ASG Law

Tag: Tenancy Rights

  • Agrarian Dispute vs. Qualified Theft: Navigating Jurisdiction in Philippine Law

    When Tenancy Rights Trump Criminal Charges: Understanding Agrarian Jurisdiction

    ROBERTO BACAR, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VICENTE TAN, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. No. 226098, August 23, 2023] VICENTE TAN, PETITIONER, VS. MICHAEL MERCADO, RESPONDENT.

    Imagine a farmer accused of stealing crops from the land he tills. Seems like a straightforward theft case, right? But what if that farmer is a tenant, with rights to the harvest? This scenario highlights a critical intersection of criminal law and agrarian reform in the Philippines, specifically, the question of jurisdiction when a criminal case involves a potential agrarian dispute. The Supreme Court, in the consolidated cases of Bacar v. People and Tan v. Mercado, grappled with this very issue, ultimately clarifying the process for determining jurisdiction when tenancy rights clash with criminal charges of qualified theft.

    The central legal question was whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction to hear qualified theft cases against Roberto Bacar and Michael Mercado, given a prior Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) decision declaring them tenants of the land owned by Vicente Tan. This decision ultimately hinged on interpreting Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, as amended by R.A. No. 9700, and its impact on the jurisdiction of regular courts in cases involving agrarian disputes.

    The Interplay of Criminal Law and Agrarian Reform

    Philippine law recognizes the importance of agrarian reform, aiming to protect the rights of farmers and tenants. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), or R.A. No. 6657, as amended, grants the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. This jurisdiction is further emphasized by Section 50-A of the law, which states:

    “No court or prosecutor’s office shall take cognizance of cases pertaining to the implementation of the CARP… If there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR…”

    This provision mandates an automatic referral to the DAR if the case involves CARP implementation or is agrarian in nature with a farmer, farmworker, or tenant involved. An “agrarian dispute” is defined broadly as any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, land use, or compensation under agrarian laws. However, regular courts, like the Regional Trial Courts, generally have jurisdiction over criminal offenses like theft, as defined in the Revised Penal Code. Article 310 defines Qualified Theft as theft committed with grave abuse of confidence, among other circumstances. The challenge arises when an act of theft occurs within the context of a landlord-tenant relationship, potentially triggering the DAR’s jurisdiction.

    The Tale of Two Cases: Bacar and Mercado

    The story begins with Roberto Bacar and Michael Mercado, who filed a petition with the DARAB seeking recognition of their tenancy status on Vicente Tan’s land. While that case was ongoing, Tan filed separate criminal charges of qualified theft against Bacar and Mercado, alleging they stole copra (dried coconut) from his plantation.

    Here’s a breakdown of the procedural journey:

    • DARAB Decision: The DARAB ruled in favor of Bacar and Mercado, declaring them tenants of Tan’s land.
    • Motions to Quash: Based on the DARAB decision, Bacar and Mercado filed Motions to Quash the criminal informations, arguing the RTC lacked jurisdiction due to the agrarian nature of the dispute.
    • RTC Denials: The RTC denied the motions, asserting jurisdiction over the qualified theft cases.
    • CA Divergence: The Court of Appeals (CA) issued conflicting decisions. In Bacar’s case, it affirmed the RTC’s denial. However, in Mercado’s case, it ordered the RTC to refer the case to the DARAB.
    • Supreme Court Review: Both Bacar and Tan appealed to the Supreme Court, leading to the consolidated cases.

    The Supreme Court emphasized the mandatory referral rule under Section 50-A, stating that “[i]f there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR.”

    The Court also highlighted the purpose of this referral mechanism, quoting the case of Ligtas v. People, stating that “[t]enants having rights to the harvest cannot be deemed to have taken their own produce.”

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided to acquit both Bacar and Mercado. The Court reasoned that the DARAB’s prior determination of tenancy created a prima facie presumption that the cases involved an agrarian dispute. The Court found that a referral to the DAR in this case would be redundant. The Court held that the established tenancy relationship negated the element of taking without the owner’s consent, essential for a qualified theft conviction.

    Key Implications of the Ruling

    This case clarifies the interplay between criminal jurisdiction and agrarian reform laws. It reinforces the mandatory referral rule when an agrarian dispute is alleged and a tenancy relationship exists. The ruling underscores the importance of the DARAB’s findings in influencing criminal proceedings related to land disputes.

    Key Lessons:

    • Automatic Referral: Judges and prosecutors must automatically refer cases to the DAR when an agrarian dispute is alleged and a party is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.
    • DARAB Findings: DARAB decisions on tenancy have significant implications, potentially negating elements of crimes like theft.
    • Procedural Compliance: Strict adherence to the referral procedure outlined in R.A. No. 6657, as amended, is crucial to avoid unnecessary litigation.

    Hypothetical Example: Imagine a sugarcane farmer is charged with malicious mischief for allegedly damaging a fence on the land he farms. If the farmer claims to be a tenant and alleges the fence was damaged during normal farming operations, the court must refer the case to the DAR for a determination of whether an agrarian dispute exists. If the DAR determines the farmer is a tenant and the damage arose from the tenancy relationship, the court may lack jurisdiction over the malicious mischief charge.

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Q: What happens if a court fails to refer a case to the DAR when it should?

    A: If a court fails to refer a case that involves an agrarian dispute to the DAR, its proceedings may be considered void for lack of jurisdiction.

    Q: Does a DAR certification automatically mean the court loses jurisdiction?

    A: No. While the DAR’s certification is persuasive, the court still has the final say on the issue of jurisdiction. The court must review the DAR’s findings and determine if they are supported by evidence.

    Q: What if the DARAB decision is still pending appeal?

    A: Even if a DARAB decision is pending appeal, it can still serve as a basis for alleging an agrarian dispute and triggering the mandatory referral rule.

    Q: What types of cases are considered agrarian disputes?

    A: Agrarian disputes encompass a wide range of issues related to tenurial arrangements, land use, and compensation under agrarian laws. This can include disputes over lease rentals, illegal ejectment, and the right to possess and cultivate agricultural land.

    Q: Can a landowner file criminal charges against a tenant?

    A: Yes, but the court must first determine if the charges arise from an agrarian dispute. If so, the case must be referred to the DAR.

    ASG Law specializes in agrarian law and litigation. Contact us or email hello@asglawpartners.com to schedule a consultation.

  • Tenant Rights vs. Landowner Control: Clarifying Agrarian Dispute Jurisdiction in the Philippines

    The Supreme Court ruled that while lower courts must refer cases involving potential agrarian disputes to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for initial assessment, they cannot blindly accept the DAR’s findings without independent evaluation. This means landowners can challenge questionable DAR certifications and reclaim jurisdiction over their properties if there’s insufficient evidence of a genuine tenancy relationship. This ensures fairness and prevents abuse of the referral process, especially in ejectment cases.

    Navigating the Tenancy Trap: When Ejectment Becomes an Agrarian Tug-of-War

    The case of Antonio R. Cruz and Loreto Teresita Cruz-Dimayacyac vs. Carling Cervantes and Celia Cervantes Santos highlights a common legal battle: a landowner seeking to evict occupants, only to be met with claims of agricultural tenancy, which, if proven, would shift jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The crux of the issue lies in determining whether a genuine agrarian dispute exists, requiring a delicate balance between respecting the DAR’s expertise and safeguarding the rights of property owners.

    The factual backdrop involves petitioners, heirs of Spouses Cruz, seeking to eject the respondents from a portion of their land. Respondents claimed to be agricultural tenants, having succeeded their father, who was allegedly a tenant of the Spouses Cruz. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC), based on a certification from the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO), dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, deferring to the DARAB. This decision was affirmed by both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the Supreme Court reversed these rulings, emphasizing that while the MTC correctly referred the case to the PARO, it erred in blindly accepting the PARO’s certification without conducting its own assessment of the evidence.

    The legal framework rests on Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) as amended by Republic Act No. 9700, particularly Section 50-A, which mandates the referral of cases to the DAR if there’s an allegation of an agrarian dispute and one party is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant. However, as clarified in Chailese Development Co., Inc. v. Dizon, the mere allegation is insufficient; there must be proof to substantiate the claim of being a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.

