Tag: maritime law

Seafarer’s Willful Act: Determining Liability in Maritime Death Benefit Claims

In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court of the Philippines addressed the issue of liability in death benefit claims for seafarers. The Court held that when a seafarer’s death results from a willful act or gross negligence, the employer is not liable for death benefits. This decision underscores the importance of proving that the seafarer’s actions were the direct and proximate cause of their demise. This case clarifies the scope of employer responsibility under the POEA-Standard Employment Contract, particularly when a seafarer’s own conduct contributes to a fatal incident. This ruling has significant implications for maritime employers and seafarers’ families, setting a precedent for future claims involving similar circumstances and emphasizing personal responsibility in maritime employment.

When a Party at Sea Turns Deadly: Determining Willful Negligence in Seafarer’s Death

The case of Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. v. Heirs of Ricardo S. Ganal revolves around the tragic death of Ricardo Ganal, an oiler aboard the vessel MV Stadt Hamburg. Ganal attended a party organized for the crew while the ship was anchored in Chittagong, Bangladesh. After his shift, he joined the festivities and consumed alcohol. Despite being instructed by the ship captain to rest due to his intoxication, Ganal refused and subsequently jumped overboard, leading to his drowning. The central legal question is whether Ganal’s death is compensable under the POEA-Standard Employment Contract, considering his intoxication and willful act.

The legal framework governing this case is primarily the POEA-Standard Employment Contract, specifically Section 20(B) and 20(D), alongside Article 172 of the Labor Code. Section 20(B) outlines the compensation and benefits for death, stating that in case of work-related death during the contract term, the employer shall pay the beneficiaries a specified amount. However, Section 20(D) provides an exception, stating that no compensation is payable if the death resulted from the seafarer’s willful or criminal act, provided the employer can prove the death is directly attributable to the seafarer. Article 172 of the Labor Code further limits liability if the death was caused by the employee’s intoxication or willful intent.

In analyzing the case, the Supreme Court emphasized that the death, to be compensable, must arise out of and in the course of employment. The Court clarified that while Ganal’s death occurred during his employment, it did not arise out of it. The party was a social event, and Ganal’s actions were not related to his duties as a seaman. The Court distinguished this from a work-related incident, stating that the hazardous nature of Ganal’s act was not specific to his employment but was a risk any person on board could have faced.

“The words ‘arising out of’ refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character, while the words ‘in the course of’ refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place.”

Building on this principle, the Court addressed whether Ganal’s act was willful. The Court cited previous rulings, including Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, where a seaman’s death due to his own aggression was deemed a deliberate act attributable to him. Applying this to Ganal’s case, the Court found that his act of intentionally jumping overboard while intoxicated was a willful act directly attributable to him.

This approach contrasts with the Court of Appeals’ finding that Ganal was not in control of his actions due to excessive alcohol intake. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that there was no substantial evidence to prove that Ganal’s intoxication deprived him of his consciousness and mental faculties. The Court noted the absence of a post mortem report indicating Ganal’s blood alcohol concentration and the lack of affidavits showing he was distraught or out of his mind. While he may have been unruly, this did not prove that his act was involuntary.

Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the employer, Marlow Navigation, had taken necessary precautions by advising Ganal to rest and having crew members assist him. Despite these efforts, Ganal resisted and jumped overboard. The Court reiterated that employers are not insurers against all accidental injuries but only those arising from the risks associated with the employment.

The practical implications of this decision are significant for both maritime employers and seafarers. For employers, it reinforces the importance of documenting incidents and providing evidence of precautions taken to ensure seafarers’ safety. It also clarifies the boundaries of liability, indicating that employers are not responsible for deaths resulting from seafarers’ willful acts or gross negligence. For seafarers and their families, it highlights the need to establish that the death was genuinely work-related and not a result of personal choices or negligence. It also underscores the importance of presenting evidence of impaired mental capacity due to intoxication to overcome the defense of willful misconduct.

In essence, the Supreme Court’s decision provides a balanced perspective, emphasizing the need to protect seafarers while acknowledging the limits of employer liability. This case serves as a crucial reference point for future disputes involving death benefits in the maritime industry, highlighting the necessity of proving the causal link between employment and the fatal incident.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the death of a seafarer, who jumped overboard while intoxicated, is compensable as a work-related death under the POEA-Standard Employment Contract. The court had to determine if the death resulted from a willful act or if the seafarer’s intoxication negated the willfulness of the act.
What does the POEA-Standard Employment Contract say about death benefits?	The POEA-Standard Employment Contract provides compensation for work-related deaths but excludes cases where the death results from the seafarer’s willful or criminal act. The employer must prove that the death is directly attributable to the seafarer’s actions.
What did the Labor Arbiter (LA) decide?	The LA initially dismissed the complaint, finding that the seafarer’s death was a result of his willful act of jumping overboard. However, the LA ordered the employer to pay US$5,000 as financial assistance.
How did the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) rule?	The NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision, agreeing that the seafarer’s death was not compensable because it resulted from his deliberate and willful act. They upheld the denial of death benefits.
What was the Court of Appeals’ (CA) decision?	The CA reversed the NLRC’s decision, holding that the seafarer jumped into the sea while overcome by alcohol and deprived of his mental faculties. The CA concluded that the death was compensable because the seafarer was not in control of his actions.
What did the Supreme Court ultimately decide?	The Supreme Court reversed the CA’s decision and reinstated the NLRC’s ruling. The Court held that the seafarer’s act of jumping overboard was a willful act and that the employer had taken necessary precautions. Therefore, the death was not compensable.
What evidence did the employer present to support their case?	The employer presented testimonies from crew members and the accident report from the vessel’s master. These pieces of evidence detailed the seafarer’s actions leading up to the incident, including his refusal to rest and his intentional jump overboard.
What is the significance of the “willful act” clause in this context?	The “willful act” clause means that if a seafarer’s death is a direct result of their voluntary and intentional actions, the employer is not liable for death benefits. The burden of proof is on the employer to show that the seafarer’s actions were indeed willful.
How does intoxication affect the determination of a “willful act”?	Intoxication does not automatically negate the willfulness of an act. The person invoking drunkenness as a defense must prove that the intoxication was so extreme that it deprived the person of their consciousness and mental faculties.

In conclusion, this case underscores the importance of proving the direct causal link between a seafarer’s actions and their death to determine liability for death benefits. The Supreme Court’s decision clarifies that employers are not liable when a seafarer’s willful or negligent actions are the primary cause of their demise, providing a framework for assessing such claims in the maritime industry.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. v. Heirs of Ricardo S. Ganal, G.R. No. 220168, June 07, 2017

June 7, 2017

Seafarer’s Disability: Defining Timelines for Medical Assessment and Entitlement to Benefits

The Supreme Court affirmed that a seafarer is entitled to permanent total disability benefits if the company-designated physician fails to provide a final medical assessment within 120 days, or an extended period of 240 days with sufficient justification. This ruling clarifies the timelines for assessing a seafarer’s disability and ensures that seafarers receive timely compensation for injuries sustained while on duty. This decision reinforces the rights of seafarers, emphasizing the importance of prompt and accurate medical assessments by company-designated physicians to determine eligibility for disability benefits.

Navigating the Seas of Injury: When Does a Seafarer’s Injury Qualify as Permanent Disability?

In the case of Career Philippines Ship Management, Inc. v. Acub, the central question revolved around determining when a seafarer’s injury qualifies as a permanent disability, especially concerning the timelines for medical assessments and the seafarer’s entitlement to disability benefits. Nathaniel Acub, working as an Ordinary Seaman, sustained a knee injury while on board a vessel. After being repatriated and undergoing treatment, a dispute arose over the extent of his disability and the compensation he was entitled to receive. The company-designated physician assessed his disability as Grade 10, while Acub sought an independent physician who deemed him unfit for sea duty. The disagreement led to a legal battle that ultimately reached the Supreme Court.

