ASG Law

Tag: Public Funds

  • Public Funds Accountability: Negligence in Safekeeping Leads to Liability

    This Supreme Court decision clarifies the responsibilities of public officials in managing government funds. The Court found that Rosita P. Siniclang, a former municipal treasurer, was liable for simple neglect of duty because she failed to adequately protect public funds entrusted to her care. Even though the funds were stolen, her negligence in not securing them properly made her accountable. This case underscores the importance of diligence and adherence to established procedures for all public officials handling government assets.

    Unlocked Drawers and Lost Bonuses: When is a Public Official Liable for Stolen Funds?

    The case revolves around Rosita P. Siniclang, the former Municipal Treasurer of San Emilio, Ilocos Sur. On December 23, 2013, she encashed checks for the Productivity Enhancement Incentive (PEI) bonus of municipal employees. Some employees couldn’t claim their bonuses that day, and instead of using a vault (which was defective), Siniclang placed the unclaimed money in cloth bags inside her office drawers. During the holidays, her office was burglarized, and a significant amount of money, including the unclaimed PEI bonuses, was stolen. This incident led to administrative complaints and legal battles concerning Siniclang’s accountability for the lost funds. The core legal question is whether Siniclang’s actions constituted negligence, making her liable for the loss of public funds, despite the robbery.

    The legal framework for this case hinges on the principles of public accountability and the duty of care expected from government officials handling public funds. Presidential Decree No. 1445, also known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, is central to this framework. Specifically, Section 105 states:

    SECTION 105. Measure of liability of Accountable Officers. –(1) Every officer accountable for government property shall be liable for its money value in case of improper or unauthorized use or misapplication thereof by himself or any person for whose acts he may be responsible. He shall likewise be liable for all losses, damages, or deterioration occasioned by negligence in the keeping or use of the property, whether or not it be at the time in his actual custody. (2) Every officer accountable for government funds shall be liable for all losses resulting from the unlawful deposit, use, or application thereof and for all losses attributable to negligence in the keeping of the funds.

    This provision clearly establishes the liability of accountable officers for losses resulting from negligence, even if the funds are not in their direct custody at the time of the loss. Building on this principle, the Supreme Court examined whether Siniclang exhibited the necessary diligence in safeguarding the funds entrusted to her. The Court considered the fact that the office vault was defective, and Siniclang chose to store the money in an unlocked drawer. This decision was a critical point of contention. Furthermore, the Commission on Audit (COA) found that Siniclang had not taken sufficient steps to request a replacement or repair of the vault, further supporting the claim of negligence.

    The Court also addressed the issue of forum shopping raised by Siniclang. She argued that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) had already ruled on a related administrative complaint, thus barring the Office of the Ombudsman from taking cognizance of the case. However, the Court clarified that the two cases involved different parties, causes of action, and reliefs sought. The CSC complaint focused on Siniclang’s alleged failure to remit the PEI bonuses, while the Ombudsman case concerned her negligence in the safekeeping of government funds. Therefore, the Court found no basis for the claim of forum shopping.

    Another key aspect of the case involved the Office of the Ombudsman’s authority to intervene in proceedings where its decisions are under review. Siniclang argued that the Ombudsman should remain detached and impartial, similar to a judge. However, the Court, citing Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, emphasized that the Ombudsman has a legal interest in defending its decisions and ensuring the accountability of public officers. This right to intervene is rooted in the Ombudsman’s constitutional mandate to protect the people and preserve the integrity of public service.

    Regarding the preventive suspension order issued against Siniclang, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials if there is strong evidence of guilt and the charges involve dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty. In Siniclang’s case, the Ombudsman relied on the COA’s finding of negligence as evidence of guilt and determined that her continued stay in office could prejudice the case. Therefore, the preventive suspension order was deemed valid. This approach contrasts with cases where the evidence of guilt is weak or the charges do not warrant such a measure.

    In assessing Siniclang’s liability for simple neglect of duty, the Court reiterated the principle that negligence is a relative concept, depending on the circumstances and the required degree of care. As the municipal treasurer, Siniclang had a duty to exercise a high level of diligence in managing public funds. The Court found that she failed to meet this standard when she stored the money in an easily accessible drawer instead of a secure vault. This failure, though perhaps unintentional, constituted simple neglect of duty. In the case of Leano v. Domingo, the Supreme Court already emphasized that the safety of money cannot be ensured when it is deposited in enclosures other than the safety vault.

    Finally, the Court upheld the COA’s decision denying Siniclang’s request for relief from money accountability. The Court’s power to review COA decisions is limited to instances of jurisdictional error or grave abuse of discretion. Since Siniclang failed to demonstrate such abuse, the Court deferred to the COA’s expertise in auditing government funds. The COA’s finding of negligence was supported by substantial evidence, including the Reinvestigative Report, which highlighted Siniclang’s failure to secure a new or repaired vault. Therefore, the Court affirmed the COA’s decision, holding Siniclang accountable for the lost funds. This ruling serves as a reminder to all public officials that they will be held responsible for losses resulting from their negligence, regardless of whether the loss was directly caused by their actions.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Rosita Siniclang, as a former municipal treasurer, was liable for the loss of public funds due to negligence, even though the funds were stolen. The court examined whether her actions in securing the funds met the required standard of care.
    What is simple neglect of duty? Simple neglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. It is considered a less grave offense under Civil Service rules.
    What is the significance of Presidential Decree No. 1445 in this case? Presidential Decree No. 1445, the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, establishes the liability of accountable officers for losses resulting from negligence in the keeping or use of government property or funds. Section 105 outlines these responsibilities.
    What did the Commission on Audit (COA) decide? The COA denied Rosita Siniclang’s request for relief from money accountability, holding her liable for the loss of the PEI bonuses funds due to her contributory negligence. The COA found that she failed to exercise the diligence required of her position as custodian of government funds.
    Was Rosita Siniclang preventively suspended? Yes, the Office of the Ombudsman placed Rosita Siniclang under preventive suspension for a period not exceeding three months without pay. The suspension was based on the Ombudsman’s assessment of strong evidence of guilt and the need to prevent her from influencing potential witnesses or tampering with records.
    What is the Office of the Ombudsman’s role in this case? The Office of the Ombudsman is responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases of corruption and misconduct by public officials. In this case, the Ombudsman investigated the administrative complaint against Siniclang and issued the preventive suspension order.
    What does it mean to be an ‘accountable officer’? An ‘accountable officer’ is a public official responsible for the custody and management of government property or funds. Accountable officers are liable for any losses, damages, or deterioration of these assets due to negligence.
    Why was the argument of forum shopping rejected? The argument of forum shopping was rejected because the complaints filed before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the Ombudsman had different causes of action and parties involved. One case involved the loss of funds and negligence; the other failure to remit the said funds.
    What factors did the Court consider in determining negligence? The Court considered several factors, including the defective office vault, Siniclang’s failure to request a replacement or repair, and her decision to store the money in an easily accessible drawer. These factors led the Court to conclude that she failed to exercise the required diligence.

    This case reinforces the high standard of care expected from public officials in managing government funds. It clarifies that negligence, even in the context of a robbery, can lead to personal liability for accountable officers. Public officials must prioritize the security and proper handling of public assets to avoid potential legal and financial consequences.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: ROSITA P. SINICLANG v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 234766, October 18, 2022

  • Navigating Government Contracts: PSALM’s Authority to Hire Legal Experts Under EPIRA Law

    The Supreme Court ruled that the Commission on Audit (COA) cannot deny concurrence to the renewal of contracts for legal advisors hired by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) solely on procedural grounds, such as failing to secure prior approval from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and COA. The court emphasized that COA’s audit authority is limited to preventing irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures. This decision affirms PSALM’s authority to hire legal experts, provided such hiring does not lead to unreasonable expenses, thereby balancing governmental oversight with the operational needs of GOCCs.

