ASG Law

Tag: Online Defamation

  • Cyber Libel in the Philippines: Understanding the One-Year Prescription Rule

    Cyber Libel: The Supreme Court Clarifies the One-Year Prescription Period

    G.R. No. 258524, October 11, 2023

    Navigating the digital age comes with its own set of legal challenges, particularly when it comes to online defamation. What happens when libelous statements are made online? How long does someone have to file a case? A recent Supreme Court decision sheds light on these questions, clarifying the prescriptive period for cyber libel in the Philippines. The case of *Berteni Cataluña Causing v. People of the Philippines* establishes that cyber libel, like traditional libel, has a prescriptive period of one year from the date of discovery of the defamatory statements.

    Defining Cyber Libel and Its Legal Basis

    To understand the ruling, it’s important to define cyber libel and its legal basis. Libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is the public and malicious imputation of a crime, vice, or defect that causes dishonor or discredit to another. Cyber libel, as defined by Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act No. 10175 (RA 10175), or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, is simply libel committed through a computer system or similar means. Key to note: RA 10175 did *not* create a new crime but rather recognized a new *means* of committing an existing one.

    In the Philippines, the elements of libel are:

    * **Defamatory imputation:** A statement that harms the reputation of another.
    * **Malice:** A wrongful intention to cause harm.
    * **Publication:** The statement is communicated to a third person.
    * **Identifiability:** The person defamed is identifiable.

    Crucially, Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 states: “The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.”

    In essence, if you write something defamatory about someone online, with malice, and it is published, you could be liable for cyber libel. The penalty, as specified in RA 10175, is one degree higher than that provided for in the Revised Penal Code.

    The *Causing v. People* Case: A Step-by-Step Breakdown

    The case of *Berteni Cataluña Causing v. People of the Philippines* revolved around Facebook posts made by Causing about Representative Ferdinand L. Hernandez. Hernandez claimed that Causing’s posts implied he stole public funds intended for Marawi siege victims.

    Here’s a breakdown of the case:

    1. **The Facebook Posts:** In February and April 2019, Causing posted content on Facebook implying Hernandez was involved in stealing funds.
    2. **The Complaint:** Hernandez filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP Quezon City) in December 2020, charging Causing with Cyber Libel.
    3. **The Information:** After finding probable cause, the OCP Quezon City filed two Informations with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) charging Causing with two counts of Cyber Libel.
    4. **Motion to Quash:** Causing filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that the charges had prescribed because the complaint was filed more than one year after the Facebook posts were made. He cited Article 90 of the RPC, which prescribes a one-year period for libel.
    5. **RTC Ruling:** The RTC denied the Motion to Quash, arguing that Act No. 3326, which prescribes a 12-year period, should apply because RA 10175, a special law, does not provide for a prescriptive period. The RTC also cited *Tolentino v. People*, which held that Cyber Libel prescribes in 15 years.
    6. **Petition for *Certiorari*:** Causing filed a Petition for *Certiorari* with the Supreme Court, arguing that the RTC erred in applying Act No. 3326 and challenging the *Tolentino* ruling.

    The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of Causing’s argument that the prescriptive period for cyber libel is one year, counted from the date of discovery of the libelous material. Here are some of the key points:

    * RA 10175 did not create a new crime but merely implemented the RPC’s provisions on libel when committed through a computer system.
    * Article 90 of the RPC, not Act No. 3326, defines the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel.
    * Paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC is controlling, making the crime of Cyber Libel prescribe in one year.

    The Court noted that “Cyber Libel is therefore a crime defined and penalized by the RPC.”

    The Supreme Court emphasized that prescription is a matter of defense and must be proven by the accused. While it agreed with Causing’s legal argument, it upheld the RTC’s denial of the Motion to Quash because Causing did not provide evidence to prove when Hernandez discovered the Facebook posts. “The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,” the Court stated.

    Practical Implications of the Ruling

    This ruling has significant implications for both individuals and legal professionals. The clarification of the prescriptive period for cyber libel provides much-needed certainty in this area of law.

    **Key Lessons:**

    * **One-Year Limit:** Individuals have one year from the date of discovery to file a cyber libel case.
    * **Discovery is Key:** The prescriptive period starts from the date the libelous material is discovered, not necessarily the date it was published.
    * **Burden of Proof:** The accused bears the burden of proving that the crime has prescribed.

    Consider this example: Maria posts a defamatory statement about Juan on Facebook on January 1, 2023. Juan discovers the post on June 1, 2023. Juan has until June 1, 2024, to file a cyber libel case against Maria.

