Tag: Tolerance

Tolerance in Unlawful Detainer: Mere Inaction Is Not Enough

The Supreme Court ruled that for an unlawful detainer case based on tolerance to prosper, the property owner must demonstrate explicit permission, not just passive inaction, allowing another person to possess their property. This decision clarifies that mere silence or failure to act after transferring possessory rights does not constitute the necessary tolerance to bring an action for unlawful detainer. The ruling reinforces the importance of proving affirmative acts of consent in property disputes.

Possession by Permission or Negligence? The Fine Line in Property Disputes

This case revolves around a property dispute between Ma. Antonette Lozano and Jocelyn K. Fernandez in Olongapo City. Fernandez claimed that Lozano unlawfully detained a property after allegedly signing a Waiver and Transfer of Possessory Rights (Waiver) in her favor. After the execution of this document, Fernandez allowed Lozano to remain on the property. When Lozano refused to vacate the premises after a demand letter, Fernandez filed an action for unlawful detainer. Lozano countered that she never intended to sign such a waiver, claiming it was a blank document converted into one, and that the actual agreement was a loan with the property as collateral. The central legal question is whether Fernandez’s inaction after the alleged waiver constituted sufficient tolerance to justify an unlawful detainer action.

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) initially dismissed Fernandez’s complaint, stating that the action had prescribed because it was filed more than one year after the alleged unlawful possession. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), however, reversed this decision, arguing that Fernandez’s tolerance could be presumed from her failure to immediately ask Lozano to vacate the property. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision, emphasizing that Lozano had failed to discredit the notarized Waiver, and that Fernandez’s subsequent allowance of Lozano’s possession constituted tolerance. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the CA’s assessment.

The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Fernandez had successfully proven that she tolerated Lozano’s possession of the property. It is a well-established principle that notarized documents carry a presumption of regularity, admissible as evidence without further proof of authenticity. In Heirs of Spouses Liwagon v. Heirs of Spouses Liwagon, the Court emphasized that this presumption could only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence, not mere preponderance. In this case, Lozano claimed that she had not validly executed the Waiver and had not appeared before a notary public.

However, Lozano’s claims lacked the necessary evidentiary support to overturn the presumption of regularity. Her allegations of fraud and misrepresentation were not substantiated by credible evidence, thus failing to meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence required to invalidate a notarized document. The Court found that her mere allegations were insufficient to discredit the validity of the notarized Waiver, reinforcing the principle that the act of notarization carries significant legal weight.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court delved into the critical issue of tolerance in unlawful detainer cases. The Court highlighted that for an action of unlawful detainer based on tolerance to succeed, the acts of tolerance must be affirmatively proven. In other words, it is not enough for the plaintiff to simply claim tolerance; they must demonstrate actions indicative of such permission. Bare allegations of tolerance are insufficient and must be supported by concrete evidence. The distinction between mere inaction and active tolerance is crucial in determining the validity of an unlawful detainer action.

The Court referred to the definition of tolerance provided by Professor Tolentino, who characterized it as acts that the property owner allows out of neighborliness, friendship, or courtesy. These acts typically involve minor disturbances that do not materially prejudice the owner’s rights. However, the critical element is the tacit consent of the possessor to these acts, which implies an authorization, permission, or license. The Court underscored that not every instance of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be construed as mere tolerance.

Professor Tolentino defines and characterizes “tolerance” in the following manner:

[. . .] acts merely tolerated are those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one’s property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy. They are acts of little disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well. And even though this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription. […]

There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission.

In the case at hand, Fernandez argued that she had tolerated Lozano’s continued possession of the property because she did not take any action after the execution of the Waiver. However, the Court found that this inaction was insufficient to establish tolerance. Inaction indicates negligence rather than active permission or consent, which is the essence of tolerance. Tolerance requires affirmative acts demonstrating that the complainant consented to the possession of the property. Silence or inaction should not be mistaken for tolerance, as the latter signifies permission to possess the property in question.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court scrutinized the affidavits presented by Fernandez and Gascon, which asserted that Lozano’s possession was by mere tolerance. The Court noted that these affidavits lacked specific details of affirmative acts by Fernandez that manifested tolerance or permission. The affidavits merely stated conclusions without providing any concrete evidence of Fernandez’s actions that demonstrated she was allowing Lozano to possess the property. Therefore, the Court concluded that these affidavits did not sufficiently prove that Fernandez tolerated Lozano’s possession.

The Supreme Court’s analysis highlights that tolerance, in the context of unlawful detainer cases, requires more than just passive inaction. It necessitates active consent and permission, which must be demonstrated through concrete evidence. The absence of an overt act indicative of tolerance on the part of the plaintiff is fatal to a case for unlawful detainer. This ruling reinforces the importance of establishing clear and affirmative acts of permission when asserting tolerance in property disputes. The decision clarifies that a Waiver, by itself, does not automatically establish the tolerance required for an unlawful detainer case.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether the respondent, Jocelyn K. Fernandez, demonstrated sufficient tolerance of the petitioner, Ma. Antonette Lozano’s, possession of the property to justify an action for unlawful detainer. The Supreme Court clarified that mere inaction does not equate to tolerance.
What is the legal definition of tolerance in unlawful detainer cases?	Tolerance, in this context, means active consent and permission granted by the property owner to another person to possess the property. It requires affirmative acts demonstrating permission, not just passive inaction or silence.
What evidence is required to prove tolerance?	To prove tolerance, the plaintiff must present concrete evidence demonstrating affirmative acts that show they permitted the defendant to possess the property. This can include explicit agreements, communicated consent, or other actions that clearly indicate permission.
What is the effect of a notarized document in property disputes?	A notarized document carries a presumption of regularity and is admissible as evidence without further proof of authenticity. This presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that proves the document’s invalidity.
How can the presumption of a notarized document be challenged?	The presumption of a notarized document can be challenged by presenting clear and convincing evidence of irregularities in its execution or content. Mere allegations or unsubstantiated claims are insufficient to overcome this presumption.
What happens if tolerance is not proven in an unlawful detainer case?	If tolerance is not proven, the unlawful detainer case will fail. The plaintiff must demonstrate that they actively permitted the defendant’s possession, not merely that they failed to take action to prevent it.
What was the significance of the affidavits in this case?	The affidavits presented by the respondent were deemed insufficient because they only stated conclusions about tolerance without providing specific details of affirmative acts that demonstrated permission. This highlights the need for concrete evidence rather than mere assertions.
What is the difference between tolerance and negligence in property possession?	Tolerance involves active permission, while negligence involves a failure to act. Tolerance requires the property owner to affirmatively allow another person to possess the property, while negligence simply means they did not take steps to prevent it.

This Supreme Court decision serves as a critical reminder of the importance of establishing clear and affirmative acts of permission when asserting tolerance in property disputes. It underscores that mere inaction or silence does not equate to tolerance, and that concrete evidence is necessary to prove active consent. Property owners must be vigilant in documenting and demonstrating their permission when allowing others to possess their property to successfully pursue an unlawful detainer action.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

February 18, 2019

Unlawful Detainer: The Imperative of Alleging Tolerance in Ejectment Suits

In Hidalgo v. Velasco, the Supreme Court reiterated the crucial elements required to establish a case of unlawful detainer, emphasizing that a complaint must explicitly allege that the initial possession was by contract or tolerance of the plaintiff. The Court affirmed the dismissal of Pablo Hidalgo’s ejectment suit against Sonia Velasco because his complaint failed to assert that Velasco’s occupation of the property was initially permitted or tolerated by him. This decision underscores the importance of clearly articulating the basis of possession in ejectment cases, ensuring that courts have the proper jurisdictional foundation to resolve such disputes.

Possession Predicaments: When Tolerance Is Not Pleaded

The case revolves around a 352-square-meter residential land in Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. Pablo Hidalgo claimed ownership through a Deed of Donation from Juana H. Querubin in 2000. However, upon visiting the property in 2005, Hidalgo discovered Sonia Velasco in possession. After his demands to vacate were rebuffed, Hidalgo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with damages in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). Velasco countered that the MCTC lacked jurisdiction, arguing that Josefina Reintegrado Baron, from whom she derived her rights, was not impleaded, the one-year filing period was not met, and Hidalgo was guilty of laches.

