ASG Law

Tag: Prior Use

  • Trade Name vs. Trademark: Priority Rights and Protection Under the IP Code

    In Campbridge Waterproofing Systems, Inc. v. Greenseal Products [M] SDN. BHD., the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision to cancel Campbridge’s trademark registration for “GREENSEAL”. The Court emphasized that a trade name is protected even without registration and that appropriating another’s trade name as a trademark is unlawful, especially when it misleads the public. This ruling reinforces the protection of established trade names and prevents trademark registrations that infringe on existing business identities.

    “Greenseal” Showdown: Who Gets to Claim the Name?

    The case revolves around a dispute between Campbridge Waterproofing Systems, Inc. (Campbridge) and Greenseal Products (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Greenseal Malaysia) and Greenseal Philippines Corporation (Greenseal Philippines) (collectively, Greenseal) over the trademark “GREENSEAL.” Greenseal sought to cancel Campbridge’s trademark registration, arguing prior use and trade name protection. The central legal question is whether Campbridge’s trademark registration should be cancelled due to Greenseal’s prior use of the trade name and the potential for public confusion. The resolution of this issue determines the extent of trade name protection versus trademark rights in the Philippines.

    The Intellectual Property Code (IP Code) governs trademark and trade name rights in the Philippines. A trademark is defined as any visible sign capable of distinguishing goods or services of an enterprise, while a trade name identifies the business itself. The IP Code aims to protect both trademarks and trade names, preventing consumer confusion and unfair competition. According to Zulueta v. Cyma Greek Taverna Co., trademarks serve three key functions: indicating origin or ownership, guaranteeing quality, and advertising the articles they symbolize.

    The Supreme Court, in Zuneca Pharmaceutical v. Natrapharm, Inc., clarified that ownership of a trademark is acquired through registration under the IP Code. However, this registration provides only prima facie evidence of ownership. This means the registration can be challenged if obtained in bad faith or contrary to law. Section 151(b) of the IP Code allows for the cancellation of marks registered in bad faith or violating the Code’s provisions.

    The Court found that Campbridge’s registration was indeed contrary to law. Article 165 of the IP Code protects trade names, even without registration, against unlawful acts by third parties. Specifically, Article 165.2(b) states:

    (b) In particular, any subsequent use of the trade name by a third party, whether as a trade name or a mark or collective mark, or any such use of a similar trade name or mark, likely to mislead the public, shall be deemed unlawful.

    This provision prevents the appropriation of another’s trade name as a trademark if it is likely to cause public confusion. The Court emphasized that using the mark “GREENSEAL” on Campbridge’s products could mislead consumers into thinking they were purchasing products from Greenseal. Furthermore, the Court cited Ecole De Cuisine Manille, Inc. v. Renaud Cointreau & Cie and Fredco Manufacturing Corp. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, reiterating that Philippine law protects trade names of nationals of Paris Convention member states, even without local registration.

    Greenseal had been using its trade name in the Philippines since 2004 and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2006, predating Campbridge’s trademark application in 2009. Thus, Campbridge’s registration of Greenseal’s trade name as a trademark was deemed unlawful and a valid ground for cancellation. This case highlights the interplay between trade name and trademark protection, emphasizing that prior use and registration of a trade name can supersede a later trademark registration.

    The Court also addressed the issue of bad faith in Campbridge’s registration, although it ultimately found insufficient evidence to conclude bad faith. Bad faith in trademark registration involves knowledge of prior use or registration by another, essentially copying someone else’s trademark. Fraud involves making false claims about the origin, ownership, or use of the trademark. The Court stated that the determination of bad faith is factual and requires clear and convincing evidence, which was not sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

    Respondent points to the fact that since 1987, petitioner’s product was named FlexSeal Elastomeric Sealant and was only changed sometime in the mid-2000s to “GREENSEAL.” Additionally, the respondent added that the petitioner failed to explain how it came up with the word “GREENSEAL,” an invented mark that has no meaning in the dictionary, and why it dropped the words “elastomeric sealant.” All these, the Supreme Court held, do not amount to a showing of knowledge on the part of petitioner of prior creation, use, or registration of respondent’s trade name or mark, or show any false claims in connection with the trademark application and registration.

    The Supreme Court clarified that while the Zuneca case established that trademark ownership is acquired through valid registration under the IP Code, this does not negate the protection afforded to trade names. The cancellation of Campbridge’s trademark registration was not based on the “prior use” rule but on the finding that the registration was contrary to law due to the trade name protection afforded to Greenseal. The Court also addressed the Court of Appeals’ misapplication of Sections 3 and 131 of the IP Code, which pertain to reciprocal rights and priority rights based on foreign applications.

    Under Article 4(C)(1) of the Paris Convention, the priority period for trademarks is only six months from the date of filing the first application. Since Greenseal filed its Philippine application in 2010, it could not claim priority based on its 1993 Malaysian registration because the six-month period had long expired. Therefore, while the IP Code provides mechanisms for recognizing foreign trademark rights, these mechanisms are subject to specific timelines and requirements.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Campbridge’s trademark registration for “GREENSEAL” should be cancelled due to Greenseal’s prior use of the name as a trade name and the likelihood of public confusion.
    What is the difference between a trademark and a trade name? A trademark distinguishes goods or services, while a trade name identifies a business. Trade names are protected even without registration, while trademarks generally require registration for full protection.
    What does prima facie evidence mean in this context? Prima facie evidence means that a trademark registration is initially accepted as proof of ownership, but it can be challenged with evidence to the contrary, such as prior use of a trade name.
    Under what circumstances can a trademark registration be cancelled? A trademark registration can be cancelled if it was obtained in bad faith, is contrary to law, or infringes on an existing trade name or trademark.
    What is the significance of Article 165 of the IP Code? Article 165 protects trade names, even without registration, against unlawful acts by third parties, including using the trade name as a trademark in a way that could mislead the public.
    What is the Paris Convention, and how does it relate to this case? The Paris Convention is an international treaty that protects industrial property rights. It allows nationals of member states to protect their trade names and trademarks in other member states.
    What is the “priority right” under the IP Code? The “priority right” allows an applicant who has filed a trademark application in one country to claim the filing date of that application as the filing date in another country, provided the application is filed within six months.
    Why was Campbridge’s trademark registration cancelled in this case? Campbridge’s registration was cancelled because it appropriated Greenseal’s trade name as a trademark, which was deemed contrary to law and likely to mislead the public, violating Article 165 of the IP Code.

    The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of protecting established trade names and preventing the appropriation of these names as trademarks when it creates a likelihood of confusion. While trademark registration provides a legal advantage, it does not override the prior rights and protection afforded to trade names under the Intellectual Property Code. This case emphasizes the need for businesses to conduct thorough due diligence before registering a trademark to avoid infringing on existing trade name rights and misleading consumers.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: CAMPBRIDGE WATERPROOFING SYSTEMS, INC. v. GREENSEAL PRODUCTS [M] SDN. BHD., G.R. No. 269302, January 22, 2025

  • Trademark Ownership in the Philippines: Prior Use vs. First-to-File

    Trademark Disputes: When Prior Use Trumps First Filing in the Philippines

    G.R. No. 205699, January 23, 2023

    Imagine investing years building a brand, only to find someone else trying to register your trademark. In the Philippines, the “first-to-file” rule generally governs trademark ownership. However, this case highlights a crucial exception: bad faith. Even if you’re the first to file, prior use by another party, especially if known to you, can invalidate your application. The Supreme Court case of Manuel T. Zulueta vs. Cyma Greek Taverna Co. clarifies how bad faith, stemming from knowledge of prior use, can defeat a trademark application, even under the first-to-file system. This case revolves around a dispute over the “CYMA & LOGO” trademark, highlighting the importance of good faith in trademark registration.

    Understanding Trademark Law in the Philippines

    The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IPC), specifically Republic Act No. 8293, governs trademark registration. A trademark, as defined by the IPC, is a “visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise.” Trademarks serve to identify the source of goods or services, guarantee quality, and act as a form of advertising.

    The First-to-File Rule: The Philippines generally adheres to the “first-to-file” rule. This means that the first person or entity to file a trademark application has priority. However, this rule isn’t absolute.

    Bad Faith and Fraud: The Supreme Court has consistently held that registrations obtained in bad faith are void ab initio (from the beginning). Bad faith, in this context, means that the applicant knew of prior creation, use, or registration of an identical or similar trademark by another party. Fraud involves making false claims regarding the origin, ownership, or use of the trademark.

    Key Provisions: Section 123(d) of the IPC states that a mark cannot be registered if it “[i]s identical with a registered mark belonging to a different proprietor or a mark with an earlier filing or priority date, in respect of the same goods or services, or closely related goods or services, or if it so nearly resembles such a mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion.”

    Section 138 of the IPC states that a certificate of registration shall be “prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the same in connection with the goods or services and those that are related thereto specified in the certificate.”