    This leads to the critical question: what constitutes sufficient proof? The Supreme Court elucidated that it requires specific and clear allegations showing the indispensable elements of tenancy, supported by documents that, on their face, tend to show that such a tenancy relationship exists. These elements, derived from established jurisprudence, are:

    • The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
    • The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
    • There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
    • The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
    • There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
    • The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

    Crucially, the absence of even one element negates the existence of a tenancy relationship. In this case, the respondents presented a tally sheet and a handwritten receipt as proof of their tenancy. However, these documents lacked the signatures or acknowledgment of the landowners, Spouses Cruz, failing to demonstrate the crucial element of consent. Moreover, as the Court pointed out, even the receipt of produce by a landowner, without an agreed system of sharing, does not automatically create a tenancy relationship. This reflects the high court’s acknowledgement of landowners’ property rights and the need for concrete evidence before these are impaired by alleged tenancy agreements.

    The Supreme Court also underscored the procedural requirements outlined in DAR Administrative Order No. 03-11, which mandates the PARO to conduct a summary investigation, ascertain the relevant facts, and issue a certification stating the findings of fact upon which the determination is based. In this case, the PARO’s certification failed to meet this standard, providing only a conclusory statement without detailing the evidence or reasoning behind its determination. This deficiency, according to the Supreme Court, rendered the certification unreliable and insufficient to justify the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case.

    The Court emphasized that while it accords great respect to the factual findings of administrative agencies, it will not hesitate to disregard such findings when they are not supported by substantial evidence or when the agency has misappreciated the evidence. As Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe pointed out, the documents presented by the respondents did not satisfactorily show that Spouses Cruz consented to the alleged tenancy relationship or agreed to share in the harvests. Occupancy and cultivation alone, no matter how long, do not automatically create a tenancy relationship. The court reiterated the importance of independent and concrete evidence to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent of the landowner. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the CA’s decision and remanded the case to the MTC for further proceedings, holding that the respondents failed to discharge their burden of proving the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship. The Supreme Court’s discussion is not without legal bases; as pointed out, the quasi-judicial determination can always be reviewed by the courts.

    This ruling carries significant implications for landowners facing similar situations. It clarifies that the referral of a case to the DAR does not automatically divest the regular courts of jurisdiction. Landowners have the right to challenge the DAR’s certification and present evidence to demonstrate the absence of a genuine tenancy relationship. This safeguards their property rights and ensures that cases are decided based on credible evidence, rather than unsubstantiated claims. Furthermore, the decision underscores the importance of complying with the procedural requirements outlined in DAR Administrative Order No. 03-11, ensuring that the PARO’s determination is based on a thorough investigation and supported by factual findings.

    Ultimately, the case of Cruz v. Cervantes serves as a reminder that while the agrarian reform program aims to protect the rights of farmers and tenants, it cannot be used to unjustly deprive landowners of their property rights. A delicate balance must be struck, requiring careful consideration of the evidence and adherence to established legal principles. Landowners facing ejectment cases should be proactive in challenging unsubstantiated claims of tenancy and ensuring that the DAR’s determination is based on a thorough and impartial investigation. This ultimately safeguards the integrity of the judicial process and protects the rights of all parties involved.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the MTC correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case based solely on the PARO’s certification that the case involved an agrarian dispute, thus falling under the DARAB’s jurisdiction.
    What is an agrarian dispute? An agrarian dispute is a controversy relating to tenurial arrangements over agricultural lands, including disputes concerning farmworkers, tenants, and the terms of their agreements. It involves issues like leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, and the transfer of ownership from landowners to agrarian reform beneficiaries.
    What are the key elements of a tenancy relationship? The key elements are: (1) landowner and tenant, (2) agricultural land, (3) consent, (4) agricultural production purpose, (5) personal cultivation, and (6) sharing of harvest. All these elements must be present to establish a valid tenancy relationship.
    What is the role of the PARO in determining agrarian disputes? The PARO conducts a summary investigation to determine whether a case involves an agrarian dispute and issues a certification based on its findings. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that the PARO’s certification is not conclusive and is subject to judicial review.
    What kind of evidence is needed to prove a tenancy relationship? Beyond mere allegations, there must be specific evidence showing the elements of tenancy, such as a written agreement, proof of sharing harvests, and the landowner’s consent. Unauthenticated documents or mere occupancy are insufficient.
    What happens if the PARO certification is flawed? If the PARO certification fails to comply with procedural requirements or is not based on substantial evidence, the courts are not bound by it and can make their own determination regarding jurisdiction. The referring courts are duty-bound to independently assess the DAR’s recommendation in light of the evidence presented during the summary investigation.
    Can a landowner challenge a DAR certification? Yes, a landowner can challenge a DAR certification by presenting evidence to demonstrate the absence of a genuine tenancy relationship. The judicial recourse is expressly granted to any aggrieved party under Section 50-A.
    What is the practical implication of this ruling for landowners? This ruling safeguards landowners’ property rights by ensuring that unsubstantiated claims of tenancy cannot automatically divest the regular courts of jurisdiction. It allows them to challenge flawed DAR certifications and reclaim jurisdiction over their properties.

    This case clarifies the balance between agrarian reform and property rights, ensuring that claims of tenancy are backed by solid evidence and procedural fairness. This decision offers landowners a pathway to contest questionable DAR certifications, thus ensuring their rights are properly protected.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: ANTONIO R. CRUZ AND LORETO TERESITA CRUZ-DIMAYACYAC v. CARLING CERVANTES, G.R. No. 244433, April 19, 2022

  • Zoning Regulations Prevail: How Land Reclassification Impacts Agrarian Reform Coverage in the Philippines

    This Supreme Court decision clarifies that land reclassified for industrial use by local governments before the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) took effect is exempt from agrarian reform coverage, provided the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) ratified the reclassification. Occupants claiming tenancy rights must prove their rights existed before the land was reclassified. This ruling reinforces the authority of local zoning ordinances and provides certainty for landowners regarding land use exemptions.

    From Farms to Factories: Zoning Laws and Land Reform Clash in Laguna

    This case revolves around a dispute over a two-hectare property in Barangay Makiling, Calamba, Laguna, owned by Asia United Bank (AUB), as successor-in-interest of Asia Trust Development Bank. AUB sought to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), arguing it had been reclassified as an industrial zone prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, the CARP law. Renato Tañon and Pio Candelaria, claiming to be tenants, opposed the exemption, asserting their rights as agricultural land occupants.

    The central legal question is whether the land’s reclassification as industrial by the local government, ratified by HLURB before June 15, 1988, effectively exempts it from CARP coverage, overriding the claims of alleged tenants. To understand this, it’s crucial to delve into the history of land use regulation and agrarian reform in the Philippines.

    Prior to CARP, local government units (LGUs) possessed the authority to reclassify land use through zoning ordinances, a power derived from their police power. As the Supreme Court articulated in Heirs of Luna v. Afable:

    It is clear from the last clause of the afore-quoted provision that a land is not agricultural, and therefore, outside the ambit of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program] if the following conditions concur[, namely,]:

    1. the land has been classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as residential, commercial[,] or industrial; and

    2. the town plan and zoning ordinance embodying the land classification has been approved by the [Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board] or its predecessor agency prior to 15 June 1988.

    Building on this principle, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, clarified that lands classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before June 15, 1988, no longer required conversion clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). This opinion serves as a cornerstone in determining land use exemptions under CARP.

    In this case, AUB presented a certification from HLURB stating that the land was classified as within the “industrial zone” through Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 63, series of 1980, dated September 3, 1980, and ratified by HLURB under Resolution No. 28 dated October 27, 1981. This certification became a pivotal piece of evidence.

    Petitioners, however, argued that the HLURB certification and the zoning ordinance lacked a categorical statement reclassifying the land from agricultural to industrial. They also claimed to be tenants, asserting that the land was devoted to agricultural use, as evidenced by fruit-bearing trees and cash crops.

    The Supreme Court, however, sided with AUB, emphasizing the presumption of regularity enjoyed by the HLURB certification. The Court also underscored the consistent findings of the DAR Secretary, the Office of the President, and the Court of Appeals, all affirming the land’s industrial classification. The Court emphasized its reluctance to interfere with the factual findings of administrative agencies acting within their area of expertise.