The MCTC initially upheld its jurisdiction and ruled in favor of Hidalgo, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed this decision, noting that Hidalgo’s complaint failed to allege that Velasco’s possession was by virtue of an express or implied contract that had expired or terminated. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision, emphasizing that the complaint did not assert that Hidalgo permitted or tolerated Velasco’s occupation. This failure to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer was fatal to Hidalgo’s case.

The Supreme Court (SC) in G.R. No. 202217 addressed whether the complaint sufficiently established a case for unlawful detainer. The SC highlighted that jurisdiction in ejectment cases hinges on the allegations in the complaint aligning with the actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer. As the Court noted, “what determines the nature of an action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint.” This underscores the significance of precisely framing the cause of action to ensure the proper court can exercise jurisdiction.

The SC referred to Cabrera v. Getaruela, which outlines the essential recitals for a valid unlawful detainer complaint. These include: (1) initial possession by contract or tolerance; (2) subsequent illegality of possession upon notice of termination; (3) continued possession depriving the plaintiff of enjoyment; and (4) filing the complaint within one year from the last demand to vacate.

These averments are jurisdictional and must appear on the face of the complaint.

In Hidalgo’s case, the complaint failed to assert that Velasco’s possession was initially by Hidalgo’s contract or tolerance. Therefore, the MCTC lacked jurisdiction. This requirement is critical because unlawful detainer presumes an initially lawful possession that becomes unlawful upon the expiration or termination of the right to possess. Without this foundational element, the action cannot be sustained as unlawful detainer.

The Court also considered whether the complaint could be construed as one for forcible entry, which involves possession obtained unlawfully from the start. The SC referenced Zacarias v. Anacay, emphasizing that the allegations in Hidalgo’s complaint seemed more aligned with forcible entry, as it indicated Velasco entered the land without Hidalgo’s consent.

The bare allegation of petitioner that ‘sometime in May, 2007′ she discovered that the defendants have entered the subject property and occupied the same,’ as correctly found by the MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered the land and built their houses thereon clandestinely and without petitioner’s consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful detainer.

However, even if treated as forcible entry, the action would still fail because it was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period. Nuñez v. Slteas Phoenix Solutions, Inc. clarifies that the one-year period for forcible entry begins from the date of actual entry, or from the discovery of entry if it was done stealthily. Since Hidalgo discovered Velasco’s entry in January 2005 but filed the complaint in December 2006, the action was time-barred.

The Supreme Court further highlighted the distinction between actions for unlawful detainer and those concerning ownership. In cases where the allegations do not sufficiently establish forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the appropriate remedies are either accion publiciana (recovery of the right to possess) or accion reinvindicatoria (recovery of ownership). These actions must be filed before the proper Regional Trial Court, which has the necessary jurisdiction to resolve questions of ownership and broader possessory rights.

In essence, the SC’s decision reinforces the principle that clear and precise pleading is essential for establishing jurisdiction in ejectment cases. The failure to adequately allege the basis of possession—whether by contract, tolerance, or unlawful entry—can be fatal to the action. Litigants must ensure their complaints accurately reflect the nature of the possession and comply with the prescriptive periods to avail themselves of the proper legal remedies.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) had jurisdiction over Pablo Hidalgo’s complaint for unlawful detainer against Sonia Velasco, given the allegations in the complaint. The Supreme Court determined that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege unlawful detainer because it did not state that Velasco’s possession was initially by contract or tolerance of Hidalgo.
What is unlawful detainer?	Unlawful detainer is a legal action to recover possession of property where the initial possession was lawful, either by contract or tolerance, but subsequently became unlawful due to the termination of the right to possess. A key element is that the defendant’s possession must have been initially permitted by the plaintiff.
What must a complaint for unlawful detainer allege?	A complaint for unlawful detainer must allege that the initial possession was by contract or tolerance of the plaintiff, that the possession became illegal upon notice of termination, that the defendant remained in possession, and that the complaint was filed within one year from the last demand to vacate. These are jurisdictional requirements.
What is forcible entry?	Forcible entry is a legal action to recover possession of property where the entry was unlawful from the beginning, such as through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Unlike unlawful detainer, there is no initial lawful possession in forcible entry.
What is the prescriptive period for filing an ejectment case?	For both forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the complaint must be filed within one year from the date of unlawful deprivation of possession. In forcible entry cases involving stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned of the unlawful entry.
What happens if the complaint fails to sufficiently allege unlawful detainer or forcible entry?	If the complaint fails to sufficiently allege either unlawful detainer or forcible entry, the proper remedies are either accion publiciana (recovery of the right to possess) or accion reinvindicatoria (recovery of ownership). These actions must be filed before the Regional Trial Court.
Who was Josefina Reintegrado Baron and why was she relevant to the case?	Josefina Reintegrado Baron was the person from whom Sonia Velasco claimed to derive her rights to possess the property. Velasco argued that Baron should have been impleaded as a party defendant.
What was the Supreme Court’s ruling in this case?	The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Hidalgo’s complaint for unlawful detainer, holding that the MCTC lacked jurisdiction because the complaint failed to allege that Velasco’s possession was initially by contract or tolerance of Hidalgo. The Court also noted that even if treated as forcible entry, the action was time-barred.

The ruling in Hidalgo v. Velasco serves as a reminder of the necessity for meticulous pleading in ejectment cases. The absence of a clear assertion of initial tolerance or contract is a critical flaw that can undermine the jurisdiction of the court and the success of the action. Parties seeking to recover possession of property must ensure their complaints precisely articulate the basis of possession and comply with all procedural requirements.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

January 7, 2019

Unlawful Detainer: Proving Tolerance for Successful Ejectment

In unlawful detainer cases, proving that the occupant’s initial entry was lawful and based on the owner’s permission is crucial. The Supreme Court has consistently held that without establishing this tolerance, an action for unlawful detainer will fail. This means landowners must demonstrate they allowed the occupant on the property; mere silence or inaction isn’t enough. If the initial entry was unlawful, other legal remedies like an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, which address the right of possession or ownership, respectively, may be more appropriate.

Possession Predicaments: When Ownership Isn’t Enough in Ejectment Cases

The case of Cecilia T. Javelosa v. Ezequiel Tapus, et al., G.R. No. 204361, decided on July 4, 2018, revolves around a dispute over a parcel of land in Boracay Island. Cecilia Javelosa, claiming ownership through a donated title, sought to eject Ezequiel Tapus and his co-respondents, alleging they occupied the property upon her tolerance. The central legal question is whether Javelosa successfully proved the essential elements of unlawful detainer, particularly the initial lawful entry based on her permission, to warrant the respondents’ eviction.

Javelosa claimed that the respondents’ predecessor was a caretaker, implying their presence was initially tolerated. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) and subsequently the Supreme Court found that Javelosa failed to sufficiently demonstrate this tolerance. The Supreme Court emphasized that in unlawful detainer cases, proving that the possession was legal at the beginning is critical. Without this proof, the action for unlawful detainer must be dismissed. The Court reiterated that landowners need to show overt acts indicative of their permission for the respondents to occupy the property.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court referred to several key cases. In Quijano v. Atty. Amante, the Court stressed that a plaintiff must prove the initial lawfulness of the possession and its basis. Similarly, Suarez v. Sps. Emboy highlights that when a complaint lacks details about how entry was effected or when dispossession began, remedies like accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria are more appropriate. The Court also noted that tolerance cannot be presumed from an owner’s failure to eject occupants, as mere silence or inaction does not equate to permission.

Moreover, the Supreme Court explained the different types of actions available to recover possession of real property. An accion interdictal, a summary action, includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer. An accion publiciana is a plenary action to recover the right of possession, typically brought in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) when dispossession has lasted over a year. Finally, an accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership, also brought in the RTC. The choice of action depends on the specific circumstances and the relief sought.