The Labor Arbiter initially ruled in favor of Acub, but the NLRC reversed this decision, granting him total and permanent disability benefits. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s decision with modifications, reducing the disability compensation to US$89,100.00. The petitioners argued that the CA erred in applying the 120-day rule and in upholding the assessment of Acub’s physician over the company-designated physician. The Supreme Court, however, found no merit in the petition.

The Supreme Court based its analysis on established jurisprudence, particularly citing Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr., which underscores a seafarer’s right to consult a physician of their choice and have those findings duly evaluated. The Court reiterated that if doubts arise regarding the company-designated physician’s assessment, the seafarer has the right to seek additional medical opinions. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of considering the findings of the seafarer’s chosen physician when awarding disability claims.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court underscored that the timeliness of the medical assessment is crucial. It highlighted the guidelines set in Elbur Shipmanagement Phils., Inc., v. Quiogue, Jr.:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

In Acub’s case, the company-designated physician issued a certification declaring him entitled to a disability rating of Grade 10 only after more than six months, far beyond the initial 120-day period. The Court found no justifiable reason for this delay, leading it to conclude that Acub’s disability was correctly adjudged as permanent and total. The Court referenced Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. v. Osias to further clarify the 120-day and 240-day periods, emphasizing that the medical assessment of the company-designated physician must be issued within these authorized timeframes to be considered valid.

The Supreme Court referenced Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, which defines permanent and total disability:

ART. 192. Permanent Total Disability

x x x x

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules; [emphasis supplied]

The Court also cited Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC:

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

This framework ensures that seafarers receive timely medical assessments and are not unduly delayed in receiving the disability benefits they are entitled to under the law. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of harmonizing the 120-day period under the Labor Code and POEA-SEC with the 240-day period under the IRR, always striving for social justice and the protection of the rights of seafarers.

The ruling in Career Philippines Ship Management, Inc. v. Acub reaffirms the legal protection afforded to seafarers who sustain injuries while on duty. The decision clarifies the responsibilities of employers and company-designated physicians in providing timely and accurate medical assessments. It ensures that seafarers are not disadvantaged by delays in the assessment process and receive the disability benefits they are entitled to under the law. The ruling also highlights the importance of seeking independent medical opinions when there is doubt about the assessment of the company-designated physician, ensuring a fair and just resolution of disability claims.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the seafarer was entitled to permanent total disability benefits given the delay in the company-designated physician’s assessment.
What is the role of the company-designated physician?	The company-designated physician is responsible for providing a timely and accurate medical assessment of the seafarer’s condition within the prescribed periods.
What are the prescribed periods for the medical assessment?	The initial period is 120 days, which can be extended to 240 days with sufficient justification, such as the need for further medical treatment.
What happens if the assessment is delayed?	If the company-designated physician fails to provide an assessment within the prescribed periods without justification, the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total.
Can a seafarer seek an independent medical opinion?	Yes, a seafarer has the right to seek an independent medical opinion, especially if there are doubts about the company-designated physician’s assessment.
How are conflicting medical opinions resolved?	The labor tribunals evaluate conflicting medical opinions, considering the qualifications and findings of both physicians to determine the appropriate disability benefits.
What is the basis for permanent total disability?	Permanent total disability is defined as the inability of a seafarer to perform their job for more than 120 days, subject to extensions for medical treatment, as determined by the company-designated physician.
What is the significance of the POEA-SEC in these cases?	The POEA-SEC sets the standard terms and conditions of employment for seafarers, including provisions for medical treatment and disability compensation.
What is the effect of this ruling on future cases?	This ruling reinforces the rights of seafarers, emphasizing the importance of timely medical assessments and ensuring that seafarers receive appropriate disability benefits.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Career Philippines Ship Management, Inc. v. Acub provides clarity and protection for seafarers, reinforcing the importance of timely medical assessments and the right to seek independent medical opinions. This ruling ensures that seafarers receive fair compensation for disabilities incurred while on duty, and that employers and company-designated physicians fulfill their responsibilities in providing prompt and accurate medical evaluations.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Career Philippines Ship Management, Inc. v. Acub, G.R. No. 215595, April 26, 2017

April 26, 2017

Timely Disability Claims: Seafarers’ Rights and Employer Obligations Under POEA-SEC

The Supreme Court ruled that a seafarer’s claim for permanent disability benefits was premature because it was filed before the expiration of the 240-day period for medical assessment by the company-designated physician. This decision clarifies the importance of adhering to the procedural requirements set forth in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) regarding the timing of disability claims and the role of the company-designated physician in assessing a seafarer’s fitness for duty.

Anchoring Hope: When Can a Seafarer Claim Disability Benefits?

In TSM Shipping Phils., Inc. v. Patiño, the central question revolves around the timing of a seafarer’s claim for disability benefits. Louie Patiño, a seafarer, sustained an injury while working on board a vessel. Following his repatriation, he underwent medical treatment with a company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz. Prior to the lapse of 240 days from the date of repatriation, and while still undergoing treatment, Patiño filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits. The core legal issue is whether Patiño’s claim was premature, given that the company-designated physician had not yet issued a final assessment within the prescribed period.

The Supreme Court emphasized the significance of adhering to the provisions of the POEA-SEC and relevant labor laws, which are deemed integrated into the employment contract between the seafarer and the employer. The Court referred to Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, which addresses permanent total disability, and Section 2, Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation Implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, which specifies the period of entitlement. Section 20 B(3) of the POEA-SEC was also cited, outlining the seafarer’s entitlement to sickness allowance and the procedure for post-employment medical examination.

Building on these provisions, the Supreme Court reiterated the guidelines established in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., which harmonized the aforementioned regulations. According to Vergara, a seafarer must report to the company-designated physician within three days of arrival for diagnosis and treatment. During the treatment period, not exceeding 120 days, the seafarer is considered under temporary total disability and receives his basic wage. This period can be extended up to 240 days if further medical attention is required. The employer retains the right to declare a permanent disability within this extended period.

Based on these established guidelines, the Supreme Court in C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Taok outlined the specific conditions under which a seafarer may validly pursue an action for total and permanent disability benefits. These conditions include instances where the company-designated physician fails to issue a declaration within the prescribed periods, issues a contrary opinion to the seafarer’s chosen physician, acknowledges a partial disability while other doctors believe it to be total, or disputes the disability grading. Essentially, the seafarer must demonstrate that the assessment process has been exhausted or improperly handled by the employer before filing a claim.

In Patiño’s case, the Court found that his complaint was prematurely filed. He was repatriated on May 24, 2010, and received medical attention from Dr. Cruz. An interim assessment of Grade 10 disability was issued on August 17, 2010, while Patiño was still undergoing treatment. However, on September 8, 2010—only 107 days after repatriation—Patiño filed a complaint for disability benefits. At this point, he was still considered under temporary total disability, as the 120/240-day period had not yet lapsed. The Court emphasized that Patiño’s belief that his injury had rendered him permanently disabled did not justify the premature filing of the complaint.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that Patiño only sought the opinion of his own physician, Dr. Escutin, after filing the complaint. This sequence of events further underscored the prematurity of his action. The Labor Arbiter, therefore, should have dismissed the complaint due to a lack of cause of action. This ruling highlights the importance of adhering to the prescribed procedures and timelines in pursuing disability claims.

The Court also addressed the lower tribunals’ reliance on the 120-day rule and Patiño’s perceived inability to work, resulting in a loss of earning capacity. The Court clarified that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated physician declares it so within the 240-day period or fails to make such a declaration after its lapse. Dr. Cruz issued a final assessment of Grade 10 disability on September 29, 2010, well within the 240-day period. Therefore, Patiño could not claim entitlement to the maximum benefit of US$60,000.00, which is typically reserved for permanent total disabilities.

The Supreme Court emphasized the controlling nature of the medical assessment made by the company-designated physician. The POEA-SEC explicitly states that the company-designated physician determines a seafarer’s fitness or unfitness for work. If the seafarer’s physician disagrees with the company-designated physician’s assessment, a third doctor may be jointly agreed upon, whose decision shall be final and binding. In Patiño’s case, this procedure was not followed. He sought a second opinion but did not pursue the process of jointly selecting a third doctor to resolve the conflicting assessments.