    EPIRA Mandate vs. COA Oversight: Who Decides PSALM’s Legal Needs?

    The Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM), tasked with managing the privatization of the National Power Corporation’s (NPC) assets under the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA), sought to renew contracts with several legal advisors. These advisors provided consultancy services on privatization projects critical to PSALM’s mandate. However, the Commission on Audit (COA) denied concurrence to these contract renewals, citing PSALM’s failure to obtain prior written conformity from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and prior written concurrence from COA itself, as required by Memorandum Circular No. 9 and COA Circular No. 95-011. This denial led to a legal battle, questioning the extent of COA’s authority and PSALM’s operational autonomy in fulfilling its statutory obligations.

    Under Presidential Decree No. 1415, the OGCC is designated as the principal law office for all government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs). However, this designation isn’t absolute. Recognizing the need for flexibility, Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code allows for exceptions, acknowledging that GOCCs may, in certain cases, require specialized legal expertise not readily available within the OGCC. This understanding is crucial, as it sets the stage for balancing the OGCC’s oversight role with the practical realities faced by GOCCs like PSALM.

    The Supreme Court has previously acknowledged that GOCCs can engage private lawyers in exceptional cases, provided they secure the written conformity of the OSG or the OGCC, and the written concurrence of the COA prior to the hiring. In PSALM’s case, the EPIRA Law contains no express prohibition on hiring private legal services. Section 51 (h) allows such hiring if availing the services of personnel detailed from other government agencies is not practicable. Given the technical and specialized nature of PSALM’s work, the Court recognized the impracticality of relying solely on the OGCC’s limited resources, reinforcing the need for PSALM to engage external legal expertise.

    The EPIRA Law places specific time constraints on PSALM for implementing its key provisions. These include deadlines for submitting privatization plans, privatizing generating assets, and liquidating NPC financial obligations. These deadlines highlight the urgency and necessity of PSALM’s mission. If PSALM is to meet these statutory objectives in a timely manner, its administrative prerogative to determine its needs must be respected. This underscores the importance of allowing PSALM the flexibility to engage necessary expertise without undue procedural delays.

    COA requires prior concurrence for every engagement of private lawyers and consultants, acting as a pre-audit to prevent suspicious transactions and ensure the proper use of public funds. This pre-audit is meant to identify potentially problematic transactions before they are implemented, thereby safeguarding against embezzlement or wastage of public funds. COA’s Circular No. 2021-003 outlines instances where government agencies and GOCCs can hire private lawyers without prior written concurrence, setting specific conditions for such exemptions.

    The constitutional mandate of COA is to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures. The Court interpreted the term “irregular” in conjunction with the other terms, stating that it pertains to the transactions themselves. The court emphasized that the COA’s jurisdiction should focus on the transaction itself (the hiring or contract renewals) to determine if it aligns with constitutional standards, rather than solely on procedural compliance.

    The COA’s refusal to grant concurrence centered on PSALM’s failure to secure prior approval. However, the court found that this procedural lapse, by itself, was insufficient justification for withholding concurrence. The COA must demonstrate that the contract renewals were, in fact, irregular, unreasonable, excessive, or extravagant. Without such a finding, PSALM’s actions could not be deemed a violation of the constitutional mandate to prevent misuse of public funds.

    While COA possesses the authority to prevent excessive expenditures, this authority must be exercised in a reasonable and evidence-based manner. COA should have presented substantial evidence demonstrating the unreasonableness or extravagance of the contract renewals. Because they failed to do so, the court found that COA had gravely abused its discretion. Consequently, the Court granted PSALM’s petition, setting aside COA’s decisions and deeming the engagement of legal advisors as concurred in. This decision underscores the importance of balancing procedural compliance with the practical needs of GOCCs in fulfilling their statutory mandates.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the Commission on Audit (COA) correctly denied concurrence to the renewal of contracts for legal advisors hired by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) due to procedural non-compliance. Specifically, PSALM did not secure prior approval from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and COA before renewing the contracts.
    What is PSALM’s mandate under the EPIRA Law? Under the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) of 2001, PSALM is responsible for managing the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of the National Power Corporation’s (NPC) generation assets, real estate, and other disposable assets. Its main goal is to liquidate all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs efficiently within a 25-year period.
    Why did PSALM hire private legal advisors? PSALM hired private legal advisors to provide consultancy services on legal matters related to its privatization projects, aiming to achieve its mandate under the EPIRA Law. The corporation deemed these services vital for achieving its goals, especially given the specific time constraints set by the EPIRA Law.
    What requirements did COA claim PSALM failed to meet? COA claimed that PSALM failed to comply with Memorandum Circular No. 9 and COA Circular No. 95-011, which require government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) to obtain prior written conformity from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) or OGCC, and prior written concurrence from COA before hiring private lawyers. These issuances aim to prevent unauthorized and unnecessary expenditures of public funds.
    What was COA’s primary reason for denying concurrence? COA primarily denied concurrence because PSALM did not obtain the required prior written conformity from the OGCC and prior written concurrence from COA before renewing the contracts. COA argued that PSALM’s non-compliance with these procedural requirements justified the denial.
    What did the Supreme Court rule regarding COA’s denial? The Supreme Court ruled that COA could not deny concurrence solely on procedural grounds. The Court emphasized that COA’s authority is limited to preventing irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures and that COA must present substantial evidence demonstrating that the contract renewals were indeed unreasonable or excessive.
    What is the significance of the EPIRA Law in this case? The EPIRA Law is significant because it provides the statutory context for PSALM’s mandate and imposes specific time constraints for achieving its objectives. The Court recognized the urgency of PSALM’s mission under the EPIRA Law as a factor in assessing the reasonableness of PSALM’s decision to hire legal advisors.
    What does the ruling mean for other GOCCs hiring private lawyers? The ruling clarifies that while GOCCs must comply with procedural requirements when hiring private lawyers, COA’s denial of concurrence must be based on substantive findings of irregular, unnecessary, or excessive expenditures. This underscores the need for COA to justify its decisions with evidence of actual misuse of public funds, rather than solely on procedural lapses.

    This decision highlights the delicate balance between ensuring governmental oversight and allowing government-owned corporations the necessary flexibility to operate effectively and meet their statutory mandates. The Supreme Court’s ruling clarifies the scope of COA’s audit authority, ensuring that it is exercised within constitutional bounds and with due consideration for the operational needs and statutory obligations of government entities.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM) vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 218041, August 30, 2022

  • Government Contracts: COA’s Discretion in Approving Legal Consultancy Agreements

    The Supreme Court has ruled that the Commission on Audit (COA) cannot arbitrarily deny concurrence to government contracts for legal services. While COA has the power to prevent irregular expenditures, this power must be exercised reasonably and with substantial justification, focusing on whether the expenses are unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable. The decision reinforces the principle that specialized government agencies like the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) have the authority to determine their specific needs, and COA’s role is to ensure compliance with constitutional limits on public spending rather than impede necessary functions.

    PSALM’s Legal Hires: Can COA Overrule Agency Expertise on Necessity?

    This case revolves around the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM), a government-owned corporation tasked with managing the privatization of energy assets. To fulfill its mandate under the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA), PSALM hired several legal consultants. When PSALM sought to renew these contracts in 2010, the Commission on Audit (COA) denied concurrence, arguing that PSALM had failed to obtain prior approval from both the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and COA itself. This raised a critical question: can COA deny concurrence to contracts solely based on procedural lapses, or must it also demonstrate that the expenditures were unreasonable or extravagant?

    The COA based its decision on Memorandum Circular No. 9 and COA Circular No. 95-011, which require prior written conformity from the OSG or OGCC and concurrence from COA before government-owned corporations hire private lawyers. The Supreme Court, however, recognized that while these circulars establish important procedures, they should not be applied so rigidly as to undermine an agency’s ability to fulfill its statutory duties. The Court emphasized PSALM’s specific mandate under the EPIRA Law, which sets strict deadlines for the privatization of energy assets.