In this case, Javelosa chose to pursue an action for unlawful detainer. The court emphasized that she bore the burden of proving all the jurisdictional facts for such an action. These facts include: (i) initial possession by contract or tolerance; (ii) subsequent illegality of possession upon notice of termination; (iii) continued possession depriving the plaintiff of enjoyment; and (iv) institution of the complaint within one year from the last demand to vacate. While Javelosa’s complaint alleged these facts, she failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her claim of tolerance.

The Court noted that Javelosa did not provide details on how and when the respondents entered the property, or how and when permission to occupy was purportedly given. The respondents had been occupying the subject property for more than 70 years. In this regard, it must be shown that the respondents first came into the property due to the permission given by the petitioner or her predecessors.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court clarified that possessing a Torrens Title does not grant an owner the automatic right to wrest possession from an occupant. Even a legal owner cannot simply evict someone who has been in possession, as stated in Spouses Munoz v. CA. Prior possession is a significant factor, and a party with prior possession can recover it even against the owner, until lawfully ejected through an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The Court also emphasized the need to respect the rights of indigenous occupants and tribal settlers.

The Court’s decision underscores the importance of carefully selecting the appropriate legal remedy when seeking to recover property. Unlawful detainer requires specific proof of initial lawful entry based on permission or tolerance. Without such proof, the action will fail. Landowners must be prepared to demonstrate these elements to succeed in ejecting occupants from their property.

In summary, the Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision, dismissing Javelosa’s case for unlawful detainer due to a lack of evidence proving the respondents’ initial entry was based on her tolerance. This case serves as a reminder that ownership alone is insufficient to justify immediate eviction; demonstrating the legal basis of the occupant’s initial possession is equally vital.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Cecilia Javelosa sufficiently proved that the respondents’ initial entry onto her property was based on her permission or tolerance, a necessary element for a successful unlawful detainer case. The Court ruled that she did not provide enough evidence to support this claim.
What is unlawful detainer?	Unlawful detainer is a legal action to recover possession of property from someone who initially had lawful possession but whose right to possess has expired or been terminated. It requires proving that the initial entry was lawful and based on the owner’s permission.
*What is the difference between accion publiciana* and accion reivindicatoria?**	An accion publiciana is an action to recover the right of possession, while an accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership of the property. The former focuses on who has a better right to possess, whereas the latter aims to establish legal ownership.
What evidence is needed to prove tolerance in an unlawful detainer case?	To prove tolerance, the landowner must present evidence of overt acts indicating permission for the occupant to enter and stay on the property. Mere silence or inaction is not sufficient.
Can a property owner immediately evict someone with a Torrens Title?	No, possessing a Torrens Title does not automatically grant the owner the right to immediately evict someone. The owner must still follow the proper legal procedures and prove the necessary elements of the chosen action, such as unlawful detainer.
What happens if the unlawful detainer case fails?	If an unlawful detainer case fails due to insufficient evidence of tolerance or other required elements, the owner may need to consider other legal remedies, such as an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. These actions address the right of possession and ownership.
Why was Javelosa’s case dismissed?	Javelosa’s case was dismissed because she failed to provide sufficient evidence that the respondents’ initial entry onto the property was based on her permission or tolerance. This is a critical element in an unlawful detainer case.
What is the significance of prior possession in property disputes?	Prior possession is a significant factor, and a party with prior possession can recover it even against the owner, until lawfully ejected through an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

This case emphasizes that while ownership is a fundamental right, it must be exercised within the bounds of the law. Landowners seeking to recover possession of their property must choose the appropriate legal remedy and provide sufficient evidence to support their claims. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of their case and the need to pursue alternative legal avenues.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

July 4, 2018

Unlawful Detainer: The Importance of Establishing Initial Lawful Possession

In Fatima O. De Guzman-Fuerte v. Spouses Silvino S. Estomo and Concepcion C. Estomo, the Supreme Court clarified the essential elements of an unlawful detainer case, emphasizing the necessity of proving that the initial possession of the property by the defendant was lawful and subsequently became unlawful upon the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The Court ruled that a complaint for unlawful detainer must specifically allege facts demonstrating that the defendant’s possession was initially based on a contract, express or implied, or by tolerance of the plaintiff. This decision underscores the principle that without establishing the original lawful nature of the possession, the court lacks jurisdiction to order the ejectment of the defendant.

Tolerance is Key: Understanding Unlawful Detainer Actions

This case revolves around a dispute over a property in Antipolo City. Fatima O. De Guzman-Fuerte, having acquired the property through foreclosure, filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Spouses Silvino and Concepcion Estomo, who were occupying the land. Fuerte alleged that the Spouses Estomo were illegally occupying the property without her consent, and despite a demand to vacate, they refused to do so. The Spouses Estomo, in their defense, claimed ownership of the property based on a Contract to Sell from 1999 and denied that their entry was unlawful. The Municipal Trial Court initially dismissed Fuerte’s complaint due to a lack of evidence of the demand letter’s receipt, but the Regional Trial Court reversed this decision, ordering the spouses to vacate. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, leading to the Supreme Court review. The central legal question is whether Fuerte’s complaint sufficiently established a cause of action for unlawful detainer, thus giving the Municipal Trial Court jurisdiction over the case.

The Supreme Court, in its analysis, reiterated the fundamental principles governing unlawful detainer actions. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. For an unlawful detainer case to prosper, the complaint must contain specific allegations demonstrating that the defendant’s initial possession was lawful, arising from a contract (express or implied) or the tolerance of the plaintiff. This is because, as the Supreme Court has stated, “the possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.”

In the case at bar, the Court found Fuerte’s complaint deficient in this critical aspect. A careful examination of the complaint revealed that Fuerte characterized the Spouses Estomo’s possession as illegal from the outset, stating that they were “illegally occupying and staying at the above subject premises without their (sic) permission, consent and approval.” There was no allegation that Fuerte, or her predecessor-in-interest, had ever tolerated the spouses’ possession. Further, the December 1, 2008, demand letter explicitly stated that the Spouses Estomo were “presently occupying without her consent, permission nor approval,” which is contradictory to the idea of tolerance.

The Court emphasized that “acts of tolerance must be proved showing the overt acts indicative of his or his predecessor’s tolerance or permission for them to occupy the disputed property.” Fuerte failed to provide any evidence or allegations demonstrating that she or the previous owner had granted the Spouses Estomo permission to enter and occupy the property. Without such evidence, the claim of tolerance could not be substantiated. The absence of the essential element of initial lawful possession was fatal to Fuerte’s unlawful detainer case. As the Court pointed out, “A requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must then be established.“

The Supreme Court also addressed Fuerte’s argument that the Court of Appeals erred by not remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court for a determination of ownership. The Court clarified the distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession or ownership. Unlawful detainer suits are limited to the question of possession de facto and do not bar a separate action to determine title or ownership. As the Court stated, “What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reivindicatory action (accion reivindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto.” A judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive only with respect to possession and does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land.

Because of the lack of identity of causes of action, there can be no multiplicity of suits. Additionally, the RTC acted as an appellate court when reviewing the MTCC decision; therefore, it was not the proper venue to litigate the issue of ownership in the first instance. The CA’s decision to dismiss the unlawful detainer case did not preclude Fuerte from pursuing other remedies to establish her ownership and recover possession of the property, such as an accion reivindicatoria.

The Court also addressed Fuerte’s reliance on Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, arguing that the CA should have remanded the case to the RTC as an appellate court. The Supreme Court noted that this section applies when the lower court dismisses a case without trial on the merits due to lack of jurisdiction. However, in this case, the RTC already treated the case as an appeal from the MTCC decision and ruled on the merits of the unlawful detainer case. The CA’s decision was based on the RTC’s appellate jurisdiction, and therefore, there was no basis to remand the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court emphasized that “jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it is ‘not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.’“

This case serves as a critical reminder that while a registered owner of real property is generally entitled to its possession, they cannot simply take possession from someone already occupying the property. The owner must resort to the proper legal remedy and fulfill the necessary conditions for that action to succeed. By choosing unlawful detainer as the remedy, Fuerte was required to establish the essential element of initial lawful possession, which she failed to do. As a result, the MTCC lacked jurisdiction over the case, and the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint.