The Court has consistently held that non-observance of the third doctor requirement results in the company-designated physician’s assessment prevailing. As reiterated in Veritas Maritime Corporation v. Gepanaga, Jr., the failure to adhere to the agreed procedure leaves the Court with no option but to uphold the certification issued by the company-designated physician. In this case, Dr. Cruz’s assessment was deemed final and binding due to Patiño’s failure to properly dispute it through the prescribed channels.

Moreover, the Court noted that Dr. Cruz had closely monitored Patiño’s condition from repatriation until his last follow-up examination. This continuous supervision allowed Dr. Cruz to gain a detailed understanding of Patiño’s medical status. The extensive medical attention, including surgery and physical therapy, further solidified the reliability of Dr. Cruz’s assessment. In contrast, Dr. Escutin’s opinion, obtained after Patiño had already filed his complaint, carried less weight due to the limited scope of his evaluation.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court underscored the importance of adhering to the procedural requirements and timelines outlined in the POEA-SEC. A seafarer’s claim for disability benefits must be filed after the company-designated physician has had the opportunity to fully assess the seafarer’s condition within the prescribed period. Failure to follow these procedures, including the proper disputing of the company-designated physician’s assessment, can result in the denial or reduction of disability benefits. The Court ultimately ruled that Patiño was entitled only to the amount corresponding to a Grade 10 disability, as certified by Dr. Cruz, highlighting the significance of properly navigating the legal framework governing seafarers’ disability claims.

Section 32 of the POEA-SEC provides for a schedule of disability compensation which is often ignored or overlooked in maritime compensation cases. Section 32 laid down a Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases including Occupational Diseases or Illness Contracted, in conjunction with Section 20 (B)(6) which provides that in case of a permanent total or partial disability, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with Section 32. Section 32 further declares that any item in the schedule classified under Grade 1 shall be considered or shall constitute total and permanent disability. Therefore, any other grading constitutes otherwise. We stressed in Splash Philippines, Inc. v. Ruizo that it is about time that the schedule of disability compensation under Section 32 be seriously observed.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the seafarer’s claim for disability benefits was premature because it was filed before the expiration of the 240-day period for assessment by the company-designated physician.
What is the POEA-SEC?	The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) is a standard contract that governs the employment of Filipino seafarers on foreign vessels. It outlines the rights and obligations of both the seafarer and the employer.
What is the role of the company-designated physician?	The company-designated physician is responsible for assessing the seafarer’s medical condition, determining fitness for work, and providing medical treatment. Their assessment is crucial in determining the extent of disability and entitlement to benefits.
What is the 120/240-day rule?	The 120/240-day rule refers to the period within which the company-designated physician must assess the seafarer’s condition. The initial period is 120 days, which can be extended to 240 days if further medical treatment is required.
What happens if the seafarer’s doctor disagrees with the company doctor?	If the seafarer’s doctor disagrees with the company-designated physician’s assessment, a third doctor may be jointly agreed upon by the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
What is the effect of not following the third doctor procedure?	Failure to follow the third doctor procedure means that the assessment of the company-designated physician prevails. This highlights the importance of adhering to the agreed-upon process for resolving conflicting medical opinions.
What disability grade was the seafarer initially assessed with?	The seafarer, Louie Patiño, was initially given an interim assessment of Grade 10 disability by the company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz, while he was still undergoing treatment.
What amount was the seafarer ultimately awarded?	The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that Patiño was entitled to the amount corresponding to a Grade 10 disability, which amounted to US$10,075.00, based on the certification issued by Dr. Cruz.

This case underscores the importance of adhering to the established procedures and timelines in pursuing disability claims under the POEA-SEC. Seafarers must ensure that they follow the prescribed steps, including undergoing medical assessment by the company-designated physician and properly disputing any conflicting assessments, to protect their rights and ensure fair compensation for work-related injuries or illnesses.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: TSM SHIPPING PHILS., INC. VS. PATIÑO, G.R. No. 210289, March 20, 2017

March 20, 2017

Seafarer’s Disability: Defining ‘Unfit to Work’ Beyond Grading

In the case of Reynaldo Y. Sunit vs. OSM Maritime Services, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that a seafarer’s disability should be considered total and permanent if they remain unfit to work for more than 240 days after repatriation, irrespective of a partial disability grading issued by a third doctor. This decision emphasizes that the actual impact of the injury on the seafarer’s ability to work is paramount, ensuring fair compensation that reflects their true incapacity and protects their rights under maritime law.

Beyond the Grade: When Can a Seafarer Claim Total Disability?

Reynaldo Sunit, working as an Able Body Seaman for OSM Maritime Services, suffered a serious injury onboard when he fell, resulting in a fractured right femur. After repatriation and medical assessments, a company-designated doctor gave him a Grade 10 disability. Dissatisfied, Sunit sought a second opinion, and eventually, both parties consulted a third doctor, Dr. Bathan, who assigned a Grade 9 disability but noted Sunit was “not yet fit to work and should undergo rehabilitation.” The core legal question emerged: Can a seafarer claim total and permanent disability benefits when a third doctor assesses a partial disability grade but acknowledges the seafarer’s continued unfitness to work beyond the allowable medical treatment period?

The Supreme Court addressed the conflicting interpretations of disability assessments under the POEA-SEC (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract) and the Labor Code. The court emphasized that while the POEA-SEC provides a schedule of disability gradings, the ultimate determination of whether a disability is total and permanent depends on the seafarer’s ability to resume their usual sea duties. If the injury prevents the seafarer from engaging in gainful employment for more than 240 days, it legally constitutes total and permanent disability, irrespective of the assigned grade.

The court referenced Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, stating that a “disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.” The decision underscores that the 120/240-day period primarily applies to the company-designated doctor’s assessment. However, the assessment from the third doctor must be definite and conclusive to be binding on both parties.

The Supreme Court clarified that while the parties must mutually agree on the third doctor, the doctor’s assessment must definitively state the seafarer’s disability or fitness to return to work. The court quoted from Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar:

Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer’s medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.

In Sunit’s case, Dr. Bathan’s assessment that Sunit was “not yet fit to work and should undergo rehabilitation” indicated an unresolved medical condition, rendering the disability assessment inconclusive. The court also noted that Sunit’s inability to secure gainful employment for 499 days from his repatriation underscored his total and permanent disability.

The court stated that a final and definite disability assessment is necessary to reflect the true extent of the seafarer’s injuries and their capacity to resume work. This ensures that the disability benefits awarded are commensurate with the prolonged effects of the injuries suffered. The court in this case also highlighted that the primary consideration is the seafarer’s capacity to perform their usual duties.

Even if there’s a partial disability grade, if the seafarer cannot perform their work for an extended period, they are entitled to total and permanent disability benefits. The court in Kestrel emphasized that if partial and permanent injuries or disabilities would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120 or 240 days, then he is, under legal contemplation, totally and permanently disabled. The Court ruled that Sunit was entitled to attorney’s fees because he was forced to litigate to protect his rights.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether a seafarer should receive total and permanent disability benefits when assessed with a partial disability grade, but remains unfit to work beyond the allowable period.
What is the significance of the 240-day period?	The 240-day period is the maximum time allowed for the company-designated physician to assess a seafarer’s condition; if the seafarer remains unfit to work beyond this period, it can indicate total and permanent disability.
What if the third doctor’s assessment is inconclusive?	If the third doctor’s assessment does not definitively state the seafarer’s fitness to work or disability, it is considered inconclusive, and the seafarer’s actual condition is considered.
How does this case define ‘total and permanent disability’?	Total and permanent disability refers to the inability of a seafarer to perform their usual sea duties or any similar work for an extended period, typically beyond 240 days from repatriation.
What role does the POEA-SEC play in disability claims?	The POEA-SEC provides the framework for compensating seafarers for work-related injuries, including a schedule of disability gradings and procedures for medical assessments.
Can a seafarer challenge the third doctor’s assessment?	Yes, a dissatisfied party can challenge the third doctor’s assessment in court, citing reasons such as evident partiality, corruption, fraud, or lack of basis to support the assessment.
Why was attorney’s fees awarded in this case?	Attorney’s fees were awarded because the seafarer was compelled to litigate to protect his rights and interests, recognizing the expenses incurred in pursuing his claim.
*What is the impact of Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar* on this ruling?**	Kestrel emphasizes that if disabilities prevent a seafarer from performing their duties for more than 120 or 240 days, they are legally considered totally and permanently disabled, influencing the court’s decision.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Reynaldo Y. Sunit vs. OSM Maritime Services, Inc. clarifies that the actual incapacity to work, rather than a mere disability grading, should be the primary consideration in determining total and permanent disability for seafarers. This ruling protects the rights of seafarers by ensuring they receive appropriate compensation that reflects their true inability to resume their duties due to work-related injuries.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Reynaldo Y. Sunit, vs. OSM Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 223035, February 27, 2017

