ASG Law

Tag: Prescription of Penalties

  • Prescription of Penalties and Civil Liability: Understanding Execution of Judgments in Criminal Cases

    In Basilonia v. Villaruz, the Supreme Court clarified the rules on the execution of judgments in criminal cases, specifically addressing the prescription of penalties and the enforcement of civil liability. The Court held that while the penalty of imprisonment does not prescribe if the convict has not evaded service, the civil liability arising from the crime is subject to the statute of limitations under the Civil Code. This means that a motion for execution of the civil aspect must be filed within five years from the entry of judgment, or an independent action must be initiated within ten years, otherwise, the right to enforce the civil liability is lost. This decision highlights the importance of timely action in enforcing judgments to ensure that the rights of the victims are protected.

    Justice Delayed? Untangling Timelines for Criminal Judgment Execution

    The case stems from a 1987 decision against Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, and John Basilonia for the murder of Atty. Isagani Roblete and the frustrated homicide of Rene Gonzales. The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed their appeal in 1989, and the case records were remanded to the trial court. However, it was not until 2009, almost twenty years later, that Dixon Roblete, the victim’s son, filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment. This prompted the court to examine whether it still had jurisdiction to enforce the judgment, considering the time that had elapsed. The central legal question revolved around the applicability of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to criminal cases, specifically concerning the prescription of penalties and the extinction of civil liability.

    The petitioners argued that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to order the execution of the judgment, citing Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule provides a specific timeline for the execution of judgments. The Supreme Court, however, addressed the issues separately, distinguishing between the penalty of imprisonment and the civil liability arising from the offense. With respect to the penalty of imprisonment, the Court turned to the Revised Penal Code (RPC), specifically Articles 92 and 93. These articles outline when and how penalties prescribe, stating that the period of prescription begins when the culprit evades the service of his sentence.

    ARTICLE 92. When and How Penalties Prescribe. – The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows:

    1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
    2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
    3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
    4. Light penalties, in one year.

    The Court emphasized that evasion of service is a crucial element for the prescription of penalties to commence. Drawing from previous jurisprudence, such as Infante v. Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental and Tanega v. Masakayan, et al., the Court reiterated that the culprit must escape during the term of imprisonment for the prescription of the penalty to begin running. In Tanega v. Masakayan, et al., the Supreme Court expounded on the concept of evasion of service of sentence:

    x x x The period of prescription of penalties- so the succeeding Article 93 provides – “shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence.”

    What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence? Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready answer. Says Article 157:

    ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. – The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period.

    Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he “is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty”; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. x x x

    In this case, the petitioners had never been imprisoned, meaning they had not evaded any service of sentence. As such, the Court concluded that the penalty of imprisonment had not prescribed. Thus, the trial court retained jurisdiction to order the execution of the penalty of imprisonment.

    However, the Court’s treatment of the civil liability was markedly different. Acknowledging the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable, the Court underscored that civil liability is distinct from the criminal penalty. It cited Article 112 of the RPC, which states that civil liability is extinguished in the same manner as other obligations, according to the provisions of the Civil Law. This meant that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, was applicable to the civil aspect of the case. This rule sets a five-year period for execution by motion and a ten-year period for enforcement by independent action. As the Court clarified:

    These two modes of execution are available depending on the timing when the judgment creditor invoked its right to enforce the court’s judgment. Execution by motion is only available if the enforcement of the judgment was sought within five (5) years from the date of its entry. On the other hand, execution by independent action is mandatory if the five-year prescriptive period for execution by motion had already elapsed. However, for execution by independent action to prosper – the Rules impose another limitation – the action must be filed before it is barred by the statute of limitations which, under the Civil Code, is ten (10) years from the finality of the judgment.