FAQs

What is unlawful detainer?	Unlawful detainer is a legal action to recover possession of real property from someone who initially had the right to possess it, but that right has expired or been terminated.
What is the key element in an unlawful detainer case?	The key element is proving that the defendant’s initial possession of the property was lawful, based on a contract (express or implied) or the plaintiff’s tolerance. This lawful possession must have become unlawful due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
What happens if the initial possession was not lawful?	If the initial possession was not lawful, an unlawful detainer case is not the proper remedy, and the court will not have jurisdiction to order the defendant’s ejectment. Other legal actions, such as an accion reivindicatoria, may be more appropriate.
*What is an accion reivindicatoria?*	An accion reivindicatoria is a legal action to recover ownership of real property, including the right to possess it. It is a plenary action that addresses the issue of ownership, unlike the summary action of unlawful detainer.
What does “tolerance” mean in the context of unlawful detainer?	Tolerance means that the plaintiff, or their predecessor-in-interest, allowed the defendant to occupy the property with their permission, either explicitly or implicitly. This tolerance must be demonstrated through overt acts indicating permission to occupy the property.
Can a demand letter establish tolerance?	No, a demand letter demanding that the defendant vacate the property generally does not establish tolerance. In fact, if the demand letter states that the occupancy is without the plaintiff’s consent, it contradicts the idea of tolerance.
*What is the difference between possession de facto* and possession de jure?**	Possession de facto refers to actual physical possession of the property, while possession de jure refers to the legal right to possess the property. Unlawful detainer cases only concern possession de facto.
Does a judgment in an unlawful detainer case affect ownership of the property?	No, a judgment in an unlawful detainer case is conclusive only with respect to possession and does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land. A separate action is required to determine ownership.

This case highlights the critical importance of properly pleading and proving all the essential elements of an unlawful detainer action. Property owners seeking to recover possession must carefully assess the nature of the occupant’s initial possession and ensure that their complaint accurately reflects the facts necessary to establish jurisdiction in the Municipal Trial Court. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of the case, requiring the owner to pursue alternative legal remedies.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Fatima O. De Guzman-Fuerte v. Spouses Silvino S. Estomo and Concepcion C. Estomo, G.R. No. 223399, April 23, 2018

April 23, 2018

Unlawful Detainer vs. Accion Publiciana: Defining Possession in Philippine Law

In ejectment cases, understanding the nuances between unlawful detainer and accion publiciana is crucial. The Supreme Court in Eversley Childs Sanitarium v. Spouses Barbarona clarified that an unlawful detainer case requires proof of initially lawful possession that later became unlawful. If possession was illegal from the start, or if the one-year period for filing an ejectment case has lapsed, the proper remedy is an accion publiciana, a plenary action filed in the Regional Trial Court to recover the right of possession. This distinction impacts which court has jurisdiction and the evidence required to prove the right to possess property.

When Tolerance Ends: Examining Possession Rights in Property Disputes

The case revolves around a property dispute between Eversley Childs Sanitarium, a public hospital, and Spouses Anastacio and Perla Barbarona, who claimed ownership of the land the hospital occupied. The spouses filed an ejectment case against the hospital, arguing unlawful detainer based on tolerance. Eversley countered that the case was an accion publiciana, thus outside the Municipal Trial Court’s jurisdiction, and questioned the spouses’ ownership. The central legal question is whether the spouses successfully proved unlawful detainer or if their claim necessitated an accion publiciana, impacting the proper venue and the strength of their claim.

The Supreme Court’s analysis hinged on the distinction between these two types of actions. Ejectment cases, specifically unlawful detainer, require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s initial possession was lawful, based on tolerance or permission, and subsequently turned unlawful upon the expiration or termination of that right. The complaint must detail the acts of tolerance that allowed the defendant’s entry and continued occupation. This tolerance must be a conscious decision by the owner to allow another to possess the property.

In contrast, an accion publiciana is a plenary action to recover the right of possession when dispossession has lasted longer than one year, or when the initial entry was unlawful from the beginning. This action is filed in the Regional Trial Court and requires a more thorough examination of the parties’ claims to possession, potentially including evidence of ownership. The key difference lies in the nature of the initial possession and the time elapsed since dispossession.

In this case, the Spouses Barbarona claimed Eversley’s possession was by mere tolerance. However, their complaint lacked specific details of how the hospital’s possession began and what acts constituted their tolerance. The Supreme Court emphasized that a bare allegation of tolerance is insufficient; the plaintiff must demonstrate overt acts indicating permission to occupy the property. Because the spouses failed to provide this evidence, their claim did not meet the requirements for an unlawful detainer case.

Furthermore, Eversley’s occupation of the property dated back to 1930, predating the spouses’ claimed ownership. This long-standing possession cast doubt on the claim of mere tolerance, suggesting that the hospital’s presence was not simply permitted but potentially based on some other right or claim. This historical context further supported the argument that the proper action was an accion publiciana, which considers the broader history and nature of possession.

The Court also addressed the issue of the spouses’ title to the property. While they initially relied on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 53698, this title was later cancelled due to procedural defects in its reconstitution. Although a certificate of title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership, its cancellation undermined the spouses’ claim of right to possession. The Court acknowledged that ownership and possession are distinct concepts, but in ejectment cases, proof of ownership often serves as a basis for claiming the right to possess.

Even without a valid title, the spouses could potentially prove their right to possession through other means. However, they failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a clear chain of ownership or a valid basis for their claim. This lack of proof, combined with the failure to demonstrate tolerance, ultimately led the Court to rule against them.

The Supreme Court also considered Proclamation No. 507, series of 1932, which reserved portions of the property for Eversley’s use as a leprosarium. This proclamation further weakened the spouses’ claim, as it suggested that the hospital’s occupation was not merely tolerated but officially sanctioned by the government. This reservation created an encumbrance on the property, potentially limiting the rights of any subsequent titleholders.

Building on this principle, the Court stated:

Under the Torrens system of registration, the government is required to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves.

The Supreme Court highlighted that the Municipal Trial Court lacked jurisdiction over the case because the Spouses Barbarona’s complaint was, in essence, an accion publiciana disguised as an unlawful detainer action. Because the court lacked jurisdiction, its decision, as well as the subsequent decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, were void.

This case underscores the importance of correctly identifying the nature of a possession dispute and choosing the appropriate legal remedy. Filing the wrong action can result in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, causing significant delays and expenses. The Court’s decision serves as a reminder to carefully analyze the facts and circumstances surrounding a property dispute before initiating legal proceedings.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Spouses Barbarona correctly filed an unlawful detainer case against Eversley Childs Sanitarium, or if the action should have been an accion publiciana, affecting the jurisdiction of the court.
What is unlawful detainer?	Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of property where the initial possession was lawful but became unlawful due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s initial possession was based on tolerance or permission.
*What is an accion publiciana?*	An accion publiciana is a plenary action to recover the right of possession when dispossession has lasted longer than one year, or when the initial entry was unlawful from the beginning. It is filed in the Regional Trial Court.
Why did the Supreme Court rule against the Spouses Barbarona?	The Supreme Court ruled against the Spouses Barbarona because they failed to prove that Eversley’s initial possession was based on their tolerance and because Eversley’s possession predated their claim of ownership.
What is the significance of Proclamation No. 507 in this case?	Proclamation No. 507 reserved portions of the property for Eversley’s use as a leprosarium, which suggested that the hospital’s occupation was not merely tolerated but officially sanctioned by the government.
What is the impact of the cancellation of TCT No. 53698?	The cancellation of TCT No. 53698 undermined the Spouses Barbarona’s claim of right to possession, as their title was no longer valid.
What is the main takeaway from this case?	The main takeaway is the importance of correctly identifying the nature of a possession dispute and choosing the appropriate legal remedy, as filing the wrong action can result in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
What should the Spouses Barbarona have done differently?	The Spouses Barbarona should have either proven the acts of tolerance that led to Eversley’s possession or filed an accion publiciana in the Regional Trial Court.