February 27, 2017

Presumption of Work-Relatedness: Protecting Seafarers’ Rights to Disability Benefits

In Lamberto M. De Leon v. Maunlad Trans, Inc., the Supreme Court held that illnesses not explicitly listed in the POEA-SEC are disputably presumed to be work-related, reinforcing the protection afforded to seafarers seeking disability benefits. The Court emphasized that a seafarer only needs to provide reasonable proof that their working conditions contributed to their illness; they do not need to prove a direct causal relationship. This ruling ensures that seafarers receive compensation when their work, even to a small degree, contributes to the development or aggravation of their medical conditions.

Navigating the High Seas of Proof: When Does a Seafarer’s Illness Qualify for Disability?

Lamberto M. De Leon, a Team Headwaiter for Maunlad Trans, Inc., experienced severe health issues while working aboard a vessel. After being diagnosed with Parkinson’s Disease, he sought disability benefits, arguing his condition was work-related due to the harsh conditions and long hours he endured at sea. The company-designated physician, however, claimed that De Leon’s condition was not work-related, leading to a dispute over his entitlement to compensation.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) initially ruled in favor of De Leon, awarding him US$60,000.00 in disability benefits, a decision affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC emphasized that because De Leon’s illness manifested during his employment, it was presumed to be work-related, and his employment only needed to contribute to the illness’s development, not be its sole cause. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed these decisions, stating that Parkinson’s Disease was not listed as an occupational disease under the POEA-SEC, and De Leon had failed to establish a direct causal connection between his illness and his work. This divergence in rulings set the stage for the Supreme Court to weigh in on the matter.

The Supreme Court, in its analysis, underscored the importance of Section 20(B)(4) of the POEA-SEC, which requires that for disability to be compensable, the injury or illness must be work-related and must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract. Central to the Court’s decision was the application of the disputable presumption that illnesses not listed under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC are work-related. The Court cited previous rulings to reinforce the point that while this presumption exists, the seafarer must still provide substantial evidence that their work conditions caused or increased the risk of contracting the disease.

For disability to be compensable under Section 20(B)(4) of the POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract.

The Court highlighted that the standard of proof in compensation proceedings is probability, not absolute certainty. This means that a seafarer does not need to prove a direct causal relationship, but rather, needs to provide reasonable proof of a work-connection. The Supreme Court found that De Leon had met this burden, as the NLRC and LA correctly determined that his work conditions had, at the very least, increased his risk of developing Parkinson’s Disease. The Court referred to the NLRC’s findings, which detailed the various risk factors associated with De Leon’s employment, including exposure to harsh weather conditions, chemical irritants, and the physical demands of his job. The Court noted that the CA’s assessment, which downplayed the harshness of working conditions on a cruise ship, was flawed.

The Supreme Court also addressed the CA’s argument that since no other employees suffered from the same illness, De Leon’s condition could not be work-related. The Court dismissed this argument, stating that individuals have varying health conditions and physical capabilities. In essence, the Court reinforced the principle that the unique circumstances of each seafarer’s health and working conditions must be considered when determining compensability.

The Supreme Court ultimately sided with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, reinstating the award of US$60,000.00 in disability benefits to De Leon, along with attorney’s fees. This decision underscores the importance of the disputable presumption in favor of seafarers and the need for a fair and thorough assessment of their working conditions when evaluating claims for disability benefits.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Lamberto M. De Leon’s Parkinson’s Disease was work-related, entitling him to disability benefits under the POEA-SEC, despite the company-designated physician’s opinion that it was not.
What is the POEA-SEC?	The POEA-SEC refers to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, which governs the terms and conditions of employment for Filipino seafarers.
What does it mean for an illness to be “work-related” under the POEA-SEC?	Under the POEA-SEC, a work-related illness is any sickness resulting in disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of the contract or any other illness that the seafarer can prove was caused or aggravated by their working conditions.
What is the “disputable presumption” in favor of seafarers?	The disputable presumption means that illnesses not listed in Section 32 of the POEA-SEC are presumed to be work-related, shifting the burden of proof to the employer to show that the illness is not connected to the seafarer’s work.
What standard of proof is required for a seafarer to prove their illness is work-related?	A seafarer must provide substantial evidence that their working conditions caused or increased the risk of contracting the disease; they do not need to prove a direct causal relationship, only a reasonable connection.
How did the Court address the argument that no other employees suffered the same illness?	The Court dismissed this argument, stating that individuals have varying health conditions and physical capabilities, and the unique circumstances of each seafarer’s health and working conditions must be considered.
What benefits was Lamberto M. De Leon awarded?	De Leon was awarded US$60,000.00 in disability benefits, which is the equivalent of 120% of US$50,000.00 for permanent total disability, plus attorney’s fees.
Why was the award of attorney’s fees justified in this case?	The award of attorney’s fees was justified because De Leon was compelled to litigate to satisfy his claim for disability benefits, as provided under Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code.

This case reinforces the rights of Filipino seafarers to claim disability benefits for illnesses that are reasonably connected to their work, even if not explicitly listed as occupational diseases. The Supreme Court’s decision emphasizes the importance of considering the unique working conditions and health circumstances of each seafarer when evaluating claims for compensation.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: LAMBERTO M. DE LEON, VS. MAUNLAD TRANS, INC., G.R. No. 215293, February 08, 2017

February 8, 2017

Premature Claims: The Importance of the Company Physician’s Assessment in Seafarer Disability Cases

In Status Maritime Corporation v. Doctolero, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of when a seafarer can claim permanent and total disability benefits. The Court ruled that a claim filed before the company-designated physician has the opportunity to assess the seafarer’s condition within the prescribed period is premature. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to the procedures outlined in the POEA-SEC for disability claims and protects employers from premature lawsuits before a proper medical assessment has been conducted.

The Premature Claim: Did Doctolero Jump the Gun on His Disability Benefits?

Rodrigo C. Doctolero, a Chief Officer, experienced chest and abdominal pains while working on board a vessel in Mexico. He was diagnosed with “Esophago-Gastritis-Duodenitis” and subsequently repatriated to the Philippines. Upon his return, the company-designated physician evaluated his condition, but Doctolero filed a complaint demanding total and permanent disability benefits before the physician could issue a final assessment. The Labor Arbiter dismissed Doctolero’s complaint, a decision initially upheld by the NLRC, which only granted reimbursement for medical expenses. The Court of Appeals (CA), however, reversed this decision, awarding Doctolero disability benefits and damages, leading to the Supreme Court appeal. The central legal question revolved around whether Doctolero’s claim was premature given the ongoing medical evaluation by the company-designated physician.

The Supreme Court began its analysis by defining permanent and total disability, referencing Article 198(c)(1) of the Labor Code and Section 2, Rule X, of the Rules and Regulations implementing Book IV of the Labor Code. The Court also cited Section 20(3) of the POEA-SEC, which stipulates that a seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance until declared fit to work or a disability assessment is made by the company-designated physician, but not exceeding 120 days. These provisions set the stage for understanding the procedural requirements for disability claims.

A key aspect of the decision was the determination that Doctolero’s claim was indeed premature. The Supreme Court emphasized that for a seafarer’s claim for total and permanent disability benefits to succeed, certain conditions must be met. These conditions include scenarios where the company-designated physician fails to issue a timely assessment, the 120-day period lapses without certification, conflicting medical opinions arise, or the employer refuses to pay benefits despite a finding of disability.