    Considering the statutory duties of the PSALM, the Supreme Court explained that there is need to balance the power of the COA and the power of an agency especially when it has specialized functions, quoting:

    Section 47. NPC Privatization. – Except for the assets of SPUG, the generation assets, real estate, and other disposable assets as well as IPP contracts of NPC shall be privatized in accordance with this Act. Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, the PSALM Corp[.] shall submit a plan for the endorsement by the Joint Congressional Power Commission and the approval of the President of the Philippines, on the total privatization of the generation assets, real estate, other disposable assets as well as existing IPP contracts of NPC and thereafter, implement the same, in accordance with the following guidelines, x x x.

    The Supreme Court also acknowledged that PSALM has the authority to hire private consultants under Section 51 (h) of the EPIRA Law, which allows such action if availing the services of personnel detailed from other government agencies is not practicable. This provision recognizes that PSALM, with its specialized needs and time-bound objectives, requires the flexibility to engage qualified professionals.

    However, the COA contended that PSALM’s plea for a liberal interpretation of the circulars should not be considered because the circulars seek to prevent unauthorized, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable disbursement of public funds. This argument highlights the core of COA’s constitutional mandate which is to ensure that government funds are spent prudently and in accordance with the law.

    Building on this principle, the Supreme Court stressed that COA’s audit jurisdiction, as defined in Article IX (D), Section 2(2) of the Constitution, is focused on preventing “irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds.” Therefore, COA’s refusal to grant concurrence must be based on the substance of the transaction itself, not merely on procedural lapses.

    In line with the COA’s audit jurisdiction, the Supreme Court cited the Constitution:

    (2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.

    The Court said that any violation of the pre-audit process cannot be in itself a proper justification to withhold concurrence to the hiring of legal advisors or the renewal of their contracts. It is the expenditure itself, whether proposed or consummated — not the process of securing the necessary approval of key government agencies — that is the proper subject of COA’s audit jurisdiction.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that COA did not provide substantial evidence showing that the renewal of the contracts of PSALM’s legal consultants was irregular, unreasonable, excessive, or extravagant. COA’s power to prevent excessive expenditures must be exercised in a reasoned manner, not arbitrarily, which makes their move a grave abuse of discretion.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that COA gravely abused its discretion by withholding concurrence to the contract renewals based solely on procedural grounds, without demonstrating that the expenditures were unreasonable or extravagant. The Court deemed PSALM’s engagement of legal advisors for 2010 as concurred in by COA, allowing the payments for services rendered to be allowed in audit.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? Whether COA can deny concurrence to a government contract based solely on procedural non-compliance, or whether it must also demonstrate that the expenditures were unreasonable or extravagant.
    What is PSALM’s role under the EPIRA Law? PSALM is responsible for managing the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of National Power Corporation (NPC) assets to liquidate NPC’s financial obligations.
    What did COA argue in this case? COA argued that PSALM failed to obtain prior written conformity from the OGCC and prior written concurrence from COA before renewing the contracts of its legal consultants.
    What did the Supreme Court decide? The Supreme Court ruled that COA cannot arbitrarily deny concurrence based solely on procedural lapses; it must also demonstrate that the expenditures were irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable.
    What is the significance of EPIRA Law in this case? The EPIRA Law mandates specific timeframes for PSALM to privatize energy assets, highlighting the urgency and necessity of PSALM’s actions.
    What is the concept of quantum meruit, and how does it relate to this case? Quantum meruit refers to the principle that one should be compensated for services rendered. The Supreme Court did not apply this principle because the absence of COA’s concurrence means that contracts are illegal and will not be compensated by the government.
    What is the effect of this ruling on PSALM and other government agencies? The ruling affirms the authority of specialized government agencies to determine their specific needs, subject to constitutional limits on public spending, as long as they are reasonable.
    What is the legal basis for COA’s audit authority? COA’s audit authority is derived from Article IX (D), Section 2(2) of the Constitution, which empowers it to prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.

    This ruling clarifies the scope of COA’s authority in reviewing government contracts and reinforces the principle that specialized agencies must have the flexibility to fulfill their statutory mandates. While COA plays a vital role in ensuring fiscal responsibility, its oversight must be exercised reasonably and with due consideration for the specific needs and circumstances of each agency.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM) vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 218041, August 30, 2022

  • Accountable Officials and ‘Arias Doctrine’: Safeguarding Public Funds in the Philippines

    In Tito S. Sarion v. People of the Philippines, the Supreme Court reiterated that public officials entrusted with public funds must exercise diligence in handling those funds. The Court affirmed the conviction of a former mayor for malversation and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, emphasizing that reliance on subordinates does not excuse gross negligence when disbursing public money.

    When Oversight Fails: Mayor’s Negligence and Public Fund Mismanagement

    This case revolves around Tito S. Sarion, the former Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, who was found guilty of Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The charges stemmed from the irregular payment of price escalation to Markbilt Construction for the Daet Public Market Phase II project. The central legal question is whether Sarion, as the accountable officer, exercised the necessary diligence in approving the disbursement of public funds, or if his actions constituted gross inexcusable negligence leading to the illegal release of funds.

    The Supreme Court’s decision hinged on the principle that public officials, particularly those in positions of authority like mayors, have a responsibility to ensure that public funds are disbursed properly and in accordance with the law. The Court found that Sarion, by virtue of his office, was an accountable officer for the public funds of Daet. This means he was obligated to ensure that these funds were used only for their intended municipal purposes. As the Supreme Court stated, Sarion, as the mayor, had to “ensure that these funds are disbursed only for their ‘intended municipal use.’”

    In this case, the Court determined that Sarion committed malversation through gross inexcusable negligence. This negligence occurred when he allowed Markbilt Construction to receive payment for price escalation, despite the fact that Markbilt was not entitled to it. The Court elaborated, explaining that “by approving the disbursement voucher and signing the Landbank check, despite the absence of appropriation and failure to comply with the requirements of Section 61 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act, the petitioner facilitated the illegal release of public funds to Markbilt.” This act of approving the payment without ensuring compliance with legal requirements constituted a breach of Sarion’s duty as an accountable officer.

    Furthermore, the Court identified two specific acts constitutive of malversation: the failure to comply with the requirements of R.A. 9184 and the payment of price escalation despite the absence of appropriation. Sarion’s defense of good faith was rejected by the Court, citing the presence of circumstances that should have prompted him to inquire further before approving the payment to Markbilt. This ruling reinforces the principle that public officials cannot simply rely on the actions of their subordinates, especially when there are red flags or indications of irregularity.

    The Court also addressed the charge of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. This section prohibits public officials from causing undue injury to the government or giving unwarranted benefits to any private party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court affirmed Sarion’s conviction, finding him guilty of gross inexcusable negligence in violating basic rules in disbursement, thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of Daet. This underscores the importance of adhering to established procedures and regulations when handling public funds.

    Sarion argued that the Information filed against him violated his constitutional right to information, as it alleged the absence of a Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF), not an irregularity in the CAF. He also contended that there was no irregularity in the CAF because the price escalation claim of Markbilt was approved by Appropriation Ordinance No. 1. Moreover, he argued that non-compliance with Section 61 of R.A. No. 9184 did not pertain to him and that the law does not penalize such irregularity. The Court rejected these arguments, emphasizing that the absence of appropriation pertained specifically to the payment of price escalation, not the entire project. The only appropriation in this case was the original contract price, and no payment could be made beyond that amount without a specific appropriation for the price escalation.

    Section 85 in relation to Section 86 of P.D. No. 1445, requires the existence of a prior sufficient appropriation, as certified by he prop r accounting official, before any contract for expenditure of public funds is authorized, viz.:

    Section 85. Appropriation before entering into contract.

    (1) No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure.