In conclusion, Eversley Childs Sanitarium v. Spouses Barbarona serves as a critical reminder of the distinctions between ejectment and accion publiciana in Philippine property law. It emphasizes the need for plaintiffs to accurately characterize the nature of possession disputes and file the appropriate action in the correct court to ensure their claims are properly adjudicated.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: EVERSLEY CHILDS SANITARIUM, REPRESENTED BY DR. GERARDO M. AQUINO, JR. (NOW DR. PRIMO JOEL S. ALVEZ) CHIEF OF SANITARIUM, PETITIONER, V. SPOUSES ANASTACIO AND PERLA BARBARONA, RESPONDENTS., G.R. No. 195814, April 04, 2018

April 4, 2018

Unlawful Detainer: Establishing Lawful Entry as a Prerequisite for Ejectment

In the Philippines, an action for unlawful detainer is a legal remedy to recover possession of a property from someone who initially had lawful possession but whose right to possess has expired or terminated. The Supreme Court in Teresita Bugayong-Santiago, et al. v. Teofilo Bugayong, G.R. No. 220389, December 6, 2017, reiterated that for an unlawful detainer suit to prosper, the defendant’s initial possession must have been lawful, based on tolerance or permission from the owner. If the entry was unlawful from the beginning, the proper action is not unlawful detainer but either forcible entry (if filed within one year) or accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria (if filed beyond one year) to determine the right of possession or ownership.

Family Land Dispute: When Tolerance Isn’t Enough for an Ejectment Case

This case revolves around a family dispute over a commercial property in Asingan, Pangasinan. Teresita Bugayong-Santiago and her siblings (petitioners) filed an unlawful detainer case against their brother, Teofilo Bugayong (respondent), claiming that they had tolerated his occupation of a portion of the property. The petitioners asserted that Teofilo entered the property without their knowledge and consent in 2002, and they only tolerated his presence until they demanded he leave in 2008. Teofilo, on the other hand, claimed he was a co-heir to the property and had been in possession long before the alleged sale to Teresita.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) initially ruled in favor of the petitioners, ordering Teofilo to vacate the property. However, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed this decision, stating that the element of initial lawful possession, followed by unlawful withholding, was missing. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision, leading to the Supreme Court appeal. The central legal question was whether the petitioners successfully established the elements of unlawful detainer, particularly the initial lawful possession by the respondent based on their tolerance.

The Supreme Court emphasized the critical distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 146, 153-154 (1995):

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.

The Court reiterated that in unlawful detainer cases, the defendant’s possession must have been lawful at the outset, usually by tolerance or permission of the owner. This tolerance implies a promise to vacate the property upon demand. If the entry was unlawful from the beginning, such as through force or stealth, the action should be for forcible entry, filed within one year, or a plenary action for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) or ownership (accion reivindicatoria) if the one-year period has lapsed.

In the present case, the petitioners’ claim that Teofilo entered the property “without their knowledge and consent” contradicted their claim of tolerance. The Supreme Court found this inconsistency fatal to their unlawful detainer case. It highlighted that tolerance must be present from the start of possession to justify an action for unlawful detainer. As the RTC observed, the petitioners’ assertions indicated that Teofilo’s entry was forcible from the beginning, making unlawful detainer an improper remedy.

Citing Spouses Valdez v. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil. 39, 47 (2006), the Court underscored that the act of tolerance must be present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful at the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. The Court also referenced Zacarias v. Anacay, 744 Phil. 201 (2014), emphasizing that the complaint must contain averments of fact that would substantiate the claim of tolerance, indicating how the entry was effected and when dispossession started.

The Supreme Court further elucidated that jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, citing Rosario v. Alba, G.R. No. 199464, 18 April 2016, 789 SCRA 630, 637. The complaint must clearly fall within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Since the petitioners’ complaint failed to establish the jurisdictional facts necessary for an unlawful detainer case, the MCTC lacked jurisdiction.

Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision, which upheld the RTC’s dismissal of the unlawful detainer case. This ruling reinforces the principle that unlawful detainer actions require an initial lawful possession based on tolerance, and a subsequent unlawful withholding of possession after demand. The proper remedy for recovery of possession depends on the nature of the entry and the period within which the action is brought.

The Court clarified that its ruling was limited to determining the propriety of the unlawful detainer case and the MCTC’s jurisdiction. It did not constitute a final determination of possession or ownership, leaving the parties free to file appropriate actions for accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.

FAQs

What is unlawful detainer?	Unlawful detainer is a legal action to recover possession of property from someone who initially had lawful possession but whose right to possess has expired or terminated. It requires that the initial possession was based on tolerance or permission from the owner.
What is the key element that must be proven in an unlawful detainer case?	The key element is that the defendant’s initial possession of the property was lawful, typically based on the plaintiff’s tolerance or permission. This lawful possession must then become unlawful due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
What happens if the entry into the property was unlawful from the beginning?	If the entry was unlawful from the start (e.g., through force or stealth), the proper action is not unlawful detainer. Instead, the plaintiff should file an action for forcible entry (if within one year) or accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
What is the difference between forcible entry and unlawful detainer?	Forcible entry involves taking possession of property through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, making the possession illegal from the start. Unlawful detainer involves initially lawful possession that becomes unlawful after the right to possess expires or is terminated.
What does “tolerance” mean in the context of unlawful detainer?	Tolerance refers to the act of allowing someone to occupy property without any contract or agreement, implying a promise that the occupant will vacate the property upon demand. The tolerance must be present from the beginning of the possession.
*What is accion publiciana?*	Accion publiciana is an action for recovery of the right to possess, filed when the one-year period for filing a forcible entry case has already lapsed. It involves proving a better right of possession than the defendant.
*What is accion reivindicatoria?*	Accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership of property. The plaintiff must prove ownership of the property and has the right to recover its full possession.
How is jurisdiction determined in ejectment cases?	Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. The complaint must clearly state facts that bring the case within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

This case highlights the importance of properly establishing the elements of an unlawful detainer case, particularly the initial lawful possession based on tolerance. Failure to do so can result in the dismissal of the case and the need to pursue other legal remedies. This underscores the necessity of a thorough understanding of property laws and procedural rules when seeking to recover possession of property.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

December 6, 2017

Unlawful Detainer: Res Judicata and the Limits of Tolerance in Property Disputes

The Supreme Court clarified the application of res judicata and tolerance in unlawful detainer cases. The Court ruled that a previous judgment based on a compromise agreement does not necessarily bar a subsequent unlawful detainer action if the cause of action—specifically, a new breach of the implied promise to vacate—is distinct. This decision underscores the importance of enforcing judgments promptly and the impact of inaction on property rights.

From Father to Son: When Does a Property Dispute Truly End?

This case revolves around a protracted property dispute in Legazpi City, originating from a complaint filed in 1992 by Jose Diaz, Jr. and Adelina D. McMullen against Salvador Valenciano Sr. for unlawful detainer. The Diaz siblings claimed ownership of a parcel of land (Lot No. 163-A) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 20126. Valenciano Sr. countered that his family had been in possession since 1958, following a mortgage agreement with Diaz. To settle, they entered into a Compromise Agreement, where Valenciano Sr. would vacate the property by January 31, 1994, and Diaz would pay him P1,600.00. The Municipal Trial Court in the Cities (MTCC) approved this agreement. However, Valenciano Sr. failed to vacate, but Diaz never enforced the writ of execution, tolerating their continued stay. Years later, after Valenciano Sr.’s death, Diaz demanded that his son, Salvador Valenciano Jr., vacate the property, leading to a new complaint for unlawful detainer.

The central legal question is whether this second unlawful detainer case against Salvador Jr. is barred by res judicata, given the previous case against his father and the judicially-approved Compromise Agreement. The MTCC initially dismissed the second complaint, invoking res judicata, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed this decision, finding no judgment on the merits in the first case. The Court of Appeals (CA) then reversed the RTC, reinstating the MTCC’s dismissal, arguing that the Compromise Agreement had the effect of a final judgment and that Salvador Jr. was in privity with his father. This brings us to the Supreme Court, where the Diaz siblings argue that res judicata does not apply due to the absence of a final judgment on the merits, identity of parties, and identity of cause of action.

To fully understand this case, one must grasp the principle of res judicata. It prevents parties from relitigating issues that have already been decided by a competent court. The Supreme Court outlined the requisites for res judicata to apply in the concept of “bar by prior judgment”:

(1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.