    Central to the Court’s reasoning was the principle that zoning ordinances are an exercise of police power, allowing LGUs to regulate land use for the benefit of their residents. As such, these ordinances carry legal weight and can determine the scope of CARP coverage. The Supreme Court stated that when local government units approve an ordinance delineating an area or district in their cities/municipalities as residential, commercial, or industrial zone … [,] they are, at the same time, reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for non-agricultural use.”

    The Court also addressed the petitioners’ claim of tenancy rights. To establish agricultural tenancy, the following elements must be proven:

    (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
    (2) the subject matter is agricultural land;
    (3) there is consent between the parties;
    (4) the purpose is agricultural production;
    (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and
    (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties.

    The Court found no substantial evidence to support the existence of a tenancy relationship between the petitioners and AUB or its predecessor. The petitioners failed to demonstrate that they had been tilling the land prior to its reclassification in 1981. Thus, their claim of vested tenancy rights was unsubstantiated.

    Addressing the due process argument raised by the petitioners, the Court clarified that an application for exemption from CARP coverage is non-adversarial. While notice is required, it is primarily aimed at informing potential oppositors and providing them an opportunity to be heard. The Court determined that the petitioners had, in fact, been afforded due process, having actively participated in the administrative proceedings and raised their concerns before various tribunals.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the land in question was exempt from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) due to its reclassification as an industrial zone before the enactment of CARP law. The court needed to determine if the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board’s (HLURB) ratification of the zoning ordinance effectively exempted the land.
    What is the significance of the HLURB certification? The HLURB certification serves as critical evidence demonstrating that the land had been classified for non-agricultural use prior to the effectivity of CARP. It carries a presumption of regularity, and absent contrary evidence, is binding on the courts.
    What are the requirements to prove agricultural tenancy? To prove agricultural tenancy, the claimant must establish the existence of a landowner-tenant relationship, agricultural land as the subject matter, consent between the parties, agricultural production as the purpose, personal cultivation by the tenant, and sharing of harvests between the parties. All elements must be proven by substantial evidence.
    What is the role of zoning ordinances in CARP exemption? Zoning ordinances, enacted by local government units, play a significant role in determining CARP exemption. If a land has been reclassified for non-agricultural use through a zoning ordinance ratified by the HLURB before June 15, 1988, it is generally exempt from CARP coverage.
    What is the meaning of police power in this context? Police power refers to the inherent authority of the state to enact laws and regulations to promote public health, safety, morals, and welfare. Zoning ordinances are an exercise of police power, allowing LGUs to regulate land use within their jurisdictions.
    Does reclassification automatically extinguish tenancy rights? Reclassification of land does not automatically extinguish existing, vested tenancy rights. If tenants can prove they had valid tenancy rights before the land was reclassified, those rights may be protected, even if the land is now classified for non-agricultural use.
    What is the importance of DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990? DOJ Opinion No. 44 clarifies that lands classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before June 15, 1988, do not require conversion clearance from the DAR. This opinion provides a clear guideline for determining land use exemptions under CARP.
    What constitutes due process in CARP exemption applications? Due process in CARP exemption applications requires that interested parties be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. While a full-blown adversarial hearing is not required, parties must be allowed to present their arguments and evidence for consideration.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in this case affirms the primacy of local zoning ordinances ratified before the effectivity of CARP. It provides landowners with clarity regarding land use exemptions, while also underscoring the importance of protecting vested tenancy rights established prior to land reclassification. This ruling serves as a reminder that while agrarian reform aims to distribute land to landless farmers, it must also respect the existing legal framework governing land use and property rights.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Renato Tañon and Pio Candelaria vs. Asia United Bank, G.R. No. 226852, June 30, 2021

  • Land Reclassification and Agrarian Reform: Zoning Ordinances Prevail Over CARP Coverage

    In a dispute over land use, the Supreme Court affirmed that a local government unit’s reclassification of land use through a zoning ordinance, if ratified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) took effect, exempts the land from CARP coverage. This ruling emphasizes the importance of adhering to established land classifications and respecting the authority of local governments in managing land use within their jurisdictions. Occupants claiming tenancy rights must prove they held those rights before the zoning ordinance’s enactment to contest the exemption.

    From Fields to Factories: How a Zoning Decision Shaped Land Reform

    The case of Renato Tañon and Pio Candelaria vs. Asia United Bank revolves around a two-hectare property in Barangay Makiling, Calamba, Laguna, owned by Asia United Bank (AUB). AUB sought to exempt the property from CARP coverage, presenting a certification from the HLURB stating the land was classified as an industrial zone. This certification referenced a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution from 1980, ratified by the HLURB in 1981, well before CARP’s enactment in 1988. Tañon and Candelaria, claiming to be tenants, protested the exemption, arguing that the land was agricultural and devoted to agricultural use.

    The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) initially granted AUB’s application, a decision upheld by the Office of the President and eventually by the Court of Appeals. The central legal question was whether the HLURB’s certification and the zoning ordinance were sufficient to exempt the land from CARP, overriding the tenants’ claims. Petitioners argued that they were denied due process and that the land was agricultural and devoted exclusively to agricultural use as shown by the presence of fruit-bearing trees and cash crops on the property. They further claimed that the DAR secretary committed grave abuse of discretion when they disregarded the finding of the municipal agrarian reform officer regarding the presence of agricultural activity in the landholding.

    The Supreme Court, in denying the petition, underscored the principle that local governments have the authority to reclassify land use through zoning ordinances. This authority, derived from police power, allows local legislatures to define land use within their jurisdictions. The court cited Heirs of Luna v. Afable, emphasizing that a land is considered non-agricultural and outside CARP’s scope if it has been classified as residential, commercial, or industrial in town plans approved by the HLURB before June 15, 1988.

    Crucially, the Court noted that the reclassification of agricultural land for non-agricultural use before June 15, 1988, does not require DAR approval. The Department of Justice’s Opinion No. 44, s. 1990, reinforces this, stating that lands classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before this date no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR. This legal framework clarifies the timeline and the respective authorities involved in land reclassification.

    The Court addressed the issue of whether the petitioners were denied due process. The Court elucidated that an application for exemption is non-adversarial and non-litigious, which means that the occupants of the landholding are not required to be notified of a pending application for exemption. The Court found that the respondent had complied with the public notice requirement, as the bank had erected and posted within the subject lots two billboards “notifying all concerned that an application for exemption from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program had been filed over the said lands.”

    The Court then turned to the claim of tenancy rights. The Supreme Court emphasized that proving tenancy requires substantial evidence demonstrating a landlord-tenant relationship, agricultural land as the subject, consent between parties, agricultural production as the purpose, personal cultivation by the tenant, and a sharing of harvests. The Court found no evidence supporting these elements in this case.

    “The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands…” However, this coverage is not absolute. The Court weighed the reclassification against the tenants’ rights, if any existed prior to the said reclassification. In this regard, the court held that a zoning ordinance cannot affect agricultural lease in landholdings constituted on lands within the reclassified zone.

