Tag: Vice-Governor

  • Majority Rule in Local Legislatures: Clarifying the Role of the Vice Governor’s Vote

    This case clarifies whether a Vice Governor, as the presiding officer of a Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP), should be included in determining the majority vote needed to pass a resolution. The Supreme Court ruled that while the Vice Governor is part of the SP for quorum purposes, they are excluded when calculating the majority vote, except to break a tie. This decision ensures that local legislative bodies can function effectively without unnecessary deadlocks, promoting responsiveness and accountability.

    Legislative Deadlock? Unpacking the Vice Governor’s Role in Antique’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan

    The case of Javier v. Cadiao revolves around a dispute within the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Antique concerning the passage of Resolution No. 42-2008, which sought to reorganize the standing committees of the SP. The central legal question is whether the Vice Governor, as the presiding officer, should be counted when determining the majority needed to pass the resolution. This issue arose after a shift in political alliances within the SP led to a reorganization proposal that was contested by the minority bloc. The resolution’s validity hinged on whether it received the required number of affirmative votes, sparking a legal battle that reached the Supreme Court.

    The petitioners, J. Tobias M. Javier and Vincent H. Piccio III, argued that the Vice Governor should be included in the calculation of the majority, requiring eight votes for the resolution to pass. They cited Article 107(g) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Local Government Code (LGC), which refers to “a majority of all the members present, there being a quorum.” According to the petitioners, this provision necessitates including the Vice Governor in the count. Furthermore, they highlighted the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) opinions supporting their interpretation, asserting that the Combong Resolution was not validly passed because it lacked the required eight votes.

    The respondents, led by Vice Governor Rhodora J. Cadiao, countered that the Vice Governor’s role as presiding officer does not make them a regular member for voting purposes. They emphasized Section 67, Rule XVIII of the SP’s Internal Rules of Procedure (IRP), which stipulates that “a majority of those voting, there being a quorum, shall decide the issue.” The respondents argued that only the votes cast by the SP members should be considered when determining the majority, excluding the Vice Governor unless there is a tie. Therefore, with seven members voting in favor and six against, the Combong Resolution was validly approved.

    The Regional Trial Court (RTC) sided with the respondents, upholding the validity of the Combong Resolution. The RTC reasoned that legislative rules are not permanent and that courts should generally not intervene in the legislature’s internal affairs. The court emphasized Section 67 of the IRP, which focuses on the number of members actually voting when determining the majority. Because the presiding officer votes only to break a tie, the RTC concluded that the Vice Governor’s presence should not be considered when calculating the majority vote required to pass the resolution.

    The Supreme Court, while dismissing the petition on procedural grounds due to the expiration of the involved parties’ terms of office, addressed the substantive legal issues for guidance. The Court acknowledged that the Vice Governor is part of the SP’s composition for quorum purposes, citing La Carlota City, Negros Occidental, et al. v. Atty. Rojo. This case established that the vice-mayor, acting as the presiding officer, is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod because they are mandated to vote to break a tie.

    However, the Supreme Court distinguished between being a member for quorum purposes and for determining the majority vote. The Court noted that regular SP members are elected by district, representing specific constituencies, while the Vice Governor is elected at large, representing the entire province. This distinction implies that regular members have full participatory rights, including debating and voting, whereas the Vice Governor’s primary role is to ensure the SP conducts its business effectively and impartially.

    Building on this principle, the Supreme Court held that the Vice Governor’s right to vote is contingent and arises only when there is a tie to break. Excluding the Vice Governor from the calculation of the majority vote prevents unnecessary deadlocks and enables the SP to address issues effectively. As Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion noted in his concurring opinion in La Carlota:

    If the voting level required would engage the entirety of the sanggunian as a collegial body, making the quorum requirement least significant, there is no rhyme or reason to include the presiding officer’s personality at all. The possibility of that one instance where he may be allowed to vote is nil. To include him in sanggunian membership without this qualification would adversely affect the statutory rule that generally prohibits him from voting.

