The Supreme Court held that the period for the prescription of penalties does not begin to run until the convicted individual actually evades service of their sentence by escaping during imprisonment. This means that if a person, like Jovendo del Castillo, avoids imprisonment from the outset, the clock for prescription of penalties never starts ticking. This ruling underscores the necessity of actual imprisonment for the prescription period to commence, ensuring that those who evade justice from the start cannot later claim that their penalty has prescribed.
Fugitive From Justice: When Does the Clock Start Ticking on a Penalty?
Jovendo del Castillo was found guilty of violating the 1978 Election Code for disrupting election proceedings. He was sentenced to imprisonment. However, instead of serving his sentence, Del Castillo went into hiding, evading arrest for nearly a decade. Years later, he filed a motion to quash the warrant for his arrest, arguing that the penalty had prescribed. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that the prescription period only begins when a convict evades sentence by escaping during imprisonment. Del Castillo appealed this decision, leading the Supreme Court to clarify the interpretation of Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 157.
At the heart of the matter lies the interpretation of Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, which dictates when the prescription of penalties begins. It states that the period starts “from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence.” However, this provision must be read in conjunction with Article 157, which defines evasion of service of sentence as escaping during the term of imprisonment. Building on this principle, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the prescription of penalties requires an actual escape from confinement. The case of Tanega vs. Masakayan, et. al., is particularly instructive here, where the Court emphasized that the culprit must escape during their term of imprisonment for the prescription period to commence.
The Supreme Court rejected Del Castillo’s argument that the Court of Appeals had engaged in judicial legislation. It affirmed that the appellate court correctly interpreted and applied existing laws and jurisprudence. The Court emphasized that the term “escape” implies a prior state of confinement. As the Solicitor General aptly noted, “escape” refers to the unlawful departure of a prisoner from the limits of their custody. One cannot escape from prison if they have never been imprisoned. Therefore, Del Castillo, who never served any time, could not claim that his penalty had prescribed.
The Court highlighted the distinction between evading arrest and evading service of sentence. Del Castillo’s actions constituted an evasion of arrest, preventing him from beginning his sentence. This is different from escaping from prison, which would constitute evading service of sentence. The Court also considered Del Castillo’s appeal for compassion, recognizing his claim that he had lost peace of mind. However, the Court emphasized that compassion is reserved for those who deserve it, not for those who deliberately avoid facing justice. The Court found no merit in Del Castillo’s petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, reinforcing the principle that prescription of penalties requires actual imprisonment followed by an escape.
FAQs
What was the key issue in this case? | The key issue was whether the period for the prescription of a penalty begins to run when a person evades arrest and never begins serving their sentence, or only when they escape from imprisonment. |
What is the significance of Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code? | Article 93 specifies that the prescription period starts when the culprit evades the service of their sentence. This is crucial in determining when a penalty can no longer be enforced due to the passage of time. |
How does Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code relate to this case? | Article 157 defines evasion of service of sentence as escaping during imprisonment. This definition clarifies that evasion requires actual confinement followed by an escape. |
What did the Court mean by “escape” in this context? | The Court clarified that “escape” means the unlawful departure of a prisoner from the limits of their custody. This implies that the person must have been in custody to begin with. |
Why was Jovendo del Castillo’s motion to quash denied? | His motion was denied because he never began serving his sentence. Since he evaded arrest from the start, he could not claim that he had escaped from prison and that the penalty had prescribed. |
What was the Court’s ruling in Tanega vs. Masakayan? | In Tanega vs. Masakayan, the Court ruled that for prescription of penalty to commence, the culprit must escape during their term of imprisonment. This precedent was reaffirmed in Del Castillo’s case. |
Can a person who evades arrest claim prescription of penalty? | No, a person who evades arrest and never serves their sentence cannot claim prescription of penalty. The prescription period only starts if they escape from confinement. |
What is the practical implication of this ruling? | The ruling ensures that individuals who evade justice from the outset cannot later claim that their penalty has prescribed, reinforcing the importance of serving the imposed sentence. |
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in the Del Castillo case clarifies that the prescription of penalties requires actual imprisonment and subsequent escape. This ruling reinforces the principle that evading arrest does not equate to evading service of sentence. It underscores the importance of facing justice and serving the imposed penalty. The message is clear: one cannot benefit from their initial evasion of justice by later claiming prescription.
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Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Jovendo Del Castillo v. Hon. Rosario Torrecampo, G.R. No. 139033, December 18, 2002