The Court listed the situations where a claim can be considered valid:

(a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days;

(b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated physician;

(c) The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-8(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion;

(d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well;

(e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading;

(f) The company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work;

(g) The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and

(h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods.

In Doctolero’s case, none of these conditions were met when he filed his complaint. The company-designated physician was still in the process of evaluating his condition, and the initial 120-day period had not yet expired. This procedural lapse was critical to the Supreme Court’s decision. While the Court acknowledged the factual nature of disability assessments, it also noted the conflicting findings between the lower courts and the CA, necessitating a re-examination of the evidence. This re-evaluation led the Court to conclude that the CA erred in awarding disability benefits because Doctolero had filed his claim before the company-designated physician could properly assess his condition.

The Supreme Court emphasized that Doctolero filed his complaint for disability benefits before the company-designated physician had the opportunity to determine the nature and extent of his disability or even before the initial 120-day period had lapsed. As Doctolero was still undergoing tests, the company-designated physician had not yet determined his “fit to work” status or assigned a disability grading. Consequently, the Court agreed with the petitioners that Doctolero lacked a valid cause of action for disability pay and sickness allowance at the time he filed his complaint. This highlights the importance of adhering to the prescribed timelines and procedures outlined in the POEA-SEC.

The practical implications of this ruling are significant for both seafarers and employers. Seafarers must understand the importance of allowing the company-designated physician to complete their assessment within the prescribed period before filing a disability claim. This ensures that the claim is based on a proper medical evaluation and avoids premature litigation. Employers, on the other hand, are protected from facing lawsuits before they have had the opportunity to fulfill their obligations under the POEA-SEC.

Consider the following comparison:

Aspect	CA Decision	SC Decision
Timing of Claim	Premature filing not a bar to recovery	Premature filing negates cause of action
Medical Assessment	Disability occurred during contract	Company physician’s assessment required
Outcome	Awarded disability benefits	Disability benefits denied

The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of the company-designated physician’s role in assessing a seafarer’s condition and the need to adhere to the procedural requirements of the POEA-SEC. This ruling ensures a fair and orderly process for resolving disability claims in the maritime industry. By reversing the CA’s decision, the Supreme Court reinforced the principle that premature claims, filed before a proper medical assessment, cannot be sustained. This decision provides clarity and guidance for future disability claims involving seafarers.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a seafarer’s claim for disability benefits was premature because it was filed before the company-designated physician had the opportunity to assess the seafarer’s condition within the prescribed period.
What is the role of the company-designated physician?	The company-designated physician is responsible for evaluating the seafarer’s medical condition and determining their fitness to work or assigning a disability grading, which is crucial for processing disability claims.
What is the 120-day rule in seafarer disability claims?	The 120-day rule refers to the period during which the company-designated physician must assess the seafarer’s condition and issue a final medical assessment. The seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance during this period.
Under what conditions can a seafarer file a disability claim?	A seafarer can file a disability claim if the company-designated physician fails to issue a timely assessment, the 120-day period lapses without certification, conflicting medical opinions arise, or the employer refuses to pay benefits despite a finding of disability.
What was the Supreme Court’s ruling in this case?	The Supreme Court ruled that Doctolero’s claim was premature because he filed it before the company-designated physician had the opportunity to assess his condition, and thus reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision.
What is the POEA-SEC?	The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) sets the terms and conditions of employment for Filipino seafarers, including provisions for disability compensation.
Why was the Court of Appeals’ decision reversed?	The Court of Appeals’ decision was reversed because the Supreme Court found that the seafarer had filed his claim prematurely, before the company-designated physician could complete their assessment.
What is the significance of this ruling for seafarers?	This ruling emphasizes the importance of adhering to the procedural requirements of the POEA-SEC and allowing the company-designated physician to complete their assessment before filing a disability claim.
What is the significance of this ruling for employers?	This ruling protects employers from premature lawsuits and ensures they have the opportunity to fulfill their obligations under the POEA-SEC before facing disability claims.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Status Maritime Corporation v. Doctolero provides clear guidance on the timing of disability claims for seafarers. By emphasizing the importance of the company-designated physician’s assessment and adhering to the procedural requirements of the POEA-SEC, the Court has established a framework that promotes fairness and order in resolving disability claims in the maritime industry.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Status Maritime Corporation, and Admibros Shipmanagement Co., Ltd. vs. Rodrigo C. Doctolero, G.R. No. 198968, January 18, 2017

January 18, 2017

Defining Disability: Seafarers’ Rights and the Limits of Medical Assessments in Maritime Law

In Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Rapiz, the Supreme Court clarified the application of the POEA-SEC concerning disability benefits for seafarers. The Court emphasized that while a seafarer’s inability to work for more than 120 days can be a factor, the final disability assessment by the company-designated physician within the prescribed period is the primary basis for determining the extent of benefits. This ruling underscores the importance of timely and accurate medical assessments in resolving disability claims in the maritime industry, impacting the compensation and rights of Filipino seafarers.

Navigating the Seas of Compensation: When a Seafarer’s Injury Meets Contractual Obligations

This case revolves around Florvin G. Rapiz, a buffet cook who suffered a wrist injury while working on board the M/V Mercury. Employed by Jebsens Maritime, Inc. and Sea Chefs Ltd., Rapiz sought permanent and total disability benefits after being medically repatriated. The central legal question is whether Rapiz is entitled to such benefits despite a company-designated physician’s assessment of only a partial disability. This dispute highlights the interplay between a seafarer’s health, contractual obligations under the POEA-SEC, and the employer’s responsibility to provide adequate compensation for work-related injuries.

The facts of the case reveal that Rapiz experienced severe pain and swelling in his right wrist while lifting heavy meat. After consulting with the ship doctor, he was diagnosed with severe “Tendovaginitis DeQuevain” and subsequently repatriated to the Philippines. Upon repatriation, he underwent treatment with the company-designated physician, who, after a period of treatment, issued a final assessment classifying his condition as a Grade 11 disability, referring to “Flexor Carpi Radialis Tendinitis, Right; Sprain, Right thumb; Extensor Carpi Ulnaris Tendinitis, Right.” Dissatisfied with this assessment, Rapiz sought a second opinion from an independent physician who classified his condition as a Grade 10 disability. The disagreement over the disability grading led Rapiz to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), eventually escalating to a Voluntary Arbitrator (VA).

Before the VA, Rapiz argued that despite the disability ratings, he was entitled to permanent and total disability benefits because he was unable to work as a cook for more than 120 days following his repatriation. Jebsens Maritime countered that Rapiz was only entitled to Grade 11 disability benefits, as determined by the company-designated physician. The VA ruled in favor of Rapiz, awarding him permanent and total disability benefits. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), leading Jebsens Maritime to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the VA and the CA. The Court cited Ace Navigation Company v. Garcia, emphasizing that the company-designated physician has up to 240 days from repatriation to assess the seafarer’s condition. The Court underscored that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when declared by the company physician within these periods, or upon the expiration of the 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of fitness to work or permanent disability.

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA-Standard Employment Contract [(SEC)] and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.

In this case, the company-designated physician issued a final assessment within 102 days of Rapiz’s repatriation, classifying his disability as Grade 11. The Supreme Court found this timely assessment crucial. The Court also cited Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr., clarifying that the company-designated physician must perform a significant act to justify the extended 240-day period. Otherwise, the seafarer’s disability is presumed permanent and total.

The Court further emphasized that the POEA-SEC, specifically Section 20 (A) (6), governs the determination of disability benefits. This section states that the disability grading provided under Section 32 of the contract is the sole basis for determining disability, regardless of the treatment duration.

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness[,] the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
The disability shall be based solely on the disability gradings provided under Section 32 of this Contract, and shall not be measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer is under treatment or the number of days in which sickness allowance is paid.

