The Supreme Court, in Cenzon v. Hon. Salvador Abad Santos, clarified that individuals charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, are entitled to bail. The Court emphasized that the term “reclusion perpetua” in Presidential Decree No. 818 merely describes the penalty imposed based on the amount of fraud, but it is not the prescribed penalty for the offense itself. This ruling ensures that individuals accused of estafa have the opportunity to secure provisional liberty while awaiting trial, in accordance with the constitutional right to bail.
Bouncing Checks and Provisional Liberty: Does the Severity of Fraud Eliminate the Right to Bail?
The case revolves around Vicente S. Cenzon’s petition against the decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s order allowing Margarita C. Sia, the private respondent, to post bail. Sia was charged with estafa for issuing bouncing checks amounting to millions of pesos. The initial informations filed against Sia recommended no bail, but this was later amended to allow bail at P60,000.00 per count. The central legal question is whether Sia, charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
The right to bail is a fundamental principle enshrined in the Philippine Constitution and further elaborated in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that “[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties…” This provision underscores the presumption of innocence and the right to provisional liberty pending trial. However, the exception clause raises questions about the bailability of offenses where the penalty may extend to reclusion perpetua, depending on aggravating factors or the amount involved, as in the case of estafa under Presidential Decree No. 818.
In this case, the Court had to reconcile the constitutional right to bail with the penalties prescribed for estafa involving large sums of money. Petitioner Cenzon argued that since the amount of the bounced checks was substantial, the prescribed penalty would be reclusion perpetua, thus making Sia non-bailable. Cenzon relied on the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the DOJ, which recommended no bail for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) when the fraud exceeds P32,000.00. However, the Supreme Court had previously addressed this issue in several cases, clarifying that the term “reclusion perpetua” in Presidential Decree No. 818 is descriptive rather than prescriptive.
The Court cited the landmark case of People v. Panganiban, where it was held that “[a]s used in Presidential Decree No. 818, reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense, but merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds P22,000.00.” This distinction is crucial because the constitutional right to bail hinges on the prescribed penalty for the offense charged, not the actual penalty that may be imposed based on specific circumstances. Building on this principle, the Court further clarified that since the prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d), even as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, is not inherently reclusion perpetua, the accused is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
The Court also took into account DOJ Department Circular No. 74, which provides guidelines for recommending bail in estafa cases. This circular acknowledges the jurisprudence established in People v. Hernando and People v. Panganiban, clarifying that the amount of bail should be based on the penalty prescribed under the Revised Penal Code, rather than the descriptive term used in Presidential Decree No. 818. According to the circular, if the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over, the bail shall be based on reclusion temporal maximum, with specific computations outlined in the guidelines. However, the total amount of bail shall not exceed P60,000.00. This approach contrasts with the previous interpretation, which effectively denied bail to individuals accused of estafa involving significant amounts.
Moreover, the Supreme Court, through an En Banc Resolution in Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim v. People, had already pronounced that bail is allowed for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818. In Lim, the Court emphasized that the intent and provision of DOJ Circular No. 74 was to benefit the accused, aligning with the principle that penal laws are liberally construed in favor of the accused and strictly against the State. The Court found the case of People v. Reyes inapplicable, as it involved an accused who had already been convicted, whereas the present case involved an accused who was merely charged with estafa. The Lim ruling affirmed that even when the amount of fraud is substantial, the right to bail remains, subject to the guidelines outlined in DOJ Circular No. 74.
The Court also addressed the petitioner’s argument that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on Hernando and Panganiban, as these cases were decided by divisions of the Court and could not overturn the En Banc ruling in Reyes. The Court clarified that the Lim ruling, also an En Banc decision, settled the issue of bail in estafa cases. This clarification reaffirms the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movera, which dictates that established precedents should be followed to maintain stability and predictability in the legal system. The Supreme Court has consistently underscored the application of DOJ Department Circular No. 74 in estafa cases, reinforcing the right to bail for accused individuals.
FAQs
What was the key issue in this case? | The key issue was whether a person charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, is entitled to bail as a matter of right, considering that the amount of the alleged fraud was substantial. |
What is the meaning of “reclusion perpetua” as used in Presidential Decree No. 818? | According to the Supreme Court, “reclusion perpetua” as used in Presidential Decree No. 818 is merely descriptive of the penalty imposed based on the amount of fraud involved; it is not the prescribed penalty for the offense itself. |
What is the significance of DOJ Department Circular No. 74? | DOJ Department Circular No. 74 provides guidelines for recommending bail in estafa cases, acknowledging the jurisprudence that individuals charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) are entitled to bail, and outlining the computation of bail based on the amount of fraud. |
Did the Supreme Court overturn its previous ruling in People v. Reyes? | No, the Supreme Court clarified that People v. Reyes was not applicable to the case at bar, as Reyes involved a convicted individual, while the present case involved an accused person. |
What is the effect of the En Banc Resolution in Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim v. People? | The En Banc Resolution in Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim v. People settled the issue of bail in estafa cases, affirming that bail is allowed for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, in accordance with DOJ Circular No. 74. |
What is the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movera? | The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movera dictates that established precedents should be followed to maintain stability and predictability in the legal system. |
How does the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the DOJ relate to this case? | The 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the DOJ was amended by Department Circular No. 74, which provides updated guidelines for recommending bail in estafa cases, taking into account the relevant jurisprudence. |
What is the maximum amount of bail that can be imposed in estafa cases under DOJ Circular No. 74? | Under DOJ Circular No. 74, if the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over, the total amount of bail shall not exceed P60,000.00. |
In summary, the Supreme Court’s decision in Cenzon v. Hon. Salvador Abad Santos reinforces the constitutional right to bail for individuals charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818. The Court clarified that the term “reclusion perpetua” in Presidential Decree No. 818 is descriptive, not prescriptive, and that the guidelines outlined in DOJ Department Circular No. 74 should be followed in determining the appropriate amount of bail.
For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.
Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Vicente S. Cenzon v. Hon. Salvador Abad Santos, G.R. No. 164337, June 27, 2006