    The practical implication of this ruling is significant. It reinforces the validity of land reclassifications made by local governments before CARP’s implementation. It clarifies the requirements for claiming exemption from CARP coverage and the burden of proof on those asserting tenancy rights. It also serves as a reminder for potential land occupants to check the official classification of lands. This case also serves as a guidepost for landowners and agrarian reform beneficiaries alike.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the land in question was exempt from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) due to its reclassification as industrial land before CARP’s enactment. This hinged on the validity of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board’s (HLURB) certification and the local zoning ordinance.
    What is the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)? CARP is a Philippine law that aims to redistribute private and public agricultural lands to landless farmers and farmworkers. It seeks to promote social justice and equitable land ownership in the country.
    What role does the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) play in land classification? The HLURB approves local government zoning ordinances and land use plans. Its certifications regarding land classification are considered authoritative, especially when made before the enactment of CARP, and hold significant legal weight.
    What is the significance of June 15, 1988, in relation to CARP? June 15, 1988, is the date when the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law took effect. Land reclassifications made before this date are generally recognized as valid exemptions from CARP coverage, as stated in this case.
    What must tenants prove to claim rights over land reclassified before CARP? Tenants must provide substantial evidence that they had vested tenancy rights before the land was reclassified as non-agricultural. This includes proof of a landlord-tenant relationship, agricultural activity, and a sharing of harvests.
    What is the effect of a zoning ordinance on agricultural land? A valid zoning ordinance can reclassify agricultural land for non-agricultural uses like industrial, commercial, or residential. If approved by the HLURB before CARP, this reclassification can exempt the land from CARP coverage.
    What does due process mean in the context of CARP exemption applications? Due process in this context means providing a fair and reasonable opportunity for concerned parties to be heard and present their arguments. This includes proper notification and the chance to participate in administrative proceedings.
    Is an application for exemption adversarial in nature? No, an application for exemption is non-adversarial and non-litigious in nature. Hence, the occupants of the landholding are not required to be notified of a pending application for exemption.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of adhering to land classifications established by local governments and ratified by the HLURB. While CARP aims to redistribute agricultural land, it respects prior land reclassifications and the existing rights of landowners. The ruling serves as a critical precedent for resolving land disputes involving agrarian reform and zoning ordinances.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Tañon vs. Asia United Bank, G.R. No. 226852, June 30, 2021

  • Understanding Res Judicata: When Final Judgments Don’t Bar New Claims

    Key Takeaway: The Limitations of Res Judicata in Enforcing Compromise Agreements

    Heirs of Salvador and Salvacion Lamirez v. Spouses Ahmed Ampatuan and Cerila R. Ampatuan, G.R. No. 226043, February 03, 2020

    In the heart of rural Philippines, a decades-long land dispute between two families reached a critical juncture, highlighting the complexities of agrarian reform and the legal doctrine of res judicata. Imagine a family, tilling the same land for generations, suddenly facing the threat of displacement due to a legal agreement gone awry. This is the story of the Lamirez and Ampatuan families, whose struggle over land ownership and the enforcement of a compromise agreement led to a pivotal Supreme Court decision. The central question was whether a prior judgment on a related issue could bar the Lamirezes from seeking enforcement of the agreement.

    Legal Context: Res Judicata and Agrarian Reform

    Res judicata, a Latin term meaning “a matter already judged,” is a legal principle that prevents the same parties from relitigating an issue that has been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. It aims to promote finality in litigation and prevent endless legal battles over the same matter. In the Philippines, this doctrine is enshrined in Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, which states that a judgment or final order is conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest regarding matters directly adjudged or related thereto.

    In the context of agrarian reform, disputes often arise over land ownership and tenant rights. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), established by Republic Act No. 6657, aims to redistribute land to landless farmers. However, the process can be fraught with legal challenges, especially when compromise agreements are involved. These agreements, meant to settle disputes amicably, must be carefully crafted and adhered to, as failure to do so can lead to further litigation.

    The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) plays a crucial role in resolving agrarian disputes. However, its jurisdiction is limited to cases involving agricultural tenancy and related issues. For instance, DARAB’s 2003 Rules of Procedure specify that it has jurisdiction over cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of agricultural lands covered by CARP.

    Case Breakdown: The Lamirez-Ampatuan Dispute

    The Lamirez and Ampatuan families’ dispute over a piece of land in Sultan Kudarat began in 1981. After years of contention, they reached a compromise agreement in 1996, stipulating that the disputed property would be titled in the Ampatuans’ names, but subsequently offered for sale to the government under CARP, with the Lamirezes as beneficiaries.

    Despite this agreement, the Ampatuans filed a case for recovery of possession and back rentals against the Lamirezes, alleging non-payment of rent. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) ruled in favor of the Ampatuans, ordering the Lamirezes to vacate the land. This decision was upheld by the DARAB and the Court of Appeals, leading to an entry of judgment in 2010.

    Subsequently, the Lamirezes filed a complaint for specific performance or damages, seeking enforcement of the compromise agreement. The Regional Trial Court dismissed this complaint on the grounds of res judicata, a decision later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

    The Supreme Court, however, reversed these rulings. Justice Leonen emphasized that “res judicata bars a party from raising an issue or matter that has already been decided on with finality.” Yet, he noted that “there can be no res judicata where the issues raised in a subsequent action have never been passed upon in the prior judgment.” The Court found that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the specific performance case, as the property was never subjected to CARP coverage, and thus, the prior judgment could not bar the Lamirezes’ new claim.

    The procedural journey was complex:

    • The dispute began with a claim filed with the Bureau of Lands in 1981.
    • A compromise agreement was reached in 1996, but not fully executed.
    • The Ampatuans filed a recovery of possession case in 2004, which was decided in their favor by the PARAD.
    • The DARAB and Court of Appeals upheld the PARAD’s decision, leading to an entry of judgment in 2010.
    • The Lamirezes filed a new case for specific performance in 2010, which was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals on res judicata grounds.
    • The Supreme Court reversed these decisions in 2020, ruling that res judicata did not apply due to lack of jurisdiction in the prior case.

    Practical Implications: Navigating Compromise Agreements and Res Judicata

    This ruling has significant implications for similar cases involving compromise agreements and agrarian disputes. It underscores that res judicata will not apply if a prior judgment was rendered by a tribunal without jurisdiction over the subject matter. For individuals and businesses involved in such agreements, it is crucial to ensure that all terms are clearly defined and adhered to, as non-compliance can lead to further legal battles.

    Property owners and tenants must understand the jurisdiction of different bodies, such as the DARAB, and ensure that any agreements are enforceable under the relevant legal frameworks. This case also highlights the importance of seeking legal counsel to navigate the complexities of agrarian reform and ensure that rights are protected.

    Key Lessons:

    • Ensure all terms of a compromise agreement are clear and enforceable.
    • Understand the jurisdiction of relevant legal bodies, such as the DARAB, to avoid jurisdictional challenges.
    • Seek legal advice to navigate complex legal issues like agrarian reform and res judicata.

    Frequently Asked Questions

    What is res judicata?
    Res judicata is a legal principle that prevents the same parties from relitigating an issue that has been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, promoting finality in litigation.

    How does res judicata apply to agrarian disputes?
    In agrarian disputes, res judicata can apply if a final judgment has been rendered on the same issue between the same parties. However, it does not apply if the prior judgment was issued by a tribunal without jurisdiction over the subject matter.

    What should be included in a compromise agreement?
    A compromise agreement should clearly define the rights and obligations of all parties, specify the terms of enforcement, and ensure compliance with relevant legal frameworks such as agrarian reform laws.

    Can a compromise agreement be enforced if one party fails to comply?
    Yes, a party can seek enforcement of a compromise agreement through legal action if the other party fails to comply, provided the agreement is valid and enforceable under the law.

    What are the implications of this ruling for property owners and tenants?
    Property owners and tenants must ensure that any compromise agreements are enforceable and comply with relevant legal frameworks. They should also be aware of the jurisdiction of bodies like the DARAB to avoid jurisdictional challenges.

    ASG Law specializes in agrarian reform and property law. Contact us or email hello@asglawpartners.com to schedule a consultation.

  • Succession of Tenancy Rights: Personal Cultivation and Legal Heirs in Agrarian Disputes

    In the Philippines, agricultural leasehold relations are not automatically terminated by the death of a tenant. The Supreme Court clarified that the rights of a tenant, particularly in agricultural land, pass on to their legal heirs, provided the essential elements of tenancy are proven. This ruling emphasizes the importance of personal cultivation and the rights of legal heirs in succeeding to tenancy agreements, offering security to families dependent on agricultural lands.

    Passing the Torch: How Tenancy Rights Transfer to Heirs in Farmlands

    The case of Heirs of Pablito Arellano v. Maria Tolentino revolves around a dispute over a 2.5-hectare agricultural land in Bataan. At the heart of the matter is whether Pablito Arellano, the stepson of the original tenant Timoteo Tolentino, could claim tenancy rights over Maria Tolentino, Timoteo’s widow. The legal question is, did Pablito’s cultivation of the land, with the knowledge of the landowners, create an implied tenancy that superseded Timoteo’s rights, or did Timoteo’s rights pass to his legal heir?

