ASG Law

Tag: Subsequent Marriage

  • Annulment of Judgment: Remedy for Fraudulent Declaration of Presumptive Death

    The Supreme Court has clarified that when a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead is obtained through fraud, the proper legal remedy is an action for annulment of judgment, not simply filing an affidavit of reappearance. This ruling protects individuals from the consequences of fraudulent declarations and ensures their rights are fully restored. The decision emphasizes that an affidavit of reappearance is insufficient when the person declared presumptively dead was never actually absent.

    When a False Presumption Shatters Reality: Can a ‘Reappeared’ Spouse Undo a Fraudulent Death Declaration?

    This case revolves around Celerina J. Santos, who was declared presumptively dead based on a petition filed by her husband, Ricardo T. Santos, who sought to remarry. Ricardo alleged that Celerina had been absent for 12 years after supposedly leaving to work abroad. However, Celerina claimed that these allegations were false, that she had never left their conjugal home, and that Ricardo knew of her whereabouts. Upon learning of the judgment, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment, arguing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals dismissed her petition, stating that her proper remedy was to file a sworn statement of reappearance as per Article 42 of the Family Code.

    Celerina elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the affidavit of reappearance was inadequate because she had never been absent, and that it would not nullify the legal effects of the fraudulent judgment. Ricardo countered that annulment of judgment was not the proper remedy, as Celerina could simply file an affidavit of reappearance. The core issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition for annulment of judgment, given the claims of fraud.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that **annulment of judgment** is available when a court’s judgment has become final and other remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for annulment of judgment are **extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction**. The Court quoted the definition of extrinsic fraud from Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:

    For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated. It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy.

    Celerina alleged that Ricardo made false statements about her residence and absence, depriving her of notice and the opportunity to contest the petition. She also claimed the court lacked jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office were not furnished copies of the petition. These allegations, the Supreme Court noted, constituted sufficient grounds for annulment of judgment. Furthermore, the Court observed that Celerina’s petition was filed within the prescriptive period for extrinsic fraud, and no other sufficient remedy was available to her at the time she discovered the fraud.

    The Supreme Court distinguished between the remedy of filing an affidavit of reappearance and the action for annulment of judgment, highlighting their differing implications. **Article 42 of the Family Code** provides that a subsequent marriage is automatically terminated by the recording of an affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless the previous marriage has been annulled or declared void ab initio. However, the Court noted that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to conditions, including the absence of a prior annulment, the recording of the affidavit, and due notice to the subsequent spouses. The Court clarified that reappearance does not always immediately terminate the subsequent marriage.

    The Court also highlighted that choosing the correct remedy is crucial for determining the status of the second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who acted in bad faith. A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the necessary **well-founded belief** that the spouse is dead. Such a marriage is considered bigamous and void. The Supreme Court cited **Article 35(4) of the Family Code**, which addresses the prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage. If Ricardo acted in bad faith, his subsequent marriage would be void for being bigamous, as it would lack the element of well-founded belief required under Article 41 of the Family Code.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that the reappearance provision in the Family Code does not preclude the spouse declared presumptively dead from pursuing other legal remedies. The Court recognized that a subsequent marriage can also be terminated by filing a court action to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. Celerina did not admit to being absent and sought not only the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. The Court acknowledged that a mere affidavit of reappearance would be insufficient to nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, particularly concerning the legitimacy of children and potential bigamy charges.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that while an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify its effects, only the husband or wife can file such a petition. This limitation meant that even though Celerina was a real party in interest, this remedy was not available to her. Therefore, to terminate the subsequent marriage and nullify the effects of the declaration of presumptive death, Celerina’s choice to file an action for annulment of judgment was appropriate.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition for annulment of judgment, which she filed after being declared presumptively dead based on her husband’s allegedly fraudulent claims.
    What is the proper remedy for a fraudulently obtained declaration of presumptive death? The Supreme Court clarified that the proper remedy is an action for annulment of judgment, not simply filing an affidavit of reappearance, especially when the person declared presumptively dead was never actually absent.
    What is extrinsic fraud in the context of annulment of judgment? Extrinsic fraud involves acts outside the trial that prevent a party from having a fair opportunity to present their case, such as concealing the true residence of a spouse to prevent them from receiving notice of the proceedings.
    What is the significance of Article 42 of the Family Code in this case? Article 42 provides for the termination of a subsequent marriage through an affidavit of reappearance, but the Court clarified that this remedy is insufficient when the declaration of presumptive death was obtained fraudulently.
    What is the effect of a subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith? A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the necessary well-founded belief that the spouse is dead and is considered bigamous and void.
    Why was an affidavit of reappearance deemed insufficient in this case? An affidavit of reappearance only terminates the subsequent marriage but does not nullify the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, particularly concerning the legitimacy of children.
    What other remedies are available to a spouse declared presumptively dead? Besides filing an affidavit of reappearance, a spouse declared presumptively dead can file a court action to prove their reappearance and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.
    What happens to the children of a subsequent marriage if the first spouse reappears? If the subsequent marriage is terminated due to the reappearance of the first spouse, the children conceived prior to its termination are still considered legitimate, according to Article 43 of the Family Code.