Acknowledging the discrepancy between the Grade 11 rating by the company-designated physician and the Grade 10 rating by the independent physician, the Court favored the former’s assessment. It reasoned that the company-designated physician had a more comprehensive understanding of Rapiz’s condition due to the extended period of treatment and diagnosis.

The decision in Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Rapiz clarifies the process for determining disability benefits for seafarers under the POEA-SEC. It emphasizes the importance of the company-designated physician’s timely assessment and the contractual grading system in determining the appropriate compensation. While the case acknowledges the seafarer’s right to compensation for work-related injuries, it also underscores the need for adhering to the established procedures and contractual terms in assessing and awarding disability benefits.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the seafarer, Florvin G. Rapiz, was entitled to permanent and total disability benefits despite the company-designated physician’s assessment of only a partial disability. The Court had to determine the correct application of the POEA-SEC in assessing disability claims.
What is the significance of the company-designated physician’s assessment?	The assessment of the company-designated physician is crucial because it serves as the primary basis for determining the extent of disability and the corresponding benefits due to the seafarer under the POEA-SEC. The assessment needs to be timely.
How long does the company-designated physician have to make an assessment?	The company-designated physician generally has 120 days from the seafarer’s repatriation to make a final assessment. This period can be extended to a maximum of 240 days if further medical treatment is required, and justification for the extension is provided.
What happens if the company-designated physician fails to make an assessment within the prescribed period?	If the company-designated physician fails to provide an assessment within the 120-day period (or the extended 240-day period, if justified), the seafarer’s disability may be deemed permanent and total, regardless of the actual degree of impairment.
What is the role of the POEA-SEC in determining disability benefits?	The POEA-SEC serves as the governing contract between the seafarer and the employer. Section 32 of the POEA-SEC provides a disability grading system that determines the amount of compensation based on the type and severity of the disability.
What is the difference between permanent total disability and permanent partial disability?	Permanent total disability refers to a condition where the seafarer is unable to return to his regular work as a seafarer, often compensated with a lump sum. Permanent partial disability, on the other hand, refers to a condition where the seafarer has some degree of impairment but can still perform some work, compensated according to the disability grading.
Can a seafarer seek a second opinion from an independent physician?	Yes, a seafarer has the right to seek a second opinion from an independent physician. However, in case of conflicting assessments, the assessment of the company-designated physician generally prevails if it is based on a more thorough and prolonged period of medical evaluation.
What benefits was Rapiz ultimately entitled to in this case?	The Supreme Court ruled that Rapiz was entitled to permanent and partial disability benefits corresponding to a Grade 11 disability under the 2010 POEA-SEC, amounting to US$7,465.00, plus legal interest.

The Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Rapiz case provides a valuable lesson on the significance of adhering to the POEA-SEC guidelines in assessing disability claims of seafarers. It highlights the importance of timely medical assessments and the contractual grading system in determining the appropriate compensation. This ruling ensures that seafarers receive just compensation for work-related injuries while providing a framework for employers to fulfill their obligations within the bounds of established maritime law.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Rapiz, G.R. No. 218871, January 11, 2017

January 11, 2017

Work-Related Illness and Seafarer’s Death: Proving Causation for Compensation

The Supreme Court ruled that for a seafarer’s death to be compensable, it must be proven that the death was work-related and occurred during the employment contract. The burden of proof lies with the claimant to substantiate their claim with relevant evidence. This means that simply alleging a condition is work-related is insufficient; concrete evidence linking the illness to working conditions is required to receive death benefits.

Seafarer’s Renal Failure: Was It the Sea or a Silent Predisposition?

This case revolves around Alma Covita’s claim for death benefits after her husband, Rolando, passed away from chronic renal failure. Rolando was employed by SSM Maritime Services, Inc. as a Bosun. Although he was declared fit for duty during his pre-employment medical examination (PEME), he developed weakness and vomiting shortly after boarding his vessel. He was diagnosed with end-stage renal failure and medically repatriated, eventually passing away. Alma argued that Rolando’s condition was work-related, stemming from the stress and heavy workload inherent in his seafaring job. The respondents, however, contended that his illness was not work-related and developed over a long period, unrelated to his brief stint on the vessel. The central legal question is whether Alma successfully proved that Rolando’s chronic renal failure was causally linked to his work as a seafarer, entitling her and her children to death benefits.

The Supreme Court emphasized that while a seafarer’s employment is governed by the contract they sign, the POEA Standard Employment Contract is deemed written into it, setting minimum requirements for Filipino seafarers on foreign vessels. Section 20(A) of the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract outlines the conditions for death benefits. It explicitly states that the death must be work-related and occur during the term of the employment contract. Work-related death, as the court clarified, refers to death resulting from a work-related injury or illness. To be precise, Section 20(A) states:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

1. In the case of work-related death of the seafarer during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.

xxxx

4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of work-related injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:

xxxx

c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.

Building on this principle, the Court then defined a work-related illness within the context of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Any sickness resulting in disability or death due to an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A is considered work-related, provided certain conditions are met. These conditions include the seafarer’s work involving the described risks, the disease being contracted as a result of exposure to those risks, the disease being contracted within a specific exposure period, and the absence of notorious negligence on the seafarer’s part. While illnesses not listed in Section 32-A are disputably presumed work-related under Section 20B(4), this presumption does not relieve the claimant of the burden of proof. As the Supreme Court emphasized, Section 20 must be interpreted alongside the conditions specified in Section 32-A for an illness to be compensable.

The Court cited Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management (Phils.), Inc., highlighting that the disputable presumption does not allow the claimant to simply rely on it without substantiating their claim. The seafarer must prove that the illness was work-related and existed during the term of their employment contract. In Alma’s case, she argued that her husband’s chronic renal failure was caused by high blood pressure, which in turn was caused by the stress of his work as a seaman. The Court, however, found her allegations to be mere general statements without supporting evidence. She did not provide specific details about Rolando’s daily tasks, working conditions, or medical records demonstrating that his work aggravated his condition.

In essence, the Supreme Court highlighted the lack of concrete evidence linking Rolando’s kidney failure to his shipboard duties. The court emphasized that bare allegations of stress and heavy workload are insufficient to establish a causal connection. There was no record of Rolando suffering from high blood pressure during his brief period of employment on the vessel, which could have supported the claim that his work exacerbated his condition. The Court reiterated that self-serving allegations, without credible information, are inadequate to prove work-relatedness. The claimant must present evidence to prove a positive proposition. As the Court has previously ruled, the probability of work-connection must be anchored on credible information and not on unsubstantiated claims.

Furthermore, the Court addressed the timeline of Rolando’s illness. He was diagnosed with chronic renal failure after only seven days on board the vessel. The Court cited medical principles that chronic renal failure results from a progressive and irreversible destruction of nephrons over a period of time, making it highly improbable that it developed within such a short period. This point was also underscored with reference to Masangcay v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc., which stated that it is highly improbable that Masangcay’s chronic renal failure developed in just a month’s time.

In Harrison’s Principles of Internal Medicine, chronic renal failure is described as a result of progressive and irreversible destruction of nephrons, regardless of cause. This diagnosis implies that glomerular filtration rate (GFR) is known to have been reduced for at least 3 to 6 months. Often a gradual decline in GFR occurs over a period of years. It is, therefore, highly improbable that Masangcay’s chronic renal failure developed in just a month’s time, the length of time he was on board M/T Eastern Jewel before the symptoms became manifest.