The petitioners argued that the Compromise Agreement was not a judgment on the merits. However, the Supreme Court disagreed. A judgment is considered to be “on the merits” when it legally declares the rights and duties of the parties based on the disclosed facts. Judgments based on Compromise Agreements are indeed judgments on the merits. In such agreements, the parties have entered into valid stipulations, and the court has duly considered the evidence. Therefore, the Resolution approving the Compromise Agreement in the first case had the same effect as an ordinary judgment, immediately becoming final and executory.

The petitioners also contended that there was no identity of parties between the first and second cases, arguing that Salvador Jr. was not a successor-in-interest to his father. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. There is identity of parties when the parties in both actions are the same, or there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. Privity exists between a decedent and his heir. Salvador Jr., as the son of Salvador Sr., shared the same interest in the property and occupied it prior to the institution of the first case, satisfying the requisite of substantial identity of parties.

Despite these points, the Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners on one crucial aspect: the lack of identity of the cause of action. A cause of action is an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. To determine the identity of causes of action, courts apply the “same evidence rule.” If the same evidence fully supports and establishes both the present and former causes of action, the former judgment bars the subsequent action. In unlawful detainer cases based on tolerance, what must be proven is that such possession is by mere tolerance and that there was a breach of implied promise to vacate upon demand.

In this case, the Supreme Court found that while the petitioners relied on the same transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 20126), separate and distinct demand letters were required to prove the different breaches of implied promise to vacate. The demand letter addressed to Salvador Sr. and the demand letter dated February 9, 2009, addressed to Salvador Jr., created different causes of action. The refusal to comply with the first demand constituted a cause of action in the first case, while the refusal to comply with the second demand created a separate cause of action in the second case. Thus, the cause of action in the first unlawful detainer case was Salvador Sr.’s breach of the implied promise to vacate, while the cause of action in the second case was Salvador Jr.’s breach of a similar implied promise.

The Supreme Court also addressed the CA’s ruling on estoppel by laches. The CA held that the petitioners’ inaction for 15 years after the issuance of the writ of execution barred the second case. The Supreme Court clarified that Article 1144 (3) of the New Civil Code pertains to the prescriptive period to enforce or revive a final judgment. While the petitioners could no longer enforce the judgment in the first unlawful detainer case, they could still file a similar action based on a different cause of action. As the registered owners, the petitioners’ right to eject any person illegally occupying their property could not be barred by laches. The right of a registered owner to demand the return of property is never barred by laches, as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated.

The Court also addressed the conflicting claims of ownership. Salvador Jr.’s claim was based on a tax declaration dated October 13, 1978, and a sworn statement of the current and fair market value dated June 23, 1983, both under the name of his father. In contrast, the petitioners’ claim was based on TCT No. 20126, a tax declaration, and a certification of payment of realty taxes issued under the name of petitioner Diaz Jr. The Court reiterated that tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proof of ownership. A certificate of title under the Torrens system serves as evidence of an indefeasible title. Thus, the Court held that the petitioners had proven by preponderant evidence their better right to ownership and possession of the subject property.

Finally, the Court emphasized that Salvador Jr.’s occupation was by mere tolerance of the petitioners, analogous to a lessee whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. The adjudication of ownership in an ejectment case is merely provisional and does not bar or prejudice a separate action involving title to the property.

FAQs

What is res judicata?	Res judicata is a legal principle that prevents the same parties from relitigating issues that have already been decided by a competent court. It ensures finality in judicial decisions and avoids repetitive litigation.
What are the elements of res judicata?	The elements are: (1) a final judgment, (2) a judgment on the merits, (3) a court with jurisdiction, and (4) identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. All these elements must be present for res judicata to apply.
What is a judgment on the merits?	A judgment on the merits is a legal declaration of the rights and duties of the parties based on the facts presented. It concludes controversies and determines the rights of the parties, unlike dismissals based on technicalities.
Does a Compromise Agreement constitute a judgment on the merits?	Yes, a judgment based on a Compromise Agreement is considered a judgment on the merits. In such agreements, parties make reciprocal concessions to end litigation, and the court’s approval gives it the force of res judicata.
What is the “same evidence rule” in determining identity of cause of action?	The same evidence rule tests whether the same evidence supports both the present and former causes of action. If the same evidence is sufficient, the former judgment bars the subsequent action.
What is the effect of tolerance in unlawful detainer cases?	When someone occupies land by the owner’s tolerance without a contract, there’s an implied promise to vacate upon demand. Failure to do so allows the owner to file an ejectment case.
Can the right to eject be barred by laches?	No, the right of a registered owner to eject an illegal occupant cannot be barred by laches. This right is imprescriptible and remains with the owner as long as the possession is unauthorized.
What is the significance of a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)?	A TCT is strong evidence of ownership under the Torrens system. It serves as proof of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person named on the certificate.

In conclusion, this case serves as a crucial reminder of the nuanced application of res judicata and the significance of promptly enforcing court judgments. While a Compromise Agreement carries the weight of a final judgment, a new cause of action arising from a subsequent breach can justify a new legal action. The Supreme Court’s decision emphasizes the enduring rights of property owners and the limits of tolerance in property disputes.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

December 6, 2017

Tolerance Must Exist from the Start: Unlawful Detainer and Initial Possession

In the case of Queen Errika L. Saddi v. Maricris Renomeron, the Supreme Court clarified that an action for unlawful detainer requires the plaintiff’s tolerance of the defendant’s possession from the very beginning. If the defendant’s possession was unlawful from the outset, an unlawful detainer suit is not the proper remedy. This ruling underscores the importance of establishing the nature of the initial possession when seeking to recover property, ensuring that legal actions align with the actual circumstances of the occupancy.

Whose House Is It Anyway? Contesting Ownership in Ejectment Cases

Queen Errika L. Saddi filed an ejectment case against Maricris Renomeron, claiming Renomeron unlawfully withheld possession of a property Saddi had purchased. Saddi argued that she allowed Renomeron to stay temporarily, but Renomeron refused to leave. Renomeron countered that she was a co-owner of the property, having inherited rights through her mother, and was already in possession before Saddi’s purchase. The central legal question revolves around whether Saddi correctly pursued an unlawful detainer action, given Renomeron’s claim of prior possession and co-ownership.

The heart of the matter lies in the distinction between different types of ejectment cases. An ejectment case is a legal action filed to recover the right to possess real property. Philippine law recognizes two primary types of ejectment: forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Forcible entry involves the unlawful taking of possession through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. On the other hand, unlawful detainer arises when a person initially possesses property legally but continues to hold it unlawfully after their right to possession has expired or been terminated.

The Supreme Court emphasized that for an action of unlawful detainer to prosper, certain conditions must be met. These conditions, as articulated in Cabrera v. Getaruela, require that:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Building on this principle, the Court in Spouses Golez v. Heirs of Bertulo further clarified that, “To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.” This highlights a critical element: the tolerance must be present from the beginning of the possession in question.

In Saddi’s case, the Court found that her allegations did not support a claim for unlawful detainer. Saddi argued that she tolerated Renomeron’s stay after purchasing the property, but the evidence suggested otherwise. The “Eviction Letter” dated August 4, 2010, indicated that Saddi, as the new owner, was requesting Renomeron to vacate the property, giving her only four days to move out. This implied that Renomeron was already in possession before Saddi’s alleged tolerance began.

The Court noted that Saddi’s claim contradicted the essential requirement that her tolerance be present from the start of Renomeron’s possession. Since Renomeron’s possession appeared unlawful from the beginning, an action for unlawful detainer was deemed an improper remedy. The Court stated that the absence of the first requisite of tolerance from the start is particularly important, especially considering Renomeron’s claim that she occupied the property as a co-owner before Saddi’s purchase.

While acknowledging the registered owner’s right to possess their property, the Supreme Court affirmed that owners cannot simply take possession from those already occupying it. Instead, they must resort to the proper legal remedy and satisfy all the conditions necessary for that action to succeed. In this instance, Saddi failed to prove that her tolerance of Renomeron’s possession existed from the beginning, which is a crucial element in an unlawful detainer case.