    The Court also addressed Sarion’s reliance on the legal opinion of Legal Officer Edmundo R. Deveza II, who stated that the Municipal Engineering Office found no irregularity in the computation of the price escalation. The Court noted that it was not Sarion who sought this opinion, but rather the Accountant acting on the advice of the COA Auditor. Furthermore, the Court found that Sarion immediately ordered the Administrator to look for sources of funds upon receiving Markbilt’s request, without first verifying the propriety of the claim. This demonstrated a lack of diligence on Sarion’s part.

    The Supreme Court distinguished this case from the doctrine established in Arias v. Sandiganbayan, which generally holds that heads of offices can rely on the actions of their subordinates. The Court emphasized that the Arias doctrine does not apply when there are circumstances that should have alerted the head of office to exercise a higher degree of circumspection. In this case, the Court found that such circumstances existed, including the fact that the project was completed prior to Sarion’s term, the amount appropriated for the project had already been fully released, and Markbilt’s demand was dependent on material costs from years prior. The Court therefore deemed that Sarion’s failure to observe sufficient diligence, resulting in a violation of laws and rules relating to the disbursement of public funds, amounted to gross inexcusable negligence.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the former mayor exercised due diligence in approving the disbursement of public funds for price escalation, or if his actions constituted gross inexcusable negligence.
    What is malversation of public funds? Malversation of public funds is the misappropriation or misuse of public funds by a public official entrusted with their care or custody. It is a crime punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
    What is Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019? Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, prohibits public officials from causing undue injury to the government or giving unwarranted benefits to any private party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
    What is gross inexcusable negligence? Gross inexcusable negligence is the failure to exercise even slight care, or the acting in a manner so as to show complete disregard for the rights and safety of others. In the context of public officials, it involves a clear and palpable breach of duty due to manifest inattention or lack of care.
    What is the ‘Arias Doctrine’? The ‘Arias Doctrine’ generally allows heads of offices to rely on the actions of their subordinates, unless there are circumstances that should have alerted them to exercise a higher degree of circumspection.
    What is a Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF)? A Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) is a document certifying that funds have been duly appropriated for a specific purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed expenditure is available for expenditure. It is a requirement under Section 86 of P.D. No. 1445.
    What is the Government Procurement Reform Act (R.A. No. 9184)? The Government Procurement Reform Act (R.A. No. 9184) provides the rules and regulations for the procurement of goods, supplies, and services by government agencies. Section 61 of the act lays down the requirements for price adjustments.
    What was the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision in this case? The Supreme Court based its decision on the finding that the former mayor, as an accountable officer, failed to exercise the necessary diligence in approving the disbursement of public funds, and that his actions constituted gross inexcusable negligence leading to the illegal release of funds.

    This case serves as a reminder to all public officials of their responsibility to safeguard public funds and to exercise due diligence in all their official actions. The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the importance of adhering to established procedures and regulations, and of being vigilant in the performance of one’s duties. A lack of oversight will not be tolerated.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: TITO S. SARION, PETITIONER, V.S. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT., G.R. Nos. 243029-30, August 22, 2022

  • Accountability in Public Office: Mayor’s Liability for Negligence in Fund Disbursement

    The Supreme Court has affirmed that public officials, particularly those in positions of authority like mayors, can be held liable for malversation of public funds and violations of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) if they exhibit gross inexcusable negligence in handling public funds. This ruling underscores the high standard of care expected of public servants in managing government resources, emphasizing that ignorance or reliance on subordinates does not excuse them from liability when clear warning signs of irregularity are present. This decision reinforces the principle that public office is a public trust, demanding utmost diligence and prudence from those entrusted with government funds.

    When Oversight Fails: Can a Mayor Be Liable for Negligence Despite Subordinates’ Actions?

    This case, Tito S. Sarion v. People of the Philippines, revolves around Tito S. Sarion, the former mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, who was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan of malversation of public funds and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The charges stemmed from the allegedly irregular payment of price escalation to Markbilt Construction for the Phase II construction of the Daet Public Market. Sarion approved the disbursement despite concerns about the validity of the claim, particularly the absence of a specific appropriation for the price escalation at the time the contract was agreed upon. The Supreme Court, in its initial decision and subsequent resolution denying Sarion’s motion for reconsideration, affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s ruling, finding that Sarion exhibited gross inexcusable negligence, leading to undue injury to the municipality.

    The central legal issue is whether Sarion, as mayor, could be held liable for these offenses despite his defense of relying on the certifications and recommendations of his subordinates. Sarion argued that he relied in good faith on the diligent exercise of functions by municipal officers tasked with accounting, budgeting, and legal matters. He cited a legal opinion stating no irregularity was found in the price escalation computation. However, the Court found that circumstances existed that should have alerted Sarion to inquire further before approving the payment. These included the significant amount involved, the fact that the project was largely completed before his term, and the extended period since the initial demand for payment.

    The Supreme Court anchored its decision on the principle that public officials are accountable for the proper handling of public funds and cannot simply delegate their responsibility to subordinates, especially when red flags are apparent. The Court referred to Sections 85 and 86 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, also known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, which mandates prior sufficient appropriation before entering into any contract involving the expenditure of public funds. Specifically, Section 86 requires a certificate from the proper accounting official confirming that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose, which must be attached to the contract.

    Section 85. Appropriation before entering into contract.

    (1) No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure.

    Section 86. Certificate showing appropriation to meet contract. Except in the case of a contract for personal service, for supplies for current consumption or to be carried in stock not exceeding the estimated consumption for three months, or banking transactions of government­ owned or controlled banks, no contract involving the expenditure of public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current fiscal year is available for expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification by the auditor concerned. The certificate, signed by the proper accounting official and the auditor who verified it, shall be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contract, and the sum so certified shall not thereafter be available for expenditure for any other purpose until the obligation of the government agency concerned under the contract is fully extinguished.

    The Court emphasized that the original contract price of Php 71,499,875.29 was the only appropriation in this case, and no payment could be made beyond that amount without a specific, prior appropriation for the price escalation. The absence of this specific appropriation at the time the parties agreed to its payment rendered the undertaking in the Contract Agreement void and of no effect. The Court rejected Sarion’s reliance on the doctrine in Arias v. Sandiganbayan, which generally allows heads of offices to rely on their subordinates, stating that the doctrine does not apply when circumstances should have alerted the official to exercise a higher degree of circumspection.

    The court highlighted that Sarion, as mayor, held a position of significant responsibility and could not claim ignorance of the law or blindly rely on his subordinates. His approval of the disbursement voucher without verifying the propriety of the claim, especially given the time that had passed since the project’s completion and the initial demand for payment, constituted gross inexcusable negligence. This negligence caused undue injury to the Municipality of Daet, as public funds were illegally released to Markbilt Construction.

    Furthermore, the Court addressed the argument that the Information (the formal charge) against Sarion was deficient because it alleged the absence of a Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF), not an irregularity in the CAF. While Sarion claimed there was indeed a CAF, the Court clarified that the issue was the absence of a specific appropriation for the price escalation. Even if the Information was technically flawed, the Court reasoned that Sarion could still be convicted based on his approval of the disbursement voucher without complying with Section 61 of R.A. No. 9184, which requires referral to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and approval by the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) for price escalations. The failure to comply with these requirements, though not directly penalized under R.A. No. 9184, contributed to the violation of R.A. No. 3019 and the crime of malversation.