    The Cyma Greek Taverna Case: A Detailed Look

    Manuel Zulueta, claiming to have conceptualized the Greek restaurant “Cyma,” filed a trademark application for “CYMA & LOGO.” However, the Cyma Greek Taverna Company, a partnership he formed with Raoul Goco, opposed the application. The partnership argued that Zulueta falsely claimed to be the originator of the trademark, which was actually created by Goco. Here’s a breakdown of the case’s progression:

    • 2005: Cyma Boracay restaurant launched.
    • 2006: Zulueta files a trademark application for “CYMA & LOGO” in his own name.
    • 2007: Cyma Partnership files its own trademark application for “CYMA GREEK TAVERNA AND LOGO.”
    • IPOPHL-BLA Decision: The Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines – Bureau of Legal Affairs (IPOPHL-BLA) rejects Zulueta’s application, citing the partnership’s prior registration.
    • IPOPHL-ODG Decision: The IPOPHL-Office of the Director General (IPOPHL-ODG) affirms the BLA’s ruling, emphasizing the partnership’s prior use and Zulueta’s failure to demonstrate personal use of the trademark.
    • Court of Appeals (CA) Decision: The CA upholds the IPOPHL-ODG’s decision, noting the partnership’s consistent use of the trademark since 2005.

    The Supreme Court ultimately denied Zulueta’s petition. The Court emphasized that while Zulueta was the first to file, his application was tainted by bad faith. As the Court stated, “As a partner, Zulueta, was without a doubt aware of the prior use of the trademark by the partnership, and that it had been Raoul Goco who conceptualized the mark for the partnership while on vacation in Greece.”

    The Court further reasoned that “Despite the fact that Zulueta was the first to file a trademark application, his knowledge of the prior use by Cyma Partnership of the trademark meant that Zulueta’s trademark application was filed in bad faith. As a consequence, his trademark application cannot be granted and he did not obtain any priority rights under Section 123(d) of the IPC.”

    Practical Implications for Businesses

    This case underscores that being the first to file a trademark application doesn’t guarantee ownership. Businesses must act in good faith and respect existing trademarks, even if they haven’t been formally registered. Due diligence is crucial before filing a trademark application. Conduct thorough searches to identify any existing trademarks or prior uses that could conflict with your application.

    Key Lessons:

    • Good Faith is Paramount: Act honestly and transparently in all trademark-related activities.
    • Prior Use Matters: Be aware of existing trademarks and prior uses, even if unregistered.
    • Due Diligence is Essential: Conduct thorough trademark searches before filing an application.
    • Partnership Considerations: When forming a partnership, clearly define ownership and usage rights of intellectual property.

    Hypothetical Example: Suppose a small bakery develops a unique logo and uses it for several years, but doesn’t register it. Later, a larger company in another region files a trademark application for a similar logo, unaware of the bakery’s prior use. If the bakery can prove its prior use and the larger company’s knowledge (or potential knowledge through reasonable due diligence), the bakery could potentially challenge the larger company’s trademark application based on bad faith.

    Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

    Q: What is the “first-to-file” rule?

    A: It means that generally, the first person or entity to file a trademark application has priority in obtaining trademark rights.

    Q: What constitutes “bad faith” in trademark registration?

    A: It means that the applicant knew of prior creation, use, or registration of an identical or similar trademark by another party.

    Q: How can I prove prior use of a trademark?

    A: Evidence of prior use can include sales invoices, advertising materials, website content, and other documents demonstrating consistent use of the trademark in commerce.

    Q: What should I do before filing a trademark application?

    A: Conduct a thorough trademark search to identify any existing trademarks or prior uses that could conflict with your application. Consult with a trademark attorney to assess the registrability of your mark.

    Q: Can a partnership own a trademark?

    A: Yes, a partnership has a separate juridical personality and can own trademarks.

    Q: What happens if someone uses my trademark without my permission?

    A: You can take legal action against them for trademark infringement.

    Q: How long does a trademark registration last?

    A: A trademark registration is valid for ten (10) years and can be renewed for subsequent ten-year periods.

    ASG Law specializes in Intellectual Property Law, Trademark Law, and Corporate Law. Contact us or email hello@asglawpartners.com to schedule a consultation.

  • Trademark Ownership: Prior Use vs. Registration in the Philippines

    In the Philippines, trademark disputes often arise between parties claiming rights to the same mark. This Supreme Court decision clarifies that while registration is important, it doesn’t automatically guarantee ownership. The Court emphasized that prior use and good faith play crucial roles in determining who has the right to a trademark, protecting the original creators of brands from those who might try to take advantage of their established reputation.

    The Battle Over ‘FARLIN’: When a Distributor Tries to Claim the Brand

    This case revolves around a long-standing trademark dispute between Cymar International, Inc. (Cymar), a Philippine corporation, and Farling Industrial Company, Ltd. (Farling), a Taiwanese corporation. Cymar sought to register several trademarks containing the name “FARLIN,” used for baby products. Farling opposed these registrations, arguing that it was the original owner of the FARLIN trademark and that Cymar was merely a distributor of its products. The central legal question is: Who has the right to use and register the FARLIN mark and its derivatives in the Philippines?

    The legal framework for resolving this dispute involves both the old Trademark Law (Republic Act No. 166) and the Intellectual Property Code (IPC). Under the old Trademark Law, ownership of a trademark was primarily based on actual use in commerce within the Philippines. The IPC, however, shifts the focus to registration as the operative act for acquiring trademark rights. Even under the IPC, registration only creates a prima facie presumption of ownership, which can be overturned by evidence of prior use and bad faith.

    The Supreme Court meticulously reviewed the evidence presented by both parties. Key to Farling’s case was demonstrating that it had been exporting FARLIN-branded products to the Philippines through Cymar since 1982. This was supported by a vast collection of shipping documents, invoices, and correspondence between the two companies. Farling also presented evidence of its trademark registration in Taiwan and other countries, as well as promotional materials predating Cymar’s claimed first use.

    On the other hand, Cymar argued that it was the first to register the FARLIN mark in the Philippines and that it had invested significant resources in building the brand’s reputation. However, the Court found that Cymar’s registration was obtained in bad faith, given its knowledge of Farling’s prior use and the existence of a distribution agreement between the parties. This distribution agreement, in fact, proved critical to the Court’s decision.

    The Court cited numerous precedents establishing that a mere distributor does not acquire ownership rights to its principal’s trademark. The use of a trademark by a distributor inures to the benefit of the foreign manufacturer whose goods are identified by the trademark. Moreover, the Court emphasized that Cymar could not claim prior use of the FARLIN mark because its use was pursuant to the distribution agreement with Farling. As the Court stated in Superior Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Kunnan Enterprises Ltd.:

    As a mere distributor, [the spurned Philippine distributor] undoubtedly had no right to register the questioned mark in its name. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the rule that the right to register a trademark should be based on ownership. When the applicant is not the owner of the trademark being applied for, he has no right to apply for the registration of the same. Under the Trademark Law, only the owner of the trademark, trade name or service mark used to distinguish his goods, business or service from the goods, business or service of others is entitled to register the same. An exclusive distributor does not acquire any proprietary interest in the principal’s trademark and cannot register it in his own name unless it has been validly assigned to him.

    Adding to Cymar’s difficulties was a document titled “Authorization,” which Cymar claimed constituted a waiver by Farling of its trademark rights. The Court rejected this argument, finding that the Authorization pertained only to the copyright over the design of the FARLIN mark, not the trademark itself. Trademark and copyright are distinct intellectual property rights, and a waiver of copyright does not automatically transfer trademark rights. This is because trademark law protects brand names and logos used to identify products, while copyright law protects original artistic and literary works. Here, Farling had only agreed to let Cymar use the design, but not the underlying trademark.

    Furthermore, the Court addressed several procedural issues raised by Cymar. Cymar argued that Farling had committed forum shopping by filing multiple cases involving the same trademark. The Court found that while the cases involved similar issues and parties, they were based on different causes of action. Each application for a distinct trademark, even if derivative of another, constitutes a distinct cause of action. This approach contrasts with a situation where a party files multiple cases based on the same set of facts and legal claims, hoping to obtain a favorable outcome in at least one forum.

    The Court also addressed the admissibility of Farling’s evidence, particularly its Taiwanese trademark registration. Cymar argued that the registration was not properly authenticated and therefore had no probative value. The Court noted that proceedings before the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) are administrative in nature and not bound by the strict technical rules of evidence. This is a well-established principle in administrative law, allowing agencies to consider a wider range of evidence than would be admissible in a court of law. Additionally, the documents had already been submitted to the IPO for purposes of the 1994 Cancellation Case, making it unnecessary to resubmit the original documents each time. The Supreme Court echoed this principle:

    These requirements notwithstanding, the Intellectual Property Office’s own Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings (which governs petitions for cancellations of a mark, patent, utility model, industrial design, opposition to registration of a mark and compulsory licensing, and which were in effect when respondent filed its appeal) specify that the Intellectual Property Office “shall not be bound by the strict technical rules of procedure and evidence.”