    Given that the motion for execution was filed almost twenty years after the entry of judgment, the Court found that the right to enforce the civil liability had been extinguished by prescription. The Court noted that the private respondent failed to provide any compelling reason to justify the delay or to invoke the Court’s equity jurisdiction. The Supreme Court recognized exceptions where execution was allowed despite the lapse of the prescriptive period, such as when the delay was caused by the judgment debtor’s actions or when strict application of the rules would result in injustice.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court partially granted the petition. It affirmed the trial court’s order for the execution of the penalty of imprisonment but reversed the order concerning the civil liability. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for the immediate issuance of a mittimus, in accordance with existing circulars. The Court also directed the Office of the Court Administrator to investigate those responsible for the unreasonable delay in the execution of the judgment, emphasizing the ministerial duty of trial courts to execute penalties once a judgment of conviction becomes final.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant a motion for execution filed almost twenty years after the judgment in a criminal case became final. This involved determining if the penalty of imprisonment had prescribed and if the civil liability arising from the crime was already extinguished.
    Does the penalty of imprisonment prescribe? The penalty of imprisonment prescribes if the convict evades service of the sentence by escaping during the term of imprisonment. If the convict has not been imprisoned, the period of prescription does not run in their favor.
    What is the prescriptive period for enforcing civil liability arising from a crime? The civil liability arising from a crime must be enforced within five years from the date of entry of judgment through a motion for execution. After this period, an independent action must be filed within ten years from the finality of the judgment.
    What happens if the prescriptive period for civil liability has lapsed? If the prescriptive period for enforcing civil liability has lapsed, the right to enforce the civil liability is extinguished. The judgment creditor loses the ability to collect the civil indemnity awarded in the criminal case.
    Are there exceptions to the prescriptive period for execution of judgment? Yes, there are exceptions where execution may be allowed despite the lapse of the prescriptive period, such as when the delay is caused by the judgment debtor’s actions or when strict application of the rules would result in injustice. However, these exceptions are applied sparingly.
    What is the role of the trial court in executing a final judgment of conviction? The trial court has the ministerial duty to immediately execute the penalty of imprisonment and/or pecuniary penalty (fine) once a judgment of conviction becomes final and executory. A motion to execute judgment of conviction is not necessary.
    What is a mittimus? A mittimus is a commitment order issued by the trial court directing the transfer of the accused to the National Penitentiary to serve his sentence. It should be issued immediately after the promulgation of judgment if the penalty requires service in the National Penitentiary.
    Why was there a delay in the execution of the judgment in this case? The delay in the execution of the judgment was due to the inaction of the public prosecutor and the failure of the heirs of the victim to file a motion for execution within the prescribed period. The Court found that the delay was not attributable to the petitioners.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Basilonia v. Villaruz serves as a reminder of the importance of diligently pursuing the execution of judgments, especially concerning the civil aspect of criminal cases. The ruling reinforces the principle that while penalties for crimes must be served, civil liabilities are subject to specific time limitations. This underscores the need for prompt legal action to protect the rights of victims and ensure justice is fully served.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Rodolfo Basilonia, et al. vs. Hon. Delano F. Villaruz, et al., G.R. Nos. 191370-71, August 10, 2015

  • Prescription of Penalties: Imprisonment Must Commence for Evasion to Trigger Prescriptive Period

    The Supreme Court ruled that the prescriptive period for penalties, as outlined in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, only begins to run when a convicted person evades service of their sentence after imprisonment has already commenced. This means that merely avoiding arrest or absconding before serving any time in jail does not trigger the start of the prescriptive period. The ruling emphasizes that evasion of sentence presupposes an escape from confinement and affirms the principle that prescription favors only those who have begun serving their sentence.

    Fugitive from Justice: When Does Time Start Running on a Penalty?

    The case revolves around Benjamin Pangan, who was convicted of simple seduction and sentenced to two months and one day of arresto mayor. After the Regional Trial Court affirmed his conviction, Pangan failed to appear for the promulgation of the decision. An order for his arrest was issued, but he remained at large for nearly nine years before being apprehended. Pangan then filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, arguing that his penalty had prescribed because more than five years had passed since the judgment, citing Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code. The Regional Trial Court denied the petition, leading to this appeal where the central question is when the prescriptive period of penalties begins.

    Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code states that “[t]he period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence…” This provision has been the subject of interpretation by the courts. In interpreting Article 93, the Supreme Court relied on existing jurisprudence, particularly the case of Tanega v. Masakayan. This case clarifies that for the prescription of a penalty of imprisonment to commence, the offender must escape during the term of their imprisonment. The Court referred to Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines evasion of service of sentence:

    “ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. xxx”

    In Tanega, the Court explicitly stated that evasion of sentence, under Article 157, requires that the convict is “serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty” and “evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.” The court then emphasized the importance of the escape taking place while serving the sentence, which meant that because Tanega never served time, the prescription period could not run in her favor.