    In his dissenting opinion, Justice Caguioa argued that there was, in fact, a valid appropriation to pay for the contract price escalation, referring to Appropriation Ordinance No. 01. He also contended that the obligation to secure the documents required under Section 61 of R.A. No. 9184 did not pertain to Sarion but to the contractor. Furthermore, he cited Arias v. Sandiganbayan, arguing that Sarion should be able to rely on the good faith of his subordinates and the legal opinion he received. However, the majority of the Court remained unconvinced, upholding the conviction based on the clear evidence of Sarion’s negligence and the resulting injury to the municipality.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether a mayor could be held liable for malversation of public funds and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act due to gross inexcusable negligence in approving a disbursement. The central question was whether reliance on subordinates and a legal opinion absolved the mayor of responsibility.
    What is malversation of public funds? Malversation of public funds, under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, involves a public officer who, by reason of their office, is accountable for public funds or property, and misappropriates, takes, or allows any other person to take those funds or property. This can occur through intent or negligence.
    What is Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019? Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 prohibits public officials from causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of their official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
    What is gross inexcusable negligence? Gross inexcusable negligence signifies a failure to exercise even slight care or diligence, or the omission of care that even inattentive and thoughtless persons never fail to take on their own property. In this context, it means a clear and palpable failure to perform a legal duty.
    What is the significance of P.D. No. 1445 in this case? Presidential Decree No. 1445, also known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, outlines the requirements for appropriating and disbursing public funds. Sections 85 and 86 of P.D. No. 1445 require prior appropriation and certification by the proper accounting official before entering into contracts involving public funds.
    When can a public official rely on the Arias doctrine? The Arias doctrine allows a head of office to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. However, this doctrine does not apply when circumstances exist that should have alerted the official to exercise a higher degree of circumspection.
    What is Section 61 of R.A. No. 9184? Section 61 of R.A. No. 9184, the Government Procurement Reform Act, requires that for price escalations in government contracts, there must be a determination of extraordinary circumstances by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and approval by the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB).
    What was the dissenting opinion’s main argument? The dissenting opinion argued that there was a valid appropriation for the price escalation, that the mayor was not responsible for compliance with Section 61 of R.A. No. 9184, and that the mayor was entitled to rely on the legal opinion and the good faith of his subordinates under the Arias doctrine.

    The Sarion case serves as a crucial reminder that public office demands a high degree of accountability and diligence. Public officials cannot shield themselves from liability by claiming ignorance or reliance on subordinates when faced with evident signs of irregularity. This ruling reinforces the importance of transparency and adherence to established procedures in the management of public funds, safeguarding against corruption and ensuring responsible governance.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: TITO S. SARION, PETITIONER, V.S. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT., G.R. Nos. 243029-30, August 22, 2022

  • Accountability in Public Spending: Good Faith and the Duty to Document

    The Supreme Court ruled that public officials can be held liable for disallowed government expenditures if they fail to provide adequate documentation, even if they claim good faith. This decision reinforces the importance of transparency and accountability in handling public funds. While the principle of quantum meruit may reduce liability by allowing contractors to be paid for services rendered, officials bear the responsibility to ensure all transactions are fully documented.

    When a Stadium’s Lights Dim: Questioning Good Faith in Public Infrastructure Projects

    This case revolves around the disallowance of funds spent on the 23rd Southeast Asian Games (SEA Games) held in Bacolod City. Monico O. Puentevella, as chairperson of the Bacolod Southeast Asian Games Organizing Committee (BASOC), was found liable for failing to properly document expenditures related to the rehabilitation of sports facilities. The Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed P36,778,105.44 due to the lack of supporting documents, leading to the central question: Can a public official be excused from liability for disallowed expenses by claiming good faith, despite failing to comply with auditing rules?

    The Philippine Sports Commission (PSC) granted financial assistance to BASOC, yet the proper liquidation reports were not submitted promptly. After a special audit, deficiencies were noted, including a lack of acknowledgment receipts and failure to submit contracts and specifications. Despite these issues, petitioner argued that he acted in good faith, citing time constraints and a lack of technical expertise within BASOC. He presented that he submitted what he could, despite it all.

    The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of documentary evidence in government transactions. Section 4 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445, the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, mandates that claims against government funds must be supported with complete documentation. The COA issued circulars, such as COA Circular No. 76-34, which requires agencies to submit copies of contracts and supporting documents shortly after execution, ensuring transparency and accountability.

    The court referenced COA Memorandum No. 2005-027, which implements the Government Procurement Reform Act by requiring the submission of technical documents for evaluation by specialists. These documents include approved contracts, plans, specifications, and cost breakdowns. The systematic failure to submit these documents was a major point.

    The Supreme Court found Puentevella liable for gross negligence, referencing Sections 38 and 39 of the 1987 Administrative Code. These sections state that public officers can be held accountable for acts performed in connection with official duties if there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. Gross negligence is defined as a want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act where there is a duty to act, with conscious indifference to consequences.

    The court stated that Puentevella’s submissions were insufficient and did not comply with COA circulars or the Notice of Suspension. The court noted that detailed scopes of work, designs, and cost estimates are essential for transparency in publicly funded construction contracts. The failure to secure such documents, especially for a large international event, defied logic and undermined the claim of good faith.

    Despite upholding the disallowance, the Supreme Court invoked the principle of quantum meruit, modifying the COA’s decision to allow for a reduction in liability. The court acknowledged that the 23rd SEA Games brought prestige to the Philippines, and the rehabilitation of sports facilities benefited the public. As such, contractors and suppliers were entitled to receive reasonable payment for their services, preventing undue enrichment. The court remanded the case to the COA to determine the appropriate amounts based on the principle of quantum meruit.

    The Rules of Return first enunciated in Madera v. COA and later amended by Torreta v. COA apply in this case. To restate, the civil liability for the disallowed amount may be reduced by the amounts due to the recipient based on the application of the principle of quantum meruit on a case to case basis.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Monico O. Puentevella, as chairperson of BASOC, could be held liable for disallowed expenses due to a lack of documentation, despite claiming good faith. The court ultimately held him liable due to gross negligence in failing to comply with auditing requirements.
    What is a Notice of Disallowance (ND)? A Notice of Disallowance is issued by the Commission on Audit (COA) when it finds that certain government expenditures are irregular, illegal, or unconscionable. It requires the responsible officials to return the disallowed amount to the government.
    What does “gross negligence” mean in this context? Gross negligence refers to a public official’s failure to exercise even slight care in performing their duties. It involves acting or failing to act with conscious indifference to the potential consequences, indicating a reckless disregard for the proper handling of public funds.
    What is the principle of quantum meruit? Quantum meruit, meaning “as much as he deserves,” is a legal principle that allows a person to recover the reasonable value of services or goods provided, even without a valid contract. In this case, it allows contractors to be paid for the work they performed, despite irregularities in the contracts.
    Why were the funds disallowed in this case? The funds were disallowed because BASOC failed to submit the necessary supporting documents to justify the expenditures. This included contracts, plans, specifications, and receipts, making it impossible for the COA to verify the validity and reasonableness of the expenses.
    What is the role of the Commission on Audit (COA)? The COA is an independent constitutional body tasked with ensuring the proper use of government funds. It audits government agencies and disallows illegal or irregular expenditures to safeguard public resources.
    What happens after a Notice of Disallowance is issued? After a Notice of Disallowance is issued, the individuals held liable can appeal the decision. If the disallowance is upheld, they are required to return the disallowed amount. However, principles like quantum meruit may be applied to reduce the amount to be returned.
    What was the outcome of this Supreme Court case? The Supreme Court affirmed the COA’s disallowance but modified the decision to allow for the application of quantum meruit. The case was remanded to the COA to determine the reasonable value of the services rendered by the contractors, which would be deducted from the disallowed amount.

    This case underscores the critical importance of meticulous record-keeping and compliance with auditing regulations in government projects. While good faith is a consideration, it cannot excuse a complete failure to document the use of public funds. Public officials must ensure that all expenditures are properly supported to maintain transparency and accountability.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: MONICO O. PUENTEVELLA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 254077, August 02, 2022

  • Probable Cause and Ombudsman’s Discretion: Safeguarding Public Funds in the Philippines

    In Mario L. Relampagos v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against petitioner Mario L. Relampagos for malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The Court emphasized its non-interference in the Ombudsman’s factual determinations, recognizing the Ombudsman’s expertise in investigating and prosecuting public officials. This decision reinforces the authority of the Ombudsman to pursue cases involving alleged misuse of public funds, ensuring accountability and upholding the integrity of public service.