    In light of these findings, the Supreme Court upheld the IPO’s decision to deny Cymar’s trademark applications. The Court emphasized that while registration is important, it is not the sole determinant of trademark ownership. Prior use, good faith, and the circumstances of the commercial relationship between the parties are also critical factors to be considered. Here, Farling demonstrated that it was the original owner of the FARLIN trademark, and Cymar’s attempt to register the mark was tainted by bad faith and a violation of its fiduciary duty as a distributor.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was determining who had the right to use and register the FARLIN trademark in the Philippines: the original foreign manufacturer (Farling) or its local distributor (Cymar).
    What is the difference between trademark and copyright? A trademark protects brand names and logos used to identify goods or services, while copyright protects original artistic and literary works. A waiver of copyright does not automatically transfer trademark rights.
    What is the significance of ‘prior use’ in trademark law? Prior use refers to the first commercial use of a trademark in a particular territory. Under the old Trademark Law, prior use was a key factor in determining trademark ownership.
    What is the ‘first-to-file’ rule? The “first-to-file” rule, as implemented by the IPC, generally grants trademark rights to the first party to register a mark. However, this presumption can be overcome by evidence of bad faith or prior rights.
    What does ‘bad faith’ mean in trademark registration? Bad faith in trademark registration means that the applicant knew about another party’s prior use of an identical or similar mark when filing the application. This implies an intent to take advantage of another’s goodwill.
    How does a distribution agreement affect trademark rights? Generally, a distributor does not acquire ownership rights to its principal’s trademark. The use of the trademark by the distributor typically inures to the benefit of the principal (the manufacturer or owner of the mark).
    What is ‘forum shopping,’ and did it occur in this case? Forum shopping is filing multiple lawsuits based on the same cause of action, hoping one court will rule favorably. The Court found no forum shopping because each case involved a distinct trademark application.
    Why were photocopies of documents allowed as evidence in this case? Proceedings before the IPO are administrative and not bound by strict rules of evidence. The original documents were also already part of IPO records, making resubmission unnecessary.
    How does the Intellectual Property Code (IPC) affect this case? The IPC emphasizes registration as the primary means of acquiring trademark rights. However, prior use and bad faith remain relevant factors in determining trademark ownership, especially in cases initiated before the IPC’s enactment.

    This case underscores the importance of conducting thorough due diligence before attempting to register a trademark. Companies should ensure that they are not infringing on the rights of others, particularly those who have a history of prior use. The Supreme Court’s decision serves as a reminder that trademark rights are not solely determined by registration but also by equitable principles of good faith and fair dealing.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: CYMAR INTERNATIONAL, INC. VS. FARLING INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD., G.R. Nos. 177974, 206121, 219072 and 228802, August 17, 2022

  • Trademark Ownership: Prior Use vs. Registration in Philippine Law

    In a trademark dispute between Cymar International, Inc. and Farling Industrial Co., Ltd., the Supreme Court affirmed that merely being the first to register a trademark in the Philippines does not guarantee ownership. The Court prioritized evidence of prior use and bad faith, ruling that Farling, as the original owner and prior user of the ‘FARLIN’ trademark, had the right to prevent Cymar from registering derivative marks. This decision underscores the importance of establishing legitimate claim to a trademark beyond mere registration, especially when a distributor attempts to usurp the rights of the original manufacturer.

    From Distributor to Trademark Owner? Unraveling the ‘FARLIN’ Dispute

    The legal battle between Cymar International, Inc., a Philippine corporation, and Farling Industrial Co., Ltd., a Taiwanese corporation, centered on who had the rightful claim to the ‘FARLIN’ trademark and its variations. This dispute involved multiple cases before the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) and the Court of Appeals (CA), ultimately reaching the Supreme Court for a definitive resolution. At the heart of the matter was whether Cymar, as the first registrant of the trademark in the Philippines, could claim ownership despite evidence suggesting Farling’s prior use and ownership of the mark internationally.

    The Supreme Court consolidated four petitions for review arising from trademark disputes between Cymar and Farling. Farling had originally filed petitions to cancel Cymar’s trademark registrations, arguing prior ownership and use of the ‘FARLIN’ mark. The IPO initially denied Farling’s petitions, but the Director General of the IPO reversed this decision, leading to appeals and counter-appeals. Cymar argued that as the first to register the trademarks in the Philippines, it should be considered the rightful owner under the ‘first-to-file’ rule. Farling countered by presenting evidence of its prior use, international registrations, and a distributorship agreement with Cymar, arguing that Cymar was merely an importer and distributor, not the owner, of the ‘FARLIN’ trademark.

    The Court addressed several key issues, including forum shopping, admissibility of evidence, and the interpretation of the ‘first-to-file’ rule. The Court found that Farling did not engage in forum shopping, as each case involved distinct causes of action based on separate trademark applications by Cymar. Regarding evidence, the Court upheld the IPO’s decision to consider evidence from prior cancellation cases, emphasizing the administrative nature of IPO proceedings, which are not strictly bound by technical rules of evidence. This approach ensured a comprehensive review of the parties’ claims and commercial relationship.

    The Court delved into the relationship between Cymar and Farling. Evidence showed that Cymar acted as a distributor of Farling’s products. This arrangement began as early as 1982, prior to Cymar’s registration of the FARLIN trademark. Farling authorized Cymar to sell its products, including those bearing the FARLIN brand, in the Philippines. Further, an authorization document, though presented late, was deemed insufficient to transfer trademark rights, as it pertained only to copyright over the box design. Given the distribution agreement, the Court found that Cymar could not claim prior use of the FARLIN mark, because any use it made of the mark inured to the manufacturer-exporter, Farling. This underscored the importance of the commercial relationship in determining trademark ownership.

    Examining the applicability of the Intellectual Property Code (IPC), the Court clarified that while registration is the operative act for acquiring trademark rights, it does not override evidence of bad faith or prior ownership. The Court emphasized that while registration is important, ownership must be grounded in actual use and good faith. The Supreme Court highlighted that Cymar acted in bad faith by registering trademarks that belonged to Farling, particularly given their existing business relationship. This element of bad faith was critical in the Court’s decision to prioritize Farling’s rights over Cymar’s registration.

    To emphasize the interplay of use and registration in trademark law, the Court cited Kolin Electronics Co., Inc. v. Kolin Philippines International, Inc., noting that each trademark application initiates a new process of determining registrability, accounting for nuances of potential damage to other parties. This approach contrasts with a system where trademark rights are awarded automatically to the first registrant, regardless of other factors. The Court referenced specific legal provisions to support its analysis. Section 134 of the IPC outlines the opposition process, allowing parties who believe they would be damaged by the registration of a mark to file an opposition. Section 151.1(b) allows for the cancellation of a trademark registration obtained fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of the IPC.

    The Supreme Court also highlighted the distinct nature of copyright and trademark law by citing the case Kho v. Court of Appeals. This case clarified that trademarks and copyrights serve different purposes and provide different rights, further supporting the conclusion that the Authorization document held no weight in the trademark dispute.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court denied Cymar’s petitions, affirming the CA’s decisions. The Court’s ruling emphasized that mere registration does not guarantee trademark ownership, especially when there is evidence of prior use, a distribution agreement, and bad faith on the part of the registrant. This case reinforces the principle that trademark law aims to protect the rights of legitimate owners and prevent unfair competition. It highlights that the registration of a trademark is only one factor in determining ownership, and it can be overridden by compelling evidence of prior use and bad faith registration.

    This ruling has significant implications for businesses involved in distribution agreements and trademark registration. It serves as a reminder that distributors cannot simply register trademarks of their suppliers and claim ownership. The case also highlights the importance of conducting thorough due diligence before registering a trademark, to ensure that it does not infringe on the rights of others. Further, it underscores the importance of maintaining accurate records of distribution agreements and other relevant documents, as these can be crucial in resolving trademark disputes.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether Cymar, as the first to register certain trademarks in the Philippines, had superior rights to those trademarks over Farling, which claimed prior use and ownership. The Court examined the interplay between registration and prior use in determining trademark rights.
    What is the ‘first-to-file’ rule? The ‘first-to-file’ rule generally grants trademark rights to the first party to register a mark. However, this rule is not absolute and can be overridden by evidence of bad faith or prior existing rights.
    What evidence did Farling present to support its claim? Farling presented evidence of its prior use of the FARLIN trademark, its international registrations, and the distribution agreement with Cymar. This evidence demonstrated that Cymar was merely an importer, not the original owner.
    How did the Court interpret the distribution agreement between Cymar and Farling? The Court interpreted the distribution agreement as meaning that any use of the FARLIN trademark by Cymar inured to the benefit of Farling, the original manufacturer and owner. This prevented Cymar from claiming prior use based on its activities as a distributor.
    What is the significance of ‘bad faith’ in trademark registration? Bad faith refers to registering a trademark with knowledge of prior use or registration by another party. The Court found that Cymar acted in bad faith by registering trademarks belonging to Farling.
    What is the difference between trademark and copyright? A trademark protects brand names and logos used to identify goods or services, while copyright protects original artistic or literary works. The Court clarified that the authorization document only related to copyright, not trademark rights.
    How does this ruling affect distributors? This ruling clarifies that distributors cannot simply register their suppliers’ trademarks and claim ownership. Distributors must respect the intellectual property rights of the original owners.
    What should businesses do to protect their trademarks? Businesses should conduct thorough due diligence before registering a trademark, maintain accurate records of distribution agreements, and act in good faith when dealing with intellectual property rights. Registration and prior use are both important in securing trademark rights.