The implications of this ruling are significant for property owners and occupants alike. It underscores the importance of understanding the nature of possession and choosing the correct legal remedy when seeking to recover property. If possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer is not the appropriate course. Instead, other legal remedies, such as an accion publiciana (an action for recovery of the right to possess) or an accion reinvindicatoria (an action for recovery of ownership), may be more suitable.

In practical terms, this means that property owners must carefully assess the circumstances surrounding an occupant’s possession before initiating legal action. They must determine whether their tolerance of the possession existed from the beginning. If not, they may need to pursue a different legal strategy to recover their property. This decision protects the rights of occupants who may have valid claims to possession or ownership, preventing them from being summarily evicted through an improper legal action.

This case serves as a reminder that the law provides different remedies for different situations, and it is crucial to choose the right one. Misunderstanding the nuances of property law can lead to delays, increased costs, and ultimately, the failure to recover possession of one’s property. As such, seeking legal advice is often the best course of action to ensure that the appropriate remedy is pursued.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Queen Errika L. Saddi properly filed an unlawful detainer case against Maricris Renomeron, given Renomeron’s claim of prior possession and co-ownership of the property. The Court examined whether Saddi’s alleged tolerance of Renomeron’s possession existed from the beginning, a crucial element for an unlawful detainer action.
What is unlawful detainer?	Unlawful detainer is a legal action to recover possession of property from someone who initially had legal possession but continues to hold it unlawfully after their right to possess has expired or been terminated. It requires that the initial possession was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff.
What is the significance of “tolerance” in unlawful detainer cases?	For an unlawful detainer case to succeed, the plaintiff’s tolerance of the defendant’s possession must have been present from the very beginning. If the defendant’s possession was unlawful from the start, an unlawful detainer suit is not the proper remedy.
What was the Court’s ruling in this case?	The Court ruled that Saddi’s complaint did not sufficiently allege and prove a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The evidence suggested that Renomeron was already in possession of the property before Saddi’s alleged tolerance began, making unlawful detainer an improper remedy.
What is an accion publiciana?	An accion publiciana is an action for the recovery of the right to possess property. It is typically filed when the one-year period for filing an ejectment case has already expired, and the issue is who has the better right of possession.
What is an accion reinvindicatoria?	An accion reinvindicatoria is an action for the recovery of ownership of property. It requires the plaintiff to prove their ownership of the property, identify the property, and show that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession.
What are the practical implications of this ruling for property owners?	Property owners must carefully assess the circumstances surrounding an occupant’s possession before initiating legal action. They need to determine whether their tolerance of the possession existed from the beginning. If not, they may need to pursue a different legal strategy to recover their property.
How did the “Eviction Letter” affect the Court’s decision?	The “Eviction Letter” dated August 4, 2010, played a crucial role in the Court’s decision. It indicated that Saddi, as the new owner, was requesting Renomeron to vacate the property, giving her only four days to move out. This implied that Renomeron was already in possession before Saddi’s alleged tolerance began, undermining the claim for unlawful detainer.
What should property owners do if they are unsure about the appropriate legal remedy?	Property owners should seek legal advice from a qualified attorney. An attorney can assess the specific circumstances of the situation and recommend the appropriate legal remedy to recover possession of the property.

In conclusion, the case of Queen Errika L. Saddi v. Maricris Renomeron serves as a significant reminder of the importance of understanding the nuances of property law, especially concerning the legal remedies available for recovering possession of property. The Supreme Court’s decision underscores that an action for unlawful detainer is only appropriate when the plaintiff’s tolerance of the defendant’s possession exists from the very beginning. Failure to establish this crucial element can result in the dismissal of the case, necessitating the pursuit of other legal remedies.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

August 23, 2017

Upholding Land Ownership: Technicalities Yield to Substantive Rights in Property Disputes

In a ruling that underscores the importance of protecting substantive property rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of lower courts, ordering petitioners to vacate land owned by the respondents. The Court emphasized that procedural technicalities should not be used to defeat the legitimate claims of property owners, particularly when the occupants’ rights are based merely on tolerance. This decision reinforces the principle that registered land ownership carries significant weight and that courts should prioritize justice over strict adherence to procedural rules when the result would clearly undermine established property rights. The ruling serves as a reminder to those occupying land by tolerance that such arrangements are tenuous and subject to the owner’s right to reclaim their property.

Tolerance Has Limits: Can Relatives Claim Rights Over Registered Land?

The case of Guyamin v. Flores revolves around a dispute over a 984-square meter lot in General Trias, Cavite. Jacinto and Maximo Flores, the registered owners, sought to recover possession of their property from Rodante and Lucinia Guyamin, and Eileen Gatarin, who were relatives occupying the land. The Floreses claimed the petitioners were occupying the land through the tolerance of their predecessors. The Guyamins resisted, arguing the lack of a formal demand to vacate and procedural lapses invalidated the lower court’s decisions. At the heart of the legal battle was the question: Can relatives who occupy land by mere tolerance successfully claim rights against the registered owners based on procedural technicalities?

The Supreme Court tackled the petitioners’ arguments, finding them unpersuasive in light of the clear evidence of the respondents’ ownership and the nature of the petitioners’ occupancy. The Court emphasized the principle that as registered owners, the Floreses’ rights should be protected, rather than undermined by procedural technicalities that do not serve the interests of justice. The Court highlighted that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a substantial defense against the respondents’ claim. Lack of a formal offer of evidence by the respondents in the trial court was also raised by the petitioners, however the court found this to be inconsequential.

The Court addressed the claim that there was no proper demand to vacate. It reasoned that the filing of a case before the Barangay Chairman to cause the petitioners’ eviction served as a categorical demand.

[T]here could be no more categorical demand by respondents than the filing of a case against petitioners before the Barangay Chairman to cause the latter’s eviction from the property.

Moreover, the Court dismissed the argument that the inclusion of only Rodante in the conciliation process was a fatal flaw, labeling it as undue hairsplitting given the overall context of the case. The purpose of the barangay conciliation proceedings, which is to facilitate settlement, was served.

Regarding the alleged improper service of summons, the Court deferred to the presumption of regularity in the court process server’s Return of Summons. The petitioners’ claims that Lucinia was abroad during the service were unsupported by evidence, and thus, deemed insufficient to overturn the presumption of regularity. Similarly, the Court dismissed the argument that the filing of the petitioners’ answer prior to the respondents’ motion to declare them in default cured the defect. The Court clarified that the answer was still filed late, and the respondents’ reply did not validate the belated pleading.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court supported the Court of Appeals’ determination that the exhibits presented by the respondents during the ex parte hearing were properly considered, despite the lack of a formal offer of evidence. The exhibits had been presented, marked, and referred to by the RTC Judge in his decision. The court has consistently held that the formal offer of evidence is a procedural requirement that may be relaxed in certain circumstances, particularly when the evidence has been duly identified and incorporated into the record. Citing the case of People v. Napat-a, the Court emphasized that the strict application of procedural rules should not prevail over the pursuit of substantial justice.

The court emphasized that procedural rules are tools to facilitate justice, not to frustrate it. In this case, the Court found that the petitioners sought to shield themselves from scrutiny by failing to attach a copy of their Answer to their Petition, thereby preventing a proper evaluation of their defense. In effect, the court highlighted that reliance on technicalities should not be used to defeat the substantive rights of the opposing party, especially when there has been substantial compliance with the rules.

The Supreme Court reiterated that occupants of registered private lands by mere tolerance should be aware that their stay is temporary and dependent on the owner’s goodwill. Such occupants cannot claim a right to the property and must be prepared to vacate the premises when the owner decides to reclaim it. The Court balanced the rights of both parties, acknowledging that the owners had already demonstrated considerable generosity by allowing the petitioners to occupy their land for an extended period. In this context, the Court was disinclined to allow procedural technicalities to perpetuate the petitioners’ continued occupation of the property, to the detriment of the rightful owners.

In emphasizing the importance of substantive justice over procedural technicalities, the Supreme Court echoed its previous pronouncements on the matter.

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice, but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts, in rendering justice, have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around.