    Malampaya Fund Misuse: When Does Signing Off Imply Complicity?

    The case revolves around the alleged anomalous use of P900 million from the Malampaya Fund, intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries affected by typhoons. These funds were allegedly diverted through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) controlled by Janet Lim Napoles. Petitioner Mario L. Relampagos, then-Undersecretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), was implicated for signing the Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) that facilitated the release of funds. The central legal question is whether Relampagos’s act of signing the NCA, despite knowledge of potential irregularities, constitutes probable cause for malversation and violation of anti-graft laws, thereby warranting a trial.

    At the heart of this case lies the delicate balance between an official’s duty to execute directives and their responsibility to ensure the legality and propriety of fund disbursements. The Ombudsman, tasked with investigating the matter, found sufficient basis to believe that Relampagos acted in conspiracy with others to facilitate the diversion of public funds. The Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause is not a pronouncement of guilt. As such, probable cause merely requires that the elements of the crime are reasonably apparent. Relampagos argued that the evaluation and preparation of the Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and NCAs were handled by technical staff, and he signed the NCA in good faith, relying on the DBM Secretary’s approval. He also claimed that the lack of a List of Due and Demandable Accounts Payable (LDDAP) was not a legal impediment at the time of the NCA’s issuance.

    The Court, however, emphasized that its role is not to substitute its judgment for that of the Ombudsman in factual determinations. The Supreme Court reiterated the principle of non-interference in the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers, as enshrined in the Constitution and RA 6770. The Constitution grants the Ombudsman a wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees. Therefore, the Supreme Court may only interfere when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, which means a virtual refusal to perform a positive duty under the law. The court highlighted that a finding of probable cause only needs to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is sufficient reason to believe that the accused committed it. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, or on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

    “The executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter. It requires probing into the ‘existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he [or she] was prosecuted.’”

    The Supreme Court also addressed Relampagos’s argument that the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and malversation were not present. The Court held that whether the elements of the crime are present is already a matter of evidence and is best passed upon in a full-blown trial on the merits. The Supreme Court has consistently held that conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence, as it can be inferred from the acts of the accused. Relampagos argued that the allegation of conspiracy against him was baseless, being merely based on speculation and lacking proof of overt acts indicating a common design. The Court rejected this argument, stating that it cannot interfere with the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining the adequacy of evidence.

    “The Court cannot interfere with the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining the adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence before him.”

    The Court noted that Informations had already been filed before the Sandiganbayan, and Relampagos was declared a fugitive from justice for failing to return to the country following a permitted travel. This development further underscored the gravity of the charges against him.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause against Mario L. Relampagos for malversation of public funds and violation of anti-graft laws.
    What is the Malampaya Fund? The Malampaya Fund is derived from the government’s share in the revenues from the Malampaya gas field project. It is intended for energy-related projects and other purposes as authorized by the President.
    What is probable cause? Probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of. It does not require absolute certainty but only a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed.
    What does non-interference in Ombudsman’s decisions mean? It means the Supreme Court generally respects the Ombudsman’s findings on factual matters and will only intervene if there is grave abuse of discretion.
    What is Section 3(e) of RA 3019? Section 3(e) of RA 3019 prohibits public officials from causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of their official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
    What is the role of the Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA)? The NCA is a document issued by the DBM authorizing government agencies to withdraw funds from the Treasury to cover their expenditures.
    What is an Information? An Information is a formal charge filed by the prosecutor in court, accusing a person of committing a crime.
    What is malversation of public funds? Malversation involves a public officer appropriating public funds or property entrusted to them for their own use or the use of another.
    What is the significance of being declared a fugitive from justice? Being declared a fugitive from justice means that a person has evaded legal proceedings. It can result in the denial of certain rights and privileges.

    The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of the Ombudsman’s role in holding public officials accountable for alleged misuse of public funds. It also serves as a reminder of the responsibilities of public officials in ensuring the proper disbursement of government resources. The ruling highlights the principle that even seemingly routine actions, such as signing an NCA, can lead to legal liability if done with knowledge of potential irregularities.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. Nos. 234868-69, July 27, 2022

  • Accountability in Governance: Good Faith and the Duty to Return Illegally Granted Benefits in the NHA

    The Supreme Court has affirmed the Commission on Audit’s (COA) decision, holding National Housing Authority (NHA) officials and employees liable for the return of disallowed benefits. The court emphasized that good faith cannot be claimed when approving officers are aware of the illegality of disbursements, and recipients are bound to return amounts unduly received, especially when they’ve acknowledged this obligation. This ruling underscores the importance of due diligence and adherence to legal regulations in the handling of public funds, promoting accountability within government agencies.

    NHA Under Scrutiny: Can Good Intentions Excuse Illegal Bonuses?

    The National Housing Authority (NHA) found itself in legal crosshairs following a Commission on Audit (COA) investigation into the allowances, bonuses, and other emoluments granted to its officers and employees from 2008 to 2009. The COA issued several Notices of Disallowance (NDs) totaling P367,844,754.36, questioning the legal basis for these disbursements. The NHA, in defense, argued that these grants were made in good faith and in accordance with existing policies and collective bargaining agreements. This case brought to the forefront the critical question of whether good faith can excuse government officials from liability when public funds are disbursed without proper legal basis, and the extent to which recipients of these funds are obligated to return them.

    The core of the dispute stemmed from the NHA’s grant of various incentives, including Cash Incentive Awards, Economic Subsidies, Christmas Bonuses, Citation Bonuses, Mid-Year Financial Assistance (MYFA), meal subsidies, children’s allowances, rice subsidies, and Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA). The COA challenged these disbursements, citing violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758, which mandates a standardized compensation and position classification system in the government. The COA argued that these allowances and bonuses were inconsistent with the standardized salary system and lacked proper legal authorization. Specifically, Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 was cited, along with Memorandum Order (MO) No. 20, and Sections 45 of R.A. Nos. 9498 and 9524, highlighting the lack of legal basis for these disbursements.

    The NHA countered that the grants were authorized under Letter of Implementation (LOI) No. 97 and Section 10 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 757, which empower the General Manager, subject to the Board of Directors (BOD) approval, to determine allowances and compensation. They also argued that the incentives were given in recognition of the employees’ contributions and to help them cope with financial difficulties. However, the COA maintained that these justifications were insufficient, as R.A. No. 6758 had already repealed the earlier provisions, and no specific approval from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or the President was obtained for the said grants.

    The Supreme Court, in its analysis, sided with the COA, emphasizing that R.A. No. 6758 aimed to standardize compensation across government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) and eliminate multi-level allowances. The court affirmed that any provisions of law inconsistent with this standardization were effectively repealed. The court also noted that the authority to determine which allowances or benefits could continue rested with the DBM, and most of the allowances in question were not excluded from integration into the standardized salary rates.

    A crucial aspect of the case revolved around the issue of good faith. The NHA argued that its officials and employees acted in good faith and should not be held liable to refund the disallowed benefits. However, the court found that good faith could not be appreciated in this case. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that good faith does not apply when the approving officers had knowledge of facts or circumstances which would render the disbursements illegal. In this case, the NHA Board of Directors, composed largely of Cabinet Secretaries, should have been aware of the limitations imposed by R.A. No. 6758 and the need for specific approval from the DBM or the President.

    Furthermore, the court highlighted the significance of the notarized Deeds of Undertaking signed by the recipient-employees.

    These documents acknowledged the possibility of a refund and authorized the NHA to deduct the equivalent amount from their salaries or benefits. The court interpreted this as an indication that the employees were aware of the potential illegality of the allowances and benefits they received.

    The Court also invoked Section 103 of PD No. 1445 which states, “Expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor.” The court made a distinction between approving/certifying officers and the recipient-employees. It emphasized that the approving and certifying officers were solidarily liable for the total disallowed amount, while the recipient-employees were individually liable for the amounts they actually received.