    Building on this principle, the Court underscored the essence of evasion as being synonymous with “jail breaking,” further cementing the idea that it can only occur during active imprisonment. The case of Del Castillo v. Torrecampo reinforced this doctrine, reiterating that prescription begins only when the convict escapes during imprisonment. The Supreme Court clarified that one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped and thus, cannot claim the benefit of prescription of penalties. In the case at hand, the Supreme Court emphasized that Pangan had never been imprisoned prior to his arrest on January 20, 2000. Therefore, because Pangan was never in prison, there could be no talk of an escape during imprisonment, and thus, the period for the prescription of his penalty never began to run.

    Despite the affirmation of the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court noted that Pangan had already served his sentence by the time the decision was rendered. As such, it ordered his immediate release, unless he was being detained for any other offense or charge. This demonstrates the court’s consideration for individual liberties while upholding the principles of penal law.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was to determine when the prescriptive period for penalties begins, specifically whether it starts from the date of conviction or from the date the convict evades service of sentence after imprisonment has commenced.
    What is the meaning of “evasion of service of sentence” according to the Revised Penal Code? “Evasion of service of sentence” refers to a convict escaping during the term of their imprisonment after having been convicted by final judgment, as defined under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code.
    Does prescription of penalties apply to someone who avoids arrest after conviction? No, the Supreme Court clarified that the prescription of penalties under Article 93 applies only to those who have begun serving their sentence through imprisonment and subsequently escape.
    What previous cases influenced the Supreme Court’s decision in this case? The Supreme Court relied heavily on the rulings in Tanega v. Masakayan and Del Castillo v. Torrecampo, which both established that prescription of penalties requires an escape from confinement.
    What happens if the convict is detained for another offense or charge? If the convict is detained for another offense or charge, they will not be released immediately, and their detention will continue based on the merits of the new case.
    Can someone claim prescription of penalty if they were never imprisoned? No. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that if there was no imprisonment, the period of prescription of penalties does not begin.
    What is the practical implication of this ruling? The ruling establishes that avoiding arrest does not constitute evasion of sentence. In other words, it clarifies that people cannot simply hide to allow their penalties to prescribe if they have not even begun serving their sentence in jail.
    How does Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code relate to Article 93? Article 157 helps define the phrase ‘evade the service of his sentence’ used in Article 93. According to 157, for a person to evade their sentence, they must have been imprisoned by reason of final judgment, and subsequently escaped from that imprisonment.

    This case provides a clear interpretation of Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, emphasizing that prescription of penalties requires actual evasion of sentence through escape from imprisonment. This ensures that individuals cannot avoid serving their sentences by simply remaining at large before ever being confined. It must be noted that this decision hinged upon the fact that by the time this decision was rendered, petitioner Pangan had completely served his sentence, entitling him to release from confinement.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: BENJAMIN PANGAN Y RIVERA v. HON. LOURDES F. GATBALITE and COL. JAMES D. LABORDO, G.R. NO. 141718, January 21, 2005

  • Prescription of Penalties: Evasion of Sentence Requires Prior Imprisonment

    The Supreme Court has clarified that the prescription of penalties for a crime only begins to run when a convicted person evades their sentence after already being imprisoned. In Del Castillo v. Torrecampo, the Court ruled that if a person avoids imprisonment altogether, the period for the penalty to prescribe does not commence. This means that individuals who successfully evade initial imprisonment remain liable to serve their sentence indefinitely, until they are apprehended. This decision underscores the importance of serving the imposed sentence and clarifies the conditions under which penalties can be considered prescribed under Philippine law.

    Fugitive’s Dilemma: Can a Sentence Prescribe if Never Served?

    This case revolves around Jovendo Del Castillo, who was convicted of violating the 1978 Election Code for disrupting a Barangay election in 1982. After his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 1986, Del Castillo failed to appear for the execution of the judgment, prompting the court to issue an arrest warrant and confiscate his bond. He remained at large for ten years, after which he filed a motion to quash the warrant, arguing that the penalty had prescribed. The trial court denied his motion, a decision upheld by the Court of Appeals. The central legal question is whether the period for the prescription of a penalty begins when the convict evades initial imprisonment, or only after they have already begun serving their sentence.

    The Supreme Court, in affirming the Court of Appeals’ decision, emphasized the importance of interpreting Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in conjunction with Article 157 of the same code. Article 93 addresses the computation of the prescription of penalties, stating that the period begins to run from the date the culprit evades the service of their sentence. However, Article 157 defines evasion of service of sentence as escaping during the term of imprisonment following a final judgment.

    Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code: ‘Computation of the prescription of penalties – The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which his Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.’