    This approach contrasts with a scenario where including the Vice Governor in the majority calculation could lead to legislative gridlock. For instance, if a Sanggunian has thirteen regular members, eight votes are needed to suspend a member. Including the presiding officer and raising the membership to fourteen would require nine votes, even if the presiding officer cannot vote in this instance. Thus, the Supreme Court’s ruling promotes the efficient functioning of local legislative bodies by preventing deadlocks and ensuring that the SP can effectively address the needs of the body politic.

    Furthermore, the Court emphasized that it is beyond its province to declare a legislative act invalid solely for non-compliance with internal rules. While the petitioners raised issues regarding alleged violations of the SP’s IRP, the Court declined to resolve them, reinforcing the principle of non-interference in internal legislative processes. This stance underscores the importance of respecting the autonomy of legislative bodies in managing their internal affairs, provided they do not violate constitutional or statutory provisions.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Vice Governor should be counted in determining the majority vote needed to pass a resolution in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
    What did the Supreme Court rule? The Supreme Court ruled that while the Vice Governor is part of the SP for quorum purposes, they are excluded when calculating the majority vote, except to break a tie.
    Why did the Court make this ruling? The Court made this ruling to prevent unnecessary deadlocks and enable the SP to function effectively and address issues without gridlock.
    What is the significance of this ruling? This ruling clarifies the role of the Vice Governor in local legislative bodies and promotes the efficient functioning of these bodies by preventing potential deadlocks.
    What IRR provision was cited by the petitioners? The petitioners cited Article 107(g) of the IRR of the LGC, which refers to “a majority of all the members present, there being a quorum.”
    What IRP provision was cited by the respondents? The respondents cited Section 67, Rule XVIII of the SP’s IRP, which stipulates that “a majority of those voting, there being a quorum, shall decide the issue.”
    What was the RTC’s decision? The RTC upheld the validity of the Combong Resolution, stating that the presence of the Vice Governor should not be considered when determining the majority.
    What is the Vice Governor’s role in the SP? The Vice Governor is the presiding officer of the SP, responsible for ensuring the body conducts its business effectively and impartially, and can only vote to break a tie.
    What is the effect of this ruling on local legislative bodies? The ruling ensures that local legislative bodies can function effectively without unnecessary deadlocks, promoting responsiveness and accountability towards the affairs of the body politic.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Javier v. Cadiao provides valuable guidance on determining the majority vote in local legislative bodies. By clarifying that the Vice Governor should not be included in the calculation unless there is a tie, the Court promotes the efficient functioning of these bodies and ensures that they can effectively address the needs of their constituents.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: J. Tobias M. Javier, et al. v. Rhodora J. Cadiao, et al., G.R. No. 185369, August 03, 2016

  • Local Autonomy vs. Executive Control: Defining the Scope of Power Between a Governor and Vice-Governor

    In Atienza v. Villarosa, the Supreme Court addressed a power struggle between a provincial Governor and Vice-Governor in the Philippines, definitively ruling that the Vice-Governor, as the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Provincial Board), has the authority to approve purchase orders and appoint employees for the board’s operations. The Court underscored the principle of local autonomy enshrined in Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), emphasizing that the executive branch (Governor) should not unduly interfere with the legislative functions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, headed by the Vice-Governor. This clarifies the separation of powers at the local government level, promoting a more independent and effective legislative branch.

    Clash of Powers: Who Decides How Provincial Funds Are Spent?

    This case stemmed from a dispute between Ramon M. Atienza, the Vice-Governor of Occidental Mindoro, and Jose T. Villarosa, the Governor. The Governor issued memoranda attempting to control the procurement of supplies for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and terminate the employment of casual and job order employees appointed by the Vice-Governor. The Vice-Governor challenged these actions, arguing that they violated his authority and the principle of separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches at the local government level. This case presented the central question of how to balance the Governor’s oversight of provincial funds with the Vice-Governor’s role in managing the legislative body’s resources.