    This case underscores the importance of protecting intellectual property rights and acting in good faith. For businesses, it serves as a reminder to conduct thorough due diligence and understand the legal implications of their commercial relationships.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: CYMAR INTERNATIONAL, INC. VS. FARLING INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD., G.R. Nos. 177974, 206121, 219072 and 228802, August 17, 2022

  • Trademark Ownership: Registration Trumps Prior Use Under the Intellectual Property Code

    In a trademark dispute between Zuneca Pharmaceutical and Natrapharm, Inc., the Supreme Court affirmed that under the Intellectual Property Code (IP Code), trademark ownership is acquired through registration, not prior use. This means that the first party to register a trademark in good faith generally has superior rights, even if another party used the mark earlier. However, the Court also held that a prior user in good faith may continue using their mark even after another party registers it, but this right is tied to their existing business.

    Whose Brand Is It Anyway? Zuneca vs. Natrapharm’s Trademark Showdown

    Zuneca Pharmaceutical, engaged in importing and selling medicines since 1999, used the brand name “ZYNAPS” for its carbamazepine drug. Natrapharm, on the other hand, registered the trademark “ZYNAPSE” in 2007 for its citicoline product. Natrapharm then sued Zuneca for trademark infringement, arguing that “ZYNAPS” was confusingly similar to its registered mark. Zuneca countered that it had been using “ZYNAPS” since 2004, predating Natrapharm’s registration, and that Natrapharm acted in bad faith by registering a confusingly similar mark despite knowing of Zuneca’s prior use. The central legal question before the Supreme Court was: In a trademark dispute, does prior registration trump prior use?

    The Supreme Court held that under the IP Code, ownership of a trademark is acquired through registration, provided the registration is made in good faith. This principle is enshrined in Section 122 of the IP Code, which states, “The rights in a mark shall be acquired through registration made validly in accordance with the provisions of this law.” This marked a shift from the previous Trademark Law, which prioritized prior use in determining trademark ownership. The Court emphasized that the intent of the lawmakers was to abandon the rule that ownership of a mark is acquired through use, as evidenced by the legislative history of the IP Code.

    The Court found that Natrapharm had registered its trademark in good faith, as there was no evidence that it knew of Zuneca’s prior use of “ZYNAPS” at the time of registration. Consequently, Natrapharm, as the registered owner of “ZYNAPSE,” had the right to prevent others from using confusingly similar marks for related goods or services. However, the Court also recognized an exception: Section 159.1 of the IP Code states that a registered mark has no effect against any person who, in good faith, before the filing date, was using the mark for the purposes of his business or enterprise.

    In effect, this exception protects prior users who, in good faith, had already been using a mark before someone else registered it. To clarify, Section 159.1 of the IP Code states:

    SECTION 159. Limitations to Actions for Infringement. – Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the remedies given to the owner of a right infringed under this Act shall be limited as follows:

    159.1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 155 hereof, a registered mark shall have no effect against any person who, in good faith, before the filing date or the priority date, was using the mark for the purposes of his business or enterprise: Provided, That his right may only be transferred or assigned together with his enterprise or business or with that part of his enterprise or business in which the mark is used.

    This section serves as a limitation on the rights conferred by trademark registration, acknowledging the equities of prior users who have built goodwill around a mark before registration occurs. As the Court elaborated, this section should not be interpreted as merely exempting prior use before the registration date but as protecting the prior user’s right to continue using the mark, as long as it remains connected to their original business.

    Building on this principle, the Court ruled that Zuneca, as a prior user in good faith of the “ZYNAPS” mark, was protected from liability for trademark infringement. This protection, however, was not without limits. Zuneca’s right to use “ZYNAPS” was tied to its existing business, and it could not transfer or assign the mark independently of that business. The decision acknowledged the potential for confusion arising from the concurrent use of similar marks for pharmaceutical products but emphasized the importance of adhering to the provisions of the IP Code while also ordering the parties to prominently display information about their products’ uses on their packaging to mitigate confusion.

    The Supreme Court underscored the importance of complying with the Generics Act of 1988, as amended, which mandates the use of generic names in prescriptions. The intent is to help protect the public even where brand names may cause confusion. The Court further directed the Food and Drug Administration to monitor and regulate drug names to prevent the concurrent use of confusingly similar names for medicines. This part of the decision recognized the state’s duty to “protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.”

    In effect, the Zuneca v. Natrapharm ruling clarifies the interplay between registration and use in Philippine trademark law, affirming the primacy of registration while carving out protections for prior users who have acted in good faith. While a registrant has rights to a mark, a good faith prior user of a confusingly similar mark is given some leeway. This is a carefully balanced approach intended to protect the rights of legitimate businesses while also acknowledging prior investments made in building brand recognition.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was to determine the prevailing party in a trademark dispute and whether trademark infringement existed, necessitating a ruling on the acquisition of ownership of marks by both parties.
    How does the Intellectual Property Code define trademark ownership? Under the IP Code, trademark ownership is primarily acquired through registration made validly in accordance with the provisions of the law, not through prior use.
    What is the “first-to-file” rule? The “first-to-file” rule means that the first party to register a trademark generally has superior rights, even if another party used the mark earlier.
    Does prior use have any relevance under the IP Code? Yes, Section 159.1 of the IP Code protects a prior user in good faith, allowing them to continue using their mark even after another party registers it, provided the use is tied to their existing business.
    What is bad faith in trademark registration? Bad faith in trademark registration means that the applicant knew of a prior creation, use, or registration by another of an identical or similar trademark.
    What was the outcome for Zuneca Pharmaceutical? Zuneca was declared a prior user in good faith and was protected from liability for trademark infringement, but it could not transfer or assign the mark independently of its business.
    What was the outcome for Natrapharm, Inc.? Natrapharm was affirmed as the lawful registrant of the “ZYNAPSE” mark under the IP Code, solidifying its rights as the registered trademark owner.
    What steps were ordered to prevent confusion between the two medicines? Both companies were ordered to indicate on their packaging, in plain language, the medical conditions that their respective drugs treat and a warning indicating what each drug is not supposed to treat.
    What future action was required of the Food and Drug Administration? The Food and Drug Administration was directed to monitor the parties’ compliance with the labeling directives and to take action toward better regulation of pharmaceutical brands.

    This case highlights the importance of trademark registration under the IP Code while also protecting businesses that have previously and in good faith, been using the disputed trademark. It is a balancing act intended to promote both the protection of IP rights and fair competition. This decision underscores the need for businesses to register their trademarks to secure their rights, but it also ensures that prior good-faith users are not unfairly penalized.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL v. NATRAPHARM, INC., G.R. No. 211850, September 08, 2020

  • Trademark Registration: Prior Use Determines Ownership, But Goods Must Be Related to Cause Confusion

    In a trademark dispute between Kensonic, Inc. and Uni-Line Multi-Resources, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed the issue of trademark registration for the mark “SAKURA.” The Court ruled that while prior use establishes trademark ownership, registration can be cancelled only if the goods are related enough to cause consumer confusion. This decision underscores the importance of proving a direct link between goods for trademark disputes, ensuring that trademark protection extends only to related products to prevent unfair market advantage.

    SAKURA Showdown: Can a Common Name Blossom into Exclusive Trademark Rights?

    The intertwined appeals of Kensonic, Inc. v. Uni-Line Multi-Resources, Inc. [G.R. Nos. 211820-21 and 211834-35, June 6, 2018] center on the trademark “SAKURA” and its registration battles between two companies. Kensonic sought the cancellation of Uni-Line’s “SAKURA” trademark registration, arguing that Kensonic had prior use and registration of the mark. The central question before the Supreme Court was whether Uni-Line’s registration of the SAKURA mark for various goods should be cancelled due to Kensonic’s earlier use and registration, focusing specifically on whether the goods were related enough to cause consumer confusion. This case highlights the complexities in determining trademark rights, especially when a mark is not entirely unique and is used across different product categories.

    The Intellectual Property Office (IPO) initially ruled in favor of Kensonic, but this was later modified, leading to cross-appeals to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA initially sided with Uni-Line but later reversed course in an amended decision. Both parties then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, presenting the high court with the task of resolving the dispute over the SAKURA mark. The Supreme Court needed to determine whether the goods were related enough to warrant the cancellation of Uni-Line’s trademark registration, focusing on the likelihood of consumer confusion.