    Furthermore, businesses must be mindful of their online presence and the potential for defamatory statements to be made about them. Monitoring social media and promptly addressing any libelous content is crucial to protecting their reputation. Failing to act within the one-year prescriptive period could mean losing the opportunity to pursue legal action.

    Frequently Asked Questions

    * **What is the difference between libel and cyber libel?**
    Libel is the public and malicious imputation of a crime, vice, or defect. Cyber libel is simply libel committed through a computer system or similar means.

    * **How long do I have to file a cyber libel case?**
    You have one year from the date of discovery of the libelous material to file a case.

    * **What if I didn’t discover the libelous statement until long after it was posted?**
    The prescriptive period starts from the date of discovery, not the date of publication. You will need to prove when you discovered the statement.

    * **Who has the burden of proving prescription?**
    The accused has the burden of proving that the crime has prescribed.

    * **Does this ruling mean I can’t file a cyber libel case if it’s been more than a year since the statement was posted?**
    If you discovered the statement more than a year before filing the case, it may be prescribed. However, it depends on when you discovered the libelous statement. It is best to consult with a lawyer to determine your options.

    * **What evidence do I need to prove when I discovered the libelous statement?**
    Evidence can include affidavits, emails, screenshots, or any other documentation that shows when you became aware of the statement.

    This Supreme Court decision provides clarity on the prescriptive period for cyber libel in the Philippines, ensuring that individuals and businesses are aware of their rights and obligations in the digital age.

    ASG Law specializes in defamation and cybercrime law. Contact us or email hello@asglawpartners.com to schedule a consultation.

  • Cyber Libel and Retroactivity: Understanding Criminal Liability for Online Posts Before the Cybercrime Law

    The Supreme Court ruled that an individual cannot be held criminally liable for libelous Facebook posts made before the enactment of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. The Court emphasized that penal laws cannot be applied retroactively if they are unfavorable to the accused. This decision clarifies the scope of cyber libel and ensures that individuals are only prosecuted for actions that were criminalized at the time they were committed, aligning with the fundamental principle of legality in criminal law.

    From Facebook Post to Legal Battle: When Does Online Speech Become a Crime?

    This case arose from a Facebook post made by Jannece C. Peñalosa in 2011, which Jose A. Ocampo, Jr. claimed was libelous. Ocampo, Jr. filed a complaint, leading to an Information for libel being filed against Peñalosa. However, the Department of Justice later directed the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information, arguing that there was no law penalizing “Internet Libel” at the time of the post. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) agreed and dismissed the case, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed, holding that the post was punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Peñalosa then appealed to the Supreme Court, questioning whether her actions could be retroactively penalized.

    The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether the CA erred in ruling that Peñalosa’s Facebook post, made before the Cybercrime Prevention Act, could be prosecuted under Article 355 of the RPC. The Court had to determine if online libel could be considered a “similar means” of committing libel under the RPC and whether applying the Cybercrime Prevention Act retroactively would violate fundamental principles of criminal law.

    The Supreme Court began its analysis by addressing the procedural errors in the case. It emphasized that the proper remedy against a court order granting a motion to withdraw information is an appeal, not a petition for certiorari. The Court cited Rule 122, Section 1 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that an appeal is the remedy against a judgment or final order. Certiorari is only appropriate when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available. The Court pointed out that an order granting a motion to withdraw information is a final order because it disposes of the case, leaving nothing for the court to do, as established in Santos v. Orda, Jr. The Court noted that Ocampo, Jr. should have filed an appeal, but instead, erroneously availed himself of a petition for certiorari.

    Moreover, the Court found that Ocampo, Jr. lacked the legal personality to file the petition questioning the RTC’s order. Citing People v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the doctrine that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the private complainant’s interest is limited to the civil liability. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. As Ocampo, Jr.’s petition focused on Peñalosa’s criminal liability rather than civil damages, he had no standing to bring the petition without the prosecution’s concurrence.

    Turning to the substantive issue, the Supreme Court considered whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting the Motion to Withdraw Information. The Court defined grave abuse of discretion as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, amounting to an evasion of a positive duty. The Supreme Court emphasized that judges must make an independent assessment of the lack of probable cause and the consequent withdrawal of the information.

    The Court contrasted the RTC’s actions with the perfunctory grant of a motion to withdraw information in Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. In this case, Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali made an exhaustive and independent assessment of Peñalosa’s Motion to Quash and the prosecution’s Motion to Withdraw Information. Judge Capco-Umali explicitly noted that on August 3, 2011, when the alleged libelous statements were posted, there was no law yet penalizing Internet Libel. The Cybercrime Prevention Act, which criminalized such acts, was only approved on September 12, 2012. The court’s order underscored the fundamental principle of Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, which means there is no crime when there is no law punishing it.