    The legal framework for resolving this dispute centers on interpreting the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. Specifically, Sections 465 and 466 of the Code delineate the powers of the Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively. The Governor’s camp argued that the provision requiring the local chief executive’s approval for disbursement vouchers meant that purchase orders also needed his approval. Meanwhile, the Vice-Governor’s camp claimed his authority to sign warrants and manage the Sangguniang Panlalawigan affairs extended to these powers.

    The Supreme Court sided with the Vice-Governor, clarifying that his power to sign warrants for expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan inherently includes the authority to approve purchase orders. The Court cited the doctrine of necessary implication, stating that “what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.” This means that because the Vice-Governor has control over the legislative body’s finances, they should have the authority to approve actions needed to keep it operational. The court also emphasized that the Vice-Governor’s authority stems from their role as the head of the legislative branch at the provincial level.

    Sec. 466. (a)(1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan and sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan.

    Furthermore, the Court struck down the Governor’s attempt to terminate the Vice-Governor’s appointments of casual/job order employees. Although the Governor has general appointment powers, the Code carves out an exception for employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, granting the Vice-Governor the authority to appoint them. This is rooted in the principle of separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. The governor cannot interfere with the Vice-Governor’s right to make those employment decisions in their capacity of running the legislative arm. In conclusion, the Supreme Court made it clear the powers afforded to each role in governing must be respected.

    The Court emphasized that Rep. Act No. 7160 was intended to distribute powers among elective local officials, enabling the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to function independently and check the executive branch without undue interference. It is the intent of the legislature that neither executive or legislative should interfere with each other.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was determining whether the Governor or the Vice-Governor has the authority to approve purchase orders for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s supplies and appoint its employees. This hinged on interpreting the Local Government Code’s provisions on local autonomy and separation of powers.
    Who has the authority to approve purchase orders for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan? The Supreme Court ruled that the Vice-Governor, as the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, has the authority to approve these purchase orders. This authority is implied from the Vice-Governor’s power to sign warrants for expenditures appropriated for the board’s operation.
    Can the Governor terminate or cancel appointments of casual/job order employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan? No, the Governor does not have the authority to terminate or cancel these appointments. The power to appoint officials and employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, including casual and job order employees, is vested in the Vice-Governor.
    What is the doctrine of necessary implication? The doctrine of necessary implication means that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as what is expressly stated. In this case, it supports the Vice-Governor’s authority over purchase orders because it is essential to fulfill his express power to manage the Sangguniang Panlalawigan‘s expenditures.
    What is the main principle underlying this decision? The decision underscores the principle of local autonomy, as enshrined in the Local Government Code of 1991. This principle seeks to decentralize power and ensure that local government units have the resources and authority to manage their affairs effectively.
    Why is the separation of powers important in local governance? Separation of powers prevents the concentration of power in one individual or branch of government, promoting checks and balances. In this case, it prevents the Governor from unduly interfering with the legislative functions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
    How does this ruling affect local government units in the Philippines? This ruling clarifies the scope of authority between Governors and Vice-Governors, ensuring a more distinct separation of powers at the local level. This promotes a more independent and effective legislative branch, contributing to better local governance.
    Was the case initially moot, and why did the Supreme Court decide it anyway? The case became technically moot because both the Governor and Vice-Governor’s terms had expired. However, the Supreme Court addressed the issues for purposes of clarifying the law to guide lower courts in similar matters.

    Ultimately, Atienza v. Villarosa serves as a vital precedent that reinforces the principles of local autonomy and separation of powers within Philippine local government units. It delineates the boundaries of authority between the executive and legislative branches, fostering a system of checks and balances that is essential for effective and accountable local governance.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Atienza v. Villarosa, G.R. No. 161081, May 10, 2005

  • Acting Governor’s Authority: Can a Vice Governor Preside Over the Sangguniang Panlalawigan?