    The central issue hinges on the concept of **personal cultivation** and its implications on tenancy rights. The petitioners argued that Timoteo failed to personally cultivate the land, thus abandoning his rights, which Pablito then assumed by cultivating the land himself and remitting payments to the landowner. This argument stems from the requirement in agrarian law that a tenant must personally cultivate the land to maintain their tenancy. However, the Supreme Court clarified that **personal cultivation** includes cultivation by the tenant or with the assistance of their immediate farm household. This definition is crucial in determining whether a tenant has indeed abandoned their rights.

    The Court referred to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, also known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, to define key terms relevant to the case. According to the Code:

    “Agricultural lessee” means a person who, by himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter’s consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both.”

    “Personal cultivation” means cultivation by the lessee or lessor in person and/or with the aid of labor from within his immediate household.

    “Immediate farm household” means the members of the family of the lessee or lessor and other persons who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him in his activities.

    Building on this principle, the Court emphasized that Pablito’s assistance as Timoteo’s stepson falls within the ambit of “aid from within his immediate household.” This assistance does not negate Timoteo’s role as the lawful tenant, nor does it imply an abandonment of his tenancy rights. This interpretation ensures that tenants who rely on family members for assistance are not penalized or deemed to have relinquished their rights.

    Moreover, the Court found no concrete evidence supporting Pablito’s claim of a direct tenancy agreement with the landowners, the Songcos. The receipts presented as proof of harvest sharing were deemed insufficient to establish a harvest sharing relationship between Pablito and the Songcos. The Court noted that:

    Such receipts cannot sufficiently and persuasively prove that Pablito and the Songcos have a definite sharing arrangement in their supposed tenancy relationship. Neither would such receipts sufficiently prove that the Songcos consented to have a tenancy relationship with Pablito.

    This lack of evidence is critical because establishing a tenancy relationship requires proof of consent from the landowner, personal cultivation by the tenant, and a harvest sharing agreement. In the absence of these elements, Pablito’s claim of an implied tenancy fails. This requirement underscores the need for clear and convincing evidence when asserting tenancy rights, especially in cases involving family members assisting in cultivation.

    This approach contrasts with the DARAB’s earlier decision, which favored Pablito based on his physical cultivation of the land and remittance of rentals. The Supreme Court, however, emphasized that mere physical cultivation does not automatically confer tenancy rights. There must be a clear agreement, either express or implied, between the landowner and the tenant, along with the other essential elements of tenancy. The Supreme Court’s ruling reinforces the necessity of proving all elements of tenancy, preventing claims based solely on physical cultivation.

    The decision also highlights the **security of tenure** afforded to agricultural lessees. An agricultural leasehold relation is not extinguished by the death of either party. Instead, the rights and obligations pass on to the legal heirs. This principle ensures continuity and stability in agricultural tenancies, protecting the livelihoods of families dependent on the land. The Court cited Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844, which states:

    In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within one month from such death or permanent incapacity.

    Given Timoteo’s established tenancy, upon his death, his rights passed to his legal heir, Maria Tolentino, his surviving spouse. This succession is in line with the legal framework designed to protect agricultural lessees and their families. The Court’s decision affirms that the rights of a tenant are not easily disrupted, providing a measure of security and stability for agricultural families.

    The implications of this decision are significant for agrarian law. It clarifies the scope of **personal cultivation**, emphasizing that assistance from immediate family members does not negate the tenant’s rights. It also reaffirms the principle of **security of tenure**, ensuring that tenancy rights are not easily extinguished and can be passed on to legal heirs. This ruling protects the rights of tenants and their families, promoting stability in agricultural leasehold relations.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was determining whether Pablito Arellano could claim tenancy rights over the land, superseding the rights of the original tenant, Timoteo Tolentino, and his legal heir, Maria Tolentino.
    What is the definition of “personal cultivation” according to the Agricultural Land Reform Code? “Personal cultivation” means cultivation by the lessee in person or with the help of labor from their immediate household, such as family members.
    Can a tenant lose their tenancy rights if they allow a family member to help cultivate the land? No, allowing a family member to help cultivate the land does not automatically mean the tenant loses their rights, as long as the family member is part of the tenant’s immediate household.
    What evidence is needed to prove a tenancy relationship? To prove a tenancy relationship, one must show that there is consent from the landowner, personal cultivation by the tenant, and a harvest sharing agreement between the parties.
    What happens to tenancy rights when the tenant dies? Upon the death of the tenant, their tenancy rights are not extinguished but are transferred to their legal heirs, ensuring continuity in the leasehold relation.
    What was the Court’s ruling regarding Pablito Arellano’s claim? The Court ruled against Pablito Arellano, stating that he did not establish a valid tenancy relationship with the landowner and that Timoteo Tolentino’s tenancy rights were rightfully passed to his legal heir, Maria Tolentino.
    How did the Court define “immediate farm household”? The Court defined “immediate farm household” as the members of the family of the lessee or lessor and other persons who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him in his activities.
    What is the significance of security of tenure in this case? Security of tenure ensures that agricultural lessees cannot be easily dispossessed of their landholding, providing stability and protection for their livelihoods.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Heirs of Pablito Arellano v. Maria Tolentino underscores the importance of adhering to the legal definitions of tenancy and personal cultivation in agrarian disputes. This case serves as a reminder of the protections afforded to agricultural tenants and their families, ensuring that their rights are upheld and that the legacy of agricultural leaseholds continues through successive generations.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Heirs of Pablito Arellano, G.R. No. 207152, July 15, 2019

  • Agrarian Reform Beneficiary Rights: Valid CLOA Prevails Over Prior Claims

    The Supreme Court ruled that a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to an agrarian reform beneficiary (ARB) grants them the right to possess the land, superseding prior claims. This means that if the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) awards land to a farmer under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), that farmer’s right to the land is protected, even if there were previous disputes or court decisions about the land’s ownership. This ensures that the goals of agrarian reform—to distribute land to landless farmers—are upheld.

    From Tenant Dispute to Land Ownership: How Agrarian Reform Transformed a Farmer’s Fate

    Vivencio Dalit initially filed a petition to maintain his possession of a land parcel, claiming he was a tenant instituted by the Balagtas family. The land was also subject to a mortgage with Metrobank, which led to foreclosure and disputes over ownership. This case questions whether Dalit, as an alleged tenant, had the right to remain on the land, and further examines how subsequent events, particularly the land’s coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to Dalit, affected the rights of all parties involved.

    The central issue revolved around whether Dalit had established his status as a de jure tenant. This determination would typically require proving that he had been instituted as a tenant, that he personally cultivated the land, and that there was an agreement to share the harvest with the landowner. However, supervening events significantly altered the legal landscape. The land was placed under the coverage of CARP, and a CLOA was issued in Dalit’s favor. This action effectively transferred ownership to Dalit as an agrarian reform beneficiary (ARB), changing the nature of his claim from a tenant’s right to possess to an owner’s right.

    The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL) aims to distribute land equitably, balancing the rights of landowners and the needs of the nation. Republic Act No. 9700 extended the CARP implementation period, emphasizing the government’s commitment to land redistribution. The CARP covers both public and private agricultural lands, highlighting the importance of the land’s classification. In this case, the classification of the Disputed Lot was critical. Tax Declaration No. 02927, presented by the Balagtas family, was deemed invalid. The OCA-Cabanatuan certification confirmed the land’s agricultural nature, reinforcing its eligibility for CARP coverage. This underscored the DAR’s authority in determining land use for agrarian reform purposes.

    “This is to certify that [the] Tax Declaration issued in the name of ROLANDO L. BALAGTAS married to CARMELITA G. BALAGTAS, Rolando G. Balagtas, Jr., single and Clarina Balagtas of Kalikid [S]ur, Cabanatuan City dated November 15, 1996 with ARP no. 02927 should be considered NULL and VOID, because of its nature as being made under bad faith.”

    The Supreme Court recognized the DAR’s expertise in agrarian matters. Administrative bodies’ factual findings are generally respected unless there is evidence of fraud or a lack of substantial evidence. This deference to the DAR’s findings highlights the importance of the agency’s role in implementing agrarian reform. Executive Order No. 229 grants the DAR quasi-judicial powers over agrarian reform matters, reinforcing its exclusive jurisdiction. All doubts are resolved in favor of the DAR, affirming its authority in these cases. The issuance of a CLOA is a key step in land distribution. It confirms the ARB’s ownership and includes the terms of the grant. The issuance of CLOA No. T-2165 in Dalit’s favor affirmed his right to possess the portion of the Disputed Lot specified in the CLOA.