    The Court reasoned that the term “evade” implies that the person must have already been in custody, serving their sentence, before they can be considered to have evaded it. The Supreme Court referenced the case of Tanega vs. Masakayan, et. al., wherein it was established that the prescription of a penalty starts when a convict escapes during their term of imprisonment. Building on this principle, the Court clarified that merely failing to submit oneself to imprisonment does not constitute evasion as contemplated by the law.

    A critical aspect of the Court’s analysis is the distinction between avoiding imprisonment altogether and escaping from imprisonment. The Solicitor General aptly pointed out that “escape,” in legal terms, refers to the unlawful departure of a prisoner from the confines of their custody. This approach contrasts with simply not reporting to serve a sentence. The Supreme Court highlighted that Del Castillo had never been incarcerated, thus he could not be said to have “escaped” from confinement. Because he avoided imprisonment from the outset, the prescriptive period for his penalty never began.

    The Supreme Court also addressed Del Castillo’s plea for compassion, noting that his predicament was a direct result of his own actions. Despite being found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he chose to evade justice, thereby forfeiting any claim to leniency from the court. This decision underscores the principle that individuals are accountable for their choices, particularly when those choices involve evading legal consequences. The court’s position reinforces the importance of respecting and complying with judicial orders.

    Furthermore, the Court emphasized that its decision was rooted in settled jurisprudence and applicable laws, and did not constitute judicial legislation. The Court was tasked with interpreting existing laws, not creating new ones. This demonstrates a commitment to adhering to legal precedent and maintaining consistency in the application of the law. The ruling reaffirms the principle that laws must be interpreted in a manner that aligns with their intended purpose and historical context.

    In summary, the Supreme Court’s decision in Del Castillo v. Torrecampo offers a clear interpretation of the prescription of penalties under Philippine law. The ruling clarifies that the prescriptive period for a penalty does not begin to run until a convict has already begun serving their sentence and subsequently evades it. This interpretation ensures that individuals who avoid imprisonment from the outset remain accountable for their crimes, regardless of the passage of time. This ruling has significant implications for the enforcement of criminal penalties and the pursuit of justice in the Philippines.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the period for the prescription of a penalty begins when a convict evades initial imprisonment, or only after they have already begun serving their sentence. The Court determined that prescription only begins after imprisonment has commenced.
    What is the meaning of “evasion of service of sentence” in this context? Evasion of service of sentence, as defined in relation to prescription of penalties, refers to escaping from imprisonment after having been incarcerated, not simply failing to report for imprisonment. This distinction is crucial in determining when the prescriptive period begins.
    What is Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code about? Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code discusses the computation of the prescription of penalties, stating that the period begins to run from the date the culprit evades the service of their sentence. However, this article must be read in conjunction with Article 157.
    Why did the court deny Del Castillo’s motion to quash the warrant? The court denied the motion because Del Castillo had never been imprisoned, and therefore, the prescriptive period for his penalty had never begun to run. His act of avoiding initial imprisonment did not constitute evasion of sentence.
    What was the penalty imposed on Del Castillo? Del Castillo was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum for violating Section 178 (nn) of the 1978 Election Code. This penalty is considered a correctional penalty under the Revised Penal Code.
    What is the significance of the Tanega vs. Masakayan case in this ruling? The Tanega vs. Masakayan case established the precedent that the prescription of a penalty starts when a convict escapes during their term of imprisonment, which the Supreme Court reaffirmed in this case. This reinforces the principle that evasion requires prior imprisonment.
    Can a person who avoids initial imprisonment claim that their penalty has prescribed? No, a person who avoids initial imprisonment cannot claim that their penalty has prescribed because the prescriptive period only begins to run once they are serving their sentence and subsequently evade it. This ruling clarifies this point definitively.
    What is the practical implication of this ruling for convicted criminals? The practical implication is that convicted criminals who avoid imprisonment from the outset remain liable to serve their sentence indefinitely, regardless of the passage of time, until they are apprehended. This underscores the importance of complying with court orders.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Del Castillo v. Torrecampo serves as a reminder of the importance of adhering to the law and fulfilling one’s legal obligations. By clarifying the requirements for the prescription of penalties, the Court has strengthened the enforcement of criminal sentences and reaffirmed the principle of accountability. Individuals facing legal challenges should seek advice from qualified legal professionals to understand their rights and obligations.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Del Castillo v. Torrecampo, G.R. No. 139033, December 18, 2002

  • Prescription of Penalties: The Importance of Actual Imprisonment in Philippine Law

    The Supreme Court held that the period for the prescription of penalties does not begin to run until the convicted individual actually evades service of their sentence by escaping during imprisonment. This means that if a person, like Jovendo del Castillo, avoids imprisonment from the outset, the clock for prescription of penalties never starts ticking. This ruling underscores the necessity of actual imprisonment for the prescription period to commence, ensuring that those who evade justice from the start cannot later claim that their penalty has prescribed.