    The Supreme Court referenced its prior ruling in Madera v. COA, which established guidelines for the refund of disallowed amounts. However, the Court also addressed the applicability of the 3-year prescriptive period established in the case of Cagayan de Oro City Water District v. COA. The Court found that the 3-year prescriptive period does not apply to the present case, considering the employees’ execution of notarized Deeds of Undertaking. The Court reasoned that although it took more than three years before the COA issued the NDs, the NHA employees who were passive recipients are still liable to refund the disallowed amounts because the notarized Deeds of Undertaking gave them sufficient notice of the illegality and irregularity of the allowances and benefits.

    The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the consolidated petitions, affirming the COA’s decision in its entirety. The Court held the approving and certifying officers solidarily liable for the return of the disallowed amounts, while the recipient-employees were individually liable for the amounts they received. The decision underscores the importance of adhering to legal regulations and exercising due diligence in handling public funds. It also reinforces the principle that good intentions cannot excuse illegal disbursements, and recipients of such funds have a duty to return them, particularly when they have acknowledged the potential for a refund.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of certain benefits granted to NHA officers and employees, and whether these individuals should be held liable to return the disallowed amounts.
    What benefits were disallowed by the COA? The disallowed benefits included Cash Incentive Awards, Economic Subsidies, Christmas Bonuses, Citation Bonuses, Mid-Year Financial Assistance, meal subsidies, children’s allowances, rice subsidies, and Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA).
    What law did the COA cite in disallowing the benefits? The COA primarily cited Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758, which prescribes a revised compensation and position classification system in the government, aiming to standardize salaries and eliminate unauthorized allowances.
    What was the NHA’s main argument in defending the grants? The NHA argued that the grants were made in good faith, based on existing policies, collective bargaining agreements, and the employees’ contributions to the agency.
    Why did the Supreme Court reject the NHA’s good faith argument? The Court found that the NHA officials, particularly the Board of Directors, should have been aware of the limitations imposed by R.A. No. 6758 and the need for specific approval from the DBM or the President for such allowances.
    What was the significance of the Deeds of Undertaking signed by the employees? The Deeds of Undertaking acknowledged the possibility of a refund and authorized deductions from their salaries, indicating that the employees were aware of the potential illegality of the benefits.
    Who is liable to refund the disallowed amounts? The approving and certifying officers are solidarily liable for the total disallowed amount, while the recipient-employees are individually liable for the amounts they actually received.
    Does the 3-year prescriptive period apply to excuse recipients from refunding the amounts they received? No, the 3-year prescriptive period does not apply to the present case considering the NHA employees’ execution of notarized Deeds of Undertaking which gave them sufficient notice of the illegality and irregularity of the allowances and benefits.

    The Supreme Court’s decision serves as a reminder to government agencies and officials to exercise caution and due diligence in the disbursement of public funds. Compliance with legal regulations and obtaining proper authorization are essential to avoid disallowances and personal liability. The ruling underscores the importance of transparency and accountability in governance, ensuring that public resources are used responsibly and in accordance with the law.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: National Housing Authority vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 239936, June 21, 2022

  • Accountability Prevails: Public Officials Held Civilly Liable Despite Acquittal in Illegal Funds Transfer Case

    In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed that public officials can be held civilly liable for negligence in handling public funds, even if acquitted of criminal charges. This decision reinforces the principle that public office is a public trust, and officials must exercise due diligence in managing government resources. The Court emphasized that acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not extinguish civil liability, which requires only preponderance of evidence. This case underscores the importance of accountability and responsible stewardship of public funds by those entrusted with their care, ensuring that negligence does not go unaddressed.

    Negligence Exposed: Can Public Officials Be Liable Even After Criminal Acquittal?

    This case revolves around the controversial transfer of municipal funds from the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to Davao Cooperative Bank (DCB) by officials of Pantukan, Compostela Valley. Silvino B. Matobato, Sr., the Municipal Treasurer, along with Sangguniang Bayan members Walter B. Bucao and Cirila A. Engbino, were charged with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The core issue was whether they acted with gross negligence in authorizing the transfer, which resulted in the loss of funds when DCB became insolvent.

    The Sandiganbayan acquitted the accused based on reasonable doubt, finding that the prosecution failed to prove gross and inexcusable negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the anti-graft court held them civilly liable for the unrecovered funds, amounting to P9.25 million. It reasoned that even without proving gross negligence for criminal liability, their actions demonstrated sufficient negligence to warrant civil responsibility. This decision hinged on the principle that the standard of proof for civil liability—preponderance of evidence—is lower than that for criminal liability—proof beyond reasonable doubt.

    The Supreme Court upheld the Sandiganbayan’s decision, emphasizing the **threefold liability rule**, where wrongful acts of public officers may lead to civil, criminal, and administrative liabilities. The Court cited the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr., 670 Phil. 169, 188-189 (2011), underscoring this principle.

    The court emphasized that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically extinguish civil liability, especially when the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, as was the case here. The Court referred to the case of Dayap v. Sendiong, 597 Phil. 127, 141 (2009), reiterating the exceptions:

    (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.

    The Court found that the actions of Silvino, Walter, and Cirila demonstrated a lack of reasonable care and caution expected of public officials. Silvino, as Municipal Treasurer, failed to flag potential risks associated with the transaction, vouched for DCB’s financial stability despite the Asian Financial Crisis, and continued depositing funds even after DCB’s authority to accept government deposits expired. The Court cited Section 101(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445, highlighting Silvino’s duty as Municipal Treasurer:

    SEC. 101. Accountable officers; bond requirement.
    1. Every officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require the possession or custody of government funds or property shall be accountable therefor and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with law.

    As for Walter and Cirila, the Sangguniang Bayan members, the Court noted their reliance on the bank manager’s verbal assurances without conducting due diligence on DCB’s financial status. The Court cited Section 340 of RA No. 7160, known as the “Local Government Code of 1991,” emphasizing the accountability of local officers:

    SEC. 340. Persons Accountable for Local Government Funds. – Any officer of the local government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or custody of local government funds shall be accountable and responsible for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the provisions of this Title. Other local officers who, though not accountable by the nature of their duties, may likewise be similarly held accountable and responsible for local government funds through their participation in the use or application thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)

    The Supreme Court emphasized that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions was overcome by evidence of negligence. The Court also cited Section 21 of COA Circular No. 92-382, underscoring the need for prior authority from the Sangguniang Bayan and approval of the local chief executive before depositing idle funds in time deposit accounts.

    The Court reasoned that the Municipality of Pantukan suffered actual damage because the funds were inaccessible for government purposes due to the negligence of the officials. The Court used the case of Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 350 Phil. 820, 838 (1998) to illustrate that compensation must be commensurate to the loss.

    The Court did not accept Silvino’s contention that pending DCB’s liquidation, there were no actual damages suffered by the Municipality of Pantukan.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether public officials could be held civilly liable for negligence in handling public funds, even after being acquitted of criminal charges related to the same acts.
    Why were the officials acquitted in the criminal case? The Sandiganbayan acquitted the officials based on reasonable doubt, finding that the prosecution did not prove gross and inexcusable negligence beyond a reasonable doubt.
    What standard of proof is required for civil liability? Civil liability requires a lower standard of proof than criminal liability. It only requires a preponderance of evidence, meaning the evidence must be more convincing than the opposing evidence.
    What is the significance of the “threefold liability rule”? The “threefold liability rule” states that wrongful acts or omissions of public officers may give rise to civil, criminal, and administrative liabilities, highlighting multiple avenues for accountability.
    What was the basis for holding the officials civilly liable? The officials were held civilly liable because they failed to exercise reasonable care and caution in managing public funds, specifically in transferring funds to a bank that later became insolvent.
    What duties did the Municipal Treasurer fail to fulfill? The Municipal Treasurer failed to flag potential risks, vouched for the bank’s stability without due diligence, and continued depositing funds even after the bank’s authorization expired.
    Why couldn’t the Sangguniang Bayan members rely on the presumption of regularity? The Sangguniang Bayan members could not rely on the presumption of regularity because their negligence in approving the fund transfer without proper investigation was proven.
    What was the impact on the Municipality of Pantukan? The Municipality of Pantukan suffered actual damage because the transferred funds became inaccessible, hindering the implementation of municipal projects and services.
    Is pending liquidation a valid reason to dismiss civil liability? No, the court reasoned that the municipality had already suffered damage and its financial loss could not be disregarded pending liquidation of the bank.