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    Dual Roles Denied: Acting Governor Cannot Simultaneously Preside Over Local Council

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    Serving as Acting Governor and presiding over the local council (*Sangguniang Panlalawigan*) at the same time? Philippine law says no. This Supreme Court case clarifies that when a Vice-Governor steps in as Acting Governor, they temporarily relinquish their role as presiding officer of the local council to maintain the separation of executive and legislative functions at the provincial level.

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    G.R. No. 134213, July 20, 1999

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    INTRODUCTION

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    Imagine a scenario where the second-in-command steps up to lead, but still wants to manage their old team simultaneously. This was the dilemma faced in Negros Occidental when the Vice-Governor became Acting Governor. At the heart of this case lies a fundamental question about local governance: Can an Acting Governor, who is also the Vice-Governor, continue to preside over the legislative sessions of the *Sangguniang Panlalawigan* (SP)? This seemingly procedural issue touches upon the core principles of separation of powers and effective local administration. The case of *Gamboa v. Aguirre* delves into this novel legal question arising from the Local Government Code of 1991, seeking to define the parameters of authority when local leadership temporarily shifts.

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    LEGAL CONTEXT: DELINEATING POWERS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

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    The Philippines’ Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) significantly restructured local governance, aiming for greater autonomy and efficiency. A key change was the separation of executive and legislative powers at the provincial, city, and municipal levels. Previously, under the old code, the Governor often presided over the local legislative body. However, R.A. 7160 explicitly vests local legislative power in the *Sangguniang Panlalawigan* (for provinces), *Sangguniang Panlungsod* (for cities), and *Sangguniang Bayan* (for municipalities). Section 49(a) of the Code is unequivocal: “The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the *Sangguniang Panlalawigan*…”

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    The law also outlines succession in cases of vacancy. Section 44 addresses permanent vacancies, stating that the Vice-Governor “shall become the governor” if a permanent vacancy occurs in the Governor’s office. For temporary vacancies, Section 46(a) dictates that the Vice-Governor “shall automatically exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the local chief executive…” when the Governor is temporarily incapacitated due to reasons like travel abroad or leave of absence. Crucially, while the Code details succession for both permanent and temporary gubernatorial vacancies, it remains silent on the specific question of the Vice-Governor’s role as SP presiding officer when acting as Governor. This silence created the legal ambiguity at the center of this case.

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    The Supreme Court had to interpret the intent of the Local Government Code – was it designed to allow for the Vice-Governor to wear both hats (Acting Governor and SP Presiding Officer), or did the separation of powers principle imply a temporary relinquishment of the SP presidency when assuming gubernatorial duties? The Court turned to principles of statutory construction and the overall spirit of the Local Government Code to resolve this issue.

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    CASE BREAKDOWN: GAMBOA VS. AGUIRRE – THE VICE-GOVERNOR’S DILEMMA

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    The facts of *Gamboa v. Aguirre* are straightforward. In 1995, Rafael Coscolluela was the Governor of Negros Occidental, with Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. as Vice-Governor. When Governor Coscolluela went on an official trip abroad, he designated Vice-Governor Gamboa as Acting Governor. Upon convening for a regular session, some members of the *Sangguniang Panlalawigan* (SP), respondents Aguirre and Araneta, questioned Gamboa’s authority to preside over the SP while serving as Acting Governor. They requested him to vacate the presiding chair, which Gamboa refused.

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    The matter escalated within the SP itself. A vote was held, with a majority of members supporting Gamboa continuing as presiding officer. However, respondents Aguirre and Araneta remained unconvinced and filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC ruled against Gamboa, declaring him “temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor.” Gamboa then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review.

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    Although the case became technically moot due to the expiration of the officials’ terms in 1998, the Supreme Court decided to rule on the issue. The Court recognized the novelty and recurring potential of this legal question under the Local Government Code. Justice Ynares-Santiago, writing for the Court, framed the central query: “May an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, continue to preside over the sessions of the *Sangguniang Panlalawigan* (SP)?”