    The Supreme Court addressed the apparent conflict with its earlier ruling in Disini v. Secretary of Justice, where it stated that “cyber libel is not a new crime.” However, the Court clarified that even if an allegedly libelous Facebook post could be prosecuted under the RPC, applying it retroactively would be unfavorable to the accused, violating Article 22 of the RPC. The Court emphasized that criminal laws should be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.

    The Supreme Court delved into the interpretation of Article 355 of the RPC, which addresses libel by means of writings or similar means. The Court applied the statutory construction rule of noscitur a sociis, which states that the meaning of an ambiguous word or phrase can be clarified by considering the company of words with which it is associated. In Article 355, the associated words include “writing,” “printing,” “lithography,” “engraving,” “radio,” “phonograph,” “painting,” “theatrical exhibition,” and “cinematographic exhibition.” These terms clearly exclude “computer systems or other similar means which may be derived in the future,” which were specifically added in Article 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

    To further illustrate this point, the Court presented a side-by-side comparison of Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 4(c)(a) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act in the following table:

    Article 355 of The Revised Penal Code
    Section 4(c)(a) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act
    ARTICLE 355. Libel by Means Writings or Similar Means. — A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party. (Underscoring provided)
    SECTION 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
    . . . .
    . . . .
    (c) Content-related Offenses:
    . . . .
    (4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future. (Underscoring provided)

    The Court reasoned that if Article 355 already included libel made through computer systems, there would have been no need for Congress to legislate Article 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act. This legislative action demonstrates that cyber libel is an additional means of committing libel, punishable only under the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

    The Supreme Court clarified that its ruling does not leave Ocampo, Jr. without recourse. He could still pursue a civil action for damages under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code for any harm inflicted upon him by defamatory falsehoods. In civil actions, the complainant has full control of the case, unlike in criminal actions, where the complainant must defer to the prosecution.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether a person could be criminally liable for libelous Facebook posts made before the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 was enacted.
    What did the Supreme Court rule? The Supreme Court ruled that the individual could not be held criminally liable because the act was not criminalized at the time it was committed.
    What is the principle of Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege? This principle means that there is no crime when there is no law punishing it, preventing retroactive application of criminal laws.
    Why was a petition for certiorari considered an incorrect remedy in this case? The Court stated that the proper remedy against the RTC’s order granting the Motion to Withdraw Information was an appeal, not a petition for certiorari.
    What is the role of the Solicitor General in criminal appeals? The Solicitor General is the only one who may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal in criminal cases.
    What is the significance of the noscitur a sociis rule? The noscitur a sociis rule helps interpret ambiguous words by considering the context of the other words with which they are associated.
    What civil remedies are available to the offended party? The offended party can pursue a civil action for damages under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code for harm caused by defamatory falsehoods.
    Does this ruling mean that cyber libel is not punishable? No, cyber libel is punishable under the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, but it cannot be applied retroactively to acts committed before the law’s enactment.

    This case reinforces the principle that criminal laws cannot be applied retroactively if they are unfavorable to the accused. It clarifies the boundaries of cyber libel and provides a framework for understanding when online speech becomes a crime. The Supreme Court’s decision ensures that individuals are only prosecuted for actions that were criminalized at the time they were committed, upholding fundamental principles of justice and fairness.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: JANNECE C. PEÑALOSA v. JOSE A. OCAMPO, JR., G.R. No. 230299, April 26, 2023

  • Navigating Libel in the Digital Age: Defining Jurisdiction in Online Defamation

    The Supreme Court held that accessing a defamatory article online does not equate to “printing and first publication” for purposes of determining venue in libel cases. This ruling prevents the indiscriminate filing of libel suits in any location where an online article is accessed, protecting individuals from harassment through out-of-town libel suits. This decision clarifies the jurisdictional requirements for online libel cases, ensuring that venue is not arbitrarily chosen to inconvenience the accused.

    Website Libel: Can Accessing an Article Determine Where a Case is Heard?

    In Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, and Jessie John P. Gimenez, the Supreme Court addressed the critical issue of venue in online libel cases. This case arose from a criminal complaint filed by Jessie John P. Gimenez on behalf of the Yuchengco Family and Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. against several individuals associated with Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI). The complaint alleged that the accused published defamatory articles on the website www.pepcoalition.com, attacking the Yuchengco Family and Malayan Insurance.