    At the heart of this legal battle is Section 123(h) of the Intellectual Property Code, which prohibits the registration of marks that are generic for the goods or services they identify. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the SAKURA mark, while referring to a Japanese flowering cherry, did not identify Kensonic’s goods in the same way that “Pale Pilsen” identifies a type of beer, as discussed in Asia Brewery, Inc., v. Court of Appeals. The Court stated:

    The fact that the words pale pilsen are part of ABI’s trademark does not constitute an infringement of SMC’s trademark: SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN, for “pale pilsen” are generic words descriptive of the color (“pale”), of a type of beer (“pilsen”), which is a light bohemian beer with a strong hops flavor that originated in the City of Pilsen in Czechoslovakia and became famous in the Middle Ages.

    The Court thus acknowledged Kensonic’s prior use of the mark since 1994, which established their ownership. However, the Court emphasized that a finding of prior use alone is not enough to warrant the cancellation of a subsequent registration; the goods must be related. In determining whether the goods are related, the Supreme Court leaned on the criteria established in Mighty Corporation v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, which provides factors like the nature and cost of the articles, their descriptive properties, and the channels of trade through which the goods flow.

    The Supreme Court specifically addressed whether Uni-Line’s goods classified under Class 07 (washing machines, etc.) and Class 11 (refrigerators, etc.) were related to Kensonic’s goods registered under Class 09 (electronics). The Court clarified that the prohibition under Section 123 extends only to goods that are related to the registered goods, and not to goods that the registrant may produce in the future. This is important because trademark rights are not based on mere possibilities but on actual market realities. This approach contrasts with the argument that trademark coverage should expand to encompass goods that a registrant may produce in the future.

    In applying the factors from Mighty Corporation v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, the Supreme Court found that the goods of Uni-Line and Kensonic differed in class, descriptive attributes, purposes, and conditions of use. This analysis is in line with the ruling in Taiwan Kolin Corporation, Ltd. v. Kolin Electronics, Co., Inc., which emphasized that mere classification under the same Nice Classification (NCL) is insufficient to establish relatedness. This case underscores that goods must be critically assessed beyond mere classification.

    The Court used sub-classification analysis to make the point. Kensonic’s goods belonged to the information technology and audiovisual equipment sub-class, while Uni-Line’s goods pertained to the apparatus and devices for controlling the distribution of electricity sub-class. These differences in sub-classification, along with the fact that Kensonic’s goods were final products while Uni-Line’s were often spare parts, further cemented the determination that the goods were unrelated. This distinction emphasizes the importance of granular analysis in trademark cases.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court denied Kensonic’s petition and partially granted Uni-Line’s, reversing the amended decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court partially reinstated the original decision, which allowed Uni-Line to register its SAKURA mark for voltage regulators, portable generators, switch breakers, and fuses. This ruling underscores the principle that while prior use establishes trademark ownership, the right to cancel a subsequent registration hinges on demonstrating a likelihood of consumer confusion due to the relatedness of the goods.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether Uni-Line’s registration of the “SAKURA” trademark should be cancelled due to Kensonic’s prior use, focusing on whether the goods were related enough to cause consumer confusion.
    What is the significance of prior use in trademark law? Prior use is a critical factor in determining trademark ownership, as it establishes the right to a particular mark. However, prior use alone is not sufficient to cancel a subsequent trademark registration.
    What criteria are used to determine if goods are “related” in trademark law? The Court considers factors like the business to which the goods belong, the class of the product, the nature and cost of the articles, their descriptive properties, the purpose of the goods, and the channels of trade. These criteria help assess whether consumers are likely to be confused about the source of the goods.
    How does the Nice Classification factor into determining relatedness? While the Nice Classification is a factor, it is not the sole determinant of whether goods are related. The Court conducts a more thorough analysis based on factors like descriptive attributes, purposes, and conditions of the goods.
    What did the Supreme Court decide regarding the registration of Uni-Line’s products? The Supreme Court allowed Uni-Line to register its “SAKURA” mark for voltage regulators, portable generators, switch breakers, and fuses. The Court determined that these products were unrelated to Kensonic’s goods, reducing the likelihood of consumer confusion.
    How does the Intellectual Property Code define trademark infringement? The Intellectual Property Code outlines trademark infringement when a subsequent mark is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception among consumers. This determination considers the similarity of the marks and the relatedness of the goods or services.
    Can a generic term be protected as a trademark? Generally, generic terms cannot be protected as trademarks because they describe an entire class of goods or services. However, if a term is used in a non-descriptive way and acquires secondary meaning, it may be eligible for trademark protection.
    What is the difference between a trademark and a copyright? A trademark protects brand names and logos used on goods and services to identify and distinguish them from others. A copyright protects original works of authorship, such as literary, artistic, and musical works.

    This case reinforces the principle that trademark registration requires a careful assessment of both prior use and the relatedness of goods. The Supreme Court’s decision balances the rights of trademark owners with the need to prevent unfair market advantages based on tenuous connections between product categories. By emphasizing the likelihood of consumer confusion, the Court ensures that trademark protection remains grounded in practical market realities.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: KENSONIC, INC. vs. UNI-LINE MULTI-RESOURCES, INC., G.R. Nos. 211834-35, June 06, 2018

  • Trademark Law: Prior Use Prevails Over International Reputation in Philippine Trademark Registration

    The Supreme Court ruled that prior use of a trademark in the Philippines takes precedence over international reputation when determining trademark registration rights. Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation’s prior use of the ‘DOUBLE REVERSIBLE WAVE LINE’ and ‘DOUBLE CURVE LINES’ trademarks since 1973 and 1980, respectively, bars The H.D. Lee Company, Inc. from registering the ‘LEE & OGIVE CURVE DESIGN’ trademark, despite H.D. Lee’s international presence. This decision reinforces the principle that actual use in commerce within the Philippines is a critical factor in establishing trademark ownership and rights, emphasizing the importance of local commercial activity in trademark disputes.

    Whose Curve Is It Anyway? A Trademark Battle Over Garment Designs

    The case of Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation v. The H.D. Lee Company, Inc., revolves around a dispute over trademark rights for garment designs. Emerald Garment, a local manufacturer, opposed H.D. Lee’s application to register the trademark ‘LEE & OGIVE CURVE DESIGN,’ arguing it infringed on Emerald’s existing trademarks, ‘DOUBLE REVERSIBLE WAVE LINE’ and ‘DOUBLE CURVE LINES.’ The central legal question is whether H.D. Lee’s international reputation and use of a similar design outweigh Emerald’s prior use and registration of its trademarks within the Philippines.

    The Intellectual Property Office’s (IPO) Director of the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) initially sided with Emerald, emphasizing Emerald’s prior use and registration of its marks. However, the IPO’s Director General (DG) reversed this decision, favoring H.D. Lee based on its international registrations and reputation. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the DG’s decision, taking judicial notice of H.D. Lee’s design being featured in popular culture. This ruling highlighted the complexities of trademark law when international brands clash with local businesses.

    Emerald then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, asserting the principle of conclusiveness of judgment based on a previous case, G.R. No. 195415, where the Court upheld Emerald’s registration of the ‘DOUBLE REVERSIBLE WAVE LINE’ mark. Emerald argued that the issue of confusing similarity and prior use had already been determined in that case, preventing H.D. Lee from relitigating the same issues. The Supreme Court agreed with Emerald, emphasizing the importance of finality in legal proceedings.

    The Supreme Court’s decision hinged on the doctrine of res judicata, which prevents parties from relitigating issues that have already been decided by a competent court. The Court highlighted that res judicata embraces two concepts: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment. In this case, the Court focused on the latter, which applies when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.

    The Court found that the issue of confusing similarity between the marks and the issue of prior use had already been determined in favor of Emerald in previous cases. Therefore, H.D. Lee was barred from relitigating these issues in its application for trademark registration. The Court stated:

    H.D. Lee argues that the principle of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply since no identity of issue exists between the instant petition, on one hand, and G.R. No. 195415, on the other. The Court finds the foregoing untenable as the issues all point to the registrability of the confusingly similar marks ‘DOUBLE CURVE LINES,’ ‘DOUBLE REVERSIBLE WAVE LINE,’ and ‘OGIVE CURVE DESIGN.’

    The Court emphasized that prior use in commerce within the Philippines is a critical factor in establishing trademark ownership. Section 2-A of Republic Act No. 166 (the law then in force and effect) stated that ownership of a trademark is acquired through continuous commercial use. H.D. Lee’s argument that its international reputation should outweigh Emerald’s prior local use was rejected by the Court.

    Moreover, the Court found that H.D. Lee had failed to prove that its ‘OGIVE CURVE DEVICE’ was well-known internationally and in the Philippines at the time Emerald filed its application for registration. The Court noted that H.D. Lee’s sale of garments in the Philippines only began in 1996, while Emerald had been using its marks since 1973 and 1980. This timeline was crucial in establishing Emerald’s prior rights.

    The ruling also underscored the significance of the Intellectual Property Code (IPC), specifically Section 123.1(d), which prohibits the registration of a mark that is identical or confusingly similar to a registered mark with an earlier filing or priority date. This provision is designed to protect the rights of trademark owners and prevent consumer confusion.