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    In its decision, the Supreme Court emphasized the separation of powers enshrined in the Local Government Code. It noted the shift from the old code where the Governor held both executive and legislative roles to the new framework that deliberately separated these functions. The Court reasoned:

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    “A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasi-Governor. This means, that for purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time being. By tradition, the offices of the provincial Governor and Vice-Governor are essentially executive in nature, whereas plain members of the provincial board perform functions partaking of a legislative character.”

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    The Court further elaborated on the temporary vacancy created in the Vice-Governor’s office when the Vice-Governor assumes the role of Acting Governor:

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    “By virtue of the foregoing definition, it can be said that the designation, appointment or assumption of the Vice-Governor as the Acting Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor during such contingency. Considering the silence of the law on the matter, the mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies, under the new Code, in the office of the Vice-Governor may likewise be observed in the event of temporary vacancy occurring in the same office.”

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    Ultimately, the Supreme Court denied Gamboa’s petition, affirming the RTC’s decision. The Court held that an Acting Governor, even if concurrently holding the office of Vice-Governor, cannot preside over the SP sessions. In such instances, Section 49(b) of the Local Government Code applies, mandating the SP members to elect a temporary presiding officer from among themselves.

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    PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: ENSURING SEPARATION OF POWERS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE

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    The *Gamboa v. Aguirre* decision provides critical clarity on the roles and limitations of local government officials, particularly concerning acting governors and legislative council presidencies. The ruling reinforces the principle of separation of powers at the local level, ensuring a system of checks and balances even during temporary leadership transitions. This prevents the concentration of executive and legislative authority in one individual, even temporarily.

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    For local government units, this case sets a clear precedent. When a Vice-Governor becomes Acting Governor, they must relinquish their role as SP presiding officer for the duration of their acting governorship. The *Sangguniang Panlalawigan* must then elect a temporary presiding officer from its members to ensure the continued smooth functioning of the legislative body. This ruling also implies that the Vice-Governor, while Acting Governor, should focus on executive functions and avoid legislative involvement that could be perceived as conflicting or overreaching.

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    Key Lessons:

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    • Separation of Powers: Even at the local level, the executive and legislative branches should operate distinctly, especially when leadership changes temporarily.
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    • Temporary Vacancy Implication: When a Vice-Governor becomes Acting Governor, a temporary vacancy effectively exists in the presiding officer role of the SP.
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    • SP’s Role in Leadership Transition: The *Sangguniang Panlalawigan* has a mechanism (election of a temporary presiding officer) to address the absence of its regular presiding officer.
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    • Focus on Primary Duty: An Acting Governor should prioritize executive duties and avoid simultaneously exercising legislative prerogatives as SP presiding officer.
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    FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQs)

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    Q: What happens when the Governor is temporarily out of the country?

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    A: The Vice-Governor automatically becomes the Acting Governor and assumes the powers and duties of the Governor, except for the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees (unless the temporary incapacity exceeds 30 working days).

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    Q: Can the Acting Governor still attend SP sessions?

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    A: While the Acting Governor cannot preside, there is no explicit prohibition against attending SP sessions. However, their role should be as an executive observer, not as a member exercising legislative prerogatives.

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    Q: Who presides over the SP if the Vice-Governor is Acting Governor?

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    A: The members of the *Sangguniang Panlalawigan* who are present and constitute a quorum must elect a temporary presiding officer from among themselves.

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    Q: Does this ruling apply to cities and municipalities as well?

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    A: Yes, the principles of separation of powers and temporary vacancy in leadership roles apply similarly to city and municipal governments. The city vice-mayor and municipal vice-mayor would face analogous situations when acting as Mayor.

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    Q: What is the legal basis for electing a temporary presiding officer?

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    A: Section 49(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that “[i]n the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer.” The Supreme Court interprets the Vice-Governor’s assumption as Acting Governor as creating such an “inability.”