    Fugitive From Justice: When Does the Clock Start Ticking on a Penalty?

    Jovendo del Castillo was found guilty of violating the 1978 Election Code for disrupting election proceedings. He was sentenced to imprisonment. However, instead of serving his sentence, Del Castillo went into hiding, evading arrest for nearly a decade. Years later, he filed a motion to quash the warrant for his arrest, arguing that the penalty had prescribed. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that the prescription period only begins when a convict evades sentence by escaping during imprisonment. Del Castillo appealed this decision, leading the Supreme Court to clarify the interpretation of Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 157.

    At the heart of the matter lies the interpretation of Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, which dictates when the prescription of penalties begins. It states that the period starts “from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence.” However, this provision must be read in conjunction with Article 157, which defines evasion of service of sentence as escaping during the term of imprisonment. Building on this principle, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the prescription of penalties requires an actual escape from confinement. The case of Tanega vs. Masakayan, et. al., is particularly instructive here, where the Court emphasized that the culprit must escape during their term of imprisonment for the prescription period to commence.

    The Supreme Court rejected Del Castillo’s argument that the Court of Appeals had engaged in judicial legislation. It affirmed that the appellate court correctly interpreted and applied existing laws and jurisprudence. The Court emphasized that the term “escape” implies a prior state of confinement. As the Solicitor General aptly noted, “escape” refers to the unlawful departure of a prisoner from the limits of their custody. One cannot escape from prison if they have never been imprisoned. Therefore, Del Castillo, who never served any time, could not claim that his penalty had prescribed.

    The Court highlighted the distinction between evading arrest and evading service of sentence. Del Castillo’s actions constituted an evasion of arrest, preventing him from beginning his sentence. This is different from escaping from prison, which would constitute evading service of sentence. The Court also considered Del Castillo’s appeal for compassion, recognizing his claim that he had lost peace of mind. However, the Court emphasized that compassion is reserved for those who deserve it, not for those who deliberately avoid facing justice. The Court found no merit in Del Castillo’s petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, reinforcing the principle that prescription of penalties requires actual imprisonment followed by an escape.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the period for the prescription of a penalty begins to run when a person evades arrest and never begins serving their sentence, or only when they escape from imprisonment.
    What is the significance of Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code? Article 93 specifies that the prescription period starts when the culprit evades the service of their sentence. This is crucial in determining when a penalty can no longer be enforced due to the passage of time.
    How does Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code relate to this case? Article 157 defines evasion of service of sentence as escaping during imprisonment. This definition clarifies that evasion requires actual confinement followed by an escape.
    What did the Court mean by “escape” in this context? The Court clarified that “escape” means the unlawful departure of a prisoner from the limits of their custody. This implies that the person must have been in custody to begin with.
    Why was Jovendo del Castillo’s motion to quash denied? His motion was denied because he never began serving his sentence. Since he evaded arrest from the start, he could not claim that he had escaped from prison and that the penalty had prescribed.
    What was the Court’s ruling in Tanega vs. Masakayan? In Tanega vs. Masakayan, the Court ruled that for prescription of penalty to commence, the culprit must escape during their term of imprisonment. This precedent was reaffirmed in Del Castillo’s case.
    Can a person who evades arrest claim prescription of penalty? No, a person who evades arrest and never serves their sentence cannot claim prescription of penalty. The prescription period only starts if they escape from confinement.
    What is the practical implication of this ruling? The ruling ensures that individuals who evade justice from the outset cannot later claim that their penalty has prescribed, reinforcing the importance of serving the imposed sentence.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in the Del Castillo case clarifies that the prescription of penalties requires actual imprisonment and subsequent escape. This ruling reinforces the principle that evading arrest does not equate to evading service of sentence. It underscores the importance of facing justice and serving the imposed penalty. The message is clear: one cannot benefit from their initial evasion of justice by later claiming prescription.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Jovendo Del Castillo v. Hon. Rosario Torrecampo, G.R. No. 139033, December 18, 2002