    The Supreme Court highlighted the importance of upholding final judgments to ensure an effective and efficient administration of justice. The Court quoted the case of Pryce Corporation v. China Banking Corporation, stating:

    [W]ell-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.

    Furthermore, the decision serves as a reminder to lower courts to consider related cases and ensure consistency in judicial decisions. This vigilance is crucial to avoid judicial confusion and conflicting rulings.

    The implications of this decision are significant for trademark law in the Philippines. It reinforces the principle that prior use in commerce within the Philippines is a critical factor in establishing trademark ownership. It also highlights the importance of the doctrine of res judicata in preventing the relitigation of issues that have already been decided. This ruling provides clarity for businesses seeking to register trademarks and underscores the need to conduct thorough searches to avoid infringing on existing trademark rights.

    The Court’s decision rested on the application of several key legal principles. Firstly, the concept of prior use, which dictates that the first party to use a trademark in commerce generally has the right to register and protect that mark. Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata, specifically the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, which prevents parties from relitigating issues that have already been decided by a competent court. Lastly, the provisions of the Intellectual Property Code (IPC), which govern the registration and protection of trademarks in the Philippines. These principles collectively guide the Court’s reasoning and its ultimate decision in favor of Emerald Garment.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of prior use and the principle of conclusiveness of judgment in trademark law. The Court firmly established that Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation’s prior use of its trademarks within the Philippines outweighed The H.D. Lee Company, Inc.’s international reputation. This ruling reinforces the significance of local commercial activity in trademark disputes and provides clarity for businesses seeking to register and protect their trademarks.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether H.D. Lee’s international reputation outweighed Emerald’s prior use and registration of similar trademarks in the Philippines, specifically concerning the registration of the ‘LEE & OGIVE CURVE DESIGN’ trademark.
    What is the doctrine of res judicata? Res judicata is a legal doctrine that prevents parties from relitigating issues that have already been decided by a competent court. It includes two concepts: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment.
    What is conclusiveness of judgment? Conclusiveness of judgment applies when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. It only requires identity of parties and issues to apply.
    Why did the Supreme Court rule in favor of Emerald Garment? The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Emerald Garment because Emerald had established prior use and registration of its trademarks (‘DOUBLE REVERSIBLE WAVE LINE’ and ‘DOUBLE CURVE LINES’) in the Philippines before H.D. Lee sought to register its mark. Also, the issues of confusing similarity and prior use had already been decided in favor of Emerald in previous cases.
    What is the significance of prior use in trademark law? Prior use means that the first party to use a trademark in commerce generally has the right to register and protect that mark. It is a critical factor in establishing trademark ownership.
    What is Section 123.1(d) of the Intellectual Property Code (IPC)? Section 123.1(d) of the IPC prohibits the registration of a mark that is identical or confusingly similar to a registered mark with an earlier filing or priority date. This section aims to prevent consumer confusion and protect trademark owners’ rights.
    When did H.D. Lee start selling garments in the Philippines? H.D. Lee started selling garments in the Philippines in 1996, which was after Emerald had already been using its trademarks for several years.
    What trademarks were at the center of the dispute? The trademarks at the center of the dispute were Emerald Garment’s ‘DOUBLE REVERSIBLE WAVE LINE’ and ‘DOUBLE CURVE LINES,’ and H.D. Lee’s ‘LEE & OGIVE CURVE DESIGN.’

    This landmark decision provides crucial guidance on the application of trademark law in the Philippines, especially in cases involving international brands and local businesses. The emphasis on prior use reinforces the importance of establishing a commercial presence within the Philippines to secure trademark rights.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation v. The H.D. Lee Company, Inc., G.R. No. 210693, June 07, 2017

  • Trademark Ownership: Actual Use vs. Registration Rights

    In a dispute over the “BIRKENSTOCK” trademark, the Supreme Court sided with Birkenstock Orthopaedie GmbH & Co. KG, emphasizing that prior use and actual ownership of a trademark outweigh mere registration. The Court held that failure to file a Declaration of Actual Use (DAU) results in the loss of trademark rights, and registration does not automatically confer ownership. This decision reinforces the principle that true and lawful owners of trademarks are protected, even if another party registers the mark first.

    BIRKENSTOCK Battle: Who Truly Owns a Brand?

    This case revolves around the rightful ownership and registration of the “BIRKENSTOCK” trademark in the Philippines. Birkenstock Orthopaedie GmbH & Co. KG, a German corporation, sought to register several trademarks containing the name “BIRKENSTOCK.” However, their efforts were challenged by Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corporation, who claimed prior use and registration of the mark “BIRKENSTOCK AND DEVICE” through its predecessor-in-interest. The core legal question is whether the Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corporation, through prior registration of the “BIRKENSTOCK” mark, could prevent Birkenstock Orthopaedie GmbH & Co. KG, who claimed to be the original owner, from registering their trademarks. This issue underscores the tension between trademark registration and the actual use of a mark in commerce.

    The controversy began when Birkenstock applied for trademark registrations with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO). These applications were initially suspended due to Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corporation’s existing registration. Birkenstock then filed a petition for cancellation of this registration, but the case was dismissed when Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corporation failed to submit the required 10th Year Declaration of Actual Use (DAU). Despite this failure, Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corporation opposed Birkenstock’s subsequent applications, leading to a series of conflicting rulings from the IPO’s Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA), the IPO Director General, and the Court of Appeals (CA).

    The BLA initially sided with Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corporation, emphasizing their prior use of the mark in the Philippines. However, the IPO Director General reversed this decision, asserting that the failure to file the 10th Year DAU nullified Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corporation’s rights. On appeal, the CA reinstated the BLA’s ruling, which disallowed Birkenstock’s registration. The CA argued that Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corporation’s failure to file the 10th Year DAU did not negate their ownership due to continuous use and promotion of the trademark.

    The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the CA’s position, and ultimately sided with Birkenstock. A critical point in the Supreme Court’s analysis was the admissibility of Birkenstock’s documentary evidence. The Court acknowledged that the petitioner submitted photocopies of its evidence, violating Section 8.1 of the Rules on Inter Partes Proceedings, which generally requires certified true copies. However, the Court also recognized the IPO’s discretion in relaxing procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice. The IPO had already obtained the originals of these documents in a related cancellation case.

    The Court emphasized that procedural rules are tools for achieving justice and should not be strictly applied to frustrate it. The Court cited Section 5 of the Rules on Inter Partes Proceedings, stating:

    Sec. 5. Rules of Procedure to be followed in the conduct of hearing of Inter Partes cases. – The rules of procedure herein contained primarily apply in the conduct of hearing of Inter Partes cases. The Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily. The Bureau shall not be bound by strict technical rules of procedure and evidence but may adopt, in the absence of any applicable rule herein, such mode of proceedings which is consistent with the requirements of fair play and conducive to the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of cases, and which will give the Bureau the greatest possibility to focus on the contentious issues before it.

    The legal basis for the Supreme Court’s decision rested on Republic Act No. (RA) 166, which governs trademark registration. Section 12 of RA 166 states:

    Section 12. Duration. – Each certificate of registration shall remain in force for twenty years: Provided, That registrations under the provisions of this Act shall be cancelled by the Director, unless within one year following the fifth, tenth and fifteenth anniversaries of the date of issue of the certificate of registration, the registrant shall file in the Patent Office an affidavit showing that the mark or trade-name is still in use or showing that its non-use is due to special circumstance which excuse such non-use and is not due to any intention to abandon the same, and pay the required fee.

    The Court interpreted this provision as requiring the filing of a DAU within specified periods, failure of which results in automatic cancellation of the trademark registration. This failure is deemed equivalent to abandoning the trademark rights. Since the respondent admitted failing to file the 10th Year DAU, they were considered to have lost their rights to the “BIRKENSTOCK” mark. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that ownership of a trademark is not acquired through registration alone. Ownership is established through actual use in commerce.

    The Court cited Section 2-A of RA 166, stating that:

    Sec. 2-A. Ownership of trademarks, trade names and service marks; how acquired. – Anyone who lawfully produces or deals in merchandise of any kind or who engages in any lawful business, or who renders any lawful service in commerce, by actual use thereof in manufacture or trade, in business, and in the service rendered, may appropriate to his exclusive use a trademark, a trade name , or a service mark not so appropriated by another, to distinguish his merchandise, business or service from the merchandise, business or services of others. The ownership or possession of a trademark, trade name, service mark, heretofore or hereafter appropriated, as in this section provided, shall be recognized and protected in the same manner and to the same extent as are other property rights known to this law.

    The Court further clarified that registration merely creates a prima facie presumption of ownership. This presumption can be challenged and overcome by evidence of prior use by another party. In this case, Birkenstock presented substantial evidence of its prior and continuous use of the “BIRKENSTOCK” mark in commerce, tracing its origins back to 1774. They submitted evidence of registrations in various countries, proving their long-standing claim to the mark.