    This case serves as a crucial reminder to public officials regarding their responsibilities in managing public funds. The Supreme Court’s decision underscores that even if criminal charges are not proven beyond reasonable doubt, civil liability can still arise from negligent acts that cause financial loss to the government and its constituents.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: SILVINO B. MATOBATO, SR. VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 229265 & WALTER B. BUCAO AND CIRILA A. ENGBINO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 229624, February 15, 2022

  • When Local Governance Meets Lending: Safeguarding Public Funds in Loan Transactions

    The Supreme Court acquitted Judith B. Cardenas, along with other local officials of Canlaon City, of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the loan agreements entered into by the officials were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the local government. This decision clarifies the extent to which local government units (LGUs) can utilize their assets, such as savings deposits and Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs), as collateral for loans, providing a crucial framework for future local governance and financial transactions. It emphasizes the necessity of proving actual detriment to the government to secure a conviction under Section 3(g) of RA 3019.

    Can a Loan to Benefit Employees Be a Loss to the City?

    This case revolves around a P60,000,000.00 loan obtained by the Local Government Unit (LGU) of Canlaon City from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), authorized during Judith B. Cardenas’ term as City Mayor. The loan was intended for livelihood projects for city officials and employees, with the city’s savings deposits and IRA used as collateral. The loan agreement was further supported by a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the LGU and the Canlaon City Employees Multi-Purpose Cooperative (CCGEMCO) to administer the funds. This led to charges against Cardenas and other local officials for violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which penalizes entering into contracts on behalf of the government that are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous. The central legal question was whether these loan agreements were indeed detrimental to the government, warranting a conviction under the said law.

    The Sandiganbayan initially found the petitioners guilty, reasoning that the MOAs with DBP and CCGEMCO were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the LGU. They highlighted that public funds like special savings deposits and IRA were used without proper appropriation, essentially putting the city’s finances under DBP’s control without statutory authority. The Sandiganbayan also noted that all interests from the re-lending agreement with CCGEMCO accrued solely to the cooperative, leaving the city responsible for the principal plus interests. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, leading to the officials’ acquittal.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that for a conviction under Section 3(g) of RA 3019, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The Court outlined the elements of the offense: (1) the accused is a public officer; (2) they entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) the contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous. While the first two elements were present, the critical third element was lacking.

    The Court referenced Section 297(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC), which allows LGUs to secure loans using real estate or other acceptable assets for various projects. Citing examples from the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and DBP, the Court acknowledged that IRAs are commonly accepted as collateral. DBP itself allows LGUs to use special savings deposits and IRAs as loan security. The Court highlighted testimony from a DBP Branch Head confirming that such arrangements minimize risks and benefit both the bank and the LGU, as the deposits earn interest income.

    Furthermore, the Court countered the notion that the loan primarily benefited a few private individuals. While initial complaints suggested this, it was later admitted that 273 employees were beneficiaries. The relending program managed by CCGEMCO aimed to implement the LGU’s Livelihood Incentive Support Program, designed to support local officials and employees. The Court noted the hierarchy of preference in granting loans, prioritizing those with viable livelihood projects or those seeking to consolidate debts with higher interest rates.

    The MOA between the LGU and CCGEMCO expressly stated that CCGEMCO would pay the principal, interests, and charges to DBP. While CCGEMCO was not a direct party to the loan agreement with DBP, this provision indicated the LGU’s effort to ensure the loan was repaid without jeopardizing its savings or IRA. The court also took note of a DBP certification stating that the LGU paid the P60,000,000 loan, without default and on time.

    SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

    x x x x

    (g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

    Acknowledging that the LGU did not enter the P60,000,000.00 loan in its financial statements, which the local officials did not deny. The Supreme Court also addressed the lack of an appropriation ordinance before releasing the loan proceeds to CCGEMCO, as required by Section 305(a) of the LGC. However, the Court clarified that such irregularities do not automatically render the transactions grossly and manifestly disadvantageous, as required to establish guilt under Section 3(g) of RA 3019. While the lack of an appropriation ordinance was an irregularity, it did not necessarily equate to a disadvantageous transaction.

    To illustrate, consider two LGUs taking similar loans. LGU A properly records the loan in its financial statements and enacts an appropriation ordinance, while LGU B does not. If both LGUs successfully repay their loans without defaulting, LGU B cannot be said to have been manifestly and grossly disadvantaged simply because of the procedural lapses.

    Aspect Sandiganbayan’s View Supreme Court’s View
    Disadvantage to Government Loan agreements were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous due to improper use of public funds and lack of appropriation. No manifest or gross disadvantage proven; LGUs can use assets like savings and IRA as loan security.
    Benefit to Private Parties The loan was designed to favor a few selected individuals. The loan benefited a wider group of employees as part of a livelihood program.
    Compliance with LGC Failure to comply with proper appropriation procedures made the transaction disadvantageous. Procedural lapses do not automatically equate to a disadvantageous transaction under RA 3019.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s ruling underscores the stringent standard required to prove a violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, mandating clear evidence of manifest and gross disadvantage to the government. The verdict stresses that mere procedural lapses or irregularities do not automatically trigger liability under this provision. This case provides significant guidance on how LGUs can manage their finances, secure loans, and implement livelihood programs without overstepping legal boundaries.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the loan agreements entered into by Canlaon City officials were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, thereby violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
    What is Section 3(g) of RA 3019? Section 3(g) of RA 3019 prohibits public officers from entering into contracts on behalf of the government that are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, regardless of whether the officer profits from it.
    Can LGUs use their IRA as collateral for loans? Yes, the Supreme Court acknowledged that LGUs can use their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) and other assets as collateral for loans, provided it aligns with the Local Government Code.
    What does ‘manifestly and grossly disadvantageous’ mean? ‘Manifestly’ means evident or obvious, while ‘grossly’ implies a flagrant and inexcusable level of misconduct, and ‘disadvantageous’ refers to something unfavorable or prejudicial. The contract must evidently be greatly unfavorable to the government
    Was there an appropriation ordinance for the loan proceeds? No, the Supreme Court noted the lack of an appropriation ordinance for the release of the loan proceeds to CCGEMCO, which is a procedural irregularity.
    What was the outcome for the accused officials? The Supreme Court acquitted the accused officials, including Judith B. Cardenas, of violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019, reversing the Sandiganbayan’s decision.
    What was the purpose of the loan? The loan was intended for livelihood projects for city officials and employees of Canlaon City, managed through a relending program administered by CCGEMCO.
    How did the Supreme Court view the benefit to private individuals? The Court clarified that the loan benefited a wider group of employees as part of a livelihood program, rather than just a few selected individuals.
    What happens if an accused official dies during the case? The Supreme Court dismissed the case for Ma. Luisa L. Luza and Edgar D. Estampador due to their deaths during the pendency of the case, as death extinguishes criminal liability.

    This ruling reinforces the importance of proving actual detriment to the government when prosecuting officials under anti-graft laws. It also provides clarity on the permissible use of LGU assets for securing loans, balancing the need for local development with the imperative of safeguarding public funds. Moving forward, LGUs should ensure compliance with procedural requirements, such as enacting appropriation ordinances, to avoid potential legal challenges, even when transactions are not inherently disadvantageous.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: JUDITH B. CARDENAS vs. PEOPLE, G.R. Nos. 231538-39, December 01, 2021