere pecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement does not discharge a contractual obligation. Contracts, once perfected, are binding between the contracting parties. Obligations arising therefrom have the force of law and should be complied with in good faith. ETPI cannot renege from the obligation it has freely assumed when it signed the 2001-2004 CBA Side Agreement.

    This highlights the principle that contractual obligations are binding, and financial difficulties do not automatically release a party from their commitments. The Supreme Court underscored that its previous rulings in Galaxie Steel Workers Union (GSWU-NAFLU-KMU) v. NLRC and Cama v. Joni’s Food Services, Inc., which involved separation pay in the context of business losses, were not applicable to this case because those cases did not involve CBAs. Similarly, North Davao Mining Corporation v. NLRC was distinguished because the separation benefits in that case stemmed from a unilateral company practice, not a contractual obligation. As such, the court cannot enforce generosity when the company is no longer in a position to do so.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Benson Industries was obligated to pay the full separation benefits outlined in its CBA, despite closing the business due to financial losses. The union claimed that their CBA entitled them to a higher amount: 19 days for each year of service.
    What did the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) state? The CBA stated that employees terminated without fault would receive separation pay equivalent to not less than 19 days’ pay for every year of service. The Court noted that even when Benson Industries entered into the CBA, it was already aware of its financial difficulties.
    What does the Labor Code say about separation pay in cases of business closure? Article 297 of the Labor Code mandates separation pay in cases of closure or cessation of operations not due to serious business losses. The amount is equivalent to one month’s pay or at least one-half month’s pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
    How did the Supreme Court differentiate this case from others involving business losses? The Supreme Court distinguished this case by emphasizing that the obligation to pay separation benefits was based on a CBA, not just the Labor Code. Contractual obligations have the force of law between the parties and must be honored.
    What is the significance of a Collective Bargaining Agreement? A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is a negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. Compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.
    What does it mean to be terminated without fault? To be terminated without fault means that the employee’s termination was not due to any misconduct, negligence, or other actions that would justify dismissal. This is a crucial factor in determining eligibility for separation benefits under the CBA.
    Can a company claim financial hardship to avoid its contractual obligations? Generally, no. The Supreme Court has consistently held that mere pecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement does not discharge a contractual obligation. Financial difficulties do not automatically release a party from their commitments.
    How does this ruling affect future CBA negotiations? This ruling underscores the importance of clear and unambiguous language in CBAs. Employers should carefully consider their financial situation when negotiating CBAs and explicitly state any conditions or limitations on separation benefits.

    This case highlights the paramount importance of contractual obligations in labor law. Companies must carefully consider the terms of their collective bargaining agreements, as these agreements are legally binding and must be honored even in times of financial hardship. The Supreme Court’s decision reaffirms the protection afforded to employees under Philippine law and underscores the need for clear and unambiguous labor agreements.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: BENSON INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP vs. BENSON INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 200746, August 06, 2014