    The Court found that the Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corporation’s evidence, consisting mainly of sales invoices and advertisements, was insufficient to prove ownership. The Court quoted the IPO Director General:

    The facts and evidence fail to show that [respondent] was in good faith in using and in registering the mark BIRKENSTOCK. BIRKENSTOCK, obviously of German origin, is a highly distinct and arbitrary mark. It is very remote that two persons did coin the same or identical marks. To come up with a highly distinct and uncommon mark previously appropriated by another, for use in the same line of business, and without any plausible explanation, is incredible. The field from which a person may select a trademark is practically unlimited. As in all other cases of colorable imitations, the unanswered riddle is why, of the millions of terms and combinations of letters and designs available, [respondent] had to come up with a mark identical or so closely similar tQ the [petitioner’s] if there was no intent to take advantage of the goodwill generated by the [petitioner’s] mark. Being on the same line of business, it is highly probable that the [respondent] knew of the existence of BIRKENSTOCK and its use by the [petitioner], before [respondent] appropriated the same mark and had it registered in its name.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was determining the rightful owner of the “BIRKENSTOCK” trademark in the Philippines, focusing on whether prior registration or actual use in commerce holds more weight.
    What is a Declaration of Actual Use (DAU)? A DAU is an affidavit required by Philippine law to be filed periodically by trademark registrants to prove that the mark is still in use. Failure to file a DAU can result in the cancellation of the trademark registration.
    Does trademark registration automatically confer ownership? No, trademark registration creates a prima facie presumption of ownership, but this presumption can be challenged by evidence of prior use by another party.
    What evidence did Birkenstock present to prove ownership? Birkenstock presented evidence of its long-standing use of the mark in commerce, tracing its origins back to 1774, and registrations in various countries.
    Why did the Supreme Court allow Birkenstock’s photocopied documents? The Court allowed the photocopies because the IPO had already obtained the original documents in a related cancellation case, and the Court prioritized substantial justice over strict procedural rules.
    What is the significance of prior use in trademark law? Prior use is a critical factor in determining trademark ownership. It establishes that the party has been using the mark in commerce to identify their goods or services before another party’s registration.
    What was the basis for the IPO Director General’s decision? The IPO Director General based its decision on the cancellation of the respondent’s trademark registration due to failure to file the 10th Year DAU and on evidence proving that Birkenstock was the true and lawful owner and prior user of the trademark.
    How does this decision affect trademark law in the Philippines? This decision reinforces the principle that actual use and continuous commercial activity are essential for maintaining trademark rights, and registration alone is not sufficient.

    This case emphasizes the importance of not only registering a trademark but also actively using and maintaining it in commerce. It serves as a reminder that trademark rights are not absolute and can be lost through inaction or failure to comply with legal requirements. This ruling provides clarity on the weight given to prior use versus registration in trademark disputes.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: BIRKENSTOCK ORTHOPAEDIE GMBH AND CO. KG vs. PHILIPPINE SHOE EXPO MARKETING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 194307, November 20, 2013

  • Trademark Ownership: Priority of Use vs. International Recognition

    The Supreme Court affirmed that Renaud Cointreau & Cie, a French partnership, is the rightful owner of the “LE CORDON BLEU & DEVICE” trademark, despite Ecole De Cuisine Manille’s prior use in the Philippines. The Court prioritized international recognition and prior registration in the country of origin, France, under the Paris Convention, over local prior use. This decision underscores that international treaties and the principle of protecting well-known foreign marks can override domestic use in trademark disputes, especially when the local user was aware of the mark’s existence and reputation abroad.

    Culinary Clash: Who Holds the Recipe for a Trademark Dispute?

    This case revolves around a dispute over the trademark “LE CORDON BLEU & DEVICE” between Ecole De Cuisine Manille (Ecole), claiming prior use in the Philippines, and Renaud Cointreau & Cie (Cointreau), asserting ownership based on international recognition and registration in France. The central legal question is: who has the superior right to register the trademark in the Philippines? This involves navigating the complexities of trademark law, particularly the interplay between local use, international treaties like the Paris Convention, and the principle of protecting well-known foreign marks.

    The Intellectual Property Office (IPO) Director General reversed the Bureau of Legal Affairs’ (BLA) decision, siding with Cointreau. The IPO Director General emphasized that ownership, not mere use, is the primary determinant for registration. He considered Cointreau’s undisputed use of the mark since 1895 for its culinary school in Paris, France, and the fact that Ecole’s directress had trained there. This suggested Ecole’s appropriation of the mark was unjust. Conversely, the BLA initially favored Ecole, highlighting the significance of trademark adoption and use within the Philippine commerce and that the law on trademarks rests upon the doctrine of nationality or territoriality.

    The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the IPO Director General’s decision, emphasizing that Cointreau, being the true owner, has the right to register the mark in the Philippines under Section 37 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 166, the then-governing trademark law. It also noted that Ecole’s use of the mark, even if prior, was in bad faith, and Ecole lacked a certificate of registration that would notify Cointreau of its use. In resolving the dispute, the Supreme Court had to carefully examine the provisions of R.A. No. 166, particularly Sections 2 and 2-A.

    Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 166, the trademark laws state:

    Section 2. What are registrable. — Trademarks, trade names and service marks owned by persons, corporations, partnerships or associations domiciled in the Philippines and by persons, corporations, partnerships or associations domiciled in any foreign country may be registered in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided, That said trademarks, trade names, or service marks are actually in use in commerce and services not less than two months in the Philippines before the time the applications for registration are filed; And provided, further, That the country of which the applicant for registration is a citizen grants by law substantially similar privileges to citizens of the Philippines, and such fact is officially certified, with a certified true copy of the foreign law translated into the English language, by the government of the foreign country to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

    Further, Section 2-A defines trademark ownership and how it is acquired under the law:

    Section 2-A. Ownership of trademarks, trade names and service marks; how acquired. — Anyone who lawfully produces or deals in merchandise of any kind or who engages in any lawful business, or who renders any lawful service in commerce, by actual use thereof in manufacture or trade, in business, and in the service rendered, may appropriate to his exclusive use a trademark, a trade name, or a service mark from the merchandise, business, or service of others. The ownership or possession of a trademark, trade name or service mark not so appropriated by another, to distinguish his merchandise, business or service from the merchandise, business or services of others. The ownership or possession of a trademark, trade name, service mark, heretofore or hereafter appropriated, as in this section provided, shall be recognized and protected in the same manner and to the same extent as are other property rights known to this law.

    The Supreme Court found Ecole’s argument, that it was the first to use the mark in the Philippines and therefore entitled to registration, untenable. While Section 2 of R.A. No. 166 requires actual use in commerce in the Philippines for two months before registration, it emphasizes ownership as the primary requirement. Section 2-A further clarifies that ownership is acquired through lawful production or dealing in merchandise, and that the mark must not have been previously appropriated by another. This highlights the importance of prior claim and good faith in trademark disputes.

    Furthermore, the Philippines is a signatory to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, which obligates it to protect the trade names of nationals of signatory countries, whether or not the trade name is part of a trademark. Articles 6bis and 8 of the Paris Convention state that member countries must:

    ARTICLE 6bis

    (1) The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such well- known mark or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith.

    ARTICLE 8

    A trade name shall be protected in all the countries of the Union without the obligation of filing or registration, whether or not it forms part of a trademark.

    Cointreau’s long-standing use of the mark in France since 1895, coupled with Ecole’s awareness of this use, weighed heavily in the Court’s decision. This awareness was underscored by the fact that Ecole’s directress had trained at Cointreau’s Le Cordon Bleu culinary school in Paris. The court emphasized that Ecole could not claim ownership over a mark already in use by Cointreau. The decision highlights the interplay of prior use, international recognition, and good faith in determining trademark ownership.