This statement highlights the judiciary’s commitment to ensuring fair and equitable outcomes, even when it requires a departure from strict adherence to procedural rules.

FAQs

What was the central issue in this case?	The key issue was whether relatives occupying land by tolerance could successfully claim rights against the registered owners based on procedural technicalities, despite clear evidence of the owners’ title.
What did the Court rule regarding the demand to vacate?	The Court ruled that filing a case before the Barangay Chairman to cause eviction served as a sufficient demand to vacate, even if a formal written demand was not made.
How did the Court address the issue of improper service of summons?	The Court deferred to the presumption of regularity in the court process server’s Return of Summons, finding no sufficient evidence to invalidate the service.
What was the Court’s stance on the lack of a formal offer of evidence?	The Court held that the exhibits presented during the ex parte hearing were properly considered, as they were duly identified and incorporated into the record, even without a formal offer of evidence.
Why did the Court emphasize substantive justice over procedural technicalities?	The Court emphasized that procedural rules are meant to facilitate justice, not frustrate it, and should not be used to defeat the substantive rights of property owners.
What is the implication for those occupying land by tolerance?	The ruling serves as a reminder that occupying land by mere tolerance is temporary and dependent on the owner’s goodwill, with no legal right to the property.
What did the Court say about the importance of registered land ownership?	The Court affirmed that registered land ownership carries significant weight and that courts should prioritize the protection of these rights over procedural technicalities.
What was the significance of the petitioners’ failure to attach their Answer to their Petition?	The Court viewed this as an attempt to shield their defense from scrutiny, which was indicative of the weakness of their claim.

This case reinforces the principle that registered land ownership carries significant weight and that procedural technicalities should not be used to undermine established property rights. It underscores the importance of protecting substantive justice and ensuring fair outcomes in property disputes. The ruling highlights that those occupying land by tolerance do so at the owner’s discretion and cannot claim permanent rights based on procedural missteps.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

April 25, 2017

Unlawful Detainer: When Initial Objection Voids a Claim of Tolerance

The Supreme Court has ruled that an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy when the defendant’s possession of the property was contested from the beginning. In Spouses Golez vs. Heirs of Bertuldo, the Court emphasized that unlawful detainer requires initial lawful possession by the defendant, which is permitted by the owner, followed by an unlawful withholding of possession after demand. Since the heirs of Bertuldo admitted that Domingo Bertuldo protested the construction from the start, the element of ‘tolerance’ was missing, thus nullifying their claim for unlawful detainer. This decision clarifies the prerequisites for an unlawful detainer case and protects possessors from improper eviction actions.

From Protest to Possession: Can ‘Tolerance’ Be Claimed?

The case revolves around two adjacent unregistered parcels of land, Lot 1024 and Lot 1025, in Roxas, Capiz. In 1976, Benito Bertuldo sold Lot 1024 to Asuncion Segovia, acting on behalf of her daughter, Susie Golez. However, the Spouses Golez mistakenly built their house on Lot 1025, which Domingo Bertuldo, Benito’s cousin, claimed was his property. Domingo protested the construction, but the Spouses Golez assured him they were building on Lot 1024. The central legal question is whether Domingo’s initial protest prevents his heirs from later claiming ‘tolerance’ as a basis for an unlawful detainer suit when the Spouses Golez refused to vacate the land after a relocation survey confirmed their house stood on Lot 1025.

The legal battle began when the heirs of Domingo Bertuldo filed an action for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Golez after discovering the misplacement of the house in 1993. The Spouses Golez countered that the action should be dismissed because Domingo had protested the construction from the start, negating any claim of tolerance, which is essential for an unlawful detainer case. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) initially ruled in favor of the Bertuldo heirs, ordering the Spouses Golez to vacate the property and pay rent. The MCTC reasoned that the Spouses Golez’s possession was initially lawful due to their mistaken belief that they had purchased Lot 1025, but became unlawful when the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled against them in a separate quieting of title case.

However, the RTC affirmed the MCTC’s decision, emphasizing that Domingo had not tolerated the construction because the Spouses Golez had misled him about the location of their house. The Court of Appeals (CA) also sided with the Bertuldo heirs, dismissing the Spouses Golez’s appeal. Dissatisfied, the Spouses Golez elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the unlawful detainer case was improper because the Bertuldo heirs’ claim of ownership was negated by their application for a free patent over Lot 1025. They also contended that the CA should have awaited the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) resolution on the free patent application.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, emphasizing the requirements for a valid unlawful detainer case. The Court referred to Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, which specifies that unlawful detainer applies when possession is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, typically based on a contract. The critical distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer lies in the nature of the defendant’s entry into the land. Forcible entry involves illegal occupation from the beginning, while unlawful detainer involves initially lawful possession that later becomes illegal. The Court referenced Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al., underscoring that tolerance must be present right from the start to categorize a cause of action as unlawful detainer.

Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are “those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one’s property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy.”

In analyzing the allegations in the Bertuldo heirs’ complaint, the Supreme Court found a critical contradiction. The complaint stated that Domingo Bertuldo had protested the construction of the house on Lot 1025 from the outset. This directly contradicted the requirement that the defendant’s possession was initially legal and permitted by the owner. The Court noted that since Domingo did not tolerate the possession, the complaint failed to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer, thus depriving the MCTC of jurisdiction.

Even assuming the complaint had sufficiently stated a cause of action, the Bertuldo heirs failed to prove that they or Domingo tolerated the Spouses Golez’s possession based on any express or implied contract. The Court cited Spouses Valdez v. Court of Appeals, which stated that acts of tolerance must be present from the start of possession for an unlawful detainer action to be justified. Since the Spouses Golez’s possession was deemed illegal from the beginning, the correct action would have been for forcible entry, which had already prescribed, as the Spouses Golez entered the property in 1976.

The Supreme Court clarified that because the action for forcible entry had prescribed, the Bertuldo heirs could pursue an accion publiciana, a plenary action to recover the right of possession brought to the Regional Trial Court when dispossession has lasted more than one year. Accion publiciana determines the better right of possession independently of title. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the CA’s decision, dismissing the unlawful detainer complaint and clarifying the proper legal avenues for the Bertuldo heirs to pursue their claim.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the heirs of Domingo Bertuldo could bring an action for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Golez, given that Domingo had protested the construction of their house on his property from the beginning.
What is unlawful detainer?	Unlawful detainer is a legal action to recover possession of property from someone who initially had lawful possession but whose right to possession has expired or been terminated. It requires that the defendant’s initial possession was permitted by the owner.
Why was the unlawful detainer action dismissed in this case?	The unlawful detainer action was dismissed because the Supreme Court found that the element of ‘tolerance’ was missing. Domingo Bertuldo’s initial protest against the construction meant that the Spouses Golez’s possession was never lawful or permitted.
What is the difference between forcible entry and unlawful detainer?	Forcible entry involves illegal occupation of property from the beginning, while unlawful detainer involves initially lawful possession that later becomes illegal. The nature of the entry determines which action is appropriate.
What is ‘accion publiciana’?	Accion publiciana is a plenary action to recover the right of possession of property when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is brought to the Regional Trial Court and determines the better right of possession independently of title.
What did the Supreme Court rule in this case?	The Supreme Court ruled that the unlawful detainer action was improper because the Spouses Golez’s possession was never tolerated. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and dismissed the complaint.
What other legal action could the Bertuldo heirs take?	Since the action for forcible entry had prescribed, the Bertuldo heirs could pursue an accion publiciana in the Regional Trial Court to establish their right to possess the property.
What is the significance of ‘tolerance’ in unlawful detainer cases?	‘Tolerance’ signifies that the owner initially permitted the defendant to possess the property, either expressly or impliedly. Without tolerance, an unlawful detainer action cannot stand, as the possession must have been lawful at its inception.

This case serves as a crucial reminder of the specific requirements for unlawful detainer actions and underscores the importance of establishing initial lawful possession through tolerance. It provides clarity on the appropriate legal remedies available when possession is contested from the outset and highlights the distinctions between forcible entry, unlawful detainer, and accion publiciana, thereby guiding future property disputes.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

March 20, 2017