    PEPCI, formed by disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc., used the website to voice their grievances. Gimenez claimed that upon accessing the websites in Makati, he found articles containing derogatory statements. The Makati City Prosecutor’s Office initially filed thirteen separate Informations charging the accused with libel. However, the Secretary of Justice reversed this decision, opining that “internet libel” was non-existent under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Subsequently, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially quashed the Information due to lack of allegations that the offended parties resided in Makati or that the libelous article was printed and first published there.

    The prosecution moved for reconsideration, which the RTC granted, ordering the public prosecutor to amend the Information. The Amended Information stated that the defamatory article was “first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City.” Petitioners then moved to quash the Amended Information, arguing that it still failed to establish jurisdiction in Makati. The RTC denied this motion, leading to the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Supreme Court.

    The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Amended Information was sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation, considering the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363. Article 360 provides guidance on determining who is responsible and where actions of written defamation should be pursued:

    Art. 360. Persons responsible.— Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

    The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

    The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions and particularly significant in libel cases, given the specific venue provisions in Article 360. Citing Macasaet v. People, the Court reiterated the rules on venue in libel cases:

    In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action.

    The Court clarified that venue for libel cases involving private individuals is limited to either the complainant’s residence at the time of the offense or where the defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information attempted to establish venue by stating that the article “was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City,” equating access with printing and first publication. This, the Supreme Court found insufficient to vest jurisdiction in Makati.

    The Supreme Court highlighted the rationale behind the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363, as explained in Chavez v. Court of Appeals. This amendment aimed to prevent the indiscriminate filing of libel cases in remote areas to harass the accused. The Court noted:

    Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.

    Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.

    To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts

    The Court emphasized that equating access to a website with printing and first publication would undermine the purpose of the amendment. There would be no reasonable way to determine the situs of its printing and first publication. To allow Gimenez’s premise would lead to chaos, as authors or bloggers could be sued for libel anywhere their website is accessed.

    The Supreme Court firmly rejected the notion that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed there. It acknowledged the potential for abuse, emphasizing that the intent of RA 4363 was to prevent harassment through strategically chosen venues. Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the Court’s pronouncements in Chavez are instructive:

    For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainant’s place of residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to quash the Amended Information. As a result, the Court granted the petition, setting aside the assailed order and resolution, and directing the RTC to quash the Amended Information and dismiss the case.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether accessing a defamatory article online constitutes “printing and first publication” for determining venue in libel cases under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court clarified that accessing an online article does not equate to printing and first publication.
    What is Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code? Article 360, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, specifies the venue for filing criminal and civil actions for written defamation. It states that such actions should be filed in the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the offense.
    Why was the Amended Information in this case deemed insufficient? The Amended Information was deemed insufficient because it alleged that the defamatory article was “first published and accessed” in Makati City, equating access with printing and first publication. The Supreme Court found this insufficient to vest jurisdiction in Makati, as it could lead to harassment by allowing libel suits to be filed anywhere the website is accessed.
    What does “venue is jurisdictional” mean in this context? “Venue is jurisdictional” means that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but also constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. In libel cases, Article 360 specifically provides the possible venues for instituting criminal and civil actions, making the correct venue crucial for the court’s authority to hear the case.
    What was the purpose of amending Article 360 by Republic Act No. 4363? The amendment aimed to prevent the indiscriminate filing of libel cases in remote or distant areas, which could harass or intimidate the accused. The amendment sought to ensure that venue is not arbitrarily chosen to inconvenience the accused, particularly in cases where the offended party has significant resources or influence.
    What are the permissible venues for libel cases involving private individuals? The permissible venues for libel cases involving private individuals are limited to either the complainant’s residence at the time of the commission of the offense or the place where the defamatory article was printed and first published. These limitations are designed to prevent the abuse of libel laws for harassment purposes.
    How does this ruling affect online publications and bloggers? This ruling protects online publications and bloggers from being sued for libel in any location where their content is accessed. It clarifies that merely accessing a website in a particular location does not establish jurisdiction for a libel case, preventing potential harassment through strategically chosen venues.
    What was the Court’s final decision in this case? The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the assailed order and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court directed the RTC to quash the Amended Information and dismiss the criminal case against the petitioners.

    This Supreme Court decision is a significant victory for freedom of expression in the digital age, ensuring that individuals are not subjected to arbitrary and potentially harassing libel suits based solely on where their online content is accessed. The ruling reinforces the importance of adhering to the venue requirements outlined in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, preventing the abuse of libel laws to stifle legitimate speech and expression.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: WONINA M. BONIFACIO, ET AL. VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, AND JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, G.R. No. 184800, May 05, 2010