    The court’s decision ultimately rested on the principle that Ecole’s appropriation of the “LE CORDON BLEU & DEVICE” mark was not done in good faith, as it was fully aware of Cointreau’s prior use. This is further substantiated by the sequence of registration and application between Cointreau and Ecole. Cointreau registered its trademark first, both abroad and locally. In addition, Cointreau has secured Home Registration No. 1,390,912 dated November 25, 1986 from its country of origin, as well as several trademark registrations in the Philippines. Ecole’s application was filed only on February 24, 1992, after Cointreau filed its trademark application. This underscores the importance of priority in trademark registration.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was determining the rightful owner of the “LE CORDON BLEU & DEVICE” trademark: Ecole, based on prior use in the Philippines, or Cointreau, based on international recognition and prior registration in France.
    What is the significance of the Paris Convention in this case? The Paris Convention obligates signatory countries, including the Philippines, to protect the trade names of nationals of other signatory countries, even without local registration, thus favoring Cointreau.
    Did Ecole’s prior use in the Philippines give them a superior right to the trademark? No, the Court ruled that Ecole’s prior use was not in good faith because they were aware of Cointreau’s prior use of the mark internationally.
    Why was Cointreau considered the rightful owner of the trademark? Cointreau’s registration in its country of origin, prior use since 1895, and Ecole’s knowledge of such use, established Cointreau as the rightful owner of the mark.
    What does R.A. No. 166 say about trademark ownership? R.A. No. 166 emphasizes that ownership of a trademark is acquired through lawful production or dealing in merchandise, provided the mark has not been previously appropriated by another.
    How did Ecole’s directress’s training at Le Cordon Bleu affect the case? It demonstrated Ecole’s awareness of Cointreau’s use of the mark, undermining their claim of good faith in appropriating the mark for their own use.
    What is the current law on trademarks in the Philippines? The current law is Republic Act No. 8293, also known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, as amended, which has dispensed with the requirement of prior actual use at the time of registration.
    What is the main function of a trademark? The function of a trademark is to distinctly point out the origin or ownership of goods or services and to protect the manufacturer against the sale of inferior or different articles as its product.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case underscores the importance of international treaties and good faith in trademark disputes. It serves as a reminder that prior use alone does not guarantee trademark ownership, especially when the user is aware of a prior claim by another party abroad. The ruling also highlights that current trademark laws, like Republic Act No. 8293, have further evolved to prioritize ownership over prior use, reflecting a shift towards greater protection of international brands and intellectual property rights.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Ecole de Cuisine Manille v. Renaud Cointreau, G.R. No. 185830, June 05, 2013

  • Trademark Ownership: Prior Use Trumps Earlier Filing in Philippine Law

    In the Philippines, trademark rights are not solely determined by who files first. The Supreme Court, in E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. v. Shen Dar Electricity and Machinery Co., Ltd., emphasized that prior and continuous use of a trademark is a crucial factor in establishing ownership, potentially overriding the ‘first-to-file’ rule. This means that even if another party registers a trademark first, a prior user can claim ownership if they can demonstrate consistent use of the mark in commerce. This decision clarifies the importance of actual use in asserting trademark rights, providing a legal basis for businesses to protect their brand identity based on established market presence.

    VESPA Trademark Tug-of-War: Who Really Owns the Brand?

    The heart of this case revolves around a dispute between E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. (EYIS), a local company, and Shen Dar Electricity and Machinery Co., Ltd., a Taiwanese manufacturer, both claiming rights to the “VESPA” trademark for air compressors. From 1997 to 2004, EYIS imported air compressors from Shen Dar. Shen Dar later filed a Petition for Cancellation of EYIS’ COR, arguing that EYIS was merely a distributor and that Shen Dar had prior and exclusive right to the mark under the Paris Convention. The Intellectual Property Office (IPO) initially sided with EYIS, upholding their Certificate of Registration (COR) and canceling Shen Dar’s. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision, favoring Shen Dar. The Supreme Court (SC) then stepped in to resolve the conflicting claims and determine the true owner of the “VESPA” trademark. This scenario highlights the complexities of trademark law, particularly when international trade and prior use claims are involved.

    The Supreme Court (SC) began by addressing the factual discrepancies between the IPO and the CA. Recognizing that differing conclusions were reached based on the same evidence, the SC deemed it necessary to review the factual issues. This approach acknowledges that while the SC is not typically a trier of facts, exceptions exist when lower courts or administrative bodies have conflicting findings. This review became essential to determine who truly owned the trademark, thus emphasizing the importance of factual accuracy in trademark disputes. This principle ensures that decisions are based on a thorough examination of the evidence presented by both parties.

    A key procedural issue raised was whether evidence presented before the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) of the IPO must be formally offered. The BLA initially ruled that Shen Dar failed to properly adduce evidence, but the CA disagreed, citing that attaching evidence to position papers with proper markings was sufficient. The SC clarified that, while formal offering of evidence is not strictly required in BLA proceedings, evidence must still be properly submitted and marked. This interpretation reinforces the principle that quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by strict technical rules but must still adhere to fundamental evidentiary standards. The practical impact is that parties must ensure their evidence is clearly presented, even if not formally offered.

    The SC then addressed the IPO Director General’s decision to cancel Shen Dar’s Certificate of Registration (COR), even without a formal petition for cancellation. Shen Dar argued that this violated Section 151 of the Intellectual Property Code (RA 8293), which requires a petition for cancellation. However, the SC upheld the Director General’s decision, emphasizing that quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by strict procedural rules, especially when fair play and due process are observed. In this case, Shen Dar had ample opportunity to present its evidence and argue its case during the hearing for the cancellation of EYIS’ COR. This ruling underscores the flexibility of administrative bodies in resolving disputes efficiently, provided that fundamental rights are protected.

    Turning to the central issue of ownership, the SC examined whether the factual findings of the IPO were binding on the CA. While factual findings of administrative bodies are generally given great weight, the SC identified exceptions where such findings can be reviewed, such as when relevant facts are overlooked or when the findings are contradictory. The CA had determined that Shen Dar was the prior user of the “VESPA” mark based on statements in their Declarations of Actual Use. However, the SC found this conclusion premature, emphasizing that a Declaration of Actual Use must be supported by credible evidence of actual use. This requirement highlights the importance of substantiating claims with tangible proof, not just sworn statements.

    The SC highlighted that EYIS had presented numerous sales invoices dating back to 1995, predating Shen Dar’s claimed date of first use. Shen Dar failed to rebut this evidence, leading the SC to conclude that EYIS was indeed the first to use the mark. Furthermore, the SC addressed the CA’s finding that EYIS was merely an importer and not a manufacturer. The SC reasoned that describing oneself as an importer, wholesaler, and retailer does not preclude also being a manufacturer. This interpretation prevents a restrictive reading of business descriptions and focuses on the substance of the company’s activities. This broader interpretation emphasizes the importance of looking beyond formal descriptions to determine the true nature of a business’s operations.

    Based on these findings, the SC determined that EYIS was the prior user of the “VESPA” mark and, therefore, its true owner. This conclusion led the Court to examine the “first-to-file” rule under Sec. 123.1(d) of RA 8293, which prevents the registration of a mark that is identical to an earlier filed mark. While the “first-to-file” rule is a significant consideration, it is not the sole determinant of ownership. The SC clarified that proof of prior and continuous use is still necessary to establish ownership, which can override the presumptive rights of the registrant. This clarification balances the efficiency of the “first-to-file” rule with the equitable considerations of actual market presence and brand recognition. This ruling reinforces the idea that actual use in commerce is a prerequisite to acquiring the right of ownership of a trademark.

    The SC then quoted the case of Shangri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc., stating that registration, without more, does not confer an absolute right to the registered mark. Evidence of prior and continuous use by another can overcome the presumptive ownership of the registrant. Since EYIS proved prior and continuous use, they were deemed the true owner of the mark. The Court emphasized the importance of actual commercial use in acquiring ownership of a trademark, stating that when the applicant is not the owner of the trademark, they have no right to register it. This underscores the principle that trademark rights are earned through use in commerce, not simply by securing registration.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was determining who owned the “VESPA” trademark for air compressors: E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. (EYIS) or Shen Dar Electricity and Machinery Co., Ltd. The court needed to decide if prior use or the ‘first-to-file’ rule took precedence.
    What is the ‘first-to-file’ rule? The ‘first-to-file’ rule, as stated in Sec. 123.1(d) of RA 8293, generally gives priority to the party that files a trademark application first. However, this rule is not absolute and can be superseded by evidence of prior and continuous use by another party.
    Why did the Supreme Court favor EYIS over Shen Dar? The Supreme Court favored EYIS because EYIS presented evidence of prior and continuous use of the “VESPA” trademark, predating Shen Dar’s claimed date of first use. This evidence included sales invoices and other commercial documents.
    Is formal offering of evidence required in IPO-BLA proceedings? While not strictly required, evidence presented before the IPO’s Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) must be properly submitted, marked, and made available for consideration. The BLA is not bound by strict technical rules but must adhere to basic evidentiary standards.
    Can the IPO Director General cancel a trademark without a formal petition? Yes, the IPO Director General can cancel a trademark even without a formal petition if due process is observed. This is permissible because quasi-judicial bodies have flexibility in procedural matters to ensure fair and efficient resolution of disputes.
    What is a Declaration of Actual Use, and how is it used? A Declaration of Actual Use is a sworn statement claiming the date of first use of a trademark. However, it must be supported by credible evidence of actual use, such as sales invoices or advertising materials, to be considered valid.
    Does being an importer preclude a company from being a manufacturer? No, a company describing itself as an importer, wholesaler, and retailer does not preclude it from also being a manufacturer. The court looks beyond formal descriptions to the substance of the company’s activities in determining its true nature.
    What is the key takeaway from this case for trademark ownership? The key takeaway is that prior and continuous use of a trademark is a critical factor in establishing ownership in the Philippines. It can override the ‘first-to-file’ rule, emphasizing the importance of actual market presence and brand recognition.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of prior and continuous use in establishing trademark ownership in the Philippines. This ruling reinforces the principle that actual use in commerce is a prerequisite to acquiring and protecting trademark rights, providing valuable guidance for businesses seeking to safeguard their brand identity.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. v. Shen Dar Electricity and Machinery Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 184850, October 20, 2010