    The Supreme Court’s decision clarifies the appropriate legal avenues for those wrongfully declared presumptively dead, ensuring that their rights are protected against fraudulent actions. By emphasizing the importance of annulment of judgment in cases of extrinsic fraud, the Court reinforces the integrity of judicial proceedings and the sanctity of marriage.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: CELERINA J. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. RICARDO T. SANTOS, RESPONDENT., G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014

  • Presumption of Death Under the Civil Code: No Court Declaration Needed for Subsequent Marriage Validity

    The Supreme Court, in Valdez v. Republic, clarified that under the Civil Code, no separate court declaration is needed for the presumption of death to arise after a spouse has been absent for seven years. This means that if a person remarries after their spouse has been absent for this period, the subsequent marriage is valid, regardless of a court declaration. The court emphasized that the Family Code’s stricter ‘well-founded belief’ requirement does not retroactively invalidate marriages celebrated under the Civil Code. This decision protects the validity of second marriages entered into under the presumption of death established by the Civil Code, ensuring legal certainty for those who relied on these provisions before the Family Code took effect.

    Love After Loss: When Does Absence Make the Heart (and the Law) Grow Fonder?

    Angelita Valdez married Sofio Polborosa in 1971, but he left her in 1972. After a brief reappearance in 1975, he vanished again. Believing him dead, Angelita married Virgilio Reyes in 1985. However, Virgilio’s naturalization application in the U.S. was denied because Angelita’s marriage to Sofio was deemed still valid. This prompted Angelita to seek a declaration of Sofio’s presumptive death. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed her petition, stating that she failed to prove a ‘well-founded belief’ that Sofio was dead, as required by the Family Code. This case raises a crucial question: Which law applies—the Civil Code or the Family Code—when determining the validity of a second marriage after the prolonged absence of the first spouse?

    The Supreme Court addressed a procedural issue first, noting that the appeal involved a pure question of law—the correct application of legal principles to undisputed facts. The court emphasized that the RTC erred in applying the Family Code, specifically Article 41, which requires a ‘well-founded belief’ of the absent spouse’s death before a subsequent marriage can be considered valid. The court highlighted that Angelita’s marriages to both Sofio and Virgilio occurred under the Civil Code, making its provisions the governing legal framework. Article 83 of the Civil Code states:

    Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

    (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

    (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

    Building on this principle, the Court referred to Article 390 of the Civil Code, which establishes a presumption of death after an absence of seven years, regardless of whether the absentee is known to be alive. This presumption, however, is not absolute and is subject to certain exceptions, particularly concerning succession rights. Article 390 of the Civil Code states:

    Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

    The Supreme Court also cited previous cases to support its interpretation. In Jones v. Hortigüela, the Court clarified that for civil marriage purposes, a judicial declaration of absence is unnecessary. It is sufficient that the former spouse has been absent for seven years, the present spouse has no knowledge of the former spouse being alive, the former spouse is generally reputed to be dead, and the present spouse believes so at the time of the second marriage. The presumption of death arises by operation of law, eliminating the need for a separate court proceeding to declare it.

    This approach contrasts with the Family Code’s requirement of a ‘well-founded belief,’ which necessitates diligent efforts to locate the missing spouse. However, since Angelita’s second marriage occurred before the Family Code’s enactment, this stricter standard does not apply. The Court emphasized that applying the Family Code retroactively would prejudice vested rights, violating Article 256, which states that the Code should not impair rights acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.

    To further clarify the matter, the Court cited In re Szatraw, which held that a petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death is unnecessary and unauthorized by law when the presumption arises from the Civil Code’s provisions. The Supreme Court also reiterated this ruling in Lukban v. Republic and Gue v. Republic, emphasizing that a court declaration is superfluous since the presumption of death is already established by law after the required period of absence. Therefore, because Sofio had been absent for more than seven years by 1985, the law presumes he was already dead at the time of Angelita’s second marriage.

    Given this legal framework, the Court concluded that Angelita was capacitated to marry Virgilio in 1985, and their marriage is valid under the Civil Code. The Court acknowledged that the Family Code, enacted in 1988, cannot retroactively invalidate a marriage that was validly contracted under the Civil Code. Therefore, while the petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death was denied, the Court explicitly affirmed the validity of Angelita’s marriage to Virgilio. The Supreme Court addressed a procedural issue first, noting that the appeal involved a pure question of law—the correct application of legal principles to undisputed facts.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The main issue was whether the Family Code’s ‘well-founded belief’ requirement for presumptive death should apply retroactively to a marriage celebrated under the Civil Code.
    What is the ‘well-founded belief’ requirement? It’s a provision in the Family Code requiring a spouse to conduct diligent inquiries to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse before remarrying.
    When does the presumption of death arise under the Civil Code? Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death arises after the absent spouse has been missing for seven consecutive years.
    Does the Civil Code require a court declaration for the presumption of death? No, the Civil Code does not require a separate court declaration for the presumption of death to arise after the seven-year period.
    How did the court apply the laws in this case? The court applied the Civil Code because Angelita’s marriage to Virgilio occurred before the Family Code took effect, thus, the provisions of the Civil Code governs the issue.
    What did the court decide about Angelita’s second marriage? The court declared that Angelita was capacitated to marry Virgilio in 1985, and their marriage is valid under the Civil Code, stating Sofio was already presumed dead at that point.
    Why didn’t the Family Code apply in this case? The Family Code did not apply retroactively because it would prejudice the vested rights Angelita acquired under the Civil Code when she remarried.
    What is the significance of Article 256 of the Family Code? Article 256 provides that the Family Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Valdez v. Republic reinforces the principle that laws should not be applied retroactively to impair vested rights. It protects the validity of marriages entered into under the presumption of death established by the Civil Code, ensuring legal certainty for individuals who relied on these provisions before the enactment of the Family Code.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Valdez v. Republic, G.R. No. 180863, September 08, 2009