    Moreover, the Court clarified that Dalit’s rights extended only to the portion of the Disputed Lot granted to him under CLOA No. T-2165, ensuring that other ARBs’ rights were also respected. This highlights the importance of adhering to the specific boundaries and terms outlined in the CLOA. A previous legal battle, Civil Case No. 3361-AF, involved a Complaint for Specific Performance filed by the Balagtas family against Metrobank. The Balagtas family sought to reinstate their title, TCT No. T-82410. However, this decision predated the land’s CARP coverage and the issuance of CLOAs. The events following the Decision of the RTC superseded its directives. The indefeasibility of CLOAs is recognized under DAR Administrative Order No. 07-14. CLOAs remain valid unless duly canceled, emphasizing their legal standing.

    “Identified and qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries, based on Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, shall have usufructuary rights over the awarded land as soon as the DAR takes possession of such land, and such right shall not be diminished even pending the awarding of the emancipation patent or the certificate of land ownership award.”

    The Balagtas family’s attempt to lift the land’s coverage under agrarian reform was denied with finality. The Writ of Execution enforcing the RTC’s superseded decision could not override CLOA No. T-2165. As a result, the Supreme Court granted Dalit’s petition, reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision. The ruling underscored the importance of the CLOA in securing Dalit’s rights as an agrarian reform beneficiary. The indefeasibility of CLOAs serves as a cornerstone in agrarian reform, protecting the rights of land recipients against prior claims and ensuring the stability of land ownership under the CARP.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The primary issue was whether Vivencio Dalit, as an alleged tenant, had the right to maintain possession of a land parcel that was later covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), especially after a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) was issued in his favor.
    What is a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)? A CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of land granted to a qualified agrarian reform beneficiary (ARB) under the CARP. It contains the conditions and restrictions of the grant and serves as proof of ownership.
    What is the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)? The CARP is a government program designed to redistribute agricultural lands to landless farmers, promoting social justice and rural development. It aims to provide farmers with ownership and control over the land they cultivate.
    What did the Supreme Court decide in this case? The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Vivencio Dalit, stating that the issuance of the CLOA in his name granted him the right to possess the land, superseding prior claims, including disputes over his status as a tenant.
    Why was the Tax Declaration No. 02927 considered invalid? Tax Declaration No. 02927, which claimed that the land was reclassified for residential use, was deemed null and void because the Office of the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City (OCA-Cabanatuan) certified that it was not in their records and was issued under a forged signature.
    What is the significance of the DAR’s role in this case? The DAR (Department of Agrarian Reform) has quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters. Its findings and decisions are given great weight, especially in the absence of fraud or abuse of authority, which was crucial in determining the land’s eligibility for CARP coverage.
    What happened to the Balagtas family’s claim to the land? The Balagtas family’s claim to the land was superseded by the CARP coverage and the issuance of the CLOA to Dalit. Their petition to lift the coverage of the land under the Agrarian Reform Program was denied with finality.
    How does this case affect other agrarian reform beneficiaries? This case reinforces the rights of agrarian reform beneficiaries, ensuring that their CLOAs are protected against prior claims and disputes. It underscores the government’s commitment to upholding the goals of agrarian reform.
    What was the effect of Civil Case No. 3361-AF on this case? Civil Case No. 3361-AF, which involved a dispute between the Balagtas family and Metrobank, was ultimately deemed irrelevant because the CARP coverage and CLOA issuance occurred after the court’s decision, superseding any prior claims.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in this case clarifies the rights of agrarian reform beneficiaries and reinforces the importance of the CARP in achieving equitable land distribution. By prioritizing the rights of ARBs and upholding the validity of CLOAs, the Court reaffirmed the government’s commitment to social justice and rural development.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Vivencio Dalit v. Spouses Rolando E. Balagtas, Sr., G.R. No. 202799, March 27, 2019

  • Tenancy Rights vs. Co-Ownership: Reconciling Agrarian Justice in Land Disputes

    The Supreme Court clarified that a claim of co-ownership does not automatically negate a claim of tenancy over agricultural land. This means agrarian reform adjudicators must still investigate the facts to protect the rights of potential tenants. The ruling emphasizes the importance of protecting agricultural tenants from unlawful eviction and upholding agrarian reform policies.

    Can a Co-Owner Also Be a Tenant? Unraveling Land Rights in Rural Disputes

    This case, Spouses Avelina Rivera-Nolasco and Eduardo A. Nolasco v. Rural Bank of Pandi, Inc., revolves around a dispute over land rights where the petitioners, the Nolasco spouses, claimed to be tenants on a property that the Rural Bank of Pandi foreclosed. The central legal question is whether the Nolasco spouses’ claim of co-ownership of the land negates their claim of tenancy, thereby stripping the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that the DARAB had no jurisdiction, as ownership and tenancy were mutually exclusive. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, highlighting the importance of a thorough investigation to protect potential tenants’ rights.

    At the heart of the matter lies the jurisdiction of the DARAB. The DARAB, through its adjudicators, has primary and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of agricultural lands covered by agrarian reform laws. This jurisdiction extends to cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of tenants. The Supreme Court emphasized that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of the defenses raised by the opposing party. As the Court explained, the key question is whether the complaint contains sufficient averments to establish the DARAB’s jurisdiction.

    In this case, the Nolasco spouses alleged that Avelina Rivera-Nolasco was the tenant of the subject property, initially as the successor to her father’s tenancy and later through a transfer of tenancy rights from her brother. They further claimed that after the land was transferred to the Rivera children, with the title registered in the name of Reynaldo Rivera, Avelina continued as the tenant, sharing the harvest with her siblings who were co-owners. The complaint detailed the history of their cultivation, the improvements they made, and the bank’s actions to prevent them from accessing the land. These allegations, the Court reasoned, were sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of the DARAB’s jurisdiction, triggering an agrarian dispute that needed to be resolved.

    The respondent bank argued that certifications from agrarian reform officers indicated that the property was not tenanted. However, the Supreme Court dismissed these certifications as irrelevant to the jurisdictional question. The Court reiterated that the determination of jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the complaint, and defenses raised in the answer do not affect this determination. Furthermore, the Court noted that such certifications are provisional and not binding on the courts or administrative bodies. In this context, the Supreme Court quoted the case of TCMC, Inc. v. CA:

    Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, hence, the court’s jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or motion to dismiss.

    The CA’s ruling hinged on the premise that co-ownership and tenancy are mutually exclusive. The appellate court reasoned that if the Nolasco spouses were co-owners, they could not simultaneously be tenants of the same property. However, the Supreme Court found this reasoning to be an oversimplification of the situation. The Court pointed out that the claim of co-ownership was itself a contested issue. More importantly, the Court emphasized that the outright dismissal of the case prevented a full examination of the facts, potentially leading to the unjust eviction of agricultural tenants.

    The Supreme Court underscored the policy of protecting agricultural tenants and ensuring their security of tenure. The Court emphasized that the law provides specific grounds for the ejectment of a tenant, and these grounds must be proven in court. By dismissing the case based solely on the claim of co-ownership, the CA had effectively sanctioned an extrajudicial eviction, undermining the protections afforded to tenants under agrarian reform laws. The Court stated in Bernas v. CA and Deita:

    The Court must, in our view, keep in mind the policy of the State embodied in the fundamental law and in several special statutes, of promoting economic and social stability in the countryside by vesting the actual tillers and cultivators of the soil, with rights to the continued use and enjoyment of their landholdings until they are validly dispossessed in accordance with law.