The Court also clarified that Rolando’s employment was effectively terminated upon his medical repatriation, meaning his death did not occur during the term of his employment contract. The fact that Rolando had previous contracts with the same respondents was also addressed. The Court stated that each contract is separate and automatically terminates upon expiration. If Rolando had a pre-existing condition, his death arising from it is not compensable under his last employment contract, unless it can be proven that his working conditions during that specific contract aggravated the condition. In this case, there was no substantial evidence to prove that his job as a bosun had aggravated his illness. Also, the PEME results does not irrevocably prove that one is free from any ailment prior to deployment.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the chronic renal failure that caused the seafarer’s death was work-related and occurred during his employment contract, entitling his beneficiaries to death benefits. The court examined the evidence to determine if there was a causal link between his work and his illness.
What is the significance of the POEA Standard Employment Contract in this case?	The POEA Standard Employment Contract governs the terms and conditions of employment for Filipino seafarers. It outlines the requirements for compensation and benefits, including death benefits, and defines what constitutes a work-related illness.
What is required to prove that an illness is work-related under the POEA contract?	To prove an illness is work-related, the claimant must present substantial evidence showing that the seafarer’s work involved risks associated with the illness, the disease was contracted due to exposure to those risks, and the disease manifested within a specific exposure period. Self-serving allegations will not suffice.
What is the effect of a pre-employment medical examination (PEME)?	A PEME is a summary examination of a seafarer’s physiological condition. A “fit to work” declaration in a PEME is not a conclusive proof that one is free from any ailment prior to his deployment.
What is the disputable presumption of work-relatedness?	Under Section 20B(4) of the POEA contract, illnesses not listed as occupational diseases are disputably presumed work-related. However, this presumption does not relieve the claimant of the burden of proving a causal link between the illness and the seafarer’s work.
Can a seafarer receive death benefits if they had a pre-existing condition?	If a seafarer had a pre-existing condition, their death arising from it is not compensable under their last employment contract. Unless it can be proven that the working conditions during that specific contract aggravated the condition.
What kind of evidence is needed to support a claim for death benefits?	To support a claim for death benefits, the claimant should provide specific evidence, such as medical records, detailed descriptions of the seafarer’s daily tasks and working conditions, and expert medical opinions linking the illness to the seafarer’s work.
How does the timing of the illness affect a claim for death benefits?	To be eligible for death benefits, the illness must be proven to have occurred or been aggravated during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract. The death must also occur during the term of the employment contract.

In conclusion, this case underscores the importance of providing concrete evidence to support claims for death benefits for seafarers. The burden of proof lies with the claimant to establish a clear causal link between the seafarer’s work and their illness. General allegations and unsubstantiated claims are insufficient to overcome this burden. This ruling serves as a reminder to meticulously document working conditions and gather relevant medical evidence to support claims for compensation.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: ALMA COVITA v. SSM MARITIME SERVICES, INC., G.R. No. 206600, December 07, 2016

December 7, 2016

Seafarer’s Disability Claims: Strict Adherence to POEA Contract Procedures Required

The Supreme Court ruled that a seafarer’s claim for permanent disability benefits was denied because he failed to follow the mandatory procedures outlined in the POEA-SEC (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract). Specifically, he did not seek a third doctor’s opinion to resolve the conflicting medical assessments between the company-designated physician and his personal physician. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to the contractual provisions and established procedures when seeking disability compensation, emphasizing that non-compliance can result in the forfeiture of benefits, regardless of the seafarer’s perceived state of health.

Navigating the Seas of Seafarer’s Rights: When Medical Opinions Clash

The case of Genaro G. Calimlim v. Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. revolves around a seafarer, Calimlim, who sought permanent disability benefits after experiencing health issues during his employment. Calimlim, working as a Bosun, experienced severe stomach pain and bleeding while on board. Upon reaching port in China, he was diagnosed with Hemorrhage of the Upper Digestive Tract and Hypertension. He was eventually repatriated to the Philippines and examined by a company-designated physician, who later declared him fit to work. Disagreeing with this assessment, Calimlim consulted a private physician who diagnosed him with several conditions, including Essential Hypertension and declared him permanently disabled. The core legal question is whether Calimlim is entitled to permanent disability benefits given the conflicting medical opinions and his failure to adhere to the procedure for resolving such disagreements as outlined in the POEA-SEC.

The POEA-SEC, which governs the employment of Filipino seafarers, outlines the process for claiming compensation and benefits for work-related injuries or illnesses. Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC details the liabilities of the employer when a seaman suffers a work-related injury or illness. It emphasizes the employer’s responsibility to provide medical treatment until the seafarer is declared fit to work or the degree of disability is established by a company-designated physician. The contract also stipulates the procedure to follow if a seafarer disagrees with the company-designated physician’s assessment:

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court emphasized that compliance with this procedure is mandatory. In the absence of a third doctor’s opinion obtained through the agreed process, the assessment of the company-designated physician prevails. This underscores the contractual nature of the relationship between the seafarer and the employer, where both parties are bound by the terms and conditions outlined in the POEA-SEC.

In Calimlim’s case, the Supreme Court found that he failed to adhere to this mandatory procedure. While he sought a second opinion from a private physician, he did not initiate the process of jointly selecting a third doctor with his employer to resolve the conflicting medical assessments. Further complicating matters, Calimlim’s consultation with his private physician occurred after he had already filed his complaint for disability benefits. This sequence of events led the Court to question the basis of his claim at the time of filing, suggesting that the medical evaluation was a mere afterthought to bolster his case. It’s critical to understand the timeline in these cases because it is a vital determining factor.

This approach contrasts with cases where seafarers diligently follow the POEA-SEC procedures. When seafarers adhere to the third-doctor process, their claims are often given more weight, particularly if the third doctor’s assessment supports their disability. The requirement for a third opinion serves as a mechanism to ensure impartiality and objectivity in assessing the seafarer’s medical condition, ultimately protecting the rights of both the seafarer and the employer.

The Supreme Court also addressed Calimlim’s argument regarding the 120-day or 240-day periods for medical assessment. Calimlim argued that his inability to resume work after this period automatically entitled him to permanent disability benefits. However, the Court clarified that the lapse of these periods does not automatically warrant the grant of benefits. The determination of disability should be based on the disability grading received from the company-designated physician or the third independent physician, not solely on the number of days of treatment or sickness allowance paid.

Moreover, the Court emphasized the significance of the company-designated physician’s assessment, particularly when it is based on a thorough and continuous medical evaluation. In this case, the company-designated physician declared Calimlim fit to work after a period of treatment and monitoring. The Court found no compelling reason to disregard this assessment, especially given Calimlim’s failure to pursue the third-doctor procedure and the timing of his consultation with the private physician. This highlights a crucial aspect of maritime law: that medical assessments must be timely, thorough, and adhere to established protocols to be considered valid.

In sum, the Court’s decision reinforces the principle that seafarers seeking disability benefits must strictly adhere to the procedures outlined in the POEA-SEC. This includes undergoing medical examinations by company-designated physicians, and, if necessary, jointly selecting a third doctor to resolve conflicting medical opinions. Failure to comply with these procedures can result in the denial of benefits, regardless of the seafarer’s perceived state of health. This ruling serves as a reminder to seafarers and employers alike of the importance of understanding and following the contractual obligations and established processes in maritime employment contracts.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the seafarer was entitled to permanent disability benefits despite failing to follow the POEA-SEC procedure for resolving conflicting medical opinions. Specifically, he did not seek a third doctor’s opinion after disagreeing with the company-designated physician.
What is the POEA-SEC?	The POEA-SEC is the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract. It governs the employment of Filipino seafarers and outlines the terms and conditions of their employment, including compensation and benefits for work-related injuries or illnesses.
What is the procedure for resolving conflicting medical opinions under the POEA-SEC?	If a seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated physician, the POEA-SEC requires both the employer and the seafarer to jointly agree on a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding.
What happens if the seafarer doesn’t follow the POEA-SEC procedure?	If the seafarer fails to follow the POEA-SEC procedure for resolving conflicting medical opinions, the assessment of the company-designated physician prevails. This can lead to the denial of disability benefits.
Why was the seafarer’s claim denied in this case?	The seafarer’s claim was denied because he failed to initiate the process of jointly selecting a third doctor with his employer to resolve the conflicting medical assessments. He also consulted his private physician after filing his complaint.
Does the lapse of the 120/240-day period automatically entitle a seafarer to disability benefits?	No, the lapse of these periods does not automatically warrant the grant of benefits. The determination of disability should be based on the disability grading received from the company-designated physician or the third independent physician.
What is the role of the company-designated physician?	The company-designated physician plays a crucial role in assessing the seafarer’s medical condition and determining their fitness to work. Their assessment is given significant weight, especially when based on a thorough and continuous medical evaluation.
*What is the significance of seeking medical consultation before* filing a claim?**	Seeking medical consultation and obtaining a medical assessment before filing a claim establishes a clear basis for the claim. Consulting a physician only after filing a claim can be viewed as an afterthought, potentially undermining the credibility of the claim.