    The Court acknowledged the possibility that a co-owner could also be a tenant, particularly in situations where the co-ownership arises from a family arrangement and one of the co-owners is primarily responsible for cultivating the land. The Court suggested that in such cases, a harvest-sharing agreement could be viewed as a form of leasehold arrangement, even among co-owners. This proposition, while novel, highlighted the need for a nuanced understanding of land relations in rural communities. Thus, the outright dismissal of the complaint based on the co-ownership claim was deemed premature.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision serves as a reminder of the importance of procedural fairness and the need for administrative bodies like the DARAB to fully investigate claims involving agrarian disputes. The Court’s ruling prevents the summary dismissal of cases based on a narrow interpretation of legal concepts. It underscores the significance of protecting the rights of agricultural tenants and ensuring that they are not unjustly deprived of their livelihoods. The case also highlights the complexities of land ownership and tenancy in the Philippines, particularly in rural communities where informal arrangements and family agreements often shape land relations.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether a claim of co-ownership automatically negates a claim of tenancy, thus removing the case from the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
    What did the Court of Appeals decide? The Court of Appeals ruled that the DARAB had no jurisdiction because ownership and tenancy are mutually exclusive concepts.
    What was the Supreme Court’s ruling? The Supreme Court reversed the CA’s decision, stating that the claim of co-ownership does not automatically negate a claim of tenancy, and the DARAB must investigate the facts.
    Why did the Supreme Court reverse the Court of Appeals? The Supreme Court found that dismissing the case based solely on the co-ownership claim prevented a full examination of the facts and potentially led to unjust eviction.
    What is the significance of this ruling for agricultural tenants? This ruling protects agricultural tenants from summary dismissal of their cases and ensures their rights are fully investigated by the DARAB.
    What is the role of the DARAB in agrarian disputes? The DARAB has primary jurisdiction to determine the rights and obligations of persons involved in the management, cultivation, and use of agricultural lands.
    What are the key elements of a tenancy relationship? The key elements include the parties being the landowner and tenant, agricultural land as the subject, consent between the parties, agricultural production as the purpose, personal cultivation, and sharing of harvest.
    Can a co-owner also be considered a tenant? The Supreme Court suggested that it is possible, especially in family arrangements where one co-owner cultivates the land and shares the harvest with other co-owners.
    What is the practical implication of this case? The case ensures that agrarian reform adjudicators must fully investigate claims of tenancy, even when co-ownership is asserted, to protect the rights of potential tenants.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Spouses Avelina Rivera-Nolasco v. Rural Bank of Pandi, Inc. affirms the importance of protecting the rights of agricultural tenants and ensuring that agrarian disputes are thoroughly investigated. The ruling reinforces the policy of promoting social justice and economic stability in the countryside by safeguarding the security of tenure of those who till the land.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Spouses Avelina Rivera-Nolasco v. Rural Bank of Pandi, Inc., G.R. No. 194455, June 27, 2018

  • Upholding Agrarian Reform: Security of Tenure Prevails Despite Land Reclassification

    The Supreme Court affirmed that agricultural tenants’ rights prevail even if the land they cultivate is reclassified as non-agricultural. This ruling underscores the importance of protecting farmers’ security of tenure and ensuring that agrarian reform laws are upheld. It reinforces the principle that land reclassification does not automatically extinguish the rights of agricultural tenants who have established vested interests in the land through years of cultivation and compliance with agrarian laws. This decision emphasizes the State’s commitment to social justice and the protection of vulnerable sectors of society.

    From Farm to Conservation: Can Land Reclassification Displace Tenant Farmers?

    This case revolves around a dispute between Philcontrust Resources Inc. and a group of farmers, the respondents, who claimed to be agricultural tenants on a piece of land in Tagaytay City since 1935. Philcontrust, the landowner, sought to evict the farmers, arguing that the land had been reclassified as residential and was located in a conservation area. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) ruled in favor of the farmers, declaring them to be agricultural tenants with vested rights. Philcontrust appealed, questioning the DARAB’s jurisdiction and alleging a violation of due process. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds, leading Philcontrust to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.

    At the heart of the matter lies the question of whether the reclassification of agricultural land to non-agricultural use can extinguish the rights of agricultural tenants. Petitioner Philcontrust Resources Inc. argued that the DARAB lacked jurisdiction over the case because the land in question was no longer agricultural. They presented certifications from various government agencies indicating that the land was classified as residential and located within a special conservation area. Furthermore, Philcontrust claimed that the DARAB violated their right to due process by failing to conduct a formal hearing on the merits of the case.

    The Supreme Court, however, sided with the farmers, upholding the DARAB’s jurisdiction and affirming the importance of protecting the rights of agricultural tenants. The Court emphasized that subject matter jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint, which in this case clearly indicated an agrarian dispute. Moreover, the Court stated that even if the land had been reclassified, this would not automatically extinguish the vested rights of the tenants. The Court noted that the DARAB’s jurisdiction over agrarian disputes is not contingent on the land remaining agricultural, especially when tenancy rights have already been established.

    The Court underscored the principle that the reclassification of land does not automatically override the rights of tenants who have toiled on the land for years. This position aligns with the intent of agrarian reform laws, which aim to protect the interests of farmers and ensure their security of tenure. To bolster its argument, the Court quoted Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657:

    SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

    Furthermore, the Court found no violation of due process. It noted that Philcontrust had been given ample opportunity to present its case, having filed an answer, an omnibus motion, and a motion for reconsideration. The Court emphasized that administrative bodies like the DARAB are not bound by the strict technical rules of procedure, allowing them to resolve cases expeditiously and in accordance with justice and equity. As stated in Villaran v. DARAB:

    The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. “To be heard” does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

    The Court also addressed Philcontrust’s argument that the DARAB should have remanded the case to the adjudicator for a formal hearing. The Court dismissed this argument, stating that the DARAB has the authority to resolve the case based on the evidence presented, even without a formal hearing. The Court found that there was sufficient evidence on record to support the DARAB’s finding that the farmers were agricultural tenants with vested rights.

    The ruling underscores the importance of adhering to procedural rules while also recognizing the need for flexibility in certain situations. While the Court acknowledged the importance of complying with the Rules of Court, it also emphasized that a liberal application of the rules is warranted when it serves the interests of substantial justice. However, the Court clarified that the mere invocation of substantial justice is not enough to warrant a suspension of the rules. The pleading party must also demonstrate meritorious reasons for their non-compliance.

    The Court also addressed the argument that the appeal should be considered as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which has a longer filing period. The Court rejected this argument, citing the case of Villaran v. DARAB, which held that appeals from the DARAB should be filed via a petition for review under Rule 43, regardless of the nature of the questions raised.

    The Court’s decision in this case serves as a reminder of the importance of protecting the rights of agricultural tenants and upholding the principles of agrarian reform. Landowners cannot simply circumvent agrarian laws by reclassifying their land or claiming that it is no longer agricultural. As stated in Spouses Bergonia v. CA:

    The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules, Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.

    The case underscores that the rights of agricultural tenants, once vested, must be respected, and the State has a duty to protect these rights in accordance with the Constitution and agrarian reform laws. The ruling also reiterates the principle that administrative bodies like the DARAB are not bound by the strict technical rules of procedure, allowing them to resolve cases expeditiously and in accordance with justice and equity. The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of balancing procedural rules with the need to achieve substantial justice, particularly in cases involving vulnerable sectors of society such as agricultural tenants.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the reclassification of agricultural land to non-agricultural use extinguishes the rights of agricultural tenants who have established tenancy relationships. The Court also considered if DARAB has jurisdiction over the dispute.
    What did the DARAB rule? The DARAB ruled in favor of the farmers, declaring them to be agricultural tenants with vested rights and ordering that they be maintained in peaceful possession and cultivation of the land.
    Why did Philcontrust appeal the DARAB’s decision? Philcontrust appealed the DARAB’s decision, arguing that the DARAB lacked jurisdiction because the land had been reclassified as residential and that their right to due process was violated.
    What was the Court of Appeals’ decision? The Court of Appeals dismissed Philcontrust’s appeal on procedural grounds, citing the late filing of the appeal and defects in the submitted documents.
    What did the Supreme Court ultimately decide? The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, upholding the DARAB’s jurisdiction and ruling in favor of the farmer-respondents.
    Does land reclassification affect tenants’ rights? The Supreme Court clarified that reclassification of land does not automatically extinguish the vested rights of agricultural tenants. Established tenancy rights must be respected, and agrarian reform laws continue to apply.
    What is the role of the DARAB in agrarian disputes? The DARAB has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, ensuring the implementation of agrarian reform laws and the protection of tenant rights. They are not strictly bound by the technical rules of procedure.
    What evidence supported the DARAB’s decision? The DARAB relied on sworn affidavits from the farmer-respondents and a witness, along with other evidence, to establish the existence of a tenancy relationship and vested rights.
    How did the Court address due process concerns? The Court found that Philcontrust had been given sufficient opportunity to present its case through various filings, satisfying the requirements of due process in administrative proceedings.
    What is the significance of this ruling? This ruling reinforces the protection of agricultural tenants’ rights and emphasizes that landowners cannot easily circumvent agrarian laws by reclassifying land. It highlights the state’s commitment to social justice.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case reaffirms the importance of protecting the rights of agricultural tenants and ensuring that agrarian reform laws are upheld. It serves as a reminder that land reclassification does not automatically extinguish the vested rights of tenants, and the State has a duty to protect these rights in accordance with the Constitution and agrarian reform laws.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: PHILCONTRUST RESOURCES INC. VS. CARLOS SANTIAGO, ET AL., G.R. No. 174670, July 26, 2017

  • Redemption Rights vs. Public Use: Balancing Agrarian Reform and Public Welfare in Land Disputes

    The Supreme Court ruled that while agricultural tenants have a right to redeem land sold without their knowledge, this right is not absolute. It cannot be enforced when the land has been converted to public use, such as for a public market, and when the tenants have failed to make a timely and valid redemption. This decision balances the rights of tenants under agrarian reform laws with the broader public interest and the rights of landowners who have developed the land for public benefit. The Court emphasized that agrarian reform should not unduly transgress the rights of purchasers, especially when the land serves a public purpose.

    Can Tenants Reclaim Land Now a Public Market? A Clash of Rights in Bustos

    This case revolves around a parcel of land in Bustos, Bulacan, originally owned by Simeon Santos and later sold by one of his heirs to the Municipality of Bustos. Petitioners Teddy Castro and Lauro Sebastian, as agricultural tenants of the land, claimed their right to redeem the property after the municipality began constructing a public market on it. The central legal question is whether the tenants’ right of redemption outweighs the land’s current use for public welfare, especially given the circumstances of the tenants’ actions and the property’s transformation.

    Petitioners, as agricultural tenants, asserted their rights under Republic Act No. 3844 (RA 3844), as amended, which grants tenants the right to redeem land sold without their knowledge. The controversy began when Jesus, one of the landowner’s heirs, sold his share of the property to the Municipality of Bustos in 1992, which then constructed a public market inaugurated in 1994. After the market’s inauguration, the petitioners filed a complaint seeking to exercise their rights of pre-emption and redemption, depositing a sum of P2,300.00 as redemption price. However, the municipality argued that the land’s reclassification to commercial use and its dedication to public use through the construction of the market should supersede the tenants’ redemption rights.

    Initially, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) ruled in favor of the tenants, but this decision was later modified by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), which instead directed the municipality to pay disturbance compensation to the tenants. The Court of Appeals (CA) eventually reinstated the PARAD’s original ruling, recognizing the tenants’ right to redeem the property. However, the PARAD’s subsequent orders to execute the redemption and transfer ownership to the tenants were contested, leading to the present Supreme Court decision.

    The Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between the right to redeem and the actual transfer of ownership. It clarified that the PARAD’s initial ruling recognized the petitioners’ right of redemption but did not automatically grant them ownership. The Court underscored that a valid and timely exercise of the right of redemption is essential before ownership can be transferred. Moreover, the Court considered the intervention of the market stall owners, recognizing their material interest in the case due to their lease agreements with the municipality and their potential displacement if the land were transferred to the tenants.

    The Court then delved into whether the PARAD correctly amended its June 28, 1995 Decision. Citing the immutability of final judgments, the Court held that the PARAD’s subsequent orders exceeded the scope of the original decision. The dispositive portion of the June 28, 1995 Decision stated:

    WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [petitioners] and against [respondent Municipality and Jesus Santos]. Likewise, [petitioners] are entitled to exercise the right of redemption of the property in question.

    However, the PARAD’s August 23, 2006 Resolution amended this by including specific orders for the transfer of ownership, setting a redemption price, and directing the execution of a Deed of Redemption/Conveyance. The Supreme Court found that these amendments expanded the original ruling beyond its intended scope.

    The Court also examined whether the petitioners had validly exercised their right of redemption under Section 12 of RA 3844, as amended, which provides:

    Sec. 12. *Lessee’s right of Redemption*. – In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: *Provided,* That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of the redemption under this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale.

    The Court emphasized that a valid redemption requires a formal tender with consignation of the full redemption price within the prescribed period. It noted that the petitioners’ initial deposit of only P2,300.00 was insufficient and that their subsequent tender of P1.2 million was belated, falling outside the 180-day prescriptive period. This failure to comply with the requirements for a valid redemption was a critical factor in the Court’s decision.

    Moreover, the Court took into account the public use of the property, recognizing that the land had been reclassified to commercial use and a public market had been constructed on it. Citing the principle established in Manila Railroad Company v. Paredes, the Court acknowledged that a registered owner may be precluded from recovering possession of property if it would result in irremediable injury to the public. The Court stated:

    a registered owner may be precluded from recovering possession of his property and denied remedies usually afforded to him against usurpers, because of the irremediable injury which would result to the public in general.

    The Court determined that allowing the tenants to recover the land would disrupt the public use of the market and harm the vendors who relied on their lease agreements. Therefore, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled against the petitioners’ claim for possession and ownership, balancing their agrarian rights with the public interest. However, recognizing their status as valid tenants, the Court remanded the case to the DARAB for determination of disturbance compensation to be paid to the petitioners.

    Furthermore, the Court weighed the equities of the situation. The petitioners’ prolonged silence and inaction, coupled with their collection of rentals from the market vendors, suggested an acquiescence to the commercial reclassification and public use of the property. The Court noted that the petitioners waited until after the inauguration of the public market to file their suit and did not object during the construction phase. As such, the Court concluded that the balance of equities favored maintaining the public use of the land over granting the tenants’ claim for ownership.

    The practical implications of this decision are significant. It clarifies that while agrarian reform laws aim to protect the rights of agricultural tenants, these rights are not absolute and must be balanced against other considerations, such as public welfare and the rights of landowners who have developed the land for public benefit. The case underscores the importance of timely and validly exercising the right of redemption, as well as the potential impact of land reclassification and public use on agrarian rights. It also highlights the Court’s willingness to consider the equities of each case, weighing the competing interests of all parties involved.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether agricultural tenants could redeem land that had been sold without their knowledge and subsequently used for a public market, considering their failure to make a timely and valid redemption.
    What is the right of redemption for agricultural tenants? The right of redemption allows agricultural tenants to buy back land that was sold without their knowledge, ensuring they can continue their livelihood. This right is enshrined in Republic Act No. 3844 (RA 3844), as amended.
    What are the requirements for a valid redemption? A valid redemption requires the tenant to be an agricultural lessee, the land to be sold without notice, and the redemption to be exercised within 180 days with a formal tender and consignation of the full redemption price.
    Why did the tenants in this case fail to redeem the property? The tenants failed because they did not consign the full redemption price within the 180-day period and their initial deposit was significantly lower than the actual price.
    What is the significance of the land being used for a public market? The public use of the land weighed heavily in the Court’s decision because disrupting the market would cause irremediable injury to the public. This consideration allows for the balance of public welfare against individual tenant rights.
    What is disturbance compensation? Disturbance compensation is a payment made to tenants who are dispossessed of their land, as mandated by Section 36 (1) of RA 3844, as amended, to provide them with some financial relief.
    What was the role of the market stall owners in this case? The market stall owners were recognized as having a material interest in the case because they had lease agreements with the municipality, and their livelihoods were threatened by the potential transfer of ownership.
    What is the practical implication of this decision? The decision balances agrarian rights with public welfare, clarifying that tenant rights are not absolute and can be superseded by the public interest when land is used for public purposes and redemption requirements are not met.

    In conclusion, this case provides a nuanced understanding of how agrarian reform laws interact with other legal principles, such as public use and the immutability of final judgments. While the rights of agricultural tenants are important, they must be balanced against the broader public interest and the need for a fair and equitable application of the law.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Teddy Castro and Lauro Sebastian v. Pablito V. Mendoza, Sr., G.R. No. 212778, April 26, 2017