This case emphasizes the importance of understanding and adhering to the specific procedures outlined in maritime employment contracts, particularly concerning medical assessments and disability claims. By following these procedures, seafarers can better protect their rights and ensure a fair and objective evaluation of their medical condition. Strict compliance with contractual obligations and POEA rules is paramount in ensuring that claims are processed accurately and justly.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Genaro G. Calimlim, PETITIONER, VS. WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC., WALLEM GMBH & CO. KG AND MR. REGINALDO OBEN, G.R. No. 220629, November 23, 2016

November 23, 2016

Voiding Waivers: Seafarers’ Rights and Unconscionable Agreements in Maritime Law

The Supreme Court held that agreements requiring seafarers to waive future claims in exchange for immediate payment, especially when those payments might be clawed back if the employer wins on appeal, are against public policy. This ruling safeguards seafarers’ rights, ensuring they receive fair compensation and are not coerced into disadvantageous settlements due to their vulnerable circumstances. The decision underscores the judiciary’s commitment to protecting labor rights and preventing employers from exploiting unequal bargaining positions.

Sailing into a Trap? Conditional Payments and the Seafarer’s Plight

Juan B. Hernandez, a seafarer, sought disability benefits from Crossworld Marine Services after being declared unfit for sea duty due to hypertension and diabetes. Though initially awarded compensation by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision. In the interim, Hernandez had received payment from the respondents but signed a Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment, Receipt of Payment, and Affidavit, stipulating that he would return the money if the CA ruled against him. This case examines whether such agreements, which seemingly provide immediate relief but impose potentially detrimental long-term conditions, are valid and enforceable under Philippine labor law. This analysis will delve into the implications of conditional settlements on seafarers’ rights and the extent to which courts will scrutinize agreements that appear to unduly favor employers.

The Supreme Court began by scrutinizing the documents Hernandez signed, namely the Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment, Receipt of Payment, and Affidavit. The Court found these documents to be a “ploy to deprive petitioner of all his rights to claim indemnity from respondents under all possible causes of action and in all available fora, and effectively for nothing in return or exchange.” The Court emphasized that human life and the ability to secure basic necessities should not be expendable, especially when pitted against corporate capital. It recognized the inherent vulnerability of seafarers, whose livelihoods depend on their ability to work, making them susceptible to accepting disadvantageous terms.

6. That I have no further claims whatsoever in any theory of law against the Owners of MV ‘NIKOMARIN’ because of the payment made to me. That I certify and warrant that I will not file any complaint or prosecute any suit or action in the Philippines, Panama, Japan or any other country against the shipowners and/or the released parties herein after receiving the payment of US$66,000.00 or its peso equivalent x x x.

This case highlights the principle that labor contracts are imbued with public interest and must be interpreted in favor of the employee. The Court noted that the waiver exacted from Hernandez effectively barred him from pursuing any claims, even for interest that may accrue during the pendency of the case, thereby creating an unjust situation. This broad waiver, in exchange for a payment that could be reclaimed, was deemed unconscionable and against public policy.

The Supreme Court referenced More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC, reiterating the principle that agreements where workers receive less compensation than what they are legally entitled to are invalid.

The law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what a worker is entitled to recover nor prevent him from demanding benefits to which he is entitled. Quitclaims executed by the employees are thus commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers legal rights, considering the economic disadvantage of the employee and the inevitable pressure upon him by financial necessity.

The Court emphasized that quitclaims and waivers must be carefully scrutinized, especially when there is a significant disparity in bargaining power between the employer and employee. This scrutiny ensures that workers are not exploited and that their rights are fully protected under the law.

In analyzing the actions of the respondents, the Court condemned the imposition of conditions that had far-reaching consequences beyond simple compliance with labor regulations. The respondents’ counsel should have been aware of the Court’s previous stance against such agreements, as highlighted in Career Phils. Ship Management, Inc. v. Madjus. This prior case set a precedent for invalidating conditional settlements that unduly prejudice the employee, demonstrating a consistent judicial approach to protecting workers from unfair labor practices.

The Court also addressed the argument that Hernandez still retained the right to judicial recourse, clarifying that the critical issue was the potential for him to gain nothing while being barred from pursuing further claims. The appellate court’s reasoning was deemed a mere play on words, failing to recognize the substantive disadvantage imposed on the seafarer. This underscores the judiciary’s focus on the practical effects of agreements rather than their literal wording, ensuring that legal protections extend beyond mere formalities.

The practical implications of this decision are significant for seafarers and the maritime industry. Seafarers are now better protected from being coerced into accepting conditional settlements that waive their rights. Employers must ensure that any settlements offered are fair, reasonable, and without conditions that unduly prejudice the seafarer. This ruling reinforces the principle that labor laws are designed to protect workers and that courts will actively scrutinize agreements that appear to circumvent these protections. Furthermore, legal practitioners are cautioned against using standardized agreements that have been previously deemed unfair by the Supreme Court.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision prioritizes the protection of seafarers’ rights and reinforces the judiciary’s role in ensuring fair labor practices. By declaring the conditional agreements void, the Court has set a clear precedent against exploitative practices that take advantage of the unequal bargaining positions between seafarers and their employers. This ruling serves as a reminder that labor laws are not mere formalities but essential safeguards that protect the well-being and economic security of workers.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was the validity of a conditional satisfaction of judgment signed by a seafarer, which required him to return the settlement amount if the employer’s appeal was successful, while also waiving his right to pursue further claims. The court examined whether this agreement was unconscionable and contrary to public policy.
What is a conditional satisfaction of judgment?	A conditional satisfaction of judgment is an agreement where a party agrees to accept payment to satisfy a judgment, but the satisfaction is contingent upon certain conditions. In this case, the condition was that the seafarer would have to return the money if the appellate court reversed the NLRC’s decision.
Why did the Supreme Court invalidate the agreement?	The Supreme Court invalidated the agreement because it found the terms to be unfair and prejudicial to the seafarer. The Court emphasized that the agreement effectively deprived the seafarer of his rights without a guaranteed benefit, as he could be forced to return the money while being barred from pursuing further claims.
What does this ruling mean for seafarers?	This ruling protects seafarers from being coerced into accepting disadvantageous settlements that waive their rights in exchange for uncertain benefits. It ensures that settlements are fair, reasonable, and without conditions that unduly prejudice the seafarer.
*What is the significance of the Career Phils. Ship Management, Inc. v. Madjus* case?**	The Career Phils. Ship Management, Inc. v. Madjus case set a precedent for invalidating conditional settlements that unduly prejudice employees. The Supreme Court referenced this case to emphasize the consistent judicial approach to protecting workers from unfair labor practices.
What is the role of the courts in protecting labor rights?	The courts play a crucial role in protecting labor rights by scrutinizing agreements between employers and employees to ensure fairness and prevent exploitation. This includes invalidating agreements that are found to be unconscionable or contrary to public policy.
What should employers do to ensure compliance with this ruling?	Employers should ensure that any settlements offered to seafarers are fair, reasonable, and without conditions that unduly prejudice the seafarer. They should avoid using standardized agreements that have been previously deemed unfair by the Supreme Court.
Can a seafarer waive their rights in a settlement agreement?	While settlement agreements are generally allowed, waivers of rights must be made voluntarily and with full understanding of the consequences. Courts will closely examine such waivers to ensure they are not the result of coercion or unequal bargaining power.

This Supreme Court decision reinforces the principle that labor contracts must be interpreted in favor of the employee, especially in situations where there is a clear disparity in bargaining power. It serves as a warning to employers to avoid imposing unfair conditions on settlement agreements and underscores the judiciary’s commitment to protecting the rights and welfare of seafarers.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Juan B. Hernandez v. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., G.R. No. 209098, November 14, 